

**BUCKINGHAMSHIRE AND MILTON KEYNES FIRE AUTHORITY  
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE**

Director of Legal & Governance, Graham Britten  
Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service  
Brigade HQ, Stocklake, Aylesbury, Bucks HP20 1BD  
Tel: 01296 744441



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**Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive**  
Jason Thelwell

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To: The Members of the Executive Committee

4 November 2019

**MEMBERS OF THE PRESS  
AND PUBLIC**

**Please note the content of  
Page 2 of this Agenda Pack**

Dear Councillor

Your attendance is requested at a meeting of the **EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE of the BUCKINGHAMSHIRE AND MILTON KEYNES FIRE AUTHORITY** to be held in Meeting Room 1, Fire and Rescue Headquarters, Stocklake, Aylesbury, Bucks, HP20 1BD on **WEDNESDAY 13 NOVEMBER 2019 at 10.00 AM** when the business set out overleaf will be transacted.

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Graham Britten'.

Graham Britten  
Director of Legal and Governance

Chairman: Clarke OBE  
Councillors: Hopkins, Lambert, Marland, McCall, McLean, Roberts and Teesdale



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## **Adjournment and Rights to Speak – Public**

The Authority may, when members of the public are present, adjourn a Meeting to hear the views of the public on a particular agenda item. The proposal to adjourn must be moved by a Member, seconded and agreed by a majority of the Members present and voting.

Prior to inviting the public to speak, the Chairman should advise that they:

- (a) raise their hands to indicate their wish to speak at the invitation of the Chairman,
- (b) speak for no more than four minutes,
- (c) should only speak once unless the Chairman agrees otherwise.

The Chairman should resume the Meeting as soon as possible, with the agreement of the other Members present.

Adjournments do not form part of the Meeting and should be confined to times when the views of the public need to be heard.

## **Rights to Speak - Members**

A Member of the constituent Councils who is not a Member of the Authority may attend Meetings of the Authority or its Committees to make a statement on behalf of the Member's constituents in the case of any item under discussion which directly affects the Member's division, with the prior consent of the Chairman of the Meeting which will not be unreasonably withheld. The Member's statement will not last longer than four minutes.

Where the Chairman of a Committee has agreed to extend an invitation to all Members of the Authority to attend when major matters of policy are being considered, a Member who is not a member of the Committee may attend and speak at such Meetings at the invitation of the Chairman of that Committee.

## **Questions**

Members of the Authority, or its constituent councils, District, or Parish Councils may submit written questions prior to the Meeting to allow their full and proper consideration. Such questions shall be received by the Monitoring Officer to the Authority, *in writing*, at least two clear working days before the day of the Meeting of the Authority or the Committee.

## **EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE**

### **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

1. To make all decisions on behalf of the Authority, except in so far as reserved to the full Authority by law or by these Terms of Reference.
2. To assess performance of the Authority against agreed organisational targets.
3. To determine matters relating to pay and remuneration where required by collective agreements or legislation.
4. To select on behalf of the Authority—the Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive, and deputy to the Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive, or equivalent , taking advice from suitable advisers and to make recommendations to the Authority as to the terms of appointment or dismissal.
5. To consider and make decisions on behalf of the Authority in respect of the appointment of a statutory finance officer ; a statutory monitoring officer; and any post to be contracted to “Gold Book” terms and conditions in whole or in part taking advice from the Chief Fire Officer and suitable advisers.
6. To act as the Employers’ Side of a negotiating and consultation forum for all matters relating to the employment contracts of the Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive, deputy to the Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive, or equivalent; and where relevant, employees contracted to “Gold Book” terms and conditions in whole or in part.
7. To hear appeals if required to do so in accordance with the Authority’s Policies.
8. To determine any human resources issues arising from the Authority’s budget process and improvement programme.
9. To determine policies, codes or guidance:
  - (a) after considering recommendations from the Overview and Audit Committee in respect of:
    - (i) regulating working relationships between members and co-opted members of the Authority and the employees of the Authority; and
    - (ii) governing the conduct of employees of the Authority
  - (b) relating to grievance, disciplinary, conduct, capability, dismissals and appeals relating to employees contracted to “Gold Book” terms and conditions in whole or in part.
10. To form a Human Resources Sub-Committee as it deems appropriate.

## AGENDA

### Item No:

#### 1. Apologies

#### 2. Minutes

To approve, and sign as a correct record, the Minutes of the meeting of the Committee held on 16 October 2019 (Item 2) **(Pages 7 - 10)**

#### 3. Disclosure of Interests

Members to declare any disclosable pecuniary interests they may have in any matter being considered which are not entered onto the Authority's Register, and officers to disclose any interests they may have in any contract to be considered.

#### 4. Questions

To receive questions in accordance with Standing Order S0A7.

#### 5. Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP)

To consider Item 5 **(Pages 11 - 46)**

#### 6. Response to Local Government Finance Settlement 2020-21: Technical Consultation

To consider Item 6 **(Pages 47 - 82)**

#### 7. Exclusion of Public and Press

To consider excluding the public and press representatives from the meeting by virtue of Paragraph 1 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972, as the reports and appendices contain information relating to an individual; and Paragraph 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 as the reports and appendices contain information which is likely to reveal the identity of an individual; and Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972 as the reports and appendices contain information relating to the financial or business affairs of a person (including the Authority); and on these grounds it is considered the need to keep information exempt outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information:

#### 8. Succession Planning - Business Continuity and Resilience

To consider Item 8 **(Pages 83 - 88)**

#### 9. Injury Pension Overpayments

To consider Item 9

#### 10. Senior Management Team Restructure: Director of Finance and Assets and Deputy Chief Fire Officer

To consider Item 10

## **11. Date of Next Meeting**

To note that the next meeting of the Committee will be held on Wednesday 5 February 2020 at 10am.

If you have any enquiries about this agenda please contact: Katie Nellist (Democratic Services Officer) – Tel: (01296) 744633 email: [knellist@bucksfire.gov.uk](mailto:knellist@bucksfire.gov.uk)

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Minutes of the Meeting of the EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE of the BUCKINGHAMSHIRE AND MILTON KEYNES FIRE AUTHORITY held on WEDNESDAY 16 OCTOBER 2019 at 10.00 AM

**Present:** Councillors Clarke OBE (Chairman), Hopkins, Lambert, McCall and Roberts

**Officers:** M Osborne (Deputy Chief Fire Officer), M Hemming (Director of Finance and Assets), A Hussain (Principal Accountant) C Bell (Head of Service Development), D Norris (Head of Service Delivery), D Thexton (ICT Manager), F Pearson (Consultation and Communication Manager), K Nellist (Democratic Services Officer) and J Naylor (Station Commander Amersham and Beaconsfield)

**Apologies:** Councillors Marland, McLean and Teesdale  
One member of the public

**EX08 MINUTES**

RESOLVED –

That the Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee held on Wednesday 10 July 2019, be approved and signed by the Chairman as a correct record.

**EX09 BUDGET MONITORING PERFORMANCE AND DEBT MANAGEMENT APRIL – SEPTEMBER 2019**

The Vice Chairman introduced the report and advised Members that the report presented the provisional revenue and capital outturn position and debt management performance to 30 September 2019.

The Director of Finance and Assets thanked his team for getting the information for the report together so quickly after the end of September.

The Principal Accountant advised Members that an underspend of £161k against a budget of £30,32m was forecast. The key variations in directorate budgets compared to year-end outturn was shown in Appendix A. There was an underspend in the Corporate Management directorate which related to a restructure of the Senior Management team and the removal of the Director of People and Organisational Development post. The largest underspend was in the Delivery, Corporate Development and Planning directorate and was primarily due to on-call firefighter employment being significantly below budgeted establishment levels. Statutory Accounting and Contingency was £862k over budget and this was primarily due to the costs for all operational apprentices being within this budget and related to their employee and training costs.

The Principal Accountant advised Members that the Bank Cost Analysis graph on page 16 showed the whole-time operational

staff costs from 2015/16, with Bank payments forming a significant part of these from 2016/17. The total costs for 2019/20 for whole-time had increased due to increases in employer contributions following the government's decision to decrease the discount rate used to value underfunded public sector pension schemes.

The Principal Accountant advised Members that as per Recommendation 2, due to the current levels of underspend, the planned transfer from reserves of £444k would no longer take place in 2019/20. This transfer was planned to offset the funding shortfall originally forecast for 2019/20. Of the £444k variance, £366 was shown within Movements in Reserves and £78k within Top-up Funding.

A Member asked why there was a carry-forward of £24,485k for CCTV Cameras and then it was showing as a minus in the projected year end variance and was advised that the £24,485k was no longer needed, as costs were captured within the red fleet budget.

A Member asked why in certain places within the report it showed the Authority being below establishment levels and whether this indicated a recruitment issue for whole-time firefighters. The Member was advised that there wasn't an issue, but part of the reason was the number of firefighters that could be recruited at any one time, in terms of training. The Fire Service College's maximum was 16. The Authority was exploring having two more tranches of apprentices within the next year.

The Deputy Chief Fire Officer advised Members that the Authority had also advertised for transferee firefighters from other services and there had been 26 expressions of interest.

The Head of Service Delivery advised Members that the challenge around recruiting and retaining on-call firefighters was a national issue. The Authority had initiated recently a change in the way new on-call staff were contracted. This involved staff confirming periods during the week when they would definitely be available. This was being introduced for new starters and there were around 20 staff on the new contract. The Authority was already seeing improved results for immediate turnout and for 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> tier availability, between 20 minutes and one hour. The Authority usually targeted on-call recruitment across the whole service, but now it was targeting on-call recruitment where it was needed most, around the Amersham and Buckingham areas as this would release some of the pressure on the use of the bank system.

RESOLVED –

1. That the latest projected outturn forecast for the Authority as at 30 September 2019 be noted.



2. That the planned transfer of £444k from reserves is not made in 2019-20.

## **EX10**

### **ICT STRATEGY 2019-2024**

The Vice Chairman introduced the report and advised Members that a good ICT Strategy underpins the whole vision and strategy of the organisation and reflects on the previous strategy and makes recommendations around ICT security and cyber-security and builds upon that strategy.

The ICT Manager advised Members that this ICT Strategy was different to previous versions and had been written to make it clearer and more comprehensive to read and use. The Strategy aligns and supports the Public Safety Plan/Corporate Plan 2019-2020 which was updated in March 2019 and would be reviewed again when replacement documents were released.

The ICT Manager advised Members that over the last five years there had been more issues with cyber than before. As Members may have seen recently, Wiltshire Council systems were shut down for many weeks following the novichok poisoning, not because their IT systems had been compromised, but because so many people outside the UK were trying to access their systems.

A Member asked if the Authority backed up on site or off site and was advised that back up was done to tape off site and also to the cloud. Moving forward everything was becoming more cloud based and it would eventually take over.

A Member asked what was being done to ensure the Authority's systems couldn't be hacked and was advised that there was a multi-layered approach to security using different manufacturers and different providers. The network was protected through firewalls that were intelligent and looked at the information coming in. Emails coming in presented the most risk and these were blocked if there was a link or an attachment that was not recognised.

The Head of Service Development advised Members that an exercise had taken place recently where someone had been brought in to provide penetration testing to ensure the Authority's systems were robust.

A Member asked how 'not spots' were covered when people were using mobile phones, and was advised that in order to mobilise staff, the Authority had moved away from paging which used to have a lot of 'not spots' and recently moved to an app that sits on a phone. The benefit of the app was that users would have chosen a network which had best coverage in their area. The app also worked across home based Wi-Fi, 3G, 4G and 5G.

A Member asked if the Authority was complying to GDPR as there was no mention of it in the Strategy and was the Authority still able to share data with councils and other blue light services and was advised that the Authority had recently signed up to a shared data agreement with Milton Keynes Council and it had something similar with Buckinghamshire County Council. GDPR was also factored into the acceptable use policies that sit below the ICT Strategy. There would also have been a data protection impact assessment carried out in conjunction with producing the ICT Strategy.

Members asked that for GDPR reasons, the data impact assessment be appended to the Strategy.

RESOLVED –

That the ICT Strategy 2019-2024 be approved.

**EX11**

**DATE OF NEXT MEETING**

The Committee noted that the date of the next Executive Committee meeting would be held on Wednesday 13 November 2019 at 10.00am.

THE CHAIRMAN CLOSED THE MEETING AT 10.34 AM



# Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority

<b>MEETING</b>	Executive Committee
<b>DATE OF MEETING</b>	13 November 2019
<b>OFFICER</b>	Calum Bell, Head of Service Development
<b>LEAD MEMBER</b>	Councillor David Hopkins
<b>SUBJECT OF THE REPORT</b>	<b>Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP)</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<p>This paper provides Members with a further update regarding the national status of the programme and its impact on regional and local transition. The last briefing was provided to Members in July 2019</p> <p>In the last briefing, Members were informed of the latest report issued by the National Audit Office (NAO) into the programme to deliver the Emergency Services Network (ESN). Members will recall that the NAO had reached the conclusion that the management of the ESMCP has led to delays, increased costs and poor value for taxpayers. Projected costs for the delivery of the Programme have increased to £9.3 billion and the original date for the planned switch-off of the current Airwave system had moved from December 2019. December 2022.</p> <p>Since the last paper, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) have also released their latest view regarding the national programme. Their report underlines the view of the NAO in that delays to the delivery of the programme have continued and costs have escalated. The PAC are of the opinion that the original approach of the Home Office was far too optimistic given the level of risk involved and its governance arrangement have been insufficient to deal with problems that have emerged thus far. It is felt that the Home Office team have not yet developed a delivery plan that is sufficiently robust and they do not have the skills in place to make it work. The full report from the PAC can be seen at Appendix A.</p> <p>The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) has issued a response to the report from the PAC. In this response, the NFCC agree with the findings of the Committee. They state 'that unless the issues highlighted in the report are addressed, there is a distinct risk that the current delivery timeline would mean that ESN will be in an immature state that is unreliable, does not have the confidence of users and</p>

	<p>ultimately puts the lives of the public and emergency responders at risk.'</p> <p>Officers from this Service continue to work closely with our partner fire and rescue services in Thames Valley and with Thames Valley Police, to prepare for the new Emergency Services Network. We continue to be frustrated by the lack of clarity from the Home Office Programme team regarding the deliverables for the Programme. The full statement from the NFCC can be seen at Appendix B.</p> <p>Members will recall from the last briefing that we provided an update regarding the ongoing discussion with Home Office team members about DNSP. We have since written again to the central Programme regarding this issue (see Appendix C) thanking them for their continued engagement with us to produce a potential solution to this issue. Despite this engagement however, we have yet to secure an assurance from them that we would not be disadvantaged by not installing a separate link into the Service, so we have now made a request to do so. This has refreshed the dialogue between the two parties and the Senior User, AC Calum Bell, has been invited to take part in further discussions with the Programme Director.</p>
<b>ACTION</b>	Noting.
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	That the report be noted.
<b>RISK MANAGEMENT</b>	<p>The national Programme continue to work on the completion of the Full Business Case due to be brought before the Minister in December 2019.</p> <p>The latest report from the Public Accounts Committee has made six recommendations which it is felt should be actioned in order to secure assurances that the programme can be delivered:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Department should set out, by October 2019 a detailed, achievable, integrated programme plan including a realistic date for turning off Airwave and the cost of any extension of Airwave that may be needed and update the Committee when this plan is ready.</li> <li>2. The Department should write to the Committee by October 2019 setting out the steps that it has taken to: improve senior oversight of the programme; ensure assumptions are subject to appropriate challenge; and to make sure the findings of independent assurance reviews are widely shared and taken seriously.</li> <li>3. The Department should, without delay, agree with users a set of specific and detailed criteria that will</li> </ol>

	<p>be used to determine when ESN is ready to replace Airwave, and who will ultimately decide when those criteria are met.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Before contracting with a new delivery partner, the Department should analyse the skills and tasks needed to integrate ESN, how any skills gaps will be filled, and how lessons from the failure of the KBR contract will be applied to the new delivery partner contract.</li> <li>5. The Department should write to the Committee by October 2019 setting out how it will manage the risks presented by Motorola's position and the possible need to extend Airwave until it can be replaced by ESN.</li> <li>6. The Department should ensure it delivers a revised and approved business case, which both the emergency services and the other funders of ESN support, by the end of 2019 at the latest. The business case should include an appraisal of when continuing to spend money on ESN ceases to be value for money and should set out a 'plan B' for what would happen if that point was reached.</li> </ol> <p>Officers from the Service will continue to monitor developments from the national Programme and report to Members as appropriate.</p>
<p><b>FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS</b></p>	<p>Regional funding continues to be overseen via the South Central Programme Board and service draw down funding to cover the costs of day-to-day delivery of the project. These costs are monitored by the financial lead for the South Central Programme Board, a role held by a BFRS officer. The region reports on a quarterly basis regarding the ESMCP transition grant funding.</p>
<p><b>LEGAL IMPLICATIONS</b></p>	<p>Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service have already signed up to the principles of the ESN. Officers will continue to monitor the progress of the Programme closely and will provide challenge to the process where it is felt necessary.</p>
<p><b>CONSISTENCY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DUTY TO COLLABORATE</b></p>	<p>This Authority remains an active participant of the South Central Transition Delivery arrangements. The governance and delivery models have now been established and Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service officers are involved at each level. The principle has been adopted that information is shared across all five services and where appropriate, joint responses to work requests are submitted.</p> <p>The Head of Service Development is the Vice Chair of the Regional Strategic Board and is also the Fire</p>

	<p>representative on the equivalent Police Board.</p> <p>Funding awards have been pooled centrally, and Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service are now acting as treasurers for the region.</p> <p>An information paper regarding ESMCP was presented by DCFO Steve Foye, of Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service, to the Thames Valley Fire Control Service Joint Committee on 23 September 2019. Members of the Joint Committee subsequently agreed that they would write to Permanent Secretary, Sir Phillip Rutnam setting out their concerns regarding the Programme.</p>
<p><b>HEALTH AND SAFETY</b></p>	<p>There are no health and safety implications perceived at this time. There is constant review of this and any issues that may arise in the future will be referred.</p>
<p><b>EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY</b></p>	<p>There have been no equality and diversity implications identified to date. As the programme progresses, further information, and a confirmed plan become available, then an Integrated Impact Assessment will be completed.</p>
<p><b>USE OF RESOURCES</b></p>	<p>As stated in previous updates to Members, the organisation's Programme Manager is the Project Manager for ESMCP delivery. The Area Commander Service Development is the Senior User for this Authority and is Vice Chair of the South Central Steering Group.</p>
<p><b>PROVENANCE SECTION &amp; BACKGROUND PAPERS</b></p>	<p><b>Background</b></p> <p>ESMCP is the programme, which will provide the next generation of mobile communications for emergency services and will replace the Airwave Tetra network introduced to fire services in 2009.</p> <p>The Programme is considered to be ground breaking and innovative and is designed to improve the integration of emergency services communications by taking advantage of 4G communications developments and by reducing costs to user organisations.</p> <p>The current national Airwave contracts have been extended and are now due to be terminated at the end of December 2022.</p> <p>The period of transition for the South Central Region was originally planned to take place between November 2017 and November 2018.</p>

	<p>These dates are have been reviewed and a revised plan is due to be released following the Programme reset.</p> <p><b>Provenance</b></p> <p>ESMCP Update March 2019 ESMCP Update July 2019</p>
<b>APPENDICES</b>	<p>Appendix A: Committee of Public Accounts – ESN further progress review</p> <p>Appendix B: National Fire Chiefs Council response to the PAC report</p> <p>Appendix C: BFRS letter to ESN Programme Director regarding DNSP</p>
<b>TIME REQUIRED</b>	10 minutes
<b>REPORT ORIGINATOR AND CONTACT</b>	<p>Marie Crothers – Programme Manager</p> <p><a href="mailto:mcrothers@bucksfire.gov.uk">mcrothers@bucksfire.gov.uk</a></p> <p>01296 744430 / 07765 001907</p>

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House of Commons  
Committee of Public Accounts

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**Emergency Services  
Network: further  
progress review**

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**One Hundred and Eighth Report of  
Session 2017–19**

*Report, together with formal minutes  
relating to the report*

*Ordered by the House of Commons  
to be printed 10 July 2019*

**HC 1755**  
Published on 17 July 2019  
by authority of the House of Commons

## The Committee of Public Accounts

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Evidence relating to this report is published on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee’s website.

### Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Richard Cooke (Clerk), Laura-Jane Tiley (Second Clerk), Hannah Wentworth (Chair Liaison), Ameet Chudasama (Senior Committee Assistant), Baris Tufekci (Committee Assistant), Hajera Begum (Committee Assistant) and Stephen Luxford (Media Officer).

### Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Committee of Public Accounts, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5776; the Committee’s email address is [pubaccom@parliament.uk](mailto:pubaccom@parliament.uk).

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## Summary

Effective, reliable mobile communications are vital for police, firefighters and ambulance crews to do their life-saving work. But despite repeated warnings from this Committee and others, the Home Office's (the Department's) programme to create the new Emergency Services Network (ESN) has been beset by problems. Delays to the delivery of the programme have continued and costs have escalated. ESN is now three years late and expected to cost the taxpayer at least £3.1 billion more than planned. The Department's original approach was far too optimistic given the level of risk, and its governance arrangements were insufficient to deal with problems that emerged.

In 2018 the Department announced it was to 'reset' the programme, but we are not yet convinced that it has done enough to turn the programme around. The plan for delivering ESN is still not sufficiently robust and the Department does not yet have the skills to make it work. The programme faces substantial levels of technical and commercial risk, and failures to date have undermined the confidence of users that the programme will deliver a system that is fit for purpose and meets their needs. On current evidence it seems inevitable that there will be further delays and cost increases. The department has put itself in a position where the status quo is costly and leaves little option but to progress with ESN. One company, Motorola, is involved in both the new and the old contract leading to perverse incentives and putting the department in a weak negotiating position. The committee has seen other examples where the lack of a market in certain technical or IT products and services puts the Government in a weak contractual position. This is the eighth occasion that we have examined the programme. We will continue to be concerned about the progress of this programme until the Department has a clear plan for delivery and can demonstrate that it has the skills and capacity to meet the substantial challenges ahead.

## Introduction

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In 2015 the Home Office (the Department) set out to replace the Airwave radio system, which is currently used by all 107 emergency service organisations in England, Scotland and Wales to communicate in the field. The replacement system, the Emergency Services Network (ESN), is intended to be as least as good as Airwave, add 4G mobile data capabilities and be far cheaper. The Department is responsible for the delivery of the ESN programme, which is also co-funded by the Department of Health & Social Care, the Scottish and Welsh Governments, and the organisations that will use it. In 2015, the Department awarded contracts for the main parts of ESN to EE and Motorola and appointed KBR to be the Department's delivery partner. ESN was due to be completed by December 2019 at which point Airwave, owned by Motorola since 2016, would be turned off.

In September 2018, the Department announced that it would reset ESN and would launch it in several stages. This involved changes throughout the programme, including a renegotiation of contracts with EE and Motorola and delaying the point at which ESN is expected to replace Airwave to December 2022. The cost of building and running ESN until 2037 is now expected to be £9.3 billion, an increase of £3.1 billion since the 2015 business case.

## Conclusions and recommendations

1. **Despite extending the Emergency Services Network (ESN) by 3 years and increasing its budget by £3.1 billion, the Department has still not got a grip on whether it can deliver the programme.** The Department announced it had ‘reset’ ESN in September 2018, but there are significant issues to resolve if it is to meet its extended deadline. Emergency services were meant to have started transitioning to ESN in September 2017, but nearly two years later the Department still does not yet have an integrated plan for how and when each emergency service will deploy ESN. Technology for some parts of ESN is still not yet ready, for example work to build a network to enable emergency service aircraft to use ESN has not yet started and coverage is not available everywhere it is needed, including on underground railways. The Department has extended the Airwave contract to December 2022 but is already describing this as a “not before” date rather than a realistic target for when ESN will be ready.

**Recommendation:** *The Department should set out, by October 2019 a detailed, achievable, integrated programme plan including a realistic date for turning off Airwave and the cost of any extension of Airwave that may be needed and update the Committee when this plan is ready.*

2. **An unhealthy, ‘good news’ culture in the Department meant it failed to heed warning signs that the programme was undeliverable.** Many of the issues with the Department’s original approach were foreseeable and should have been challenged earlier. For example, the Department could have taken a more incremental approach from the start and should have allowed more time to get planning permission for sites on which to build masts. We have been warning that ESN is a high-risk programme since 2016, but only now does the Department accept that it was too optimistic about how long it would take to build ESN. The Department admits that where problems had been identified, they were not escalated properly, which meant the Department missed opportunities to correct its approach earlier. For example, the Senior Responsible Owner for the programme was not made aware of an early report which had identified some of the issues and risks with the Department’s approach. It is positive that the current Accounting Officer quickly commissioned an independent review of the programme when he took up post in 2017, and that, as a result, action was taken to reset ESN, but it is concerning that such a report was necessary.

**Recommendation:** *The Department should write to the Committee by October 2019 setting out the steps that it has taken to: improve senior oversight of the programme; ensure assumptions are subject to appropriate challenge; and to make sure the findings of independent assurance reviews are widely shared and taken seriously.*

3. **The Department’s mismanagement of the programme means the emergency services do not yet have confidence that ESN will provide a service that will meet their needs.** Our previous examinations of the Department’s e-borders programme and the modernisation of the Disclosure and Barring Service have shown that a lack of understanding of user needs can lead to programme failure. The intended users of ESN have not yet seen enough evidence that it would be ready to replace Airwave by

December 2022. The new incremental approach adopted by the Department could improve users' confidence in the programme. But the initial test, the first version of 'ESN Direct', will only be used by about 120 users in immigration enforcement, a tiny fraction of the 300,000 potential ESN users. The Department continues to say that it will not force users to accept ESN until they all agree it is 'as good' as Airwave, but it has not defined what this means with sufficient clarity. It has also yet to confirm what happens if some users require expensive changes before they will accept ESN.

**Recommendation:** *The Department should, without delay, agree with users a set of specific and detailed criteria that will be used to determine when ESN is ready to replace Airwave, and who will ultimately decide when those criteria are met.*

4. **We are not convinced that the Department has the plans or the skills needed to integrate the different elements of ESN into a coherent service.** The Department's first attempt at integrating ESN was unsuccessful, with the 'delivery partner' KBR failing to provide planning and collaboration between the other contractors after its role was downgraded by the Department. The critical role of making all the different elements of ESN work seamlessly together has now passed to the Department, but it does not yet have sufficient skills to undertake this role. Its plans for testing ESN are not well developed and the its track record of coordinating this programme so far is poor. It failed to realise the implications of EE and Motorola making plans based on different versions of telecommunications standards. It similarly failed to ensure suppliers worked together in the same location at the start of the programme, which could have improved collaboration. The Department intends to contract a new delivery partner, but this has not yet happened.

**Recommendation:** *Before contracting with a new delivery partner, the Department should analyse the skills and tasks needed to integrate ESN, how any skills gaps will be filled, and how lessons from the failure of the KBR contract will be applied to the new delivery partner contract.*

5. **Based on past failures to manage its contractors, we are concerned about the Department's ability to manage the significant commercial risks facing the programme, including those presented by Motorola's position as supplier to ESN and owner of Airwave.** The Department failed to ensure contractors delivered ESN to the timetable in the original contracts. It admits that the commercial structure for ESN is highly disaggregated and adds complexity to an already difficult task, and is trying to improve the contracts by changing them. But it signed the new Motorola contract 5 months late and the new EE contract was still not signed when we took evidence. The Airwave contract has been extended to end in December 2022, but a further negotiation will be needed to cover the additional delays which now seem inevitable given the Department's admission that it could take longer to build and deploy ESN. It is vital that Airwave does not cease working before ESN is fully ready but extending Airwave again is likely to further increase the costs of the programme. Given its previous negotiation to extend Airwave achieved only a 5% discount, and given Motorola, which is a key supplier to ESN, has a monopoly position as Airwave's owner, we are concerned that the Department has limited leverage to secure value for money in any future extension of Airwave contract.



**Recommendation:** *The Department should write to the Committee by October 2019 setting out how it will manage the risks presented by Motorola's position and the possible need to extend Airwave until it can be replaced by ESN.*

6. **Delays to the Department's revised business case for ESN and the prospect of further increases in cost raises doubts over the value for money case for ESN.** Although the forecast cost of ESN has increased by £3.1 billion, the Department still asserts that ESN will eventually be cheaper than Airwave. But it no longer expects this to happen until 2029, a delay of 7 years compared to the 2015 business case. Delivering ESN later than planned is also likely to create cost pressures for emergency services who may need to buy new Airwave devices while they wait for ESN to be ready. The Department's forecast costs for the programme are not finalised as they are part of a business case which is not approved. The business case is now expected to be approved in early 2020, over a year late. Given it is likely that Airwave will need to be extended further than December 2022 it seems inevitable that the £9.3 billion cost of ESN will increase again. This will further delay the point at which ESN is cheaper than Airwave, weakening the argument for continuing with ESN.

**Recommendation:** *The Department should ensure it delivers a revised and approved business case, which both the emergency services and the other funders of ESN support, by the end of 2019 at the latest. The business case should include an appraisal of when continuing to spend money on ESN ceases to be value for money and should set out a 'plan B' for what would happen if that point was reached.*

# 1 The 2018 'reset' of the ESN programme

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1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office (the Department) about progress in delivering the Emergency Services Network (ESN).<sup>1</sup>

## The ESN programme

2. The ESN programme is Department's chosen replacement for the Airwave digital radio system, currently used by 107 emergency services and 363 other organisations, in England, Scotland and Wales for communicating in the field.<sup>2</sup> The Department intends that ESN will:

- **Fully replace Airwave, matching it in all respects.**

The Department did not define this in detail, but it expected ESN to replace all the functionality of Airwave including its network coverage and reliability, devices and upgraded control rooms.

- **Allow users greater access to mobile data.**

Emergency services require mobile data for their life-saving work. While the existing Airwave system provides only limited mobile data capabilities, ESN is intended to provide 4G, for example the fire service could use ESN to transmit live video of incidents to firefighters on the way to an incident.

- **Cost less than Airwave.**

The Airwave network was fully dedicated to its users, but ESN will see the emergency services share an existing commercial mobile network, which is expected to be far cheaper. ESN is jointly funded by the Home Office, the Department for Health & Social Care, and the Scottish and Welsh Governments, and some costs are paid for by users.<sup>3</sup>

3. The Department let the main contracts for building and running ESN in 2015 to: EE Ltd (EE), to provide priority access to its existing 4G mobile network and increase its coverage; and Motorola Solutions UK Ltd (Motorola), to provide the software and systems that ensure ESN meets the needs of the emergency services. The Department also appointed KBR Ltd (KBR) to be the delivery partner for ESN and other suppliers were, or will be, contracted to provide other elements of ESN including devices and upgraded control rooms.<sup>4</sup>

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1 C&AG's Report, *Progress delivering the Emergency Services Network*, Session 2017–19, HC 2140, 10 May 2019

2 C&AG's Report, para 1

3 C&AG's Report, paras 1–2, 1.5

4 C&AGs Report, paras 3–4

## The new approach to delivering ESN

4. When the Department awarded contracts for ESN in 2015, its timetable assumed that emergency services would start transitioning away from Airwave and onto ESN in September 2017, allowing Airwave to be shutdown in December 2019. In February 2017, the Department reported that the completion of ESN had been delayed by 9 months, and in September 2018 it announced it had ‘reset’ the programme. The reset involved extending the timetable, adopting an incremental delivery approach, with ESN delivered in phases rather than all at once, replacing a key piece of technology and renegotiating the main contracts with EE and Motorola. The point at which ESN is planned to replace Airwave was delayed by three years to December 2022, and the total cost of ESN has increased to £9.3 billion, an increase of £3.1 billion.<sup>5</sup>

5. The Department admitted that its original timetable for ensuring ESN provides network coverage everywhere it is needed was too optimistic.<sup>6</sup> The Department is responsible for building 292 new mobile phone sites in rural areas and connecting them to EE’s network. But only 2 out of 292 have been finished and it could not say when the rest would be going live.<sup>7</sup> The Department told us that it had anticipated that acquiring the land for these sites and gaining planning permission would be difficult, but accepted that getting the agreement of land owners had been more difficult than it had expected.<sup>8</sup> EE has also been slower than expected in rolling out the physical infrastructure needed to support ESN, including coverage for regional metros, which is now expected to be completed in 2020 rather than September 2017 as originally planned. The Department told us that EE had been over-optimistic about the time needed to build coverage into underground railways, such as those in Glasgow and Tyne and Wear, but that in other areas EE would have been able to deliver quickly if it had needed to, but delays elsewhere in the programme meant that it had deliberately spread out its investment over a longer period.<sup>9</sup>

6. We asked the Department how it could now be confident that ESN would deliver on time, particularly given the amount of work that is still left to do to ensure that the new technology is available.<sup>10</sup> The Department told us it had a “pretty high” degree of confidence of launching the first substantive ESN prototype product later this year, but recognised that there was a remaining challenge to roll-out the new technology and ensure people use it. But key technology for ESN is not yet proven in real-world conditions. The National Audit Office found that Samsung had produced a prototype handset, and EE had successfully tested its core network’s ability to prioritise emergency services’ use of ESN, but this has not yet been fully tested for the ESN system as a whole or in demanding scenarios such as major public events or disasters. Technology for providing direct communication between devices without the need for a network signal is also not yet provided by any device on the market.<sup>11</sup> The Department told us it was hoping to award contracts for devices for aircraft soon.<sup>12</sup> But work on the network to provide a signal for those devices has not yet started and the Department told us that emergency services

5 C&AG’s Report, paras 7, 8, 10, 1.10, Figure 4

6 [Q 126](#)

7 [Qq 131–132](#)

8 [Qq 127–129](#)

9 [Qq 125–6, 133–135](#)

10 [Qq 73–74](#)

11 [Q 74](#); C&AG’s Report, para 12

12 [Q 136](#)

would not have access to this until 2020–21.<sup>13</sup>

7. When the current Accounting Officer joined the Department in April 2017, he found that the programme’s timetable needed revising again despite the Department having recently announced 9 month delay.<sup>14</sup> In July 2017 he commissioned an independent review that reported in October 2017 and found the programme did not have a complete integrated programme plan.<sup>15</sup> The Department has now approved a new plan, but the National Audit Office found that the plan is not yet robust or sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that the Department understands the challenges faced by the programme, including how emergency services will implement ESN, or how the components of ESN will be integrated successfully. For example the Department’s plan assumes ESN will be rolled out in some areas before key parts of the system, such as upgraded control rooms, are expected to be ready.<sup>16</sup> The Department told us that it would have an integrated deployment plan in place by August 2019.<sup>17</sup> It was unable to confirm that December 2022 was a realistic target for turning off Airwave, and described it as a “not before date” rather than a firm deadline.<sup>18</sup>

### Warning signs about the delivery of the programme

8. The Department admitted that its programmes, and the people running them “tend to optimism”, which can help get them through challenges but can also narrow the perspectives of those responsible for programme.<sup>19</sup> We asked the Department the extent to which concerns about the programme were obvious and raised and discussed. The Department told us that while these concerns were obvious and were raised at a senior level, it could not confirm how widely they were discussed across the organisation.<sup>20</sup> In 2016, the programme team commissioned a report into the problems facing ESN. But this was not shared with the programme’s Senior Responsible Owner, who told us he only learned of it when it was referenced in the independent review commissioned the following year. The Department was not able to explain why this had happened. The 2016 report had identified some of the problems in the programme, including a lack of clarity around integration. We asked, had the report been more widely discussed, whether the Department could have avoided problems with the programme. It told us that, had those now responsible been aware of the report, it was likely that they would have initiated the independent review of the programme at an earlier stage.<sup>21</sup>

9. We asked the Department’s Accounting Officer what his view of ESN was when he took up his post in April 2017. He told us that it had quickly become apparent that the programme was under strain and he had been concerned that there was a risk additional time would be needed, beyond the 9 month delay that had already been reported.<sup>22</sup> As well as commissioning an independent review in July 2017, he strengthened the leadership and governance of ESN so that the programme now reports to the Chief Digital, Data

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13 Qq 74, 137; C&AG’s Report, para 12

14 Q 13

15 Q 23

16 Q 96; C&AG’s Report, para 16

17 Qq 113, 139

18 Qq 60,73

19 Q 45

20 Q 17

21 Qq 67–71

22 Qq 13–16

and Technology Officer.<sup>23</sup> The independent review identified multiple issues with the programme, including the failure of the delivery partner contract with KBR, EE and Motorola assuming different versions of telecommunication standards, a disagreement on the responsibilities for systems integration and technical design, challenges locking down the detailed requirements for software, and late delivery of the projects that the Department controlled itself.<sup>24</sup>

10. We were concerned that it took so long to surface the problems with the delivery of ESN and realise that the timetable was over optimistic. We and the NAO had been warning that ESN was high risk since 2016.<sup>25</sup> In September 2016, the NAO warned that the Department appeared to be under-rating the seriousness of the risks to delivering ESN.<sup>26</sup> In our report in January 2017, we concluded that the programme was unlikely to meet its ambitious timetable and recommended that the Department reassess its timetable and milestones to ensure that all parties involved in delivering the programme agreed they were deliverable.<sup>27</sup> We reiterated these concerns and our disappointment that the Department's risk management and assurance arrangements had not picked these problems up earlier in our second report on ESN in April 2017 and recommended the Department review the risks to the programme as we thought it was too ambitious.<sup>28</sup>

11. The Department now admits that it had believed the suppliers when they said they were “confident” that they would be able to deliver ESN on time, and that the Department itself had under-estimated the difficulty in obtaining planning permission for the new sites. We were concerned that the Department had not anticipated these issues given that they were not a surprise to Committee Members based on experience within their constituencies.<sup>29</sup> We also asked why, given the scale, complexity and level of risk of ESN, the Department had not adopted an incremental approach to rolling out the new technology from the start. The Department recognised that it had become overly focused on delivering everything at once, and that this was not the way to deliver such a complex programme.<sup>30</sup> The Department admitted its original timetable was too optimistic, but some optimism remains, for example the programme contingency is only enough to cover a small further delay.<sup>31</sup>

## Confidence of emergency services in the new approach

12. Our previous examinations of major programmes within the Home Office have found that failing to understand or engage with the end users can pose serious risks. Our predecessor Committee's report on the e-borders programme found that, while stakeholder engagement was a critical to the success of the programme, throughout the Department had underestimated the importance of securing their co-operation. The Department did not fully recognise the diversity of the industry users, and feedback from users had not

23 Qq 18- 22

24 Q 21; C&AG's Report, para 6

25 Qq 40-44

26 Comptroller & Auditor General, *Upgrading Emergency Services Communications: the Emergency Services Network*, Session 2016-17, HC 627, 15 September 2016

27 Committee of Public Accounts, *Upgrading emergency service communications*, 35th Report of Session 2016-17, HC 770, 25 January 2017

28 Committee of Public Accounts, *Upgrading emergency service communications – recall*, 52nd report of Session 2016-17, HC 997, 21 April 2017

29 Qq 55, 127-129, 149

30 Qq 147-148

31 Q 42; C&AG's Report, para 10

been acted on. We recommended that the Department should ensure all stakeholders were consulted as programmes develop and that the issues they raise were considered carefully and responded to effectively.<sup>32</sup> In our report on modernising the Disclosure and Barring Service we found that the Department launched the updated service without a sound idea of demand or whether customers would use it, and was only just starting to look at why it was not popular. It had launched the service without a pilot or properly engaging with users, which it subsequently admitted was a mistake as demand had been much lower than was predicted. We recommended that before making changes to services in future, the Department should undertake a proper and robust forecast of user needs and demand.<sup>33</sup>

13. We were concerned that the delays to ESN had reduced users' confidence in the programme and asked the Department how it was addressing this.<sup>34</sup> The Department told us that the new incremental approach to delivering ESN will give greater opportunity for emergency services to test ESN and gain confidence that it will meet their needs. But it recognised that, given the risks of using a new system in life or death situations, most may prefer to wait until later versions of ESN are available, rather than try out the earlier products.<sup>35</sup> The first test will come with the launch of the 'ESN Direct 1' product later in 2019, which is expected to be used by 120 people in Immigration Enforcement.<sup>36</sup> The Department told us that it hoped to expand the numbers using Direct 1 to around 1,000 people by November 2019, but recognised that this was still a small fraction of the 300,000 expected to eventually use ESN.<sup>37</sup>

14. The Department did not start to undertake exercises with three police forces to understand their needs in rolling out ESN until July 2018. The Department told us that while it had been talking to users, delays in producing real products meant it had not yet been able to discuss how ESN fitted into the real-world environment, and that it was only now beginning to work through the details of how ESN would be rolled out.<sup>38</sup> As a result of this some emergency services do not yet have confidence in the programme. We heard from the Police and Crime Commissioner of Bedfordshire, who told us that they had "seen nothing to give [us] assurance that [ESN] will be delivered by the end of 2022, as currently proposed".<sup>39</sup>

15. The Department continued to assert that it will not force emergency services to adopt ESN, and that ESN will be as good as Airwave in all respects.<sup>40</sup> We asked how this will be judged in the absence of an agreed, and locked down statement of what the ESN service will look like or how it will be used in practice.<sup>41</sup> The Department told us that it knows the end point for the programme and had agreed the technical requirements that the programme must meet.<sup>42</sup> But it admitted that the operating model—the way ESN will

32 Committee of Public Accounts, 27th report of Session 2015–16, *e-Borders and successor programmes*, HC 643, 4 March 2016, para 5

33 Committee of Public Accounts, *Modernising the Disclosure and Barring Service*, 42nd Report of Session 2017–19, HC 695, 25 May 2018, para 5

34 Qq 28, 107

35 Qq 31,32, 148

36 Qq 28–32

37 Q 32; C&AG's Report Figure 11

38 Qq 96, 101–103

39 Q 115; Written Evidence ESR0003, Bedfordshire Police, 5 June 2019

40 C&AG's Report, para 15

41 Qq 150–167

42 Qq 154–160

be used in practice—had not yet been agreed. We were concerned that this created a risk that ESN might not be accepted by the emergency services despite meeting the technical requirements.<sup>43</sup>

16. We heard from representatives of fire and police services, who told us that they were working on detailed acceptance criteria. The National Police ESN Coordinator told us that they had discussed and were agreeing an extensive set of exit criteria that need to be met before Airwave can be switched off. The National Fire Chiefs Council similarly told us that they had produced a comprehensive set of acceptance criteria which must be met in full for the fire service to consider ESN as fit for purpose.<sup>44</sup> We asked what would happen if the Department considered ESN to be fully delivered but emergency services were not content to transition. The Department told us it will not leave users without communication, but could only say that there would be further discussions if emergency services were not happy.<sup>45</sup> The Department was unable to explain in detail what would happen if some services were not convinced, or where the tipping point would be at which ESN is accepted by enough services to put pressure on others to accept it.<sup>46</sup>

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43 Qq 160–169

44 Q 123; Written Evidence: ESR0001, National Police ESN Coordinator, 22 May 2019; ESR0002 National Fire Chiefs Council, 22 May 2019

45 Qq 120–122

46 Qq 173–177

## 2 Remaining risks for ESN

### Integration risks

17. The Department appointed KBR to act as its ‘delivery partner’ in 2015, to oversee testing and support the integration of the different elements of ESN into a coherent system. The Department admitted that the contract was not successful and that it had downgraded the role of KBR and did not expect to continue to employ KBR much longer. Following our evidence session, it wrote to us to confirm that its contract with KBR had been terminated.<sup>47</sup> KBR was contracted to deliver planning and collaboration between suppliers but the Department told us that while the contact had been useful to procure specialist resource, in some instances it had felt it necessary to appoint its own staff as those supplied by KBR did not have the experience or expertise the Department required.<sup>48</sup>

18. The responsibility for integrating ESN has now passed wholly to the Department. The Department recognised that this was not naturally the role of a Government department and that it needed to build its capability to take on the role.<sup>49</sup> It told us that it was strengthening the programme team to increase its ability to undertake the integration, and that it was in the process of procuring a new delivery partner to ensure it has the system integration skills it needs.<sup>50</sup>

19. The Department recognised that several of the early problems faced by the programme could have been avoided with better integration and coordination between the different suppliers, for example, managing the impact of different versions of telecommunications standards being assumed by EE and Motorola. While the Department understood there was a difference, it admitted that it did not fully comprehend that this was a fundamental problem for the programme until software entered testing.<sup>51</sup> We asked why the Department had not ensured suppliers worked in the same location at the start of the programme so that they could have talked to each other. We have seen such co-location bring benefits to other programmes such as efficiencies, savings and technological improvements. The Department admitted that, on reflection, it should have ensured suppliers were co-located and that while it thought its arrangements to work with suppliers would have been good enough, this had not been the case.<sup>52</sup>

### Commercial risks

20. As part of the reset, in June 2018 the Department realised that the existing ESN contracts were not deliverable.<sup>53</sup> The Department told us that it had tried to hold its suppliers to account but it admitted that it had needed to clarify the contract to make responsibilities clear.<sup>54</sup> As part of the reset, since mid-2018 the Department has been renegotiating its contracts with EE and Motorola and has extended the Airwave contract. It has agreed temporary working arrangements with both EE and Motorola to enable

47 Q 93; [Letter from Home Office to Meg Hillier, 4 June 2019](#) C&AG’s report, para 3, 14

48 Q 93; C&AG’s Report, para 6

49 Q 97

50 Q 98

51 Qq 46–50, 56

52 Qq 59–60

53 C&AG’s Report, para 3.3

54 Qq 36–37



work to continue due the renegotiation. The Department had intended to complete this by December 2018 but it only signed the Motorola contract in May 2019, 5 months late, and it had not signed the revised contract with EE at the time of our evidence session.<sup>55</sup> The Department told us that the revised contracts would be clearer with a sharper division of responsibility. But it has not changed the complicated commercial structure of ESN, which it admitted is highly disaggregated.<sup>56</sup>

21. The National Audit Office concluded the Department needed to manage Motorola's contractual position carefully as it is both a main supplier to ESN and the owner of Airwave and may therefore benefit from delays to the programme. The Department will also need to manage any potential conflict of interest regarding Motorola's role as one of the main suppliers to ESN as well as accreditor and potential vendor of control rooms and devices for the new system. Motorola will benefit from the successful development of ESN but also receives large revenues from the Airwave contract including £1.4 billion from extending Airwave to December 2022.<sup>57</sup>

22. As part of its renegotiation with Motorola, the Department agreed a 5% discount in extending Airwave to December 2022 and a fixed price of £620 million per year to continue to run Airwave. We asked whether this cost would increase substantially if the Department needed to extend Airwave further. The Department told us that it had not tried to agree a longer contract because it did not want to be locked into Airwave.<sup>58</sup> It said it had secured a commitment for Motorola not to put the future price of Airwave up "unreasonably", but acknowledged that extending Airwave again would require another negotiation. The Department recognised that there was a risk of the cost of Airwave increasing again if a further extension is needed.<sup>59</sup> For example, the Department told us that the TETRA technology used by Airwave is not likely to last into the 2030s without further capital investment.<sup>60</sup>

## The case for continuing with ESN

23. ESN is now expected to cost up to £9.3 billion, £3.1 billion more than was forecast in 2015. Of this, £1.4 billion is due to the cost of extending Airwave.<sup>61</sup> The forecast costs of the programme are still uncertain as they are part of a business case which has not yet been approved. The Department expected to approve the new business case for ESN by December 2018, but it is not now expected until the end of 2019.<sup>62</sup> We asked the Department whether the business case still stacked up and the programme would still provide value for money given the increases in cost. The Department told us that it still considered ESN to be cheaper than Airwave due to the savings expected after Airwave is turned off. It told us that, had it known at the beginning of the programme everything it knew now, the programme would still have represented value for money. It asserted that the only circumstances where it would make sense not to undertake ESN would be if it believed it was not technically possible to deliver it, which was not the case.<sup>63</sup>

55 C&AG's Report, paras 3.4, 3.5, Q 37

56 Q 37; C&AG Report, para 8

57 C&AG's Report, paras 10, 20

58 Qq 75–77

59 Qq 75–80

60 Qq 62, 79

61 Q 61; C&AG's Report, para 10

62 Q 140, C&AG's Report, para 10

63 Qq 62–63

24. The Department estimated that running ESN will be about half the cost of running Airwave.<sup>64</sup> It told us that it also continued to expect that ESN will deliver 5 minutes of time saved per officer per shift. It described this as a “conservative” estimate despite police not having approved it.<sup>65</sup>

25. The Department now expects the point at which savings from ESN will outweigh the additional costs to happen by 2029, a delay of 7 years compared to the 2015 business case. But this assumes the cost of the programme is within the estimate in the draft business case, which only contained enough contingency to fund a delay to Airwave of less than two years.<sup>66</sup> The Department was not able to tell us what level of cost increases would make it cheaper to pursue options other than ESN, such as pausing to allow the market to develop more of the needed technology rather than the Department being the first to develop it. It asserted that there were benefits to continuing with ESN despite the extra costs that will be incurred to be the first in the world. The Department also considered that there was no realistic alternative other than to continue with ESN because if it was stopped, a future Government would likely return to it later.<sup>67</sup>

26. We were concerned that the increased cost of ESN was also likely to create local cost pressures for emergency services. Emergency service organisations told us that they have delayed upgrading their Airwave equipment in the hope ESN would be delivered will need to buy new Airwave devices while they wait for ESN.<sup>68</sup> The Department accepted that delays were causing problems for emergency services who need to plan their expenditure and had relied on ESN being ready when drawing up these plans. It acknowledged this was “unfortunate” but was not able to offer any solution other than it was working with the National Police Chiefs Council to identify whether there was scope for emergency services to pool devices.<sup>69</sup>

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64 Q 63; C&AG’s Report, para 8

65 Q 124

66 Q 60; C&AG’s Report, paras 10, 11

67 Qq 64, 65

68 Qq 117–118, Written Evidence ESR0003, Bedfordshire Police, 5 June 2019

69 Qq 18, 117–118

# Formal Minutes

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**Wednesday 10 July 2019**

Members present:

Meg Hillier, in the Chair

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown	Anne Marie Morris
Caroline Flint	Bridget Phillipson
Shabana Mahmood	Gareth Snell
Layla Moran	Anne-Marie Trevelyan

Draft Report (*Emergency Services Network: further progress review*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

*Ordered*, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 26 read and agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

*Resolved*, That the Report be the One hundred and eighth of the Committee to the House.

*Ordered*, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

*Ordered*, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Monday 15 July at 3:30pm]

## Witnesses

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The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

### Wednesday 22 May 2019

**Sir Philip Rutnam**, Permanent Secretary, **Stephen Webb**, Senior Responsible Owner, Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme, Home Office and **Joanna Davinson**, Chief Digital, Data and Technology Officer, Home Office.

[Q1-188](#)

## Published written evidence

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The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

ESR numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Bedfordshire Police ([ESR0003](#))
- 2 National Fire Chiefs Council ([ESR0002](#))
- 3 National Police ESN Coordinator ([ESR0001](#))

## List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website. The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

### Session 2017–19

First Report	Tackling online VAT fraud and error	HC 312 (Cm 9549)
Second Report	Brexit and the future of Customs	HC 401 (Cm 9565)
Third Report	Hinkley Point C	HC 393 (Cm 9565)
Fourth Report	Clinical correspondence handling at NHS Shared Business Services	HC 396 (Cm 9575)
Fifth Report	Managing the costs of clinical negligence in hospital trusts	HC 397 (Cm 9575)
Sixth Report	The growing threat of online fraud	HC 399 (Cm 9575)
Seventh Report	Brexit and the UK border	HC 558 (Cm 9575)
Eighth Report	Mental health in prisons	HC 400 (Cm 9575) (Cm 9596)
Ninth Report	Sheffield to Rotherham tram-trains	HC 453 (Cm 9575)
Tenth Report	High Speed 2 Annual Report and Accounts	HC 454 (Cm 9575)
Eleventh Report	Homeless households	HC 462 (Cm 9575) (Cm 9618)
Twelfth Report	HMRC's Performance in 2016–17	HC 456 (Cm 9596)
Thirteenth Report	NHS continuing healthcare funding	HC 455 (Cm 9596)
Fourteenth Report	Delivering Carrier Strike	HC 394 (Cm 9596)
Fifteenth Report	Offender-monitoring tags	HC 458 (Cm 9596)
Sixteenth Report	Government borrowing and the Whole of Government Accounts	HC 463 (Cm 9596)
Seventeenth Report	Retaining and developing the teaching workforce	HC 460 (Cm 9596)
Eighteenth Report	Exiting the European Union	HC 467 (Cm 9596)

Nineteenth Report	Excess Votes 2016–17	HC 806 (Cm 9596)
Twentieth Report	Update on the Thameslink Programme	HC 466 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-First Report	The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s Magnox	HC 461 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Second Report	The monitoring, inspection and funding of Learndirect Ltd.	HC 875 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Third Report	Alternative Higher Education Providers	HC 736 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Fourth Report	Care Quality Commission: regulating health and social care	HC 468 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Fifth Report	The sale of the Green Investment Bank	HC 468 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Sixth Report	Governance and departmental oversight of the Greater Cambridge Greater Peterborough Local Enterprise Partnership	HC 896 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Seventh Report	Government contracts for Community Rehabilitation Companies	HC 897 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Eighth Report	Ministry of Defence: Acquisition and support of defence equipment	HC 724 (Cm 9618)
Twenty-Ninth Report	Sustainability and transformation in the NHS	HC 793 (Cm 9618)
Thirtieth Report	Academy schools’ finances	HC 760 (Cm 9618)
Thirty-First Report	The future of the National Lottery	HC 898 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Second Report	Cyber-attack on the NHS	HC 787 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Third Report	Research and Development funding across government	HC 668 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Fourth Report	Exiting the European Union: The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy	HC 687 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Fifth Report	Rail franchising in the UK	HC 689 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Sixth Report	Reducing modern slavery	HC 886 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Seventh Report	Exiting the European Union: The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and the Department for International Trade	HC 699 (Cm 9643)
Thirty-Eighth Report	The adult social care workforce in England	HC 690 (Cm 9667)
Thirty-Ninth Report	The Defence Equipment Plan 2017–2027	HC 880 (Cm 9667)
Fortieth Report	Renewable Heat Incentive in Great Britain	HC 696 (Cm 9667)

Forty-First Report	Government risk assessments relating to Carillion	HC 1045 (Cm 9667)
Forty-Second Report	Modernising the Disclosure and Barring Service	HC 695 (Cm 9667)
Forty-Third Report	Clinical correspondence handling in the NHS	HC 929  (Cm 9702)
Forty-Fourth Report	Reducing emergency admissions	HC 795 (Cm 9702)
Forty-Fifth Report	The higher education market	HC 693 (Cm 9702)
Forty-Sixth Report	Private Finance Initiatives	HC 894  (Cm 9702)
Forty-Seventh Report	Delivering STEM skills for the economy	HC 691 (Cm 9702)
Forty-Eighth Report	Exiting the EU: The financial settlement	HC 973 (Cm 9702)
Forty-Ninth Report	Progress in tackling online VAT fraud	HC 1304 (Cm 9702)
Fiftieth Report	Financial sustainability of local authorities	HC 970 (Cm 9702)
Fifty-First Report	BBC commercial activities	HC 670 (Cm 9702)
Fifty-Second Report	Converting schools to academies	HC 697 (Cm 9702)
Fifty-Third Report	Ministry of Defence's contract with Annington Property Limited	HC 974 (Cm 9702)
Fifty-Fourth Report	Visit to Washington DC	HC 1404 (Cm 9702)
Fifty-Fifth Report	Employment and Support Allowance	HC 975 (Cm 9702)
Fifty-Sixth Report	Transforming courts and tribunals	HC 976 (Cm 9702)
Fifty-Seventh Report	Supporting Primary Care Services: NHS England's contract with Capita	HC 698 (Cm 9702)
Fifty-Eighth Report	Strategic Suppliers	HC 1031 (Cm 9702)
Fifty-Ninth Report	Skill shortages in the Armed Forces	HC 1027 (9740)
Sixtieth Report	Ofsted's inspection of schools	HC1029 (Cm 9740)
Sixty-First Report	Ministry of Defence nuclear programme	HC 1028 (Cm 9740)
Sixty-Second Report	Price increases for generic medications	HC 1184 (Cm 9740)

Sixty-Third Report	Interface between health and social care	HC 1376 (Cm 9740)
Sixty-Fourth Report	Universal Credit	HC 1375 (Cp 18)
Sixty-Fifth Report	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority	HC 1375 (Cp 18)
Sixty-Sixth Report	HMRC's performance in 2017–18	HC 1526 (Cp 18)
Sixty-Seventh Report	Financial Sustainability of police forces in England and Wales	HC 1513 (Cp 18)
Sixty-Eighth Report	Defra's progress towards Brexit	HC 1514 (CP 18)
Sixty-Ninth Report	Sale of student loans	HC 1527 (Cp 56)
Seventieth Report	Department for Transport's implementation of Brexit	HC 1657 (Cp 56)
Seventy-First Report	Department for Health and Social Care accounts	HC 1515 (Cp 56)
Seventy-Second Report	Mental health services for children and young people	HC 1593 (Cp 79)
Seventy-Third Report	Academy accounts and performance	HC 1597 (Cp 79)
Seventy-Fourth Report	Whole of Government accounts	HC 464 (Cp 79)
Seventy-Fifth Report	Pre-appointment hearing: preferred candidate for Comptroller and Auditor General	HC 1883 (Cp 79)
Seventy-Sixth Report	Local Government Spending	HC 1775 (Cp 79)
Seventy-Seventh Report	Defence Equipment Plan 2018–28	HC 1519 (Cp 79)
Seventy-Eighth Report	Improving Government planning and spending	HC 1596 (Cp 97)
Seventy-Ninth Report	Excess Votes 2017–18	HC 1931 (Cp 97)
Eightieth Report	Capita's contracts with the Ministry of Defence	HC 1736 (Cp 97)
Eighty-First Report	Rail management and timetabling	HC 1793 (Cp 97)
Eighty-Second Report	Windrush generation and the Home Office	HC 1518 (Cp 113)
Eighty-Third Report	Clinical Commissioning Groups	HC 1740 (Cp 97)
Eighty-Fourth Report	Bank of England's central services	HC 1739 (Cp 97)



Eighty-Fifth Report	Auditing local government	HC 1738 (Cp 97)
Eighty-Sixth Report	Brexit and the UK border: further progress review	HC 1942 (Cp 113)
Eighty-Seventh Report	Renewing the EastEnders set	HC 1737 (Cp 113)
Eighty-Eighth Report	Transforming children's services	HC 1741 (Cp 113)
Eighty-Ninth Report	Public cost of decommissioning oil and gas infrastructure	HC 1742 (Cp 113)
Ninetieth Report	BBC and personal service companies	HC 1522 (Cp 113)
Ninety-First Report	NHS financial sustainability: progress review	HC 1743 (Cp 113)
Ninety-Second Report	Crossrail: progress review	HC 2004 (Cp 113)
Ninety-Third Report	Disclosure and Barring Service: progress review	HC 2006
Ninety-Fourth Report	Transforming rehabilitation: progress review	HC 1747
Ninety-Fifth Report	Accessing public services through the Government's Verify digital system	HC 1748
Ninety-Sixth Report	Adult health screening	HC 1746
Ninety-Seventh Report	Local Government Governance and Accountability	HC 2077
Ninety-Eighth Report	The apprenticeships programme: progress review	HC 1749
Ninety-Ninth Report	Cyber security in the UK	HC 1745
One-Hundredth Report	NHS waiting times for elective and cancer treatment	HC 1750
One-Hundred and First Report	Submarine defueling and dismantling	HC 2041
One-Hundred and Second Report	Military Homes	HC 2136
One-Hundred and Third Report	Planning and the broken house market	HC 1744
One-Hundred and Fourth Report	Transport infrastructure in the South-West	HC 1753
One-Hundred and Fifth Report	Local enterprise partnerships: progress review	HC 1754
One-Hundred and Sixth Report	Eurotunnel	HC 2460
One-Hundred and Seventh Report	Consumer protection	HC 1752

First Special Report	Chair of the Public Accounts Committee's Second Annual Report	HC 347
Second Special Report	Third Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts	HC 1399
Third Special Report	Fourth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts	HC 2370



## NFCC responds to Public Accounts Committee ESN further progress

Following the publication of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report 'Emergency Services Network: further progress review' the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) maintains that the provision of reliable, secure and resilient communications with the best available technology is an essential component in safeguarding the public and emergency responders alike, which is the top priority of the emergency services.

Throughout the lifetime of the Programme the NFCC and its representatives, including those of its predecessor, the Chief Fire Officers Association, have consistently made it clear to Government that the timescales for delivery of the Emergency Services Network (ESN) are unduly ambitious, the costs overly optimistic and that the technology required to deliver ESN will take significant time to mature.

The NFCC agrees with the PAC's findings that unless the issues highlighted in the report are addressed there is a distinct risk that the current delivery timeline would mean that ESN will be in an immature state that's unreliable, does not have the confidence of users and ultimately puts the lives of the public and emergency responders at risk, something that's simply unacceptable.

As outlined in the report, the risks associated with integrating so many differing pieces of complex and bespoke technology into a truly effective capability should not be underestimated. Integration has created significant hurdles for other emergency services technology programmes. The NFCC remains keen to work with Government to share previous learning and experiences to avoid similar mistakes being made.

Despite the challenges of such a large and complex technology Programme, the NFCC still believes that ESN is the most appropriate direction of travel for the future of emergency services communications. However, the components of ESN and the overall end solution must be at least as good as Airwave to provide Fire and Rescue Service staff with the tools necessary to undertake their demanding and often dangerous duties.

Chief Fire Officer Darryl Keen, Strategic Lead for Operational Communications for the National Fire Chiefs Council said "This report highlights a number of key areas to be addressed in order to provide

sufficient assurance and gain the confidence of Fire and Rescue Services. ESN must deliver reliable, secure and resilient communications technology that meet our future needs.

“The NFCC will continue to work with the Programme and Government to ensure that ESN is fit for purpose and that the timescales for delivery are realistic and achievable.

“We also recognise that the implementation of ESN will be one of many technology, digital and transformation challenges for every Fire and Rescue Service which will have to be managed against a backdrop of increasing fiscal pressures and budgetary uncertainty. Therefore, ESN must also be affordable for local Fire and Rescue Services.”

Findings within the PAC report includes the following recommendations:

- 1) Recommendation: The Department [Home Office] should set out, by October 2019 a detailed, achievable, integrated programme plan including a realistic date for turning off Airwave and the cost of any extension of Airwave that may be needed and update the Committee when this plan is ready.
- 2) Recommendation: The Department [Home Office] should write to the Committee by October 2019 setting out the steps that it has taken to: improve senior oversight of the programme; ensure assumptions are subject to appropriate challenge; and to make sure the findings of independent assurance reviews are widely shared and taken seriously.
- 3) Recommendation: The Department [Home Office] should, without delay, agree with users a set of specific and detailed criteria that will be used to determine when ESN is ready to replace Airwave, and who will ultimately decide when those criteria are met
- 4) Recommendation: Before contracting with a new delivery partner, the Department [Home Office] should analyse the skills and tasks needed to integrate ESN, how any skills gaps will be filled, and how lessons from the failure of the KBR contract will be applied to the new delivery partner contract.
- 5) Recommendation: The Department [Home Office] should write to the Committee by October 2019 setting out how it will manage the risks presented by Motorola’s position and the possible need to extend Airwave until it can be replaced by ESN.
- 6) Recommendation: The Department [Home Office] should ensure it delivers a revised and approved business case, which both the emergency services and the other funders of ESN support, by the end of 2019 at the latest. The business case should include an appraisal of when continuing to spend money on ESN ceases to be value for money and should set out a ‘plan B’ for what would happen if that point was reached

**(17th July 2019)**



**Buckinghamshire**  
**FIRE & RESCUE SERVICE**  
*we save lives*

Our ref: JPMC 260719  
Enquiries to: AC Julian Parsons  
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Bryan Clark - Programme Director  
Emergency Services Mobile Communications  
Programme (ESMCP)  
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70 Petty France  
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SW1H 9EX

Dear Mr Clark

Further to your letter of 4 March 2019, we are grateful for the meeting subsequently held in Buckinghamshire on 18 March 2019.

However, due to the delay in the Proof of Concept Testing trial held with County Durham and Darlington FRS, the information in relation to functionality was not forthcoming at that time.

Within your letter, you kindly offered a further meeting should our concerns with DNSP end-to-end requirements persist. This meeting took place on 7 May 2019, for which we are again, grateful and felt it to be extremely productive.

At this meeting, your representatives agreed with our position that, in all likelihood, Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service would be disadvantaged by not having our own DNSP link. This is because it is apparent that a lack of a DNSP link would prevent us from accessing the full range of services that the Programme is committed to delivering.

We also agreed with your representatives, a potential network solution that could deliver the separate DNSP link to BFRS as part of the Thames Valley network. We have since worked with our colleagues within the Thames Valley and the Thames Valley Fire Control Service to fine tune this proposal. We have provided you with this proposal as an appendix to this letter.



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In our previous letter to you dated 21 January 2019, we requested an assurance that BFRS would not be disadvantaged by not being able to utilise the Emergency Services Network to its full potential in the future (including the ability to manage our devices).

Having given this matter some considerable thought and, as we have been unable to secure such an assurance, despite the assistance of your team members, please accept this letter as our formal request for the installation of a DNSP link into BFRS and that this will be fully funded by the Programme.

We look forward to receiving your reply.

Yours sincerely

**Area Commander Julian Parsons**

**Head of Service Development**  
**Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service**



# Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority

<b>MEETING</b>	Executive Committee
<b>DATE OF MEETING</b>	13 November 2019
<b>OFFICER</b>	Mark Hemming, Director of Finance and Assets
<b>LEAD MEMBER</b>	Councillor David Hopkins
<b>SUBJECT OF THE REPORT</b>	<b>Response to Local Government Finance Settlement 2020-21: Technical Consultation</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<p>The Consultation was published on 3 October 2019, with a deadline for responses of 31 October 2019. In accordance with the Scheme of Delegation to Officers, the response was discussed with the Chairman and Lead Member before submission. This paper details the content of the submission for the attention of the Authority.</p> <p>The section of the Consultation most relevant to the Authority at the present time is Section 5: Council Tax.</p> <p>The current proposal within the Consultation is that the council tax referendum limit for fire and rescue authorities will be less than 2%. The response to this was that the Authority would recommend that fire and rescue authorities have the flexibility to increase council tax by up to £5. This view is consistent with the consultation response provided by the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC).</p> <p>The Consultation also sought views on a number of other areas not directly relevant to the Authority, so a response of 'no comment' was submitted in relation to those questions.</p>
<b>ACTION</b>	Noting.
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	That the response to the consultation be noted.
<b>RISK MANAGEMENT</b>	No direct impact.
<b>FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS</b>	<p>In 2019/20 BMKFA had the lowest precept of any non-metropolitan combined fire and rescue authority. The band D equivalent charge is £64.57. The total council tax receivable for 2019/20 (excluding prior years' surpluses) is £19.7m.</p> <p>The current draft medium-term financial plan assumes that council tax will be increased by 1.99% every year. For 2020/21 this would result in total</p>

	<p>council tax receipts of £20.1m (ignoring the effects of any growth in the council tax base).</p> <p>If the band D equivalent was increased by £5 for 2020/21 the total council tax receipts (ignoring any increases in the council tax base) would be £21.2m.</p>
<b>LEGAL IMPLICATIONS</b>	<p>The Chief Fire Officer may make a formal response on behalf of the Authority to a Government Consultation Paper provided that such a response is subsequently referred to the appropriate committee for their attention.</p>
<b>CONSISTENCY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DUTY TO COLLABORATE</b>	<p>No direct impact.</p>
<b>HEALTH AND SAFETY</b>	<p>No direct impact.</p>
<b>EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY</b>	<p>No direct impact.</p>
<b>USE OF RESOURCES</b>	<p>See Financial Implications.</p>
<b>PROVENANCE SECTION &amp; BACKGROUND PAPERS</b>	<p><a href="#">Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes Fire Authority Scheme of Delegation to Officers June 2013</a></p>
<b>APPENDICES</b>	<p>Appendix A – Local Government Finance Settlement 2020-21: Technical Consultation</p> <p>Appendix B – Response to the Consultation</p>
<b>TIME REQUIRED</b>	<p>10 minutes</p>
<b>REPORT ORIGINATOR AND CONTACT</b>	<p>Mark Hemming  <a href="mailto:mhemming@bucksfire.gov.uk">mhemming@bucksfire.gov.uk</a></p>





Ministry of Housing,  
Communities &  
Local Government

# Local Government Finance Settlement 2020-21

Technical Consultation



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October 2019

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# Scope of the consultation

Topic of this consultation:	This consultation covers proposals for the local government finance settlement for 2020-21.
Scope of this consultation:	This consultation seeks views on proposals for the local government finance settlement for 2020-21, from representatives of local government.
Geographical scope:	These proposals relate to England only.
Impact Assessment:	Since the Government does not envisage that the proposals within this consultation document will have an impact on business, no impact assessment has been produced.

## Basic Information

To:	The consultation will be of interest to local authorities, and representative bodies for local authorities.
Body/bodies responsible for the consultation:	Local Government Finance Directorate within the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.
Duration:	This consultation will last for 4 weeks from 3 October 2019 to 31 October 2019.
Enquiries:	For any enquiries about the consultation please contact <a href="mailto:lgssettlement@communities.gov.uk">lgssettlement@communities.gov.uk</a>
How to respond:	<p>You can respond to the questions in this consultation via a pro-forma found at:  <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/local-government-finance-settlement-2020-to-2021-technical-consultation">https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/local-government-finance-settlement-2020-to-2021-technical-consultation</a></p> <p>If the link is inoperable, the pro-forma can also be found as an Annex to this consultation document.</p> <p>Email details and an address for written responses can be found in the pro-forma.</p>

# About this consultation

This consultation document and consultation process have been planned to adhere to the Consultation Principles issued by the Cabinet Office.

Representative groups are asked to give a summary of the people and organisations they represent, and where relevant who else they have consulted in reaching their conclusions when they respond.

Information provided in response to this consultation, including personal data, may be published or disclosed in accordance with the access to information regimes (these are primarily the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA), General Data Protection Regulation, and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004).

If you want the information that you provide to be treated as confidential, please be aware that, as a public authority, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government is bound by the Freedom of Information Act and may therefore be obliged to disclose all or some of the information you provide. In view of this it would be helpful if you could explain to us why you regard the information you have provided as confidential. If we receive a request for disclosure of the information we will take full account of your explanation, but we cannot give an assurance that confidentiality can be maintained in all circumstances. An automatic confidentiality disclaimer generated by your IT system will not, of itself, be regarded as binding on the Department.

The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will process your personal data in accordance with the law and in the majority of circumstances this will mean that your personal data will not be disclosed to third parties. A full privacy notice is included at Annex C.

Individual responses will not be acknowledged unless specifically requested.

Your opinions are valuable to us. Thank you for taking the time to read this document and respond.

Are you satisfied that this consultation has followed the Consultation Principles? If not or you have any other observations about how we can improve the process please contact us via the [complaints procedure](#).

# 1. Spending Round 2019

## 1.1. Background

- 1.1.1. On 4 September 2019 the Government set out the results of the 2019 Spending Round. The Spending Round responds to the pressures councils are facing by providing access to the largest year-on-year increase in Core Spending Power in almost a decade. We estimate that under our proposals Core Spending Power will rise from £46.2 billion to £49.1 billion in 2020-21. This is an increase of £2.9 billion, or an estimated 4.3% real-terms increase.
- 1.1.2. Local authorities will be able to access £1.5bn of additional funding for adult and children's social care next year. This will support local authorities to meet rising demand and recognises the vital role that social care plays in supporting the most vulnerable people in society.
- 1.1.3. At the same time as this injection of additional funding we are protecting vital front-line services by increasing elements of core settlement funding in line with inflation, and maintaining key local government grants at 2019-20 levels.
- 1.1.4. Outside of the main Local Government Finance Settlement, local government will also see increases from wider resources made available this Spending Round. This includes High Needs funding for schools and colleges which will increase by over £700m. There will also be a real-terms increase in the Public Health Grant and the NHS contribution to the Better Care Fund will grow in line with the planned additional investment in the NHS.
- 1.1.5. This document sets out more detail on the Government's plans for allocating these resources to local authorities. Once we have considered responses we will come back to the sector with proposals in the 2020-21 Provisional Local Government Finance Settlement. We are aiming to hold the provisional settlement in December.

## 2. Local Government Finance Reforms

### 2.1. Background

2.1.1. The Government has previously announced an ambitious programme of reforms to the local government finance system. These reforms include:

- **increasing the proportion of business rates retained by the sector**, to ensure local authorities have more control over the money they raise and powerful incentives to grow and reinvest in their local economies;
- **introducing reforms to the business rates retention system**, to increase stability and certainty;
- **and reviewing the funding formula** that determines funding allocations through the annual local government finance settlement, based on a fairer and more up-to-date assessment of councils' relative needs and resources.

### 2.2. Our approach to implementing the local government finance reforms

2.2.1. We have continued to make good progress on each of these reforms, based on close collaboration with sector representatives, testing issues and progressively narrowing our focus.

2.2.2. However, with such fundamental reforms, it is essential that we allow enough time to properly engage and consult on each area before final decisions are made. Over recent months we have heard the concerns of local authorities about the need for certainty and stability to enable budget planning for the next financial year.

2.2.3. Reflecting this, the one-year Spending Round and the plans for a more substantial Spending Review exercise in time for 2021-22, we propose to implement a 'roll-forward' settlement for 2020-21, which will provide stability for the majority of funding sources for local government.

2.2.4. The Government remains committed to reforming local government finance. In 2020 the Government plans to carry out a multi-year Spending Review, which will lay the groundwork for reforms. We will continue to work towards our aim to implement these reforms in 2021-22, including a full reset of business rates retention baselines.

2.2.5. On 1 April 2017 the Government launched five initial 100% business rates retention pilots in areas with ratified devolution deals. These devolution deal pilots will continue into 2020-21.

2.2.6. As planned, other business rates retention pilots agreed for 2019-20 will finish at the end of the financial year. The Government has decided not to run further pilot arrangements for 2020-21. London will operate under the 67% business rates retention scheme as agreed in 2017-18.



## 3. Summary of Proposals

### 3.1. Background

3.1.1. To reflect the one-year Spending Round and the decision to delay major reform until 2021-22 the Government is proposing to 'roll forward' the 2019-20 local government finance settlement. There will also be significant extra resource for social care and we will protect key local government grants within the settlement.

### 3.2. Summary of proposals

3.2.1. The Government's proposed approach to the 2020-21 settlement includes:

- A new £1.41 billion Social Care Grant for adult and children's services, including £1 billion of new funding;
- uprating the 2019-20 Settlement Funding Assessment in line with the change in the small business non-domestic rating multiplier;
- a core council tax referendum principle of up to 2%; an adult social care precept of 2% on top of the core principle; and no referendum principles for parish councils and mayoral combined authorities;
- committing to retain the top-slice of Revenue Support Grant to fund New Homes Bonus in 2020-21 at £900 million;
- maintaining existing improved Better Care Fund funding at 2019-20 levels, as well as rolling the £240 million which was allocated as Winter Pressures Grant this year into the improved Better Care Fund, with the same distribution as this year;
- and continuing Rural Services Delivery Grant at £81 million, with all recipients receiving the same amount as in 2019-20.

## 4. Distribution of Settlement Funding Assessment

### 4.1. Summary

4.1.1. The Government proposes that 2020-21 Settlement Funding Assessments, comprised of Revenue Support Grant and Baseline Funding Levels, will be uprated in line with the change in the small business non-domestic rating multiplier. The small business non-domestic rating multiplier will be confirmed by the time of the provisional settlement.

### 4.2. Business Rates Retention

4.2.1. From April 2013, local government has been funded in part through the business rates retention scheme, ensuring that local authorities have more control over the money they raise and are able to benefit directly from supporting local business growth. When the scheme started in 2013-14, the Government committed that Baseline Funding Levels and Business Rates Baselines, which are used to determine tariffs and top-ups, would be fixed in real terms until the system was reset.

4.2.2. Given the planned delay in implementing increased business rates retention, as set out in section 2, the Government proposes not to alter the existing mechanism for determining tariff and top-up payments in 2020-21.

### 4.3. Distribution of Revenue Support Grant

4.3.1. Recognising the need to provide stability, the Government proposes to pay Revenue Support Grant to ensure all local authorities will receive a uniform change in Settlement Funding Assessment in 2020-21, uprated in line with the change in the small business non-domestic rating multiplier.

#### ***Question 1: Do you agree with the Government's proposed methodology for the distribution of Revenue Support Grant in 2020-21?***

4.3.2. In 2019-20 the Government's approach to Settlement Funding Assessment included eliminating so-called negative RSG.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Please refer to section 5.1 of the 2019-20 Local Government Finance Settlement Technical Consultation for an explanation of the issue of negative Revenue Support Grant. The document is available here: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/728573/Settlement\\_Technical\\_Consultation\\_2019-20.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/728573/Settlement_Technical_Consultation_2019-20.pdf)

- 4.3.3. The Government is currently minded to pay off negative RSG again in 2020-21, using 2019-20 values of Settlement Funding Assessment as the baseline for this approach. This approach would recognise the need to provide stability to local authorities with negative RSG in 2020-21 and would be consistent with the Government's previous commitment, made during the implementation of the business rate retention scheme in 2013-14, that authorities' retained business rates baselines, which are used to determine their tariff and top-ups, would be fixed in real terms until the business rates system was reset. However, the Government also recognises that in the previous year some authorities opposed this policy, commenting that available resource should be distributed on the basis of need.
- 4.3.4. We welcome views in response to this consultation on whether eliminating negative RSG remains the right approach. For 2020-21 the Government will provide a further update at the provisional settlement once we have considered all responses to this consultation.

***Question 2: Should central government eliminate negative RSG in full through forgone business rates receipts?***

# 5. Council Tax

## 5.1. Council tax referendum principles for local authorities

5.1.1. The Government remains committed to its manifesto promise of council tax referendum principles. These principles strike a balance between giving local authorities the flexibility to determine their own level of council tax and ensuring local residents have the final say on excessive increases.

5.1.2. Following the outcome of the Spending Round, the Government proposes the following package of referendum principles for 2020-21:

- a core principle of up to 2%, applicable to shire county councils, unitary authorities, London borough councils, the Common Council of the City of London, the Council of the Isles of Scilly, the general precept of the Greater London Authority, and fire and rescue authorities, including Police and Crime Commissioner Fire and Rescue Authorities;
- an adult social care precept for local authorities with responsibility for adult social care of 2% on top of the core principle;
- no referendum principles for Mayoral Combined Authorities or town and parish councils.

5.1.3. In 2016-17, at the start of the four-year offer made to local government, the Government introduced a separate council tax referendum principle for shire districts, to address particular pressures on these authorities. This principle meant that districts could increase council tax by the core principle (2% in 2020-21) or £5, whichever is greater. The Government continued to grant this flexibility in 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20.

***Question 3: Do you think that there should be a separate council tax referendum principle of 2% or £5, whichever is greater, for shire district councils in 2020-21?***

## 5.2. Council tax referendum principles for Mayoral Combined Authorities

5.2.1. Devolution deals have led to the creation of eight Mayoral Combined Authorities with powers such as transport and planning.

5.2.2. In 2018-19 and 2019-20 the Government believed that each mayor should decide the level of precept, on the expectation that they would exercise restraint and set a precept that was affordable and proportionate to their needs.

5.2.3. In 2020-21 seven Combined Authority mayors have powers to raise additional resources to meet the costs of their functions through a precept on local council tax bills, with the agreement of the Combined Authority. The Government does not propose to set council tax referendum principles for Mayoral Combined Authorities in 2020-21.

### **5.3. Council tax referendum principles for town and parish councils**

5.3.1. In 2018-19, the Government announced it did not intend to set referendum principles for town and parish councils for three years. This period ends in 2020-21. This was contingent on:

- the sector taking all available steps to mitigate the need for council tax increases, including the use of reserves where they are not already earmarked for other uses or through “invest to save” projects which are intended to lower on-going costs; and
- the Government seeing clear evidence of restraint in the increases set by the sector.

5.3.2. In 2019-20 the average Band D parish precept is £67.18, an increase of 4.9%. This is the same percentage increase as in 2018-19 and compares to an increase of 6.3% in 2015-16. The Government remains concerned about the pressure placed on taxpayers from thousands of town and parish councils across England and expects them to exercise even greater restraint in 2020-21.

5.3.3. On this basis, the Government proposes to continue with no referendum principles for town and parish councils in 2020-21 but will keep this matter under active review for future years.

### **5.4. Next steps**

5.4.1. In reaching a decision on referendum principles for 2020-21 the Government will consider all responses to this consultation, as well as the overall amount of funding available and pressure on individual households. We will provide an update alongside the provisional settlement. A proposal for Police and Crime Commissioner precept referendum limits for policing will be put forward at the provisional police funding settlement.

***Question 4: Do you have views on the proposed package of council tax referendum principles for 2020-21?***

## 6. Distribution of Additional Resources

### 6.1. Social Care Funding

- 6.1.1. The Government is committed to addressing social care pressures. At Spring Budget 2017, an additional £2 billion over three years was provided for adult social care. In addition, at Autumn Budget 2018, the Government announced £650 million extra funding in 2019-20 for local authorities to help deliver the services communities need and to support the most vulnerable residents.
- 6.1.2. For 2020-21 the Government is proposing to protect all social care grants from 2019-20 as well as providing £1 billion in new grant funding.

#### *Social Care Grant*

- 6.1.3. For 2020-21 the Government is proposing a new Social Care Grant of £1.41 billion for adult and children's services. Of this, £410 million is a direct continuation of 2019-20 Social Care Support Grant, with an injection of £1 billion of new funding.
- 6.1.4. In line with the 2019-20 Social Care Support Grant, we propose to use the existing Adult Social Care Relative Needs Formula as the basis for distribution of the grant, with £1,260m of direct allocations plus an equalisation component. We propose to use the remaining £150m to equalise the impact of the distribution of the adult social care council tax precept, using the current improved Better Care Fund equalisation methodology,
- 6.1.5. A table of indicative allocations for the Social Care Grant is at Annex B along with a more detailed methodology note. This grant will not be ringfenced, and conditions or reporting requirements will not be attached. We are also not prescribing how much of it should be spent on adult social care and how much should be spent on children's social care.

#### ***Question 5: Do you agree with the Government's proposals for social care funding in 2020-21?***

### 6.2. Improved Better Care Fund

- 6.2.1. The purpose of the improved Better Care Fund (iBCF) is to meet adult social care needs, reduce pressure on the NHS and ensure that the local social care provider market is supported. It was first announced in the 2015 Spending Review and is paid as a direct grant to local government, with a condition that it is pooled into the

Better Care Fund (BCF). The iBCF grant allocations were increased at Spring Budget 2017 with an additional £2 billion funding. This additional funding was also pooled into the Better Care Fund over the period 2017-18 to 2019-20. The condition that the iBCF must be pooled into the Better Care Fund will continue in 2020-21.

- 6.2.2. Reflecting the one-year Spending Round and the proposals for a roll-forward settlement, the Government proposes to continue existing iBCF funding at 2019-20 levels (£1.837 billion), using the same methodology as 2019-20.
- 6.2.3. The Government provided £240 million in 2019-20 through a Winter Pressures Grant which was ringfenced for use by local authorities to alleviate winter pressures on the NHS. The Government proposes that, in 2020-21, this £240 million will not be ringfenced for that purpose. It will instead be rolled into the iBCF; and allocated using the existing Adult Social Care Relative Needs Formula, as in 2019-20.

**Question 6: Do you agree with the Government's proposals for iBCF in 2020-21?**

**6.3. Better Care Fund 2020-21**

- 6.3.1. The Government remains committed to the integration of health and social care and can confirm that the Better Care Fund (BCF) will continue into 2020-21. As well as announcing continued iBCF funding, the Spending Round announced that the NHS contribution to adult social care through the BCF will increase by 3.4% in real terms in 2020-21. As the NHS works with local government on plans for enhanced and improved Primary and Community services, they should also be working together on continued integration of health and social care, as well as alignment to wider local government services such as housing. Details of the BCF for 2020-21 will be issued in due course.

**6.4. New Homes Bonus**

*Background*

- 6.4.1. The New Homes Bonus was introduced in 2011 to provide an incentive for local authorities to encourage housing growth in their areas. Over £7.9 billion has been allocated to local authorities to reward additional housing supply.
- 6.4.2. Although it was successful in encouraging authorities to support housing growth, New Homes Bonus did not originally reward those authorities who are the most open to growth. In December 2016, following consultation, the Government announced reforms to New Homes Bonus as follows:

- reduction of the number of years New Homes Bonus payments are made (legacy payments) from 6 to 5 years in 2017-18 and to 4 years from 2018-19;
- introduction of a national baseline for housing growth of 0.4% of council tax base (weighted by band) from 2017-18, below which New Homes Bonus will not be paid.

#### *New Homes Bonus in 2020-21*

- 6.4.3. As part of our roll-forward settlement the Government proposes to retain the £900 million top-slice of Revenue Support Grant to fund New Homes Bonus payments in 2020-21. In addition to funding legacy payments associated with previous allocations, the Government is minded to make a new round of allocations for 2020-21.
- 6.4.4. New Homes Bonus calculations are based on additional housing stock reported through council tax base statistics published in November. For any new allocations made in 2020-21 the Government will retain the option of adjusting the baseline in 2020-21 to reflect significant additional housing growth and spending limits. The Government will set out proposals on the baseline for 2020-21 at the provisional settlement alongside any new allocations. Any funding intended for New Homes Bonus payments in 2020-21 that is not used for this purpose will be returned to local government.
- 6.4.5. It is the Government's intention to look again at the New Homes Bonus and explore the most effective way to incentivise housing growth. We will consult widely on proposals prior to implementation. As the roll forward is for one year, with any funding beyond 2020-21 subject to the 2020 Spending Review and potential new proposals, any new allocations in 2020-21 will not result in legacy payments being made in subsequent years on those allocations.

***Question 7: Do you agree that there should be a new round of 2020-21 New Homes Bonus allocations for 2020-21, or would you prefer to see this funding allocated for a different purpose, and if so how should the funding be allocated?***

#### **6.5. Rural Services Delivery Grant**

- 6.5.1. In recognition of additional cost pressures in rural areas, the Government proposes to roll-forward 2019-20 allocations of Rural Services Delivery Grant, totalling £81 million.
- 6.5.2. 2019-20 allocations were distributed to the top quartile of local authorities on the basis of the 'super-sparsity' indicator, which ranks authorities by the proportion of



the population which is scattered widely, using Census data and weighted towards the authorities with the sparsest populations.

***Question 8: Do you agree with the Government's proposed approach to paying £81 million Rural Services Delivery Grant in 2020-21 to the upper quartile of local authorities, based on the super-sparsity indicator?***

## 7. Equalities impacts of these proposals

7.1.1. Equality statements have been published for every year of the multi-year settlement, including 2019-20. Any representations made in response to this consultation will be used to inform the equalities statement to be published at the time of the 2020-21 provisional settlement.

***Question 9: Do you have any comments on the impact of the proposals for the 2020-21 settlement outlined in this consultation document on persons who share a protected characteristic? Please provide evidence to support your comments.***

# Annex A: Summary of consultation questions

**Question 1: Do you agree with the Government's proposed methodology for the distribution of Revenue Support Grant in 2020-21?**

**Question 2: Should central government eliminate negative RSG in full through forgone business rates receipts?**

**Question 3: Do you think that there should be a separate council tax referendum principle of 2% or £5, whichever is greater, for shire district councils in 2020-21?**

**Question 4: Do you have views on the proposed package of council tax referendum principles for 2020-21?**

**Question 5: Do you agree with the Government's proposals for social care funding in 2020-21?**

**Question 6: Do you agree with the Government's proposals for iBCF in 2020-21?**

**Question 7: Do you agree that there should be a new round of 2020-21 New Homes Bonus allocations for 2020-21, or would you prefer to see this funding allocated for a different purpose, and if so how should the funding be allocated?**

**Question 8: Do you agree with the Government's proposed approach to paying £81 million Rural Services Delivery Grant in 2020-21 to the upper quartile of local authorities, based on the super-sparsity indicator?**

**Question 9: Do you have any comments on the impact of the proposals for the 2020-21 settlement outlined in this consultation document on persons who share a protected characteristic? Please provide evidence to support your comments.**

# Annex B: Social Care Grant Indicative Allocations and Equalisation Methodology

The proposed equalisation methodology for Social Care Grant in 2020-21 is based on identifying the total potential new resource for social care to be equalised.

This is the sum of the additional grant funding to be used for equalisation (in this case £150m) plus the total potential increase in council tax precept income in that year as a result of the proposed 2% Adult Social Care precept referendum principle (approximately £500m). This amount is then allocated between authorities on the basis of the Relative Needs Formula.

The amount for each local authority is then reduced by its potential council tax precept income.

The resulting figure is then essentially that authority's share of the equalisation amount (£150m).

However, for a small number of authorities, the precept income exceeds the needs share, and in these cases the equalisation component of the grant is set to zero and the authority concerned retains the potential council tax resources in excess of their calculated needs share.

This results in turn in a grant total for equalisation which exceeds £150m; to reduce this to the required level, the grant payments for each authority are reduced, by amounts in proportion to the figure for each authority. The resulting amounts are shown in the second column of the table below and are added to the other grant components to give the overall total. From this, all authorities receive over 97% of their needs-based share of the total new resources.

**Social Care Grant 2020-21: Indicative Allocations**

<b>Authority</b>	<b>Element used to equalise for 2% ASC precept flexibility</b>	<b>Remaining new funding, using 2013-14 ASC RNF</b>	<b>Rollover of 2019-20 Social Care Support Grant</b>	<b>Total 2020-21 Social Care Grant</b>
	<b>(£)</b>	<b>(£)</b>	<b>(£)</b>	<b>(£)</b>
<b>England</b>	<b>150,000,000</b>	<b>850,000,000</b>	<b>410,000,000</b>	<b>1,410,000,000</b>
Barking and Dagenham	1,077,159	3,233,759	1,559,813	<b>5,870,731</b>
Barnet	243,671	5,126,523	2,472,794	<b>7,842,988</b>
Barnsley	1,291,901	4,386,003	2,115,602	<b>7,793,506</b>
Bath & North East Somerset	99,139	2,584,541	1,246,661	<b>3,930,341</b>
Bedford	-	2,198,710	1,060,554	<b>3,259,264</b>
Bexley	232,651	3,287,993	1,585,973	<b>5,106,618</b>
Birmingham	7,344,917	19,834,379	9,567,171	<b>36,746,468</b>
Blackburn with Darwen	911,523	2,707,308	1,305,878	<b>4,924,710</b>
Blackpool	1,177,496	3,200,550	1,543,795	<b>5,921,841</b>
Bolton	1,342,933	4,923,279	2,374,758	<b>8,640,971</b>
Bournemouth, Christchurch & Poole*	441,248	6,197,541	2,985,959	<b>9,624,749</b>
Bracknell Forest	-	1,281,502	618,136	<b>1,899,638</b>
Bradford	2,024,698	8,135,950	3,924,399	<b>14,085,046</b>
Brent	1,000,158	4,756,589	2,294,354	<b>8,051,100</b>
Brighton & Hove	364,424	4,351,504	2,098,961	<b>6,814,889</b>
Bristol	1,026,241	7,183,796	3,465,125	<b>11,675,162</b>
Bromley	-	4,216,196	2,033,694	<b>6,249,890</b>
Buckinghamshire*	-	5,919,253	2,855,169	<b>8,774,422</b>
Bury	481,788	2,892,518	1,395,214	<b>4,769,520</b>
Calderdale	562,097	3,260,518	1,572,720	<b>5,395,335</b>
Cambridgeshire	221,760	8,231,033	3,970,263	<b>12,423,057</b>
Camden	1,089,170	4,553,741	2,196,510	<b>7,839,421</b>
Central Bedfordshire	-	3,066,985	1,479,369	<b>4,546,354</b>

Cheshire East	-	5,137,675	2,478,173	<b>7,615,848</b>
Cheshire West & Chester	183,950	5,196,400	2,506,499	<b>7,886,849</b>
City of London	-	172,800	83,351	<b>256,151</b>
Cornwall	1,378,248	9,893,235	4,772,031	<b>16,043,514</b>
Coventry	1,287,789	5,493,344	2,649,731	<b>9,430,864</b>
Croydon	75,137	4,963,076	2,393,954	<b>7,432,167</b>
Cumbria	1,815,168	8,879,744	4,283,171	<b>14,978,083</b>
Darlington	321,159	1,774,984	856,169	<b>2,952,312</b>
Derby	1,020,142	4,067,849	1,962,139	<b>7,050,129</b>
Derbyshire	2,897,426	12,846,708	6,196,648	<b>21,940,782</b>
Devon	1,388,650	12,663,344	6,108,201	<b>20,160,195</b>
Doncaster	1,635,278	5,347,491	2,579,378	<b>9,562,147</b>
Dorset*	-	6,044,757	2,919,150	<b>8,963,907</b>
Dudley	1,573,930	5,530,739	2,667,768	<b>9,772,437</b>
Durham	2,833,674	9,995,914	4,821,558	<b>17,651,147</b>
Ealing	924,417	5,020,555	2,421,679	<b>8,366,651</b>
East Riding of Yorkshire	439,626	5,121,138	2,470,196	<b>8,030,959</b>
East Sussex	1,055,898	9,157,513	4,417,153	<b>14,630,565</b>
Enfield	848,733	4,599,334	2,218,502	<b>7,666,569</b>
Essex	2,174,750	20,964,875	10,112,469	<b>33,252,095</b>
Gateshead	1,110,784	4,013,716	1,936,028	<b>7,060,528</b>
Gloucestershire	702,999	8,960,361	4,322,057	<b>13,985,417</b>
Greenwich	1,434,191	4,711,396	2,272,556	<b>8,418,144</b>
Hackney	1,911,327	4,976,053	2,400,214	<b>9,287,594</b>
Halton	651,498	2,263,593	1,091,851	<b>4,006,942</b>
Hammersmith and Fulham	1,134,408	3,252,600	1,568,901	<b>5,955,908</b>
Hampshire	-	16,838,843	8,122,265	<b>24,961,108</b>
Haringey	930,749	4,066,550	1,961,512	<b>6,958,811</b>
Harrow	47,296	3,434,809	1,656,790	<b>5,138,895</b>

Hartlepool	468,058	1,774,812	856,086	<b>3,098,957</b>
Havering	170,533	3,561,794	1,718,042	<b>5,450,369</b>
Herefordshire	251,872	3,118,840	1,504,382	<b>4,875,094</b>
Hertfordshire	-	14,642,720	7,062,959	<b>21,705,679</b>
Hillingdon	430,480	3,687,256	1,778,559	<b>5,896,295</b>
Hounslow	523,401	3,539,335	1,707,209	<b>5,769,946</b>
Isle of Wight	300,925	2,714,387	1,309,293	<b>4,324,605</b>
Isles of Scilly	629	44,841	21,630	<b>67,100</b>
Islington	1,430,736	4,554,190	2,196,727	<b>8,181,653</b>
Kensington and Chelsea	542,486	3,069,937	1,480,793	<b>5,093,216</b>
Kent	2,003,602	21,832,371	10,530,908	<b>34,366,881</b>
Kingston upon Hull	1,996,455	5,145,840	2,482,111	<b>9,624,405</b>
Kingston upon Thames	-	2,030,009	979,181	<b>3,009,190</b>
Kirklees	1,266,544	6,587,080	3,177,297	<b>11,030,921</b>
Knowsley	1,412,938	3,460,406	1,669,137	<b>6,542,481</b>
Lambeth	1,416,041	5,344,078	2,577,732	<b>9,337,852</b>
Lancashire	4,446,134	19,543,454	9,426,843	<b>33,416,432</b>
Leeds	2,272,701	11,725,500	5,655,829	<b>19,654,030</b>
Leicester	1,726,110	5,573,657	2,688,470	<b>9,988,237</b>
Leicestershire	349,128	8,550,459	4,124,339	<b>13,023,927</b>
Lewisham	1,252,963	4,844,582	2,336,798	<b>8,434,343</b>
Lincolnshire	2,803,393	11,928,156	5,753,581	<b>20,485,129</b>
Liverpool	4,002,239	10,473,090	5,051,726	<b>19,527,055</b>
Luton	549,673	2,791,275	1,346,380	<b>4,687,328</b>
Manchester	3,567,145	9,442,260	4,554,502	<b>17,563,906</b>
Medway	253,039	3,534,127	1,704,697	<b>5,491,863</b>
Merton	131,240	2,648,847	1,277,679	<b>4,057,767</b>
Middlesbrough	838,065	2,684,362	1,294,810	<b>4,817,237</b>
Milton Keynes	62,256	3,216,109	1,551,300	<b>4,829,665</b>

Newcastle upon Tyne	1,666,547	5,315,442	2,563,919	<b>9,545,908</b>
Newham	2,101,439	5,200,629	2,508,539	<b>9,810,607</b>
Norfolk	2,817,272	14,799,485	7,138,575	<b>24,755,332</b>
North East Lincolnshire	693,434	2,761,473	1,332,004	<b>4,786,911</b>
North Lincolnshire	519,845	2,694,922	1,299,903	<b>4,514,670</b>
North Somerset	250,621	3,272,307	1,578,407	<b>5,101,334</b>
North Tyneside	794,124	3,651,730	1,761,423	<b>6,207,278</b>
North Yorkshire	324,562	8,583,586	4,140,318	<b>13,048,466</b>
Northamptonshire	1,040,162	9,623,090	4,641,726	<b>15,304,977</b>
Northumberland	457,683	5,388,477	2,599,148	<b>8,445,308</b>
Nottingham	1,655,068	5,489,681	2,647,964	<b>9,792,714</b>
Nottinghamshire	1,869,848	12,491,707	6,025,412	<b>20,386,967</b>
Oldham	1,062,263	3,975,005	1,917,355	<b>6,954,622</b>
Oxfordshire	-	8,115,922	3,914,739	<b>12,030,661</b>
Peterborough	512,725	2,810,883	1,355,838	<b>4,679,447</b>
Plymouth	1,111,659	4,547,870	2,193,679	<b>7,853,208</b>
Portsmouth	716,866	3,153,561	1,521,129	<b>5,391,556</b>
Reading	-	2,016,987	972,900	<b>2,989,887</b>
Redbridge	538,831	3,952,416	1,906,459	<b>6,397,706</b>
Redcar and Cleveland	631,656	2,550,797	1,230,384	<b>4,412,837</b>
Richmond upon Thames	-	2,340,482	1,128,938	<b>3,469,420</b>
Rochdale	1,106,484	3,925,436	1,893,446	<b>6,925,365</b>
Rotherham	1,330,479	4,764,558	2,298,199	<b>8,393,236</b>
Rutland	-	480,676	231,855	<b>712,531</b>
Salford	1,206,536	4,666,741	2,251,016	<b>8,124,292</b>
Sandwell	2,615,103	6,544,745	3,156,877	<b>12,316,725</b>
Sefton	1,309,277	5,400,635	2,605,012	<b>9,314,924</b>
Sheffield	2,660,789	9,581,141	4,621,492	<b>16,863,423</b>
Shropshire	565,317	4,936,458	2,381,115	<b>7,882,889</b>



Slough	176,941	1,825,563	880,565	<b>2,883,069</b>
Solihull	214,870	3,082,511	1,486,858	<b>4,784,239</b>
Somerset	1,592,911	8,845,550	4,266,677	<b>14,705,138</b>
South Gloucestershire	-	3,311,620	1,597,369	<b>4,908,989</b>
South Tyneside	1,135,510	3,241,548	1,563,570	<b>5,940,628</b>
Southampton	871,285	3,929,075	1,895,201	<b>6,695,561</b>
Southend-on-Sea	534,870	2,918,335	1,407,667	<b>4,860,871</b>
Southwark	1,769,007	5,562,710	2,683,190	<b>10,014,908</b>
St Helens	995,834	3,410,114	1,644,878	<b>6,050,826</b>
Staffordshire	2,244,441	12,544,457	6,050,856	<b>20,839,754</b>
Stockport	278,011	4,544,721	2,192,160	<b>7,014,892</b>
Stockton-on-Tees	430,669	2,993,553	1,443,949	<b>4,868,171</b>
Stoke-on-Trent	1,698,807	4,717,131	2,275,322	<b>8,691,260</b>
Suffolk	2,061,254	11,550,789	5,571,557	<b>19,183,600</b>
Sunderland	2,018,038	5,552,545	2,678,287	<b>10,248,871</b>
Surrey	-	14,147,673	6,824,172	<b>20,971,845</b>
Sutton	-	2,611,208	1,259,524	<b>3,870,732</b>
Swindon	-	2,724,446	1,314,145	<b>4,038,591</b>
Tameside	1,138,382	4,087,211	1,971,478	<b>7,197,071</b>
Telford and the Wrekin	672,523	2,742,279	1,322,746	<b>4,737,548</b>
Thurrock	388,454	2,316,974	1,117,599	<b>3,823,026</b>
Torbay	766,269	2,934,553	1,415,490	<b>5,116,312</b>
Tower Hamlets	1,676,113	5,188,416	2,502,648	<b>9,367,178</b>
Trafford	492,697	3,349,371	1,615,579	<b>5,457,646</b>
Wakefield	1,434,886	5,839,767	2,816,829	<b>10,091,482</b>
Walsall	1,270,480	5,071,046	2,446,034	<b>8,787,560</b>
Waltham Forest	729,460	3,855,784	1,859,849	<b>6,445,094</b>
Wandsworth	2,073,776	4,595,157	2,216,487	<b>8,885,420</b>
Warrington	230,364	2,917,403	1,407,218	<b>4,554,985</b>

Warwickshire	-	7,914,152	3,817,415	<b>11,731,567</b>
West Berkshire	-	1,774,012	855,700	<b>2,629,712</b>
West Sussex	-	11,699,725	5,643,397	<b>17,343,122</b>
Westminster	2,208,658	4,686,189	2,260,397	<b>9,155,244</b>
Wigan	1,765,260	5,639,122	2,720,047	<b>10,124,429</b>
Wiltshire	-	6,456,684	3,114,401	<b>9,571,085</b>
Windsor and Maidenhead	-	1,687,452	813,947	<b>2,501,399</b>
Wirral	1,810,692	6,376,310	3,075,632	<b>11,262,634</b>
Wokingham	-	1,422,295	686,048	<b>2,108,343</b>
Wolverhampton	1,467,437	4,875,024	2,351,482	<b>8,693,943</b>
Worcestershire	983,633	8,445,547	4,073,734	<b>13,502,914</b>
York	130,891	2,591,794	1,250,159	<b>3,972,844</b>

\* Under the proposed methodology, the indicative allocations for Bournemouth, Christchurch & Poole, Buckinghamshire and Dorset are subject to change because of restructuring. We will consult with these local authorities on the most appropriate allocations and take into account both the new restructures and updated data sets when making proposals for Social Care Grant allocations at the provisional settlement.

Depending on the final allocation decisions for the above local authorities, this may marginally change the allocations for all local authorities.

# Annex C: Glossary of technical terms

## **Adult Social Care Precept**

The 'Adult Social Care precept' was first announced at Spending Review 2015. This gave authorities with adult social care responsibilities additional flexibility to increase their council tax level by a further % each year above the core referendum principle without triggering a referendum, to spend exclusively on adult social care.

## **Baseline Funding Level**

The amount of an individual local authority's Start-Up Funding Assessment for 2013-14 provided through the *local share* of the Estimated Business Rates Aggregate updated each year by the change to the small business non-domestic rating multiplier.

## **Council Tax Base**

A "tax base" is the number of Band D equivalent dwellings in a local authority area. To calculate the tax base for an area, the number of dwellings in each council tax band is adjusted to take account of any discounts, premiums or exemptions.

## **Council Tax Referendum Principles**

These mark levels of council tax increases (either in percentage or cash terms) above which a local authority must hold a referendum which allows residents to approve or veto the increase. The comparison is made between the authority's average band D council tax level for the current financial year and the proposed average band D for the next financial year.

## **Relative Needs Formula**

Funding formulas which incorporate relevant local demographic or other data, to predict the relative demand councils face when delivering different services.

## **Revenue Support Grant**

Billing and most major precepting authorities receive Revenue Support Grant from central government in addition to their share of Business Rates Aggregate. An authority's Revenue Support Grant amount plus their share of the Estimated Business Rates Aggregate will together comprise its Settlement Funding Assessment.

## **Settlement Fund Assessment**

The Settlement Funding Assessment consists of the authority's share of business rates revenues and Revenue Support Grant. As the share of business rates has been fixed until 2021 to provide a strong incentive for local authorities to promote growth, any changes to the Settlement Funding Assessment other than adjustments for inflation can only be applied to the element of funding that is provided through Revenue Support Grant.

## **Tariffs and top-ups**

These are calculated by comparing at the outset of the business rates retention scheme an individual authority's business rates baseline against its Baseline Funding Level. Tariffs and top-ups are self-funding, fixed at the start of the scheme and index linked to the small business non-domestic rating multiplier in future years.

# Annex D: Privacy Notice

## Personal data

The following is to explain your rights and give you the information you are be entitled to under the Data Protection Act 2018.

Note that this section only refers to your personal data (your name address and anything that could be used to identify you personally) not the content of your response to the consultation.

### 1. The identity of the data controller and contact details of our Data Protection Officer

The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) is the data controller. The Data Protection Officer can be contacted at [dataprotection@communities.gov.uk](mailto:dataprotection@communities.gov.uk)

### 2. Why we are collecting your personal data

Your personal data is being collected as an essential part of the consultation process, so that we can contact you regarding your response and for statistical purposes. We may also use it to contact you about related matters.

### 3. Our legal basis for processing your personal data

The Data Protection Act 2018 states that, as a government department, MHCLG may process personal data as necessary for the effective performance of a task carried out in the public interest. i.e. a consultation.

### 4. With whom we will be sharing your personal data

- Other Government Departments including:
  - Prime Minister's Office
  - Attorney General's Office
  - Cabinet Office
  - Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
  - Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
  - Department for Education Department for Environment
  - Food and Rural Affairs
  - Department for Exiting the European Union
  - Department for International Development
  - Department for International Trade
  - Department for Transport
  - Department for Work and Pensions
  - Department of Health and Social Care
  - Foreign and Commonwealth Office
  - Her Majesty's Treasury
  - Home Office

- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Justice
- Northern Ireland Office
- Office of the Advocate General for Scotland
- Office of the Leader of the House of Commons
- Office of the Leader of the House of Lords
- Scotland Office UK
- Export Finance
- Wales Office

**5. For how long we will keep your personal data, or criteria used to determine the retention period.**

Your personal data will be held for two years from the closure of the consultation.

**6. Your rights, e.g. access, rectification, erasure**

The data we are collecting is your personal data, and you have considerable say over what happens to it. You have the right:

- a. to see what data we have about you
- b. to ask us to stop using your data, but keep it on record
- c. to ask to have all or some of your data deleted or corrected
- d. to lodge a complaint with the independent Information Commissioner (ICO) if you think we are not handling your data fairly or in accordance with the law. You can contact the ICO at <https://ico.org.uk/>, or telephone 0303 123 1113.

**7. Your personal data will not be sent overseas.**

**8. Your personal data will not be used for any automated decision making.**

**9. Your personal data will be stored in a secure government IT system.**



Sent by email to: [LGFSettlement@communities.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:LGFSettlement@communities.gsi.gov.uk)

29 October 2019

## **Local Government Finance Settlement 2020 to 2021: Technical Consultation**

Dear LGF Settlement Team,

This letter represents the response from Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority (the Authority) to the technical consultation for the 2020-21 Local Government Finance Settlement. The Authority is calling for enhanced precept flexibility for FRAs equivalent to that offered to shire district councils, being £5 on a band D property.

### **Investment in Fire Protection**

The Hackitt enquiry and HMICFRS have highlighted the significant reduction in the number of fire safety audits in recent years. Across England in 2010-11 there were 84,575 fire safety audits, which by 2018-19 had decreased to 49,327. Whilst the proportion of audits resulting in a satisfactory rating has improved from 56% to 67% it is unknown whether this is the result of improving fire safety or just fewer audits. Clearly there is a need to invest in fire protection activity to increase activity in this area and outcomes for businesses and high risk properties.

Due to local Integrated Risk Management Planning the way in which Fire and Rescue Services deliver their fire protection activity can vary, with a mixture of delivery by firefighter crews and specialised business safety officers. Cost per audit will also vary as a result, with estimations being between £580 and £1150 per completed audit. As an illustration, just returning to 2010-11 activity levels requires an additional 35,248 audits, which would equate to an additional investment in excess of £30m. According to Home Office statistics, between 2010 and 2018 there was a reduction in FTE firefighters of 22%; in 2010 there were approximately 42,000 firefighters whilst in 2018 there were 32,000. As a result the ability for Fire and Rescue Services to deliver business safety activity using firefighter crews has diminished.

In terms of business safety officers, at a salary including on costs of circa £45,000, an additional £47.8m of funding for the sector (£5 increase) could pay for the recruitment of a further 1,062 staff to deliver this vital improvement.

### **Sector Pressures**

As above, firefighter numbers have decreased by 22%. Over this same period (2010 to 2018) average response times to primary fires have increased by 31 seconds to 8 minutes and 45 seconds (a 6% increase).

If a fire of the scale of Grenfell Tower occurred anywhere other than London, it would be a significant challenge for the Authority to resource – even with mutual assistance. The reductions in firefighter numbers also directly impact the availability of personnel to support national resilience capabilities. Regarding fire and rescue operations post-Grenfell, the Authority faced additional requirements for inspections in high rise properties, even before the full impact of legislative change is known.

The sector needs to respond to the inspection process, with Tranche 2 finding that whilst responding to emergencies is a strength, Fire Protection is a concern and often under resourced whilst the inconsistent capability to respond to national incidents is highlighted. Investment will be required to work together across the sector to deliver improved outcomes.

In addition to those pressures that are specific to the FRS (outlined above) the fire service is also facing pressures like those in the wider public sector. Namely; wage inflation and the demands caused by an aging population; 42% of fire-related deaths occur in a home where the residents are aged over 65, despite making up just 19% of the population.

**Q1: Do you agree with the Government's proposed methodology for the distribution of Revenue Support Grant in 2020-21?**

With the 2020 comprehensive spending review, the fair funding review and the reform of business rates retention ahead against the ever-uncertain backdrop of Brexit and a potential general election; as much stability and certainty as is possible is needed. Given this the government's proposed methodology for the distribution of RSG in 2020-21 seems sensible.

**Q2: Should central government eliminate negative RSG in full through forgone business rates receipts?**

The government's proposed approach regarding negative RSG seems consistent with the push for greater stability and certainty as stated above.

**Q3: Do you think that there should be a separate council tax referendum principle of 2% or £5, whichever is greater, for shire district councils in 2020-21?**

Whilst the issue of shire districts' referendum principles has no direct effect on FRAs, the approach proposed seems sensible. However, the Authority advocates for the government taking a similar approach for FRAs. Similar referendum principles are required for FRAs to prevent the continued divergence of council tax, provide consistent funding protection for FRAs in all parts of England and importantly to invest in improving the service with a focus on fire protection.

**Q4: Do you have views on the proposed package of council tax referendum principles for 2020-21?**

The way that the current referendum principles affects Core Spending Power means that most authorities (of all types) will raise their precepts by the maximum referendum-free amount. This has only been compounded by the austerity agenda that dominated many years starting in 2010.

Observing the principles proposed within this consultation; one notes that, should FRAs raise their precepts by the maximum allowed amount each year then the range of FRA precepts will diverge rather than converge. Put simply, FRAs with larger precepts will be able to raise significantly more additional funding than their counterparts with lower precepts. Therefore, it is the Authority's view that the government should set referendum principles which allow for consistent investment in reform arising from HMICFRS recommendations and fire protection activity.

The NFCC proposal to allow an increase of £5 would level out council tax fire precepts, making council tax fairer; would increase local powers and devolution *and* improve fire safety and save lives.

**Q5: Do you agree with the Government's proposals for social care funding in 2020-21?**

**Q6: Do you agree with the Government's proposals for iBCF in 2020-21?**

**Q7: Do you agree that there should be a new round of 2020-21 New Homes Bonus allocations for 2020-21, or would you prefer to see this funding allocated for a different purpose, and if so, how should the funding be allocated?**

No comment.



Generally, the Authority recognises the need for increased social care funding, however this must not be delivered at the expense of FRAs' budgets (which are funded according to the *risk of demand* rather than purely the demand itself and can contribute to efficiencies in other sectors). Therefore, the NFCC welcomes the fact that proposed increases in social care funding are being met through an increased quantum of local government funding and highlights the need for an increased quantum to continue to be the source of any further social care funding increases.

**Q8: Do you agree with the Government's proposed approach to paying £81 million Rural Services Delivery Grant in 2020-21 to the upper quartile of local authorities, based on the super-sparsity indicator?**

No comment.

**Q9: Do you have any comments on the impact of the proposals for the 2020- 21 settlement outlined in this consultation document on persons who share a protected characteristic? Please provide evidence to support your comments.**

Fire and Rescue Services target their activity at the most vulnerable in society and therefore reducing resources is likely to have an impact on those needing additional support, such as elderly and disabled people.

**Additional Comments**


Whilst the Authority recognises that this is an MHCLG consultation, it would be remiss not to highlight the need for the continuation of the Home Office's 'Fire Pensions Grant' received in 2019-20. Continued work conducted by the NFCC shows that FRAs are forecasting a significant reduction in reserves in the medium-term; a loss of such a significant funding stream could lead to many FRAs becoming unsustainable.

Although the MHCLG has clearly looked to maximise certainty for 2020-21, it is unfortunate that there is no such certainty from 2021-22 onwards. Whilst recognising that this is an issue for HMT and is subject to the 2020 comprehensive spending review (which in turn is subject to many economic factors), the NFCC asks that as much certainty as possible be provided to FRAs as early as possible, regarding 2021-22 onwards.

**Summary**

The Authority welcomes the focus that the government has clearly placed on stability and certainty within these proposals and expects that this will be consistent across departments; it is vitally important that additional pensions costs continue to be recognised going forward. In general, the proposals set out seem reasonable, however the sensible approach to shire districts' referendum principles should also be extended to FRAs.

Yours sincerely



**Jason Thelwell QFSM  
Chief Fire Officer/Chief Executive  
Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority**

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# Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority



<b>MEETING</b>	Executive Committee
<b>DATE OF MEETING</b>	13 November 2019
<b>OFFICER</b>	Mick Osborne – Deputy Chief Fire Officer
<b>LEAD MEMBER</b>	Councillor Steven Lambert
<b>SUBJECT OF THE REPORT</b>	<b>Succession Planning - Business Continuity and Resilience</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<p>A key aim of the Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes Fire Authority's (BMKFA) Business Continuity and Resilience plan is to ensure that plans are in place to ensure sustainable, fit for purpose, effective leadership and that workforce capacity and capabilities are available to deliver the Public Safety Plan, Authority's vision and corporate priorities. The plans also consider building in ongoing and increasing flexibility to accommodate fast paced external workforce change drivers, balanced by current and predicted changes to workforce demographics.</p> <p>These aims are achieved through regular systematic and rigorous Strategic Workforce and Succession Planning processes, which incorporate current Public Safety Plan requirements and horizon scanning of likely future external and internal challenges. Outcomes from these processes are subsequently translated into timely interventions to ensure the Authority continues to meet workforce capacity requirements and build capability. In addition, it provides opportunity to refresh the workforce through the identification of people; internal and where required external to fill identified key positions.</p> <p>This report sets out the outcomes of the most recent 2019 Business Continuity and Resilience Workforce and Succession Planning review, and offers reassurance to the Executive Committee that the necessary safeguards and contingency plans are in place to future proof the Authority, mitigate risk and optimise opportunities during a period of significant change and increasing demands; all to continually provide the best service possible to our communities.</p> <p>The outcomes of the review are detailed in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Appendix A which outlines the succession position for the Strategic Management Board (SMB)</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Appendix B which outlines succession plans for middle and senior managers across the service</li> <li>▪ Appendix C which provides an overview of potential risks and subsequent opportunities</li> </ul>
<b>ACTION</b>	Noting
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<p>That the following be noted:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strategic Management Board (SMB) succession plan;</li> <li>2. Middle and senior management succession plans across the service;</li> <li>3. The potential risks presented and the ongoing work being undertaken to mitigate impact.</li> </ol>
<b>RISK MANAGEMENT</b>	<p>The SMB and individual directorate plans are reviewed, challenged, and updated annually as part of the Authority's Training Needs Analysis (TNA) process.</p> <p>Staff Availability is an identified corporate risk which is reviewed regularly by SMB and the Overview and Audit Committee. Plans are in place to mitigate this risk.</p> <p>The Authority's robust workforce planning allows for accurate forecasting of potential leavers in the form of retirements and subsequent planning for this accordingly.</p> <p>Increased recruitment activity nationally, locally and other significant risks (Appendix C) which may impact on the number of leavers are being mitigated by the Authority with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Substantiating those in temporary roles where possible to give stability to the organisation and assurances to staff</li> <li>• Resource allocation to accommodate increased promotional activity – developing the talent pipeline</li> <li>• Firefighter transferee recruitment process concluding October 2019</li> <li>• Early planning for recruiting a fifth and sixth cohort of Firefighter Apprentices.</li> <li>• Staff engagement – increased number of leadership events, culture survey and communications from SMB</li> <li>• Enhancing attraction, career promotional processes within the community either stand alone and/or in collaboration</li> </ul> <p>Whilst any change to current positions presents short-term risks, it also provides opportunity to review and refresh role requirements and recruit from the talent</p>

	<p>pipeline, providing promotional opportunities for existing staff.</p>
<p><b>FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS</b></p>	<p>Any cost implications will be managed within existing Directorate budgets and the planned spend on Training is agreed by SMB and The Training Strategy Group.</p> <p>Any additional spend will be considered as part of Authority's Medium Term Financial Planning process.</p>
<p><b>LEGAL IMPLICATIONS</b></p>	<p>In addition to certain appointments required by statute, the Buckinghamshire Fire Services (Combination Scheme) Order 1996 provides that "the Authority may appoint such other officers and employees as they think necessary for the efficient discharge of their functions".</p> <p><a href="#">Section 41 of the Localism Act 2011</a> requires that the Authority must comply with its Pay Policy Principles and Statement for the relevant financial year when making a determination that relates to the remuneration, or other terms and conditions of a 'chief officer' (defined elsewhere in the Act).</p> <p>'Terms and conditions' includes: <a href="#">Section 38(4)(f)</a> 'the approach to the payment of chief officers on their ceasing to hold office under or to be employed by the authority'.</p> <p>Paragraph 28 of the Authority's Pay Policy Statement provides: 'Re-employment/re-engagement will not normally occur following retirement, however there may be exceptional circumstances where specialist knowledge and expertise are required for a defined period of time in the event of which re-employment/reengagement may be considered. In the exceptional circumstance that reemployment/re-engagement is necessary in the interest of public safety, this decision will be subject to prior approval at a meeting of the Fire Authority in open session.'</p> <p>This mirrors the requirements and the criteria ('transparent, justifiable and time limited') in <a href="#">paragraphs 6.7 to 6.9 of the National Framework</a> vis-à-vis 'officers at Brigade or Area Manager level, and above, or those with comparable responsibilities to those roles'.</p> <p>Paragraph 6.10 of the National Framework: 'To ensure greater fairness and the exchange of talent and ideas, all principal fire officer posts must be open to competition nationally, and fire and rescue authorities must take account of this in their workforce planning'.</p> <p>The National Framework is statutory guidance to which the Authority must have regard in carrying out its functions. The statutory requirement 'to have regard to' something is along the lines of a</p>

	<p>requirement to consider it. It falls short of a requirement to make that thing the Authority's only priority, and it may have considered a requirement in the National Framework depart from it provided that there is a cogent rationale for doing so.</p>
<p><b>CONSISTENCY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DUTY TO COLLABORATE</b></p>	<p>The Authority continues to work with its Thames Valley Fire Service partners, through regular resourcing meetings to determine a collaborative approach to operational and apprenticeship recruitment. This is one of the priority work streams for the workforce reform group.</p> <p>The Service continues to work with other fire and emergency service partners on continuous improvement and reform, by designing and arranging national and regional events, and through sharing best practice.</p> <p>In addition the Authority is also exploring the opportunity of recruiting/repatriating "retired" Military personnel.</p>
<p><b>HEALTH AND SAFETY</b></p>	<p>There are no Health and Safety implications.</p>
<p><b>EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY</b></p>	<p>The Authority continues to improve the diversity of its workforce and during its recent firefighter apprenticeship recruitment we had a small increase in both Female and BAME.</p> <p>In previous years the authority has been mindful of trying to reduce the average age of the operational workforce.</p> <p>Workforce diversity is an ongoing priority. Building on the successes to date with our apprenticeship programme and utilising the national On Call awareness campaign material our aims are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To increase awareness through TV collaboration work and joined up resourcing</li> <li>• Existing workforce who already interact with the local community being utilised to promote the service we deliver and being supported by our ED&amp;I ambassadors</li> <li>• The continuation of identifying role models within the organisation who can promote the values, commitment to diversity and our employment propositions e.g. we have a national diversity ambassador</li> </ul> <p>The Authority endorsed the submission of a pledge, and were the first Fire and Rescue Service to be accepted by the Apprenticeship Diversity Champions Network (ADCN) in February 2018. The Authority were given the opportunity to be quoted within the 2019 ADCN report, being asked to showcase us as</p>

	<p>exemplars within this group.</p> <p>The Authority’s innovative apprenticeship programme provides an excellent opportunity to improve the diversity make-up of the Authority. Targeted “have a go” days are organised for ethnic minority applicants. Further have a Go days programmed throughout the forthcoming year. A targeted campaign was delivered via social media to assist with the attraction of a diverse workforce, and analysis of the data is being undertaken to determine the outcomes and to inform future campaigns.</p>
<p><b>USE OF RESOURCES</b></p>	<p><b>The arrangements for setting, reviewing and implementing strategic and operational objectives; Performance monitoring, including budget monitoring; achievement of strategic objectives and best value performance indicators;</b></p> <p>Workforce and Succession planning to ensure business continuity and resilience supports the continued delivery of organisational objectives against the Corporate and Public Safety Plans.</p> <p>Effective succession planning contributes to the delivery of the Authority’s People Strategy, building capacity and capabilities agenda, as well as supporting ongoing professionalisation of the service; continuing to raise standards</p> <p><b>Consultation with stakeholders;</b> Where succession is related to SMB, this will be discussed with members of the Authority directly.</p> <p>Regular communication across the Authority relating to promotions, vacancies, learning and training opportunities are delivered via:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Director blogs</li> <li>• Promoting development centre events</li> <li>• Intranet articles</li> <li>• Regular engagement with staff / face to face briefings</li> <li>• Study workshops</li> </ul> <p><b>The system of internal control;</b> Regular updates relating to career development, talent pools and training requirements are presented to the Training Strategy Group at the quarterly meetings.</p> <p>Any changes to policy and procedures to increase flexibility and ensure the Authority’s employee proposition(s) remain fit for purpose will be approved at the appropriate Board; i.e Business Transformation Board (BTB), SMB and if necessary the CFA, e.g Annual Pay Policy Statement?</p>

	<p><b>The medium term financial strategy;</b>                  Any cost implications will be managed within existing Directorate budgets and the planned spend on Training as agreed by SMB and The Training Strategy Group.</p> <p>Any additional spend will be considered as part of Authority's Medium Term Financial Planning process.</p>
<p><b>PROVENANCE SECTION &amp; BACKGROUND PAPERS</b></p>	<p><b>Background Papers</b></p> <p>Fire Authority – 18 September 2019 – Senior Management Team Restructure  <a href="https://bucksfire.gov.uk/files/6815/6797/5308/FIRE_AUTHORITY_AGENDA_AND_REPORTS_180919-min.pdf">https://bucksfire.gov.uk/files/6815/6797/5308/FIRE_AUTHORITY_AGENDA_AND_REPORTS_180919-min.pdf</a></p> <p>Executive Committee - September 2018 – Business Continuity and Resilience – Succession Planning  <a href="https://bucksfire.gov.uk/files/9815/3631/0239/ITEM_10_Business_Continuity_and_Resilience_-_Succession_Planning_Appendix_C.pdf">https://bucksfire.gov.uk/files/9815/3631/0239/ITEM_10_Business_Continuity_and_Resilience_-_Succession_Planning_Appendix_C.pdf</a></p> <p><a href="#">Fire and Rescue National Framework for England, Home Office, May 2018</a></p> <p>BMKFA Pay Policy Principles and Statement 2019/20  <a href="https://bucksfire.gov.uk/files/3515/5410/6753/Pay_Policy_Principles_and_Statement_2019-20.pdf">https://bucksfire.gov.uk/files/3515/5410/6753/Pay_Policy_Principles_and_Statement_2019-20.pdf</a></p>
<p><b>APPENDICES</b></p>	<p>Not for publication by virtue of Paragraph 1 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972, as the Appendices contain information relating to any individual; and Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972, as the Appendices contain information relating to the financial or business affairs of a person (including the Authority).</p> <p>Appendix A – Succession Plans/Critical Roles SMB                  Appendix B – Succession Plans/Critical Roles Directorate Senior Managers                  Appendix C – Potential Risks and Opportunities</p>
<p><b>TIME REQUIRED</b></p>	<p>15 Minutes</p>
<p><b>REPORT ORIGINATOR AND CONTACT</b></p>	<p>Anna Collett, Organisational Development Manager  <a href="mailto:acollett@bucksfire.gov.uk">acollett@bucksfire.gov.uk</a>                  01296 744468</p>