BFRS Evidence Base
CRMP 2025-2030

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2. National Resilience Strategy Call for Evidence - 23 September 2021
3. Fire Reform Consultation Paper - 13 July 2022

Introduction

This document summarises the detailed analysis and evidence that has been used to develop our CRMP.

The document describes how we understand the range of foreseeable fire and rescue service related risks as they relate to the communities we serve.

We have identified a range of hazards and at-risk groups and locations. This assessment of risk will allow us to make appropriate provision for fire prevention and protection activities and response to fire and rescue related incidents.

The evidence base also includes analysis that we have used to inform the priorities set out in the CRMP document.

The requirement to complete this activity is driven by the Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2018 which sets out a range of requirements for fire and rescue authorities. Every fire and rescue authority must have regard to the Framework in carrying out their functions.

We publish an annual statement of assurance which explains how we comply with the Framework

Summary of Risk Information and Risk Matrix

There are three main categories of risk evaluated as part of our CRMP preparation, all of which are further informed by our listening and engagement with public, staff and partners.

This document is separated into sections to reflect these categories:

- Section 1: Chronic/local risk and demand – this is based primarily on historic demand and current demographic information, alongside analysing trends to assist in forecasting the level of prevention, protection and response activity required over the next five years.

- Section 2: Horizon scanning and research – this looks at current and predicted future risks across a range of categories (political, economic, social/demographic, technological, environmental, legal and organisational). This is often referred to as a PESTELO analysis.

- Section 3: National security risk assessment – this draws on the national risk assessments already prepared by the UK Government, which are then analysed in more detail at a local level through the Local Resilience Forum, before we analyse them to determine the potential impacts for us.

The detailed risk evaluation has been summarised on the next two pages by scoring each individual risk and plotting them on a risk matrix. The overall score is a combination of the likelihood of the risk impacting us, and the scale of the consequences for us should the risk materialise.

This risk categorisation helps us to focus on the risks that have the most potential to affect the way the service operates in the period 2025 to 2030. Forecasting risk is inherently uncertain and risks can often change rapidly. Categorising the risks also helps determine how frequently each risk needs to be reviewed during the lifetime of the CRMP.

Risk Matrix



Key	Risk Classification
	Primary risks to be addressed
	Other key risks to be addressed
	Risks to actively monitor on a regular basis
	Risks to monitor periodically

Political

1 2023 Integrated Review Refresh
2 2023 Defence Command Paper
3 UK Resilience Framework
4 Russia – Ukraine War
5 Israel / Gaza and associated conflict across the wider Middle East
6 Fire Reform White Paper
7 USAR Funding
8 2024/25 General Election
9 FBU Manifesto

Economic

10 Inflation / cost of living.
11 Risk of low economic growth
12 Brexit
13 Pension Liabilities

Social/Demographic

14 Rising Population
15 Ageing Population
16 Health and Disability
17 Population Diversity
18 Overcrowded Housing
19 Housing without Central Heating
20 Communal Establishments
21 Residual / Long Term effects of Covid Pandemic
22 Hoarding
23 Fly Tipping

Technological

24 Alternatively Fuelled Vehicles (AFV)
25 Artificial Intelligence / Robotics /Autonomous Vehicles
26 Frontier Artificial Intelligence Risks

27 Remote working Technologies
28 High energy density rechargeable batteries
29 Air Sourced Heat Pumps
30 Solar PV Systems
31 Smart Motorways
32 High Speed Rail
33 The Elizabeth Line
34 Western Rail Link into Heathrow
35 East West Rail

Environmental

36 Climate Change
37 Rewilding
38 New Housing Development
39 Permitted Development
40 Reinforced Autoclaved Aerated Concrete
41 Defective External Wall Systems (EWS)
42 Asbestos
43 Unoccupied and Derelict Buildings

Legal

44 Fire Safety Act 2021
45 The Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022
46 The Building Safety Act 2022
47 Minimum Service Levels Act 2023
48 Serious Violence Duty
49 Procurement Act
50 Failure to comply with Equal Pay legislative requirements.
51 Potential amendments to Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Business Regulations 2003
52 Firefighters Pensions (Remediable Service) Regulations 2023
53 Safeguarding
54 Insufficient funding to achieve 2025-30 CRMP objectives.

Organisational

55 BFRS Service resilience issues: staff availability, retention, loss of key staff.
56 Ageing Workforce: Health and Wellbeing
57 FRS Workplace culture.
58 TVFCS mobilising issues
59 Strategic Partnership Opportunities
60 Contaminants management / liabilities
61 Impact of public enquiries e.g. Grenfell, Manchester Arena, Covid
62 Demand for SCAS or TVP services exceeds available capacity to respond with 'knock on' effects for BFRS when attending incidents requiring multi-agency response.
63 Results from Audit/inspection
64 Fire Service Pensions
65 Maintaining cadre of specialist skills: NILO, HMA, DIM, WIM, Tac-Ads

National Risk Register

66 Terrorism (Conventional)
67 Cyber (inc. Cyber Terrorism)
68 Disruption of supplies (inc. oil)
69 Accidents requiring response (e.g. collisions, spillages, major fire)
70 Systems failures (e.g. utilities, financial systems)
71 Natural and environment (e.g. wildfire, flooding)
72 Disease and pandemic
73 Societal (public disorder, industrial action)
74 Conflict and instability

Section 1 Chronic / Local Risk and Demand

The County of Buckinghamshire

Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service (BFRS) covers the areas of Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, in the south east of England.

Buckinghamshire is a predominately rural county especially in north western areas. Just over half of the county's population live in one of three main population centres Milton Keynes, High Wycombe and Aylesbury. Milton Keynes alone is home to roughly a third of the county's residents.

In the 2021 Census the County of Buckinghamshire had a population of 840,200 and spans 723 square miles. The county is made up of two Unitary Authorities: Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes. . These authorities are responsible for the provision of local government services within Buckinghamshire including, through the Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority, Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service (BFRS).

Buckinghamshire is bounded by six neighbouring fire services. To the east are Bedfordshire FRS and Hertfordshire FRS. To the south east is London Fire Brigade and to the south is Royal Berkshire FRS. The western boundary is shared with Oxfordshire FRS and to the north is Northamptonshire FRS

Deprivation

The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) is the official government measure of relative deprivation in England. It is not just a measure of financial deprivation.

IMD is calculated nationwide for small areas, called Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs). Each LSOA is given a score from 1 (most deprived) to 10 (least deprived) for each of the seven inputs and as well as an overall score for total deprivation.

Across the world increased levels of deprivation have been linked with increased risk of fire and associated outcomes.

Deprivation in Buckinghamshire

Generally, there are low or very low levels of deprivation in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes with 75.6% of areas (LSOAs) classified within the top five least deprived groups, with more than a quarter of all areas being classified in the least deprived group. The relationship between increased levels of deprivation and an increased risk of fire is evident in ADF numbers in the county. In the last 5 years, households in the most deprived areas experienced proportionally three times as many fires as the least deprived areas.

Nationally the relationship between deprivation and an increased risk of fire is less clear. Fire services with proportionally much higher levels of deprivation have not experienced a proportionally similar number of accidental dwelling fires. In fact, there are some fire services with much higher levels of deprivation which have experienced fewer ADFs per person than Buckinghamshire.



Service-wide distribution of IMD scores (2019).



Deprivation Comparison

As well as an internal comparison of IMD scores it is possible to compare IMD scores with our neighbouring counties. The graph below shows the distribution of IMD groups in neighbouring counties (excluding London). It is possible to see that in general, as is the case in Buckinghamshire, there are low levels of deprivation in our neighbouring counties. Like Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire have high proportions of areas in the least deprived group and few areas in the most deprived groups. Northamptonshire and Bedfordshire are less like Buckinghamshire. They are similar to each other, because there is a more even distribution across the IMD groups, however they both still have few areas in the most deprived group.



Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service

Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service has nineteen fire stations placed in strategic positions across the county. These consist of five wholetime fire stations, all of which also have on-call appliances; four day-crewed stations, two of which also have on-call appliances; and ten on-call only fire stations.

In addition to the pumping appliances mentioned above, there are a number of specialist appliances located throughout the service. The most noteworthy of these are the USAR unit located in Aylesbury, which is also home to the command unit. Additionally, there are aerial appliances in West Ashland and High Wycombe and boats located at Newport Pagnell and Beaconsfield fire stations.

In 2015 Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Services established the Thames Valley Fire Control Service, in Calcot, Reading. This shared service provides emergency call handling and mobilising for Thames Valley.



Response

The map below shows where appliances could reach within five and ten minutes if the fire appliance was situated at the station when called upon.



The map below shows the density of buildings by type across Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes



Demand

We looked at the demand on our pumps (fire engines) and how often pumps are used simultaneously when attending emergencies. We achieved this by calculating the number of pumps assigned to an incident each second. This included all BFRS pumps (regardless of the location of the incidents) and any pumps from other fire and rescue services being utilised within Buckinghamshire or Milton Keynes.

Analysis indicates that between April 2019 and March 2023 only eight pumps were needed at high states of readiness to meet our day-to-day demand (99.2%). However, we propose to keep our current number of immediately and rapidly available pumps in order to maintain:

- Our emergency incident attendance times, as although our analysis indicates that eight pumps are sufficient to meet our typical level of day-to-day demand, a larger number, suitably located, is needed to ensure we can reach all parts of the geographical area that we serve in a timely manner.
- The standing capacity to deal with two medium sized incidents simultaneously as required by our operational planning assumptions.



- 10 pumps or more were utilised at the same time for an average of 16 hours and 55 minutes per year.
- 15 pumps or more were utilised at the same time for an average of 6 hours per year.
- 20 pumps or more were utilised at the same time for an average of 2 hours and 4 minutes per year.

Demand

The charts to the right show the utilisation of our pumping appliances by hour of the day between. The charts show:

- The average number of appliances used during each hour of the day.
- The average number of appliances used during each hour of the day + standard deviation (SD). Standard deviation is a measure of variability about the mean. The majority of observations are within one standard deviation of the mean.
- The maximum number used at each hour.
- The number of pumps would cover over 99% of the demand within that hour.

During the summer of 2022, Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes experienced two heatwaves, during which the demand on our pumping appliances was exceptionally high. To demonstrate the impact of the heatwave, we have included a chart showing the utilisation excluding the data between April 2022 and March 2023.





Understanding Risk

Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service has adopted the National Fire Chiefs Council definition of

risk. For community risk management in the fire and rescue service, risk is defined as:

Risk: A combination of the likelihood and consequences of hazardous events

We expand the key terms in this definition as follows:

Term	Definition
Hazardous event	A potential event that can cause harm.
Likelihood	The chance of something happening. May be described by the probability, frequency or uncertainty of events.
Consequence	The outcome of an event. Specifically, the severity or extent of harm caused by an event.

In preparing the CRMP we have used the NFCC Community Risk Management Planning Strategic Framework (see also next page) to ensure that:

- All hazards (both current and future) are identified.
- The risk level of identified hazards is determined by looking at the likelihood and consequence of each hazard.
- Key CRMP actions are set out to ensure appropriate actions are taken to mitigate the risks identified.
- Appropriate measures are in place to monitor the level of risk and effectiveness of mitigation actions on a regular basis

Community Risk Management Planning Strategic Framework



Normal and Foreseeable Risk

We need to plan for both what is normal demand and what is beyond normal demand. This is driven by The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, which states that (in relation to fires and road traffic collisions) fire and rescue services must secure the provision of the personnel, services and equipment necessary efficiently to meet all normal requirements. The Act does not define what normal requirements are. The CRMP is the process we undertake to ensure we are able to understand what is required to ensure we can manage normal demand in our community.

Normal Risk

Our normal conditions of operation are the incidents (and false alarms) we manage in our communities on a day to day basis and those risks which, whilst less common, are still normal and to be expected (e.g. larger incidents). We know from our experience, and from our risk analysis, that there will be some days when the demand for a response to incidents is significantly higher than on others. These circumstances include some large incidents that require us to deploy multiple resources to one location or because there are multiple incidents happening at the same time (known as spate conditions). Spate conditions are commonly caused by challenging weather events such as heatwaves, flooding, high winds or snow. Although these risks are normal, they are unusual and we set specific expectations around our response in these conditions.

Beyond Normal Risk

When demand is beyond normal this means that we will need to request assistance to support our service. These conditions are caused by particularly large incidents, or periods of spate conditions that are very unusual. We have long standing arrangements in place with neighbouring fire and rescue services to support each other during these periods, ensuring we can provide an ongoing response to incidents. These arrangements are commonly known as mutual aid.

When the scale of an incident or spate conditions is so severe that it outstrips mutual aid arrangements, such as during regional or national storms, or where an incident is very large or requires specialist technical support we can call upon national assets to support our deployment. These national resilience assets are continuously available and provide specialist capabilities, personnel and resources which enhance our ability to respond effectively to large-scale or critical incidents. Those incidents may be natural disasters, industrial accidents or terrorist attacks.

Response to Foreseeable Risks

On a basic level, BFRS identifies its foreseeable risks/incidents so that it can ensure it's control staff mobilise the correct number and type of resources to those incidents. This is called our Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA). These PDAs are reviewed regularly to ensure they are still effective.

It is worth noting that the PDA only sets out the minimum level of response, so more resources will be mobilised in some circumstances, for example if there are reports of people involved.

PDAs can also be increased if there are known risks at a specific location, for example if we know that a warehouse on fire is occupied by squatters. These are known as special attendances.

The following tables show which incident types BFRS has a planned PDA based the risks associated with that type of incident.

Alarms

Category	Incident Type
Automatic Fire Alarm	ALARM - INDUSTRIAL / COMMERCIAL
Automatic Fire Alarm	ALARM - RETAIL / PUBLIC ASSEMBLY
Automatic Fire Alarm	ALARM - RESIDENTIAL
Automatic Fire Alarm	ALARM - AGRICULTURAL BUILDINGS
Automatic Fire Alarm	ALARM - OTHER BUILDINGS NOT ATTENDED
Automatic Fire Alarm	ALARM - BURGULAR ALARM
Gas alarms	ALARM - CARBON MONOXIDE ALARM ACT
Smoke alarm	ALARM - SMOKE ALARM ACT
Smoke alarm	ALARM - LOW BATTERY

Civil Disturbance

Category	Incident Type
Bomb confirmed	PUBLIC ORDER - BOMB CONFIRMED
Bomb suspected	PUBLIC ORDER - BOMB SUSPECTED
Civil disturbance	PUBLIC ORDER - CIVIL DISTURBANCE

Explosion

Category	Incident Type
Explosion	PUBLIC ORDER - EXPLOSION
Vehicle LPG fuelled	TRANSPORT - LPG FUEL VEHICLE ON FIRE

Hazardous Materials

Category	Incident Type
(H10)hazard zones	HAZMAT - CYLINDERS INVOLVED
(H10)hazard zones	HAZMAT - ACETYLENE INVOLVED
(H10)hazard zones	HAZMAT - (LPG) PROPANE / BUTANE INVOLVED
Gas involved	HAZMAT - GAS / RELEASE / LEAKS
Haz mat major	HAZMAT - LARGE
Haz mat major	PUBLIC ORDER - CBRNE EVENT
Haz mat major	PUBLIC ORDER - CBRNE LEVEL THREE
Haz mat major	PUBLIC ORDER - WHITE POWDER
Haz mat major	PUBLIC ORDER - SUSPICIOUS POWDER
Haz mat minor	HAZMAT - SMALL
Haz mat minor	HAZMAT - ACID ATTACK
Oil pollution	HAZMAT - OIL POLLUTION
Pipeline	HAZMAT - PIPELINES
Radiation involved	HAZMAT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Radiation involved	HAZMAT - CHEMICAL SUICIDE
Vehicle leaking fuel	HAZMAT - VEHICLE LEAKING FUEL

Response to Foreseeable Risks

Fire

Category	Incident Type
Abandoned call	MOBILISING - ABANDONED CALL
Barn	FIRE - AGRICULTURAL
Barn	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED AGRICULTURAL
Below ground fire	FIRE - FIRE BELOW GROUND
Boat	TRANSPORT - BOAT ON FIRE
Building	FIRE - INDUSTRIAL / COMMERCIAL
Building	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED INDUSTRIAL/COMMER
Building	FIRE - COMMERCIAL BUILDING
Building	FIRE - COMMERCIAL HIGH RISE
Building	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED COMMERCIAL BUILDI
Building	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED COMMERCIAL HIGHRI
Building	FIRE - ROOF COMMERCIAL BUILDING
Building	FIRE - INDUSTRIAL BUILDING
Building	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED INDUSTRIAL BUILDI
Building	FIRE - RETAIL/ PUBLIC ASSEMBLY
Building	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED RETAIL/PUBLIC ASS
Building	FIRE - SHOPPING CENTRE
Building	FIRE - CINEMA/THEATRE
Building	FIRE - SCHOOL/COLLEGE
Building	FIRE - ARENAS / STADIA
Building	FIRE - RESIDENTIAL
Building	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED RESIDENTIAL
Building	FIRE - ROOF RESIDENTIAL
Building	FIRE - HIGHRISE
Building	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED HIGHRISE
Building	FIRE - HOSPITALS
Building	FIRE - PRISONS / DETENTION / SECURE ACCOM
Building	FIRE - DOMESTIC
Building	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED DOMESTIC
Building	FIRE - ROOF DOMESTIC
Building	FIRE - OTHER BUILDINGS
Building thatched	FIRE - THATCHED
Caravan / camping	FIRE - MARQUEES
Caravan / camping	FIRE - CARAVAN / CAMPING
Caravan / camping	FIRE - PERSONS REPORTED CARAVAN / CAMPING
Chimney	FIRE - CHIMNEY
Chimney thatch	FIRE - CHIMNEY THATCHED ROOF
Derelict property	FIRE - DERELICT BUILDINGS
Derelict property	FIRE PERSONS REPORTED DERELICT BUILDINGS
Electrical installations	FIRE - ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION
Fire	MOBILISING - CONTROLLED BURNING
Fire in the open - large	FIRE - RECYCLING / LANDFILL
Fire in the open - large	FIRE - TYRE STACK AND RUBBER CRUMB FIRES
Fire in the open - small	FIRE - SMOKE IN THE AREA
Fire in the open - small	FIRE - FIRE IN THE OPEN
Fire in the open - small	FIRE - IN THE OPEN LARGE
Fire in the open - small	FIRE - RECYCLE BANK(S)
Fire in the open - small	FIRE - FIELD
Fire now out	FIRE - FIRE NOW OUT
Fire now out	FIRE - LATE FIRE CALL
Persons on fire	FIRE - PERSON ON FIRE
Post box	FIRE - FIRE POST BOX
Railway embankment	FIRE - RAILWAY EMBANKMENT
Railway train goods	TRANSPORT - FREIGHT TRAIN FIRE
Railway train goods	TRANSPORT-INCIDENT ON RAIL LINE
Railway train passenger	TRANSPORT - PASSENGER TRAIN FIRE
Road furniture	FIRE - ROAD FURNITURE AND RECEPTICALS
Silo/grain dryer	FIRE - SILO / GRAIN DRYER
Smoke in the open	FIRE - FIRE UNKNOWN ORIGIN
Vehicle large	TRANSPORT - RTC PERSONS TRAPPED FIRE LGE
Vehicle large	TRANSPORT - RTC VEHICLE FIRE MULTI VEHIC
Vehicle large	TRANSPORT - LARGE VEHICLE ON FIRE
Vehicle large	TRANSPORT - FIRE HAZARDOUS LOAD (TANKER)
Vehicle small	TRANSPORT - RTC PERSONS TRAPPED FIRE SMA
Vehicle small	TRANSPORT - SMALL VEHICLE ON FIRE
Vehicle small	TRANSPORT - HYBRID VEHICLE ON FIRE

Response to Foreseeable Risks

Humanitarian Assistance

Category	Incident Type
Assist other agency	MOBILISING - FIRE MAJOR INCIDENT
Assist other agency	MOBILISING - POLICE MAJOR INCIDENT
Assist other agency	MOBILISING - HEALTH MAJOR INCIDENT
Assist other agency	MOBILISING - MAJOR INCIDENT ABROAD
Assist other agency	MOBILISING - OVERFLOW / BUDDY
Assist other agency	MOBILISING - FRSNCC NATIONAL RESILIENCE
Assist other agency	PUBLIC ORDER - MTFA
Assist other agency	PUBLIC ORDER - NILO
Assist other agency	SPECIAL SERVICE - ASSIST OTHER AGENCY
Assist other agency	SPECIAL SERVICE - BARIATRIC PATIENT
Assist other agency	ASSIST SCAS - EFFECTING ENTRY
Assist other agency	SPECIAL SERVICE - RELEASE
Boat stability	TRANSPORT - BOAT STABILITY
Co responder	SPECIAL SERVICE - CO-RESPONDER
Co responder	ASSIST SCAS - CARDIAC ARREST
Dangerous structure	SPECIAL SERVICE - DANGEROUS STRUCTURE
Fire safety issue	MOBILISING - FIRE SAFETY ISSUE
Flooding	SPECIAL SERVICE - INTERNAL FLOODING
Flooding	SPECIAL SERVICE - EXTERNAL FLOODING
Inform other agency	SPECIAL SERVICE - INFORM OTHER AGENCY
Persons collapsed	SPECIAL SERVICE - PERSON COLLAPSED BEHIND
Persons locked out	SPECIAL SERVICE - LOCKED IN / OUT
Persons locked out	SPECIAL SERVICE - PERSON(S) LOCKED IN
Persons locked out	SPECIAL SERVICE - PERSON(S) LOCKED OUT
RTC	TRANSPORT - RTC SCENE SAFETY
RTC	TRANSPORT - RTC WASH DOWN

Rescue

Category	Incident Type
Aircraft accident large	TRANSPORT - AIRCRAFT LARGE
Aircraft accident large	TRANSPORT - AIRCRAFT MILITARY
Aircraft accident light	TRANSPORT - AIRCRAFT LIGHT
Aircraft in distress	TRANSPORT - AIRCFRAFT TAKE OFF / LANDING
Aircraft in distress	TRANSPORT - AIRCRAFT IN DISTRESS
Animal rescue large	RESCUE - RESCUE OF LARGE ANIMALS
Animal rescue large	RESCUE - LARGE ANIMAL FROM WATER
Animal rescue small	RESCUE - RESCUE OF SMALL ANIMALS
Animal rescue small	RESCUE - SMALL ANIMAL FROM WATER
Boat rescue	TRANSPORT - BOAT REQUIRING RESCUE
Building collapse	RESCUE - RESCUE FROM COLLAPSED STRUC-TURE
Evacuation of persons	SPECIAL SERVICE - ASSIST WITH EVACUATION
Lift persons shut in	SPECIAL SERVICE - PERSON SHUT IN LIFT
Persons trapped	MOBILISING - FF EMERGENCY
Persons trapped	MOBILISING - BA EMERGENCY
Persons trapped	RESCUE - SILO / GRAIN DRYERS
Persons trapped	RESCUE - RESCUE FROM DEPTH
Persons trapped	TRANSPORT - RTC PERSONS TRAPPED FIRE HAZ
Railway accident	TRANSPORT - TRAIN INCIDENT
Rescue from confined space	RESCUE - TRENCHES
Rescue from height	RESCUE - RESCUE FROM HEIGHTS
Rescue from mud	RESCUE - RESCUE FROM UNSTABLE SURFACE
Rescue from mud	RESCUE - RESCUE FROM MACHINERY
Rescue from water	MOBILISING - WATER EMERGENCY
Rescue from water	RESCUE - RESCUE FROM WATER
Rescue from water	RESCUE - VEHICLE IN WATER
RTC persons trapped (large veh)	TRANSPORT - RTC PERSONS TRAPPED LARGE VE
RTC persons trapped (large veh)	TRANSPORT - RTC PERSONS TRAPPED MULTIPLE
RTC persons trapped (small veh)	TRANSPORT - RTC PERSONS TRAPPED SMALL VE
Suicide attempt	SPECIAL SERVICE - ATTEMPTED SUICIDE

Understanding the Risks

Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADFs)

Summary

Dwelling' means a property that is a place of residence i.e. occupied by households, excluding hotels, hostels and residential institutions. Includes non-permanent structures used solely as a dwelling, such as houseboats and caravans.

Caused by accident or carelessness (not thought to be deliberate). Includes fires which accidentally get out of control e.g. fire in a grate or bonfires.

The Hazard

Fires in the home are one of the biggest concerns for our communities. Nationally, around 200 people die in dwelling fires each year. Over the past five years in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes there have been 12 fire-related fatalities and 200 non-fatal casualties in accidental dwelling fires. Even when there are no casualties, the impact of a fire on the lives of those involved can be catastrophic.

This hazard type represents a normal risk that BFRS manage on an ongoing basis. Large incidents may be beyond normal.

Likelihood - 2021/2022

England	1 in 1028 Dwellings
Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes	1 in 1286 Dwellings

Based on incident data from 2021/2022, 1 in every 1286 homes in Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes will experience an accidental fire in their home each year. This can range from a small fire contained within a toaster to total loss of the building. The more severe incidents are less common and are explored more in depth later in this document.

Outcomes

The following figures show the outcomes of accidental dwelling fires in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes between April 2018 and March 2023.

Damage	Incidents	% of Incidents	Fatalities	Serious Injuries	Slight Injuries	First Aid Only
Heat and Smoke Damage Only	663	44.9%	0	2	35	26
Limited to item 1st ignited	297	20.1%	0	0	12	10
Limited to room of origin	299	20.2%	4	6	21	34
External roof only	18	1.2%	0	0	0	0
Roof space only	14	0.9%	0	0	0	1
Whole roof (including roof space)	6	0.4%	0	0	0	0
Limited to floor of origin	94	6.4%	5	4	14	8
Limited to 2 floors	30	2.0%	2	1	3	4
Roof space and other floors(s)	23	1.6%	0	1	1	1
Affecting more than 2 floors	3	0.2%	0	0	0	0
Whole building	31	2.1%	1	1	4	3

Pump (fire engine) Utilisation

Between April 2018 and March 2023, the following number of pumps were utilised at accidental dwelling fires:

Pumps	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11
Incidents	1	276	888	205	64	23	15	3	1	1	1
Percentage	0.1%	18.7%	60.1%	13.9%	4.3%	1.6%	1.0%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%

Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADFs) - Trends







Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADFs)

Location of ADFs

The following map shows where accidental dwelling fires were recorded between April 2018 and March 2023.



Density of ADFs

The following map shows the areas in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes that have the most dwelling fires per 1000 dwellings.



Serious Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADFs)

Summary

The definition of dwelling fires and the cause are the same as the previous section (Accidental Dwelling Fires). However, this section focuses on the incidents where the fire had spread from the item that initially ignited.

The Hazard

Fires in the home are one of the biggest concerns for our communities. Nationally, around 200 people die in dwelling fires each year. Over the past five years in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes there have been 12 fire-related fatalities and 200 non-fatal casualties in accidental dwelling fires. Even when there are no casualties, the impact of a fire on the lives of those involved can be catastrophic.

This hazard type represents a normal risk that BFRS manage on an ongoing basis. Large incidents may be beyond normal.

Likelihood - 2021/2022

England	1 in 2837 Dwellings
Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes	1 in 3656 Dwellings

Based on incident data from 2021/2022, 1 in every 3656 homes in Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes will experience a serious accidental fire in their home each year (95 homes). Of those incidents, only 35% (33 homes) will experience a fire that spreads from the room of origin.

Outcomes

Between April 2018 and March 2023 BFRS attended 1478 ADFs. Of these 518 had spread from the item that first ignited. Despite only representing 35%, nearly all the injuries and fatalities were recorded during these incidents.

Damage	Incidents	% of Incidents	Fatalities	Serious Injuries	Slight Injuries	First Aid Only
Limited to room of origin	299	20.2%	4	6	21	34
External roof only	18	1.2%	0	0	0	0
Roof space only	14	0.9%	0	0	0	1
Whole roof	6	0.4%	0	0	0	0
Limited to floor of origin	94	6.4%	5	4	14	8
Limited to 2 floors	30	2.0%	2	1	3	4
Roof space and other floors(s)	23	1.6%	0	1	1	1
Affecting more than 2 floors	3	0.2%	0	0	0	0
Whole building	31	2.1%	1	1	4	3

Pump (fire engine) Utilisation

Between April 2018 and March 2023, the following number of pumps were utilised at serious accidental dwelling fires:

Pumps	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	11
Incidents	1	44	277	111	50	18	11	3	1	1	1
Percentage	0.2%	8.5%	53.5%	21.4%	9.7%	3.5%	2.1%	0.6%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%

Serious Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADFs) - Trends







Serious Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADFs)

Location of ADFs

The following map shows where accidental dwelling fires were recorded between April 2018 and March 2023.

Density of ADFs

The following map shows the areas in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes that have the most dwelling fires per 1000 dwellings.



Accidental Fires in other premises

Summary

Fires also occur in buildings or premises which aren't classified as dwellings, some of which also include significant risk to our communities. For example, other property types where people sleep, including hospitals, hotels and residential care homes.

Caused by accident or carelessness (not thought to be deliberate).

The Hazard

Fires in the non-domestic properties tend to see far fewer fire related fatalities and injuries when compared with dwelling fires. However, these types of fires tend to see far more damage to property. This in turn can destroy local businesses and infrastructure, aw well as the employment associated with them. Furthermore, there is much more opportunity for larger scale incidents.

Outcomes

The following figures show the outcomes of accidental fires in premises that weren't dwellings within Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes between April 2018 and March 2023.

Damage	Incidents	% of Incidents	Fatalities	Serious Injuries	Slight Injuries	First Aid Only
Heat and Smoke Damage Only	278	39.5%	0	1	0	4
Limited to item 1st ignited	101	14.3%	0	1	0	4
Limited to room of origin	96	13.6%	0	0	1	2
External roof only	9	1.3%	0	0	0	0
Roof space only	9	1.3%	0	0	0	0
Whole roof	1	0.1%	0	0	0	0
Limited to floor of origin	75	10.7%	0	0	1	1
Limited to 2 floors	8	1.1%	0	0	0	0
Roof space and other floors(s)	6	0.9%	0	0	2	0
Affecting more than 2 floors	2	0.3%	0	0	0	0
Whole building	119	16.9%	0	0	2	5
Total	704	100%	0	2	6	16

Pump (fire engine) Utilisation

Between April 2018 and March 2023, the following number of pumps were utilised at serious accidental dwelling fires:

Pumps	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	16	28
Incidents	133	199	271	57	13	13	6	4	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Percentage	18.9%	28.3%	38.5%	8.1%	1.8%	1.8%	0.9%	0.6%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%

	Fires
Private Garden Shed	104
Retail	70
Food and Drink	62
Industrial Manufacturing	61
Residential Home	52
Education	46
Offices and call centres	38
Private garage	38
Warehouses and bulk storage	30
Industrial Processing	22
Hospitals and medical care	19
Permanent Agricultural	18
Hotel/motel	14
Other private non-residential building	14
Entertainment and culture	12
Public admin, security and safety	12
Public Utilities	9
Sheltered Housing – not self contained	9
Vehicle Repair	9
Laboratory/research Establishment	8
Hostel (e.g. for homeless people)	7
Sporting venues	7
Other buildings/use not known	6
Animal boarding/breeding/kennels (not farm)/animal shelter	4
Private Summer house	4
Religious	4
Transport buildings	4
Car Parks	3
Military/Barracks	3
Other Residential Home	3
Boarding School accommodation	2
Nurses'/Doctors' accommodation	2
Other holiday residence (cottage, flat, chalet)	2
Student Hall of Residence	2
Youth hostel	2
Boarding House/B&B for homeless/asylum seekers	1
Boarding House/B&B other	1
Total	704





Accidental fires in other properties

Location of fires

The following map shows where accidental fires in buildings other than dwellings were recorded between April 2018 and March 2023.



Density of fires

The following map shows the areas in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes that have the most accidental fires in other premises



High-rise fires

Summary

BFRS defines high-rise buildings as any building that has an occupied floor more than 18m above the fire service access level, which generally means a building of 6 floors or more. Tall building types include residential flats, hotels, institutions, hospitals, commercial offices and mixed occupancies.

There are currently 97 high-rise buildings in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, some of which are residential, some commercial and some are a mixture of the two.

The Hazard

Any significant high-rise fire will require the commitment of considerable operational resources. We consider high rise building fires to be foreseeable normal risk, however a confirmed fire is likely to require mutual aid from neighbouring services. It is easily conceivable that an established fire in a tall building would be declared a major incident. This progression would lift the incident beyond our normal operational planning assumptions.



High-rise fires

The map on the right shows the modelled response areas and times for the two turntable ladders (TLs) located towards the north and south of our area. These TLs help firefighters to target water more effectively at greater heights.

High-rise buildings are designed to resist fire, stop smoke spread and provide a safe means of escape. Most fires do not spread further than one or two rooms.



Chimney Fires

Summary

A chimney fire is any fire in a building where the flame was contained within the chimney structure and did not involve casualties, rescues or attendance by five or more pumping appliances.

The Hazard

Chimney fires are dangerous because they can rapidly spread to other areas of the home, putting those within the home at risk of injury or death. Not only that, they can cause a lot of damage to the chimney itself.





Heritage Premises

Summary

Fire is probably the most devastating of disasters that can strike a heritage property. As well as the damage caused by heat and smoke, the water used to extinguish the blaze can also cause serious issues.

Due to the age and makeup of some of these structures, they can be more susceptible to fire, the spread of fire and other unique challenges.

Unlike dwellings and most non-domestic properties, heritage building can often be found in the more rural areas, further away from wholetime stations, potentially resulting in a slower response time than those buildings closer to larger towns and cities.

When viewed from a risk perspective, listed premises fall within our usual categorisation of being a dwelling or other premises, as such we have assessed the overall risk within these groups.



Deliberate fires to other people's property (primary)

Summary

Fires that were deliberately started by somebody that wasn't the owner.

Primary fires are potentially more serious fires that harm people or cause damage to property.

The Hazard

Fires set deliberately have a significant effect on the local economy, damage the environment, destroy property, and can, in the worst cases, take someone's life.

Even small fires can spread very quickly, and often much quicker than expected. What may have been intended to be just a small fire or just a bit of fun, can quickly spread to become out of control. Deliberate fires can also result in an injury to the person setting the fire, or others who may become trapped by a rapidly developing fire. People have also been killed as a result of deliberate fire setting.

Likelihood - 2021/2022



Outcomes

Number of deliberate primary fires broken down by the main property damaged by the fire.

		18/19	19/20	20/21	21/22	22/23	23/24	Total
Building	Non Residential	40	35	16	48	75	70	284
	Dwelling	21	11	13	24	15	11	95
	Other Residential				1	4		5
Building Total		61	46	29	73	94	81	384
Outdoor	Grassland, woodland and crops	32	29	37	26	41	20	185
	Outdoor structures	22	17	11	9	12	9	80
	Outdoor equipment & machinery	4	2	3	4	5	1	19
	Other outdoors (including land)		1			1	1	3
Outdoor Total		58	49	51	39	59	31	287
Road Vehicle	Car	47	43	35	24	27	14	190
	Motorcycle	16	12	6	16	19	15	84
	Van	9	9	11	10	5	8	52
	Multiple Vehicles	6	4	6	2	4	4	26
	Other	3	4	1	2	3	3	16
	Bicycle	1	2		1	1		5
	Lorry/HGV		3	2				5
	Towing caravan	2	1	1		1		5
	Caravan unspecified	1			2	1		4
	Trailers - Trailer unit	2		2				4
	Agricultural	1	1					2
	Motor Home					1	1	2
	Minibus	1						1
	Bus/coach					1		1
Road Vehicle Total		89	79	64	57	63	45	397

Pump (fire engine) Utilisation

Between April 2018 and March 2023, the following number of pumps were utilised at accidental dwelling fires:

Pumps	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10	18
Incidents	614	183	208	27	11	14	5	2	3	1
Percentage	57.5%	17.1%	19.5%	2.5%	1.0%	1.3%	0.5%	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%

Deliberate fires to other people's property (primary)

Location of Deliberate Primary Fires



2022/2023 Deliberate Primary Fires



Deliberate fires to other people's property (secondary)

Summary

Fires that were deliberately started by somebody that wasn't the owner.

Secondary fires are generally small outdoor fires, not involving people or property. These include refuse fires, grassland fires and fires in derelict buildings or vehicles, unless these fires involved casualties or rescues, or five or more pumping appliances attended.

The Hazard

Fires set deliberately have a significant effect on the local economy, damage the environment, destroy property, and can, in the worst cases, take someone's life.

Even small fires can spread very quickly, and often much quicker than expected. What may have been intended to be just a small fire or just a bit of fun, can quickly spread to become out of control. Deliberate fires can also result in an injury to the person setting the fire, or others who may become trapped by a rapidly developing fire. People have also been killed as a result of deliberate fire setting.

Deliberate secondary fires are more prevalent during periods of hot and dry weather, when there is more opportunities as well as a higher risk of spread.

Likelihood



Outcomes

Number of deliberate Secondary fires broken down by the main property damaged by the fire.

	18/19	19/20	20/21	21/22	22/23	Total
Grassland, woodland and crops	130	147	126	106	182	691
Other outdoors (including land)	158	136	118	122	156	690
Outdoor structures	99	83	53	68	84	387
Non Residential	16	5	9	12	16	58
Car	2	5	6	6		19
Other	13	14	15	10	9	61
Total	418	390	327	324	447	1906

Pump (fire engine) Utilisation

Between April 2018 and March 2023, the following number of pumps were utilised at accidental dwelling fires:

Pumps	0	1	2	3	4
Incidents	2	1699	162	29	14
Percentage	0.1%	89.1%	8.5%	1.5%	0.7%

Deliberate fires to other people's property (secondary)

Location of Secondary Fires



Flooding

Summary

There are two main types of external flooding that impact Buckinghamshire, Fluvial Flooding and Surface water flooding.

Fluvial flooding occurs when waterways such as rivers, streams or brooks overflow their banks into surrounding areas.

Surface water flooding occurs when rainfall overwhelms the capacity of drainage systems and surface water sewers, resulting in water flowing over the land instead of through drainage systems.

Fluvial Flooding

The Hazard

This risk is most likely to occur following periods of intense rainfall and will become more frequent as a result of climate change. Impacts are widespread and may include damage to the local environment, properties and essential services, with disproportionate effects on vulnerable groups.

The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a significant river flood event, resulting from cumulative local events or a series of concurrent events across multiple geographic regions following a sustained period of heavy rainfall. This could possibly be combined with snow melt and surface water flooding.

Flood defences would become overtopped by river levels and breaches may occur in river banks and hard defences as they are put under pressure. Across urban and rural areas there would be flooding of homes and businesses.

A number of people would require evacuation, with some of these being vulnerable and requiring assistance.

Fluvial Flooding

The Hazard

While the impact of Fluvial flooding can be much greater than surface water flooding , it is also more predictable. The environment agency provides the locations that are at risk of fluvial flooding and the likelihood.

The map on the right shows where in the county is most at risk of fluvial flooding. The diagram below is an example of how can identify those properties that are most at risk of flooding.





Surface Water Flooding

The Hazard

This type of flooding can occur in a wide variety of locations, including towns or cities located far from rivers and waterways. It is also particularly difficult to forecast with accuracy and can happen at very short notice, with periods of short but intense rainfall likely to increase in the future due to the warming climate.

The reasonable worst-case scenario is based on a large flood event in a built-up area, resulting from a pocket of exceptionally high rainfall. The most severe impact would lead to significant damage to homes and businesses. The evacuation of residents might be necessary, with short- to medium-term shelter being required. Depending upon the geological conditions, surface water flooding may lead to an increased likelihood of geological instability (for example sinkholes) in the impacted area. This could cause significant impacts to the local response, transport infrastructure, and other infrastructure in the impacted area.

Other scenarios include occupants of cars becoming trapped in water where the occupants have tried to make their way through the surface water flooding

Water Safety

The Hazard

In 2022 there were 436 water related fatalities in England. To put this in context, there were 272 fire-related fatalities in the year ending March 2022.

The table below shows the activity and location type of incidents in England where an accidental water related fatality was recorded (this excluded incidents at sea or at a coastal shore).

The following are some key stats from 2022 in relation to water related fatalities:

- There were 151 accidental fatalities
- 78% of accidental fatalities were male
- Males 20-29 were the highest group for accidental fatalities
- Recreational activities accounted for 59% of accidental fatalities
- 44 accidental fatality reports noted the presence of drugs or alcohol
- There were 154 suicide suspected fatalities at or near water in England.

	Bath (includes jacuzzis, hot-tubs)	Canal/ Aquaduct	Drain/ Well/Pit	Harbour/ Dock/ Marina/ Port	Lake/ Loch/ Lough	Pond	Pool (Swimming)	Quarry	Reservoir	River	Stream/ Ditch/ Burn	Water Container	Total
Bath	4												4
Jumping/diving in					1					4			5
Manually powered boats					1					1			2
Motor vehicle						2				1			3
Motorboating		2		3	2					2			9
Person on ice					4								4
Personal Water Craft					1								1
Sailing													0
Sub aqua diver					1								1
Swimming		2			9		2	1	3	7			24
Walking/running	1	11	2	1	2	2				17	5	1	42
Waterside activity/in water play					2					2			4
Total	5	15	2	4	23	4	2	1	3	34	5	1	99

Water Safety

In Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes

BFRS responded to 196 Water Safety related incidents between April 2018 and March 2023.

	18/19	19/20	20/21	21/22	22/23	23/24
RESCUE FROM WATER	14	18	12	16	19	14
VEHICLE IN WATER	3	16	28	3	1	2
SMALL ANIMAL FROM WATER	4	2	8	6	7	3
LARGE ANIMAL FROM WATER	1	1	4	3	2	2
BOAT REQUIRING RESCUE	0	3	0	3	2	1



Map of water rescues



Road Safety

Summary

Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service is required by The Fire and Rescue Services Act to rescue people in the event of road traffic collisions, to make provision for protecting people from harm and ensuring we have the resources necessary to meet all normal requirements. Incidents on our roads have a big impact on communities and lives of Buckinghamshire residents and those traveling through.

The Hazard

Incidents on our roads have a big impact on communities and lives of Buckinghamshire residents and those traveling through. Nationally, around 1,700 people die in Road Traffic Collisions (RTC), and a further 28,000 are seriously injured.

Buckinghamshire is served by four motorways, although two are on its borders:

M1 motorway: serves Milton Keynes in the north via junctions 13 and 14 (although the former is just outside the county boundary in Bedfordshire).

M4 motorway: passes through the very south of the county with one junction in Bucks (J7).

M25 motorway: passes into Bucks with one junction (J16- interchange for the M40).

M40 motorway: cuts through the south of the county serving towns such as High Wycombe and Beaconsfield.

Buckinghamshire also has six important A roads:

A428: serving the northern villages of Lavendon and Cold Brayfield.

A5: serves Milton Keynes.

A421: serves Milton Keynes and Buckingham; links the M1 to the M40.

A40: parallels M40 through south Bucks and continues to Central London.

A41: cuts through the centre of the county from Watford to Bicester, serving Aylesbury.

A4: serves Taplow in the very south.

Milton Keynes has a grid road system that is a network of predominantly national speed limit, fully landscaped routes that form the top layer of the street hierarchy for both private and public transport in Milton Keynes. The system is unique in the United Kingdom for its innovative use of street hierarchy principles: the grid roads run in between districts rather than through them.

Road Safety

Outcomes

The following figures show the outcomes of RTCs attended in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes by the fire and rescue service between April 2018 and March 2023.

	2018/2019	2019/2020	2020/2021	2021/2022	2022/2023
Incidents attended	569	592	413	548	557
Fatalities	14	8	12	11	9
Seriously injured	82	91	76	69	95
Slight injuries	280	249	196	224	180
First aid given only	117	99	67	113	93

Pump (fire engine) utilisation

Between April 2018 and March 2023, the following number of pumps were utilised at Road Traffic Collisions

Pumps	0	1	2	3	4
Incidents	23	978	1397	266	15
Percentage	0.9%	36.5%	52.1%	9.9%	0.6%



Section 2:
Horizon Scanning and Research – PESTELO Analysis

Overview of risks, issues and opportunities

Political	Economic	Social / Demographic	Technology and Infrastructure	Environment Natural / Built	Legal	Organisational
2023 Integrated Review Refresh	Inflation / cost of living.	Rising Population	Alternatively Fuelled Vehicles (AFV)	Climate Change	Fire Safety Act 2021	Insufficient funding to achieve 2025-30 CRMP objectives.
2023 Defence Command Paper	Risk of low economic growth	Ageing Population	Artificial Intelligence / Robotics / Autonomous Vehicles	Rewilding	The Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022	BFRS Service resilience issues: staff availability, retention, loss of key staff.
UK Resilience Framework	Brexit	Health and Disability	Frontier Artificial Intelligence Risks	New Housing Development	The Building Safety Act 2022	Ageing Workforce: Health and Wellbeing
UK National Risk Register (2023)	Pension Liabilities	Population Diversity	Remote working Technologies	Permitted Development	Minimum Service Levels Act 2023	FRS Workplace culture.
Russia – Ukraine War	City Deals and Growth Deals	Overcrowded Housing	High energy density rechargeable batteries	Reinforced Autoclaved Aerated Concrete	Serious Violence Duty	TVFCS mobilising issues
Israel / Gaza and associated conflict across the wider Middle East		Housing without Central Heating	Air Sourced Heat Pumps	Defective External Wall Systems (EWS)	Procurement Act	Strategic Partnership Opportunities
Fire Reform White Paper		Communal Establishments	Solar PV Systems	Asbestos	Failure to comply with Equal Pay legislative requirements.	Contaminants management / liabilities

Overview of risks, issues and opportunities

Political	Economic	Social / Demographic	Technology and Infrastructure	Environment Natural / Built	Legal	Organisational
USAR Funding		Residual / Long Term effects of Covid Pandemic	Smart Motorways	Unoccupied and Derelict Buildings	Potential amendments to Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Business Regulations 2003	Impact of public enquiries e.g. Grenfell, Manchester Arena, Covid.
2024/25 General Election		Hoarding	High Speed Rail		Firefighters Pensions (Remediable Service) Regulations 2023	Demand for SCAS or TVP services exceeds available capacity to respond with 'knock on' effects for BFRS when attending incidents requiring multi-agency response.
FBU Firefighters Manifesto		Fly-tipping	The Elizabeth Line			Results from Audit/inspection
			Western Rail Link into Heathrow		Safeguarding	Maintaining cadre of specialist skills: NILO, HMA, DIM, WIM, Tac-Ads
			East West Rail			

Political

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Integrated Review Refresh 2023

The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 (IR2023) updates the government's security, defence, development and foreign policy priorities to reflect changes in the global context since the first Integrated Review in 2021. In particular, to take account of the effects of the war in the Ukraine which has added to inflationary pressures and disrupted supply chains with adverse consequences for households, businesses and public services.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
"Address vulnerabilities through resilience" is one of the four pillars that comprise the IR2023. It priorities addressing strategic UK vulnerabilities in the following areas: · **Energy security** (maximising sources of supply in the immediate term, while accelerating the transition to clean energy and net zero CO2 emissions over the long term whilst, in parallel, strengthening UK resilience to risks associated with climate change and environmental damage); · **Strengthening health resilience** (this includes: a new Centre for Pandemic Preparedness within the UK Health Security Agency to better detect and respond to emerging risks and threats; and the development of a Biological Security Strategy to provide a strategic framework for mitigating biological risks whether arising naturally or through accidental or deliberate release); · **Economic security**, including the development of a UK Supply Chains and Import Strategy to strengthen resilience in critical sectors such as semiconductors. Also, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure will be replaced by the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) to provide expert, intelligence-led advice to businesses and institutions in sensitive sectors of the economy; · **Democratic and wider societal resilience**, including the establishment of a 'Defending Democracy Taskforce' to make electoral processes and infrastructure secure and resilient and ensure that elected officials at all levels are protected from physical, cyber and other threats. Its work will include bridging gaps between the national security establishment	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The Service issued a formal response to the public consultation held in relation to the 2021 Integrated Review (see Appendix 1 - Response to Cabinet Office Integrated Review Call for Evidence). **Future Actions / Requirements:** Service officers will monitor the development of all strategies and measures specified in the IR2023 that are relevant to the emergency services in general, and the fire and rescue service in particular. The Service will respond to any future consultations held in relation to these where appropriate to do so. Any strategic implications for Service resourcing, capabilities, policies, procedures, equipment or training will be identified, evaluated and reported to the Fire Authority via the community risk management planning, corporate planning and / or corporate risk management processes as appropriate. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Failure to identify emerging risks and / or requirements resulting in adverse outcomes for the public, communities and Service staff should a related event occur. Potential for consequential financial losses and / or reputational damage.

and non-traditional partners such as local councils, police forces and global tech companies; · **Strengthening of protective security**, by addressing vulnerabilities that expose people and infrastructure to physical and security risks, including a new Protect Duty ('Martyn's Law) which will make it a legal requirement for owners and operators of public spaces and venues to keep the public safe from terrorist attacks; · **Cyber Security and resilience**, across UK businesses, people, critical national infrastructure and public services; · **Strengthening UK borders**, by reducing vulnerability to threats from terrorists, criminals and state actors including the prevention of the importation illicit goods, stopping illegal migration and protecting the UK's bio-security.	

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: 2023 Defence Command Paper This sets out how Defence will respond to the changing context and deliver on the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh within its resource envelope, increasing its productivity and focusing on areas that will achieve real-world impact.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Chapter 8 (pages 87-88) sets out the military's role in relation to civil contingencies. This includes: · Army and Navy provision of explosive ordnance disposal teams across the country to help safely dispose of conventional munitions and improvised explosive devices; · Army contribution of 2,600 personnel at two-day readiness to support homeland resilience, including specialist capabilities and armed police backfill under OP TEMPERER, with further support available from other Services, to provide support to the Police in the event of a terrorist incident which goes beyond their capacity or capability for response; · Continued support for civil authorities more generally with forces held at high levels of readiness to respond to a wide range of national events and crises (as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic).	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The Command Paper caveats these commitments by stating that: "…the deterioration in the international security environment means that it is of paramount importance that Defence focuses on its core role of ensuring the national security of the UK. To enable this, it will be important to ensure that the support Defence provides domestically is limited to tasks that only Defence can perform". It is also understood that the Government intends to continue with its plan announced in the previous Command Paper to reduce the full-time trained strength of the army from 82,000 to 73,000 by 2025. It is therefore prudent to plan on the basis that military assistance will only be available in exceptional circumstances, and that the Service should not rely on its support to cover contingencies such as industrial action or other contingencies that can be prepared for and responded to with non-military resources. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Review of sufficiency / adequacy of existing contingency resilience arrangements to be included within scope of 2025-30 CRMP. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Potential for significant disruption to provision of critical services with attendant consequences for the public and communities if unable to adequately respond to incidents presenting risks to life, property, the economy and / or the environment.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: UK Government Resilience Framework

The UK Government Resilience Framework sets out how it will strengthen the systems and capabilities that support collective resilience. The framework is the first articulation of how the UK Government will deliver on a new strategic approach to resilience. It is based on three core principles:

- A developed and shared understanding of the civil contingencies risks we face is fundamental;
- Prevention rather than cure wherever possible: a greater emphasis on preparation and prevention; and,
- Resilience is a 'whole of society' endeavour, so we must be more transparent and empower everyone to make a contribution.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Reducing risk to people, communities, the economy and the environment, via preventative and protective strategies / measures and preparing to respond to a wide range of civil contingencies are core fire and rescue service roles. BFRS therefore contributes to societal resilience both at an individual service level and also in partnership with other agencies, particularly the local resilience forum (Thames Valley - TVLRF). The Resilience Framework sets out (at pages 67-68) a number of actions and deliverables to be delivered against 2025 and 2030 time horizons, so fall within the lifespan of the new BFRS 2025-30 CRMP. A number of these may require and / or provide opportunities for participation and contributions from the fire and rescue service, in particular in relation to: · Measuring socio-economic resilience, including how risks impact across communities and vulnerable groups (2025); · Expanding the scope and use of standards and assurance in the public sector to support better contingency planning and risk management (2025); · Reforms to strengthen Local Resilience Forums (leadership, accountability and the integration of resilience into the UK's levelling up mission (pilot by 2025 / roll out by 2030); · Delivery of a new UK Resilience Academy (2025); · New training and skills pathway to drive professionalism and support resilience related careers (2025);	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The Service issued a formal response to the Cabinet Office 'Call for Evidence' relating to the draft Resilience Strategy (See Appendix 2 - National Resilience Strategy Call for Evidence - 23 September 2021). **Future Actions / Requirements:** Service officers will monitor developments and progress with the actions and deliverables that are relevant to the emergency services in general, and the fire and rescue service in particular. The Service will respond to any future consultations held in relation to these where appropriate to do so. Any strategic implications for Service resourcing, capabilities, policies, procedures, equipment or training will be identified, evaluated and reported to the Fire Authority via the community risk management planning, corporate planning and / or corporate risk management processes as appropriate. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Failure to identify emerging risks and / or requirements resulting in adverse outcomes for the public, communities and Service staff should a related event occur. Potential for consequential financial losses and / or reputational damage.

· Reinvigoration of the National Exercising Programme (2025); · Further guidance from the UK Government to LRFs and local partners, created with local responders, the VCS and communities to support them working with vulnerable groups (2025); · Introduction of standards for resilience across the private sector and better guidance on resilience to support contingency planning and risk management (2030); · Build upon existing resilience standards and do more on assurance of Critical National Infrastructure (2030); · Options for funding of any future expansion of LRF responsibilities and expectations thereof (2030); · New guidance to community organisations and households to help guide investment in their own resilience and preparedness (2030).	

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: National Risk Register 2023 The National Risk Register outlines the most serious risks facing the United Kingdom	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The 2023 National Risk Register (NRR23) identifies and evaluates an extensive range of risks that, were they to crystalise, could cause fatalities, casualties, disruption to public services, economic and / or environmental damage on a local, regional or national scale.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** A comprehensive review of the NRR23 has been carried out to identify risks that could potentially require an emergency response or other form of intervention in the community and / or disrupt our ability to deliver services to the public. These risks have been subject to local assessment to ascertain whether current preparations are sufficient or whether investment in additional capabilities is required. A summary of these risks and associated local mitigations is included in the last part of this evidence base. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Any additional capability requirements are captured in the draft 2025-30 CRMP or other Service Plans as appropriate. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Failure to identify emerging risks and / or requirements resulting in adverse outcomes for the public, communities and Service staff should a related event occur. Potential for consequential financial losses and / or reputational damage.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Prolonged continuation of the Russia / Ukraine war	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Potential for further adverse effects such as: · Disruption to energy supplies; · Volatility in gas and oil market prices; · Disruption to supplies of commodities such as fertilisers, wheat etc. leading to shortages and price inflation; · Diversion of public resources / funding to enhance national security, potentially reducing those available for other public services - on 23 April 2024, the Prime Minister announced that UK defence expenditure will progressively rise to reach 2.5 per cent of GDP (£87 Billion per annum) by 2030. The Government has indicated that this will be funded from savings elsewhere rather than additional taxation or borrowing.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Regular monitoring of energy prices and awarding of fixed-price contracts at appropriate times. · Generators installed at strategic stations. · Plan produced to manage variable rota disconnections. · Solar panels installed at key sites. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Fixed price energy contract ends 31 March 2026, so continue to monitor prices ahead of future contract award. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Increased exposure to energy price volatility. · Energy supply outages.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Risk of further escalation / expansion of conflict following 7 October 2023 terror attacks in Israel, subsequent Israeli military intervention and associated humanitarian crisis in the Gaza strip.	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Potential for further adverse effects such as: · Public disorder in other countries including the UK; · Terrorist activity in countries outside of the region including the UK. Were the conflagration to expand across other parts of the Middle East region, this could result in: · Disruption to energy supplies; · Volatility in gas and oil market prices; · Disruption to global trade (already manifesting following recent Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea which has significantly disrupted traffic through one of the world's most important shipping lanes leading to increases to insurance and transportation costs with potential for inflationary pressures). · Displacement of populations and potential for refugee flows.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · As above for energy security. · Public disorder and terrorist activity scenarios addressed in NRR23 local capabilities assessment. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · As above for energy security · Public disorder and terrorist activity scenarios addressed in NRR23 local capabilities assessment. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Increased exposure to energy price volatility. · Energy supply outages · Potential for sub-optimal response to public disorder or terrorist incidents resulting in increased risks to life and property.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: UK Government Fire Reform White Paper The Government's proposals to introduce system-wide reform of fire and rescue services in England.	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
In May 2022, the Government launched a consultation on a range of proposals for reform of fire and rescue services in England. These included proposals to consolidate governance under a single, elected individual who would hold an operationally independent Chief Fire Officer to account. The individual would either be: a mayor who could delegate day-to-day oversight to a deputy mayor; a council leader who could delegate to a cabinet member; or a police, fire and crime commissioner. In Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes this would most likely mean a transfer of governance from the existing Fire Authority to the Thames Valley Police and Crime Commissioner (TVPCC). However, as there are currently three separate fire and rescue services operating within the Thames Valley, each with separate and, in one case, different governance arrangements (Oxfordshire Fire and Rescue Service is governed by Oxfordshire County Council whereas Buckinghamshire and Royal Berkshire are governed by separate combined fire authorities), this would require the TVPCC to take over the governance of all three services and potentially consolidate them into one. Whilst the transfer to the TVPCC could take place under existing legislation, the granting of operational independence to Chief Fire Officers would require legislation to enable it. The Home Office published the Government response to the Fire Reform White Paper consultation on 12 December 2023. The Ministerial Statement set out the Government's priorities which include: · Introducing a professional College of Fire & Rescue to raise standards and strengthen leadership. · Developing provision for fire chiefs to have operational independence.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** A comprehensive Service response to the Government's consultation was issued on 13 July 2022 (See Appendix 3 - Fire Reform Consultation Paper 13 July 2022). **Future Actions / Requirements:** BFRS officers continue to monitor the situation and will report any significant developments to the Fire Authority. Officers are also monitoring the ongoing debate over potential changes to local authority structures in Oxfordshire, which could involve a move from the existing County, Oxford City and District Council structure to a unitary structure. Depending on the nature of any changes, these could have implications for the governance of fire and rescue services in Oxfordshire and the wider Thames Valley. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Risk of failure to anticipate / prepare for future legislative and / or National Framework requirements resulting in a sub-optimal response and potential for adverse HMICFRS inspection outcomes.

· Tasking the National Joint Council to review the pay negotiation mechanism. · Taking action to improve integrity and culture in fire and rescue services through improved training, more open recruitment practices and working towards a statutory code of ethics for fire and rescue employees. Proposals for the mandatory transfer of governance of fire and rescue authorities to single decision-makers such as a Police Fire and Crime Commissioner are not being taken forward by the Government.	

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Potential loss of USAR Funding
The Authority currently receives an annual grant of c. £817k from central Government to support its Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) capabilities which are available as a regional and national, as well as local, resource. In January 2023 the Authority was verbally notified by Government that this grant funding would end on 31 March 2024. Subsequently it was confirmed that the funding would remain in place for another year (2024/25) but this would be subject to further review. In the meantime, the outlook for the future provision of the grant remains uncertain.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Potential loss of locally important resources and capabilities such as heavy and technical rescue. · Increased risk to life / property / environment.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Potential loss of funding factored into Medium Term Financial Plan. With the support of local MPs, the Fire Authority will continue to lobby for the retention of the funding which underpins the provision of USAR in its current form. Creation of a USAR Capability Reserve as part of the Reserves Strategy to smooth the impact of any sudden loss of funding. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Contingent review of local heavy and technical rescue requirements to be included within scope of 2025-30 CRMP. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Inability to adequately respond to civil contingencies / catastrophic incidents resulting in loss or injury to life, property, the environment and reputational damage to the Service.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: 2024/25 General Election. The next General Election must be held no later than 24 January 2025 with Parliament being dissolved no later than 17 December 2024.	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The major political parties have yet to publish manifestos for the next General Election. Were the outcome of the election to lead to a change of Government, this could result in different policies and priorities for the fire and rescue service nationally, from those being pursued by the present Government and proposed in its Reform White Paper. The US Presidential election also takes place in 2024. This could have geopolitical and / or macro-economic effects were the outcomes to result in significant changes to US foreign, national security, trade, environmental and / or industrial policies.	**Future Actions / Requirements:** Officers will monitor the development of policy proposals and review manifestos as they are published in the run up to the General Election to identify any with potential implications, whether direct or indirect, for the fire and rescue service nationally and locally. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Risk of failure to anticipate / prepare for future legislative and / or National Framework requirements resulting in a sub-optimal response and potential for adverse HMICFRS inspection outcomes.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: FBU *Firefighters' Manifesto*	
The Firefighters' Manifesto was published on 1 November 2023. Amongst other things, it calls for: an immediate increase in funding for UK fire and rescue services; an additional 5,000 firefighters nationally; common UK-wide standards for response times and appliance crewing levels; responding to flooding and extreme weather events to become statutory duties; greater progress on equalities and fire contaminants; and more democratic accountability via directly elected Fire and Rescue Authorities.	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The FBU is influential in shaping perceptions and expectations of key stakeholders including fire and rescue service staff, politicians, media and the public. Its Manifesto serves as a counterpoint to the current UK Government Fire Reform White Paper. Its impact will depend on whether, and the extent to which, it influences future government policy in relation to fire and rescue. Many of its demands, such as those in relation to emergency response times and crewing levels, would have substantial financial and resourcing implications that would currently be beyond this, and many other, fire and rescue authorities' means to meet, particularly those with significantly rural areas to serve, without very significant increases to funding.	**Actions Undertaken:** BMKFA has used the precept flexibility offered by the government over the last two years to increase Council Tax revenues above the normal cap limit. The additional funding has been used to increase the number of operational wholetime firefighters, albeit not sufficiently to enable the Service to meet the response times and crewing levels proposed by the FBU. **Future Actions / Requirements:** The draft 2025-30 CRMP includes proposals for new response standards and enhancing the Service's capabilities to respond to climate related incidents such as wildfires. Officers will continue to engage constructively with local FBU representatives to identify improvement opportunities for the benefit of the public and Service staff. Consequences if no further action taken: Adverse effect on industrial relations

Economic

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Inflation / cost of living.

The Bank of England attributes the significant rise in inflation seen since mid-2020 to three main factors:

1. An increase in demand for goods rather than services during the Covid pandemic 'lockdown' from people being at home for prolonged periods. Suppliers experienced difficulty in fulfilling the increased demand leading to higher prices, particularly for imported goods;
2. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which led to large increases in the price of gas. It also pushed up the price of food. Poor harvests in other countries made the situation worse. Food prices in June 2023 were 17% higher than in June 2022;
3. A significant fall in the number of people available to work, that was linked to the Covid pandemic. This meant that employers have had to offer higher wages to attract job applicants. Many businesses have had to increase their prices to cover those costs.

This has led to the Bank of England progressively increasing base interest rates from a low of 0.1 per cent in December 2021 to 5.25 per cent in August 2023. The Bank currently forecasts that inflation will continue to reduce from the peak of 11.1 per cent in October 2022 and fall back to its target rate of less than 2 per cent by the second quarter of 2025.

Cost of living pressures was among the key concerns raised by members of the public from Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, who participated in a 'Listening and Engagement' consultation undertaken by the Service in June 2023 - see page 13 of linked report: https://bucksfire.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/3fire-authority-meeting-11-october-2023-item-13b-2025-2030-crmp-listening-and-engagement-consultation-outcomes.pdf





Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
· Increased levels of fuel poverty leading to risk of people resorting to alternative, unsafe means of cooking, heating and lighting, resulting in potential increases to numbers of accidental dwelling fires and associated casualties. · Increases to mortgage and rental costs, due to rising interest rates, leading to higher rates of homelessness and people living in less safe types of accommodation such as 'houses in multiple occupation' (HMOs), with potential for higher risk to life in the event of fire. · Potential for higher rates of business failure due to supply chain issues, unsustainable rises in supply costs, and / or reduced demand due to 'cost of living' pressures on consumers leading to increases in numbers of empty and derelict premises, with associated fire risks. · Longer lead times and higher prices for fire and rescue service vehicles, equipment and consumables leading to shortages of parts and budgetary pressures. · Upward pressure on fire and rescue staff pay settlements as employees / representative bodies seek to mitigate inflationary pressures leading to adverse budgetary effects. · Difficulty in attracting and retaining staff due to increased competition from other employers able to offer higher pay. · Higher revenues from Fire Authority investments due to higher interest rates providing an offset to other adverse budgetary pressures.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Targeting of domestic safety interventions to the most vulnerable. · Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Further mitigations to be considered within the scope of prevention and protection activity to be included within the 2025-30 CRMP. · Inflationary pressures and offsets factored into Medium Term Financial Plan. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Potential for increased levels of risk to life and property in the communities served by the Authority. · Greater difficulty in maintaining Service staffing to establishment requirements.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Risk that Economic growth rate remains low over the medium term and fails to keep pace with rising demands of a growing / ageing population for public services, housing and associated infrastructure. Public finances remain under extreme pressure with continuing high levels of public indebtedness and associated cost of debt servicing. Increased competition between public services for funding with potential winners and losers depending on Government's priorities.	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Demand for key public services such as health and social care outstrips capacity to supply, leading to higher ill-health and mortality rates amongst more vulnerable groups such as the elderly, disabled and those experiencing high levels of deprivation. · Demand for affordable housing continues to outstrip supply leading to more people living in HMOs or homeless. Affordable housing was among the key concerns raised by members of the public from Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, who participated in the 'Listening and Engagement' consultation undertaken by the Service in June 2023 (see page 13 of linked report). · Potential for further reductions to central government funding support for some public services including fire and rescue leading to reduced capacity / resources to undertake mitigating interventions.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Targeting of domestic safety and wellbeing interventions to the most vulnerable. · Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Further mitigations to be considered within the scope of prevention and protection activity to be included within the 2025-30 CRMP. · Future funding expectations factored into Medium Term Financial Plan. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Reduced quality of life / risk to life amongst vulnerable groups. · Risk to BFRS ability to fund current / planned level of services.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Residual effects of UK withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit)
The UK officially left the EU on 31 January 2020 with a Trade and Cooperation Agreement comprising: · A free trade agreement covering the economic and social partnership, including transport, energy and mobility; · A framework for cooperation between law enforcement and judicial authorities across civil and criminal matters; · An overarching governance arrangement which will enable either side to impose tariffs if they consider that the provisions relating to the 'level playing field' / state aid have been breached.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Assessment of the long term effects of withdrawal from the EU on the local economy falls outside of the competencies of a Fire and Rescue Service to assess. Analysis thereof is also complicated by significant impacts arising from the Covid Pandemic and the Russia – Ukraine War. Principal concerns for the Fire and Rescue Service relate to the potential for disruption to supply chains for imported vehicle parts, equipment and consumables and also associated increases to the cost of these.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Procurement team continues to monitor global impacts across supply chain via NFCC Procurement hub and Crown Commercial Services, as the national category leads for Fleet, Operational Equipment, Clothing and PPE, Energy/Utilities, ICT, Construction and Facilities and Professional Services. · Finance team have built in revised inflation increases to key Contracts to reflect the Cost of Living impact, as part of the ongoing budget forecast and planning process. · Procurement monitor financial stability of critical suppliers in 'real-time' via an external business credit monitoring service. · BMKFA Contracts are allocated a grading that specifies the level of Contract Management required per Contract, taking into account various areas of risk. Individual Contract Managers are responsible for monitoring the performance of Contract suppliers and their supply chain. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Monitor potential impact of future changes to procurement legislation. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Potential disruption to supplies and/or unbudgeted price increases.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Future pension liabilities – potential for liabilities to exceed assets leading to fund failures and / or reductions to future value of pension payments. Also risk of insufficient resources to meet unfunded pension scheme liabilities (N.B. UK Firefighter pension schemes are paid from current revenues and do not have an underpinning fund to support them).	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Increases in pensioner poverty / deprivation. · Reductions to overall spending power in the economy with knock on effects on businesses etc.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Targeting of domestic safety / wellbeing interventions to the most vulnerable. · Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards **Future Actions / Requirements:** · This is a long term trend that will be monitored and factored into our risk assessment and intervention targeting processes. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Reduced quality of life / risk to life amongst vulnerable groups.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">Risk / Issue / Opportunity: City Deals and Growth Deals</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">These are bespoke packages of funding and decision-making powers negotiated between central government and local authorities and/or Local Enterprise Partnerships and other local bodies. There are three types of devolution deal:
· The most comprehensive package for areas considering devolution for the first time is a Level 3 deal, for areas with a single institution over a sensible geography, with the strongest and most accountable leadership, such as a mayoral combined authority (MCA) or a mayoral combined county authority (MCCA) covering a functional economic area or the whole county geography with a directly elected mayor;
· The Level 2 offer is for devolution to single local government institutions without a directly elected mayor, such as an upper-tier local authority, combined authority or combined county authority covering a functional economic area or the whole county geography;
· The Level 1 offer is for local authorities with looser joint working arrangements, such as a joint committee model.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service</td><td>Actions Undertaken / Required</td></tr>
<tr><td>Buckinghamshire Council has been awarded a Level 2 offer. The draft agreement, subject to ratification, will devolve to the council the following functions:
• Adult education and skills functions.
• Land assembly and compulsory purchase powers.
The devolution agreement is contingent upon Buckinghamshire Council meeting the associated governance criteria which principally means they have and will maintain the ‘leader and cabinet’ form of executive arrangements as set out in the Levelling Up White Paper. The agreement is the first step in a process of further devolution. Buckinghamshire Council will be able to deepen its devolution arrangements over time, subject to government agreement.</td><td>Actions Undertaken:
Review of draft agreement undertaken to identify any potential opportunities or issues for the Service. None were identified at this point.
Future Actions / Requirements:
Officers will continue to monitor any further developments in the devolution process to ensure that any implications or opportunities for the Service are identified.
Consequences if no further action taken
None envisaged at this time.</td></tr>
</table>

Social / Demographic

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Rising population.

The UK's population has been rising since the late 1990s, mostly as a result of immigration and also longer life spans. On the day of the most recent census, 21 March 2021, 59,597,300 people were recorded as living in England and Wales. This is an increase of 6.3% (3.5m people) on the population recorded in the 2011 census.

Locally, the population of Buckinghamshire increased from 505,300 in 2011 to 553,100 in 2021 an increase of 9.5% (47,800 people). This means that Buckinghamshire has the fifth largest Local Authority area population - larger than Manchester, Liverpool or Bristol. The population of Milton Keynes increased from 248,800 in 2011 to 287,000 an increase of 15.3% (38,200) and the second fastest rate of population growth in the South East, where the average population increase was 7.5%. This equates to an increase of 86,000 people (11.4%) across the Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes Fire Authority (BMKFA) area as a whole, leading to a total population of 840,100 as at March 2021.

Based on current immigration trends, further significant rises to both national and local populations can be expected over the life of the 2025-30 CRMP. Milton Keynes Council, for example, in its Strategy for 2050, envisages growing the population in its area by over 40 per cent to around 410,000 by 2050, with it reaching c. 335,000 in the early 2030s.

Figure 1: Population change (%) in English Regions and Wales between 2011 & 2021. Source ONS

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service

- Rising demand for housing, transport and public services including health / medical care
- Increased pressure on existing infrastructure and utilities, including water supplies. The areas served by BMKFA are already designated by the Environment Agency as being under serious water stress.
- Potential for housing shortages leading to more people living in sub-standard, over-crowded accommodation such as HMOs with attendant fire risks.
- Increased traffic congestion with potential implications for fire and rescue service attendance times.
- Although a rising population does not necessarily imply a proportionate increase in emergency incidents, an increase can be anticipated given the current pace and scale of population growth.

Actions Undertaken / Required

Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:

- Home Fire Safety Visit programme upscaled and targeted at the most vulnerable in the community.
- Referral processes to other agencies for support that cannot be delivered by the Service.
- Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards

Future Actions / Requirements:

The draft 2025-30 CRMP will include a review of fire and rescue service provisions in high growth areas, including:

- Pump and fire station locations; and,
- Duty / crewing systems.

Consequences if no further action taken:

Potential for increased levels of risk to life and property in the communities served by the Authority.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Ageing population

Nationally, the proportion of the population aged 65 years and over on census day, was the highest percentage ever recorded, with more than one in six people falling into this age group. Locally, both Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes have seen an increase in the proportion of residents who are aged 65 years and over. In Buckinghamshire there has been a 23.2% increase in residents in this age group, in Milton Keynes this figure is 43.6%, which is highest rate of increase in this age group of all local authorities across England.

Also, there have been significant increases to the 80+ populations who are more likely to have age related disabilities and complex health issues. Further increases to the older population are expected throughout the life of the 2025-2030 CRMP. Accurate forecasts for the local impact of this are awaited. In the meantime, the ONS projects that nationally, by mid-2045, the 85+ population have nearly doubled from where it was in 2020, to 3.1 million, representing 4.3% of the total UK population.



Figure 2: Population change (%) by age group in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes between 2011 & 2021. Source ONS

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Potential for demand for affordable high quality institutional care to exceed supply, resulting in more vulnerable people with complex care needs remaining in domestic settings with little or no support. · Continuing pressure on hospital resources due to need to provide care to vulnerable people due to lack of institutional social care facilities.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Home Fire Safety Visit programme upscaled and targeted at the most vulnerable in the community. · Referral processes to other agencies for support that cannot be delivered by the Service. · Fire Sense educational programme developed for all people who work with or support people across Buckinghamshire or Milton Keynes to help them identify and reduce the risk of fire. · Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards **Future Actions / Requirements:** Implement the Online Home Fire safety tool kit. This will allow FRSs to deliver a product available to households who may not reach the threshold for a physical visit, or to be used when and where physical visits are restricted or not possible. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Reduced quality of life / risk to life amongst vulnerable groups.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Health and Disability

The results of the 2021 census show that in general residents of Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes reported that they were in either good or very good health. In Milton Keynes 84.3% of residents reported one of these two options. In Buckinghamshire this figure was 86.3%.

In Milton Keynes 3.2% of residents reported that they were in bad health and 0.9% reported that they were in very bad health. In Buckinghamshire 2.6% of residents reported that they were in bad health and 0.7% reported that they were in very bad health.

Nationally 4.2% of people reported that they were in in bad health and 1.2% reported that they were in very poor health. This suggests that the population of Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes are in slightly better health compared to the national average.

Under the Equality Act 74,597 residents of Buckinghamshire are recorded by the 2021 census as having a disability, or 13.5% of the population. The equivalent figures for Milton Keynes are 42,514 individuals or 14.8% of the population.

The Office for National Statistics states that in line with the Equality Act (2010), people who assessed their day-to-day activities as limited by long-term physical or mental health conditions or illnesses were considered disabled.

The rates of residents reporting that they had a physical or mental health condition lasting 12 months or more, which limited their day-to-day activities a lot or is shown in the map.



Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
· People with health issues / disabilities that limit their activities a lot are potentially at greater risk in the event of a fire as they may lack the ability to effect escape from the affected premises unaided and / or alert others as to enable assistance to be provided. · They are also potentially at risk from other events, such as slips and trips that could cause injury or even death in the case of extreme fragility: https://www.rospa.com/home-safety/advice/general/facts-and-figures	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Home Fire Safety Visit programme upscaled and targeted at the most vulnerable in the community. · Referral processes to other agencies for support that cannot be delivered by the Service. · Fire Sense educational programme developed for all people who work with or support people across Buckinghamshire or Milton Keynes to help them identify and reduce the risk of fire. · Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards **Future Actions / Requirements:** Implement the Online Home Fire safety tool kit. This will allow FRSs to deliver a product available to households who may not reach the threshold for a physical visit, or to be used when and where physical visits are restricted or not possible. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Reduced quality of life / risk to life amongst vulnerable groups.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Population Diversity

In addition to growing and ageing, the population served by BMKFA has continued to become more diverse in terms of ethnicity and religion as shown in the charts below. Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes followed national trends with a large decrease in the number of people describing themselves as Christian and rise in those stating that they were of no religion. However, Christian remained the most common response for both areas.

The tables below show the percentage of the total population identifying with non-white British ethnicities and the breakdown of the population by each religion, no religion or not stating a religion for the 2011 and 2021 census.



	Buckinghamshire		Milton Keynes	
	2011	2021	2011	2021
Christian	305804 (60.5%)	260961 (47.2%↓)	131352 (52.8%)	122935 (42.8%↓)
Buddhist	2207 (0.4%)	2914 (0.5%↑)	1246 (0.5%)	1404 (0.5%→)
Hindu	6244 (1.2%)	14896 (2.7%↑)	6918 (2.8%)	12911 (4.5%↑)
Jewish	1511 (0.3%)	1688 (2.7%↑)	427 (0.2%)	383 (0.1%↓)
Muslim	25781 (5.1%)	38740 (7.0%↑)	11913 (4.8%)	20484 (7.1%↑)
Sikh	4657 (0.9%)	8811 (1.6%↑)	1372 (0.6%)	1959 (0.7%↑)
No religion	121190 (24.0%)	189206 (34.2%↑)	77939 (31.3%)	108955 (38.0%↑)
Other religion	1803 (0.4%)	2582 (0.5%↑)	1216 (0.5%)	1553 (0.5%→)
Religion not stated	36086 (7.1%)	33275 (6.0%↓)	16438 (6.6%)	16473 (5.7%↓)

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
· Recent migrants with different cultural or religious backgrounds may have different attitudes towards risk and safety from those prevailing in the communities in which they are domiciled. · Language barriers could also limit scope for fire and rescue service and partner agency engagement in relation to issues like fire and water safety. Albeit, that the 2021 Census indicated that of those people who do not identify as having English as their main language 86.3% and 84.4% can speak English either very well or well in Milton Keynes and Buckinghamshire respectively. In Milton Keynes 1.7% (591 people) responded to the census stating that they cannot speak English. In Buckinghamshire this figure was 2.3% (906 people). However, given	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Working with partners to understand who and where individuals (families) will be residing. Understand what education is required and in what format/language. Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards **Future Actions / Requirements:** Continually work within our partnership arrangements for any future interventions **Consequences if no further action taken:**

recent migration trends there is the potential for this to have risen since the Census was taken. · The current profile of the Service's workforce does not mirror that of the community, with significant groups underrepresented, such as those from South Asian and Black ethnicities. Historically, this has been a factor limiting engagement with some parts of the community. The challenges associated with improving representation from such groups were discussed with members of the public from Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, who participated in the 'Listening and Engagement' consultation undertaken by the Service in June 2023 (see pages 21-23 of linked report). Among the suggestions as to how to increase this, included following the example of the military by highlighting the range of careers available in the modern fire and rescue service, particularly non-firefighting roles, to attract people from cultural and ethnic backgrounds who would not normally consider the fire and rescue service as a career.	Increased risk to life amongst vulnerable groups.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Overcrowded Housing

The 2021 Census asked residents how many bedrooms their property had. The ONS then used this information along with the number of residents to establish a property's occupancy rating. A property's occupancy rating provides a measure of whether a household's accommodation provides sufficient space or if it is overcrowded or under-occupied.

An occupancy rating of negative 1 or less implies that a household has fewer bedrooms than the standard requirement, positive 1 or greater implies that they have more bedrooms than required, and 0 implies that they met the standard required.

The map shows the proportion of households in each area with an occupancy rating of negative one or less; therefore, showing areas where there are more likely to be households which are overcrowded. These household are located mainly in the urban areas of Milton Keynes, Aylesbury and High Wycombe, although there are higher rates elsewhere in the county as well.

Service-wide the area with the highest proportion of houses which are likely to be overcrowded is Castlefield, High Wycombe, where it is believed that in parts of this area one in five houses is likely to be overcrowded. Other areas with high levels of predicted overcrowding are in Milton Keynes and include: Water Eaton, Fishermead and Tinkers Bridge / Netherfield.



Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
Overcrowded housing is associated with higher levels of deprivation and greater risk of and from fire.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Home Fire Safety Visit programme upscaled and targeted at the most vulnerable in the community. · Referral processes to other agencies for support that cannot be delivered by the Service. · Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Continually work within our partnership arrangements for any future interventions. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Reduced quality of life / risk to life and property amongst vulnerable groups.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Housing without central heating

The vast majority (99.0%) of households in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes reported that they had central heating in the 2021 census. By far the most common type of central heating, was mains gas only, with just under three out of every four households using this type (74.8%).

The next most common type was a mix of two or more types (excluding renewable) with 8.3% of households in Buckinghamshire recording this as their answer and 8.5% of households in Milton Keynes. The third most common was electric only with 8.1% and 8.3% of households recording this type in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes respectively.

A notable difference between Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes is that 5.3% of households in Buckinghamshire use oil only as their heating type, whereas in Milton Keynes the equivalent figure is 0.9%. Renewable powered central heating is uncommon in both Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes with 0.6% and 0.2% of households using renewables exclusively to heat their homes respectively (in Milton Keynes this equates to 207 households).

In addition to these, 0.7% of households in Buckinghamshire combined renewable energy with another type of central heating and 0.8% of households in Milton Keynes used two or more central heating types including a renewable energy source.

The map shows the areas where households recorded that they did not have central heating. In Buckinghamshire 1,990 households (0.9%) and in Milton Keynes 1,300 households (1.1%) reported having no central heating.

The areas reporting the highest levels of no central heating were all in Milton Keynes and include: part of Two Mile Ash / Wymbush / Bradwell Abbey (5.7%); part of Walnut Tree / Brinklow (4.0%); and part of Central Milton Keynes (3.5%).



Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
Lack of central heating can be an indicator of social / economic deprivation. There is also the potential for occupants to use forms of heating that are unsafe, creating a higher risk both of and from fire.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Home Fire Safety Visit programme upscaled and targeted at the most vulnerable in the community. · Referral processes to other agencies for support that cannot be delivered by the Service. · Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards **Future Actions / Requirements:** Continually work within our partnership arrangements for any future interventions **Consequences if no further action taken:** • Reduced quality of life / risk to life amongst vulnerable groups.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Communal establishments

A managed communal establishment is a place that provides managed full-time or part-time supervision of residential accommodation. Communal establishments include, for example:

- University halls of residence and boarding schools
- Care homes, hospitals and hospices
- Hotels, hostels and bed and breakfasts (with accommodation for seven or more guests)
- Prisons

In Buckinghamshire 7,285 residents responded to the census answering that they lived in a communal residence. The most common residence type within Buckinghamshire was Educational Establishments, including University Halls of Residence and Boarding School Accommodation. A third (1,504) of residents in communal accommodation lived in an educational establishment. The second most common communal establishment was Care Home with Nursing (20.6%) then Care Home without Nursing (17.3%). Two other notable establishment types are: 933 residents living in defence establishments and 613 living in prisons.

In Milton Keynes 2,065 residents lived in a communal establishment at the time of the 2021 census. Of these individuals, 35.8% (740) lived in a Care Home with Nursing, making this the most common type of communal establishment in Milton Keynes. The next most common was Prison Service accommodation, with 24.0% of communal establishment residents living in a prison. The third most common property type was Care Home without Nursing (20.2%). In Milton Keynes there are no recorded residents living in educational or defence establishments.



Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
Some communal establishments present special risks: · Care homes, hospitals and hospices contain particularly vulnerable people who would require special assistance to effect evacuation in the event of fire or other emergencies rendering the building unsafe for occupation; · Prisons also present special risks including that of deliberate fire setting and challenges in relation to effecting the safe and secure evacuation of occupants. These risks can be exacerbated by issues such as overcrowding and staff shortages.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Site Specific Risk Assessment process and Register · Fire Sense educational programme developed for all people who work with or support people across Buckinghamshire or Milton Keynes to help them identify and reduce the risk of fire. • Attendance on community safer partnerships/boards **Future Actions / Requirements:** Continually work within our partnership arrangements for any future interventions. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Loss of opportunities to reduce risks to life and property.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Residual / Long Term effects of Covid Pandemic
From 11 May 2023, the World Health Organisation downgraded the Covid pandemic from a global emergency to an endemic disease. The UK Government had already ended Covid related legal restrictions in England with effect from 24 February 2022 as part its 'Living with Covid' plan. A Public Inquiry began on 28 June 2022 to examine the UK's response to and impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and learn lessons for the future. The Inquiry is currently forecast to end in 2026.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The long-term effects and consequences of the Covid pandemic are not yet fully understood. However, beyond the immediate impact on human life and health and the economic costs of measures taken during the pandemic, it is likely that there will be long-lasting effects particularly in relation to human behaviours, with social and economic consequences. The British Academy was asked by the Government Office for Science to produce an independent review on the long-term societal impacts of Covid. A summary of the findings and link to the full report, published in March 2021, is **here.** The report identified nine areas of long-term societal impact. Of particular interest to fire and rescue services are effects that could increase people's vulnerability to fire and other emergencies. In particular, factors such as: · the potential loss of trust in government and other public institutions and services that may cause disengagement and social isolation; · economic effects leading to increased levels of deprivation and / or changes in human behaviours (such as the trend towards technology enabled home / remote working discussed at page 36 of this document) that may have implications for the targeting and way in which safety and risk mitigation related interventions are delivered.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Fire and rescue services, including BFRS, played a significant role in the response to the Covid pandemic. The HMICFRS highlighted some of the activities undertaken including: assisting with the delivery of personal protective equipment (PPE); providing logistical support to the NHS; delivering food and medicine to vulnerable people; providing transport for patients and NHS staff; and, supporting the vaccination programme. The HMICFRS' report on the part played by BFRS is **here**. **Future Actions / Requirements:** BFRS Officers will continue to monitor the progress of the Covid Inquiry and other relevant research, to identify any implications and recommendations of relevance for fire and rescue services. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Potential failure to reach and mitigate risks to people disproportionately affected by the social and / or economic effects of the pandemic leading to increased risk to life and safety. Potential for sub-optimal response to any future pandemic.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Hoarding.
Hoarding (Hoarding disorder) is where someone acquires an excessive number of items and stores them in a chaotic manner, usually resulting in unmanageable amounts of clutter. It representant around 2.5% of the total population of the UK. The items can be of little or no monetary value. Hoarding is challenging to treat because many people who hoard frequently do not see it as a problem or have little awareness of how it's affecting their life or the lives of others. Some may realise they have a problem but are reluctant to seek help because they feel extremely ashamed, humiliated or guilty about it.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Impact on Community: · **Increased risk of vermin:** Piles of possessions can create ideal breeding grounds for rats and other pests, posing a health risk to the wider community; · **Social isolation:** Hoarders often become withdrawn due to shame or fear of judgement, leading to social isolation and a strain on community support networks increasing potential safeguarding issues; · **Fire hazards:** Hoarding creates a cluttered environment that can easily become a fire hazard, potentially endangering neighbours; · **Blocked access:** Hoarding can block access ways like pavements or alleyways, causing inconvenience and potential safety hazards for pedestrians. **Impact on Fire and Rescue Services:** · **Increased fire risk:** As mentioned earlier, hoarded items create fuel for fires and hinder escape routes, making firefighting operations more dangerous and complex; · **Difficulty accessing the property:** Firefighters may face difficulty entering a hoarded property due to blocked doorways or exits; · **Risk of injuries:** Collapsed piles of possessions can injure firefighters during search and rescue operations. **Overall, hoarding disorder can have a cascading negative effect on both the community and emergency services. Early intervention and support for hoarders can help mitigate these impacts.**	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Hoarding awareness training is given as part of the safeguarding initial courses and BFRS has a hoarding specific operational information note: OIN-TV-656 Hoarding as well as guidance material for scoring the level of clutter/hoarding risk. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Further work with partner agencies, local charities and community groups to support the clearance of hoarded properties and to offer guidance and support via safeguarding referrals. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Sub-optimal response leading to potential for increased risk to life and the environment.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Fly-tipping.
According to data which covers 2019/20, over 75,000 fixed penalty notices (FPNs) were issued for fly-tipping - an increase of 32% since 2016 when councils were given the power to issue fly-tipping FPNs. Prosecutions have also more than doubled over the same period, with total court fines last year totalling nearly £1.2 million. For the 2022/23 year, local authorities in England dealt with 1.08 million fly-tipping incidents, a decrease of 1% from the 1.09 million reported in 2021/22. The Environment Agency also now have an ongoing operation to take commercial fly tipping for illegal waste sites.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Fly-tipping is a complex issue with far-reaching consequences. It not only undermines the well-being of communities but also places a significant burden on fire and rescue services. Addressing this problem requires a multi-pronged approach, including public awareness campaigns, stricter enforcement of waste disposal regulations, and providing residents with easier access to legal disposal options. **Health Hazards**: Piles of dumped rubbish attract vermin like rats and insects, posing a health risk to residents. The waste can also contain hazardous materials that leach into the soil and water, further contaminating the environment. **Fuelling Fires**: Fly-tipped waste often becomes fuel for deliberate fires. These fires can quickly spread, endangering nearby buildings and lives. The smoke from burning rubbish can also cause respiratory problems for residents.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Ongoing liaison with the Environment Agency for awareness about their ongoing operation has been delivered to HMAs and NILOs Fly-tipping is noted in BFRS Prevention Strategy, it is also discussed in OIN-TV-623 Fires in the Open. Fly-tipping awareness was also noted in the November 2023 Newsletter - Initial Operational Response (IOR) published by the Operational Assurance Team. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Ongoing relationship work with local councils and the Environment agencies to continue to support the identification of illegal waste sites and fly-tipping locations. Support and redirection to integrate "Fix-MyStreet" as Buckinghamshire has been hailed as a success agent in the use of this app. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Sub-optimal response leading to potential for increased risk to life and the environment.

Technology and Infrastructure

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Alternatively Fuelled Vehicles (AFV)	
This refers to vehicles powered by fuels other than petrol or diesel including: · High voltage fuel cells (batteries) · Compressed natural gas (CNG) · Liquid natural gas (LNG) · Biofuels · Hydrogen fuel cells · High voltage systems · Rechargeable batteries	According to the RAC, there are already more than 700,000 Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV) and close to 500,000 Plug-in Hybrid Electrical Vehicles (PHEV) on the UK's roads. With no new petrol and diesel cars and vans to be sold in the UK after 2035, the proportion of AFVs on the roads is expected to increase during the life span of the 2025-30 CRMP.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
National Operational Guidance identifies the following hazards associated with AFVs affected by collision, fire or submersion: · Uncontrolled or unpredictable vehicle movements; · Gases; · High-voltage systems – the residual charge in these systems may remain for up to ten minutes after isolation; · Fuel cell explosion; · Hazardous materials, including liquid petroleum gas (LPG) and lithium-ion cells; · Electrolytes leaking from fuel cells; · Pressurised systems.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. · Guidance for fire crews attending incidents alternative powered vehicles OIN-TV-407 Gas Powered Vehicles, OIN-TV-404 Hybrid - Electric Vehicles · National Fire Chiefs Council and National Operational Guidance. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Continually work within our partnership arrangements for any future learning and interventions **Consequences if no further action taken:** Sub-optimal response leading to potential for increased risk to life and the environment.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Artificial Intelligence / Robotics / Autonomous Vehicles
Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly capable of gathering, analysing and making decisions from real world data, without the need for direct human involvement in the process. It has a wide range of applications in many different sectors of the economy and society including various forms of transportation used on land, water and the air).

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Potential for safer roads by reducing the risk of human error through AI enabled automation of vehicles (although some risks have been identified, such as the potential for automated systems to be vulnerable to cyberattack / hacking and come under the control of third parties with hostile / criminal intent and / or inadequate 'fail-safe' measures in the event of system error / failure leading to harm to individuals and / or property. · Potential use in firefighting operations. Human controlled robotic firefighting devices are already in use in the USA with further developments underway to enable autonomous operating: Firefighting Robots Go Autonomous - Scientific American Such developments could reduce the need to deploy firefighters into burning buildings / hazardous structures to extinguish fires. Other developments with aerial technologies could facilitate remote analysis of incidents and inform the type and weight of response. While AI systems could also enhance situational awareness and modelling of potential strategies and tactics to be used at major / complex incidents. · AI enabled technologies could also be used to reduce social isolation and offer new ways of supporting vulnerable people, for example: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/care-robots-could-revolutionise-uk-care-system-and-provide-staff-extra-support	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Continually work within our partnership arrangements for any future learning interventions (proactive and collaborative efforts are essential to ensure the responsible development and deployment of AI technologies in Service / operational functions. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Failure to capitalise on new technology and / or properly integrate AI into operations / emergency response leading to loss of opportunities to: o Improve safety / reduce risk to life, property, the economy and environment; o Improve efficiency, productivity and effectiveness. · Failure to identify and / or address ethical considerations associated with AI deployment could lead to adverse outcomes, where, for example, it is used to target at risk groups and / or determine resource allocation.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Frontier Artificial Intelligence (AI) Risks. The UK Government's Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) prepared a discussion paper on 'Capabilities and risks from frontier AI' to inform the proceedings of the AI Safety Summit 2023 which took place at Bletchley Park. The outcomes of the summit are summarised here: 1 November and 2 November.
The DSICT paper identified a broad range of risks potentially emanating from emerging AI including: societal harms (degradation of the information environment - labour market disruption - bias, fairness and representational harms); misuse risks (dual use science risks - cyber - disinformation and influence operations); loss of control (humans might increasingly hand over control to misaligned AI systems - future AI systems might actively reduce human control.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
As this is an area of emerging technology that is evolving at a pace and in ways that are unpredictable, it is difficult to precisely specify how adverse effects may manifest in local communities and on local services including fire and rescue. However, the DSIT paper (at p.24) considers some of the ways that AI is already being used for malign purposes: "*AI-enhanced social engineering is already being used by cybercriminals to conduct scams and steal login credentials, with systems that can gather intelligence on targets, impersonate voices of trusted contacts, and generate persuasive spear phishing messages. The risk is significant given most cyber attackers use social engineering to gain access to the victim organisation's networks".* The report (at page 20) also highlights the potential use of AI to accelerate existing harmful trends by: · *"Encouraging individuals to make dangerous decisions, for example through suggesting toxic substances as medicine.* · *Exposing young or vulnerable people to high-risk information and age-restricted content, or significantly shaping their information diet.* · *Promoting skewed or radical views as a result of model features — i.e. sycophancy -that could lead to criminal or other harmful behaviours.* · *Reducing public trust in true information, institutions, and civic processes such as elections.* · *Contributing to systemic biases in online media as a result of bias in AI-generated content.* · *Inciting violence.*	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** This is an emerging area of risk which is being reviewed as part of the ongoing development of the Service's ICT and information security controls and protective measures. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Equip BFRS personnel with training programs to understand the potential risks and opportunities associated with AI. This would also allow for new ways of working to be identified. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Increased Vulnerability - without proactive measures, BFRS, as well as local communities, remain vulnerable to AI-driven cyber threats and disinformation campaigns. This could lead to disruptions in emergency services and public safety. Community Safety - failure to address the potential risks associated with AI may compromise community safety. Cyberattacks, misinformation, and other malicious uses of AI could lead to harm, damage to infrastructure, and loss of public trust.

· *Exacerbating public health crises.* · *Increase political divisiveness, through malicious and non-malicious mechanisms."* Furthermore at page 22: *"Frontier AI may help bad actors to perform cyberattacks, run disinformation campaigns and design biological or chemical weapons. Frontier AI will almost certainly continue to lower the barriers to entry for less sophisticated threat actors."* Many of the risks and potential effects identified are beyond the scope, capacity and capabilities of local fire and rescue services to mitigate or respond to, as these would require wider governmental, industrial and societal effort to orchestrate. However, where such risks involve the potential for risk to life, damage / destruction of infrastructure, the built and / or natural environment, fire and rescue services will need maintain and / or develop capacity and capabilities to respond either individually or as part of wider multi-agency efforts.	

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Remote working technologies.	
During the Covid pandemic many businesses and public services adopted new ways of working, using new technologies such as Microsoft 365, Teams and Zoom to facilitate meetings, for collaborative working and to maintain contact with customers and employees. This enabled some people to work from home or from other locations other than their normal workplace during periods of 'lockdown' when strict forms of social distancing were required by the Government. Prior to the Covid pandemic, ONS research indicates that only around one in eight (12.5%) working adults reported working from home. Following lifting of Government guidance to work from home, around 38% of working adults reported having worked from home. In the most recent period (25 January to 5 February 2023) around 40% of working adults reported having worked from home at some point in the past seven days. This indicates that Covid has acted as something of an accelerator for existing trends towards adoption of online, remote and virtual technologies for work and the conduct of commercial and public service activities and this is now a permanent feature of the UK economy and society.	**Figure 1: Trends in working from home** **Proportion of working adults in Great Britain, March 2020 to February 2023**  Characteristics of homeworkers, Great Britain - Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk)

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Reduced requirements for office and retail space in major cities and towns. · Utilisation of 'permitted development' rights for conversion of redundant office and retail premises to residential use (see page xx). · Potential for larger working age populations to be present in smaller towns and rural villages	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The Service has already adopted hybrid and flexible working policies to enable office based staff to work remotely. These are being used to rationalise premises usage enabling the release of a leased building leading to annual savings of c. £177,000. **Future Actions / Requirements:** The Service will continue to explore the potential to use technology to improve productivity, efficiency and resilience and ensure that the Service is adequately staffed, equipped, and strategically

	located to respond to the needs of the evolving demographic landscape. Establish channels for partner / community input, feedback, and involvement to ensure that the changes align with the preferences and needs of the local population. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Failure to take advantage of opportunities to improve productivity, efficiency, resilience and embrace new ways of working.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: High energy density rechargeable batteries	
NFCC guidance indicates that: "Newer style, high energy density rechargeable batteries are made from precious metals and organic electrolytes. The metals used often react very readily with water or air and the electrolytes can be highly flammable. These batteries are often carefully sealed so that water cannot enter making it difficult to cool or extinguish fires. Sensitivity to charging and discharging regimes, mechanical shock, and localised temperature gradients can lead to thermal runaway, rapid unexpected release of flammable gases and liquids under pressure, release of toxic and corrosive materials. Thermal runaway, an accelerating increase in temperature caused by chemical reactions, can lead to fire, explosion, release of highly combustible organic electrolyte under pressure and unpredictable fire behaviour. This can be the result of temperature variations limited to only one or a small number of damaged cells and can cause ignition that occurs spontaneously over varying time frames." These types of batteries are being put to a wide range of uses as indicated in the NFCC guidance. Of particular note, are Industrial scale energy storage systems that are now being used commercially. Such systems may consist of many modular units constructed from ISO containers housing thousands of rechargeable batteries. Locally, a proposal for an installation of this type at East Claydon is currently being consulted on. Potential risks associated with lithium-ion batteries were among the issues discussed with members of the public from Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, who participated in a 'Listening and Engagement' consultation undertaken by the Service in June 2023. Participants were aware of these risks which they associated, in particular, with counterfeit and / or cheap, poor quality parts, rather than these types of battery per se (see pages 16-17 of linked report).	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The NFCC guidance associates the following hazards with high energy density rechargeable batteries: · Explosive gases produced by reactive metals, such as lithium. Possible chemical reduction of water by a highly reactive metal can produce an alkaline solution and an explosive gas, for example lithium hydroxide (LiOH) and hydrogen (H2)	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. · Guidance for fire crews attending incidents involving high energy density rechargeable batteries:

· Rapid unexpected release of flammable gases and liquids under pressure · Release of toxic and corrosive materials · Fire water run-off containing poisonous metals, such as nickel or cadmium, which can release hazardous materials to their surroundings. · Toxic and explosive gases released can have the appearance of steam.	OIN-TV-415 Batteries (non-lithium-ion), OIN-TV-413 Lithium-ion Batteries · National Fire Chiefs Council and National Operational Guidance **Future Actions / Requirements:** Continually work within our partnership arrangements for any future interventions. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Sub-optimal response leading to increased life risk and environmental damage.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Air Sourced Heat Pumps

In the 'Clean Growth Strategy (2017)' the Government committed to 'phase out the installation of high-carbon fossil fuel heating in new and existing homes currently off the gas grid during the 2020s, starting with new homes. It proposes to do this via targeted regulations, including:

1. An end to the installation of fossil fuel heating in homes off the gas grid from 2026;
2. A 'heat pump first' approach to replacement heating systems from 2026; and
3. Requiring high performing replacement heating systems where heat pumps cannot reasonably practicably be installed.

The Government is also considering whether it is appropriate to end the use of fossil fuel heating in all homes off the gas grid, potentially by the late-2030s.

Figure 2: How does a ground source heat pump work?



Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
The insurance company, Swiss Re, has identified a fire risk associated with refrigerants in air source heat pump systems that "…may be combustible …commercial systems contain quantities that, if released, pose a significant fire hazard. Insulation for piping systems may also be combustible, increasing the overall fire load. This fire hazard is exacerbated by the fact that air source heat pumps are often installed in equipment rooms where ignition sources are present." air-source-heat-pumps-factsheet.pdf (swissre.com)	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Emerging Risk Group (ERG) assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Include within scope of ERG risk evaluation process to evaluate safety features, potential hazards and mitigations. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Potential for increased risk to life and property

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Solar PV Systems Solar Photovoltaic technologies convert sunlight into electrical energy. They are typically: roof mounted on residential, commercial or industrial premises; or ground mounted in the case of much larger, dedicated 'solar farms' connected to the electricity grid.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
A comprehensive study of the fire risks associated with Solar PV systems was undertaken by the Building Research Establishment in 2018: Fires and solar PV systems - Investigations Evidence Issue 2.1 (publishing.service.gov.uk) Solar PV systems are installed at some BMKFA sites as part of its contribution to reducing CO2 emissions.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. · Guidance for fire crews attending incidents involving Solar PV systems OIN-TV-428 Photovoltaic Solar Panels **Future Actions / Requirements:** None additionally at this time **Consequences if no further action taken:** Existing capabilities considered sufficient at this time. The Emerging Risks Group will monitor the impact of ongoing development of this technology and evaluate any potential risks and mitigations when required.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Smart Motorways	
On 15 April 2023, the Government announced that: · plans for new smart motorways will be cancelled in recognition of the current lack of public confidence felt by drivers and cost pressures; · smart motorways earmarked for construction during the third Road Investment Strategy (2025 to 2030) and previously paused schemes will now not go ahead; · existing smart motorways will continue to benefit from £900 million safety improvements. Locally this means that the planned M25 J10-16 upgrade is one of the schemes being cancelled. However, the conversion of the 23-mile section of the M1 between junctions 13 and 16, which passes through the area served by BMKFA, to an All-Lane Running (ALR) motorway was completed in March 2023.	 Source: M1 junction 13 to junction 16: smart motorway - National Highways

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Heightened risk of collisions in the event of technology failures such as stopped vehicle detection systems. · The lack of a dedicated hard shoulders on sections of ALR enabled motorways can impede the access and transit of emergency services vehicles where closed lanes remain congested with traffic.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. · Guidance for fire crews attending incidents on Smart Motorways is provided in an Operational Information Note (OIN) – 'Incidents on Roads and Motorways'. · Work continues with external partners regarding monitoring the construction and development of Smart Motorways although there are currently none under construction in BFRS area, following the Government announcement regarding the cancellation of future conversions not already underway. **Future Actions / Requirements:** None additionally at this time **Consequences if no further action taken:** Emerging Risks Group will monitor developments and identify any new risks.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: High Speed Rail

HS2 is a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) and the largest project of its type currently underway in Europe.

Construction of HS2 infrastructure is underway across the BMKFA area. Works are being undertaken by two different companies - Align and EKFB. Align is responsible for the southern section from the South Portal towards Great Missenden, then EKFB assume responsibility stretching North and into Oxfordshire. The route through Buckinghamshire includes a number of bridges, viaducts and tunnels with multiple compounds and sites.

Of particular note is the 10-mile tunnel, which starts in Hertfordshire and runs under the Chilterns, and exits the ground at Great Missenden. There are five vent shafts along the route of the Chiltern Tunnel, the deepest of these is at Chalfont St Peter at a depth of 65m, some fourteen stories below ground.

The impact of HS2 was discussed with members of the public from Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, who participated in a 'Listening and Engagement' consultation undertaken by the Service in June 2023 (see page 15 of linked report).



Map displaying five vent shafts along the Chiltern Tunnel route.

Impact on Community and / or FRS	Actions Undertaken / Required
· Disruption to road networks along the HS2 route: closures / 'no emergency access' road closures; temporary and permanent re-routing). · Protest activity. · Criminal activity (e.g. theft of construction equipment). · Working at height risks. · Working at depth risks (including fire). · Water hazards (e.g. below viaducts).	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. · An external HS2 traffic group is well established and informs BFRS of all road closures, including 'no emergency access' road closures, which pose a potential risk to response times. · BFRS has a positive working relationship with Align and EKFB with regular engagement occurring, both as part of the Thames Valley Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) partnership group and individually with single points of contact for all organisations. · a number of exercises have taken place at HS2 sites with all parties engaging constructively and striving to reduce risk and improve communication sharing. BFRS have undertaken a comprehensive programme of exercises including: a USAR drill at

	the Chalfont St Peter vent shaft (trapped protestor scenario) and a further fire scenario; and, a Water rescue scenario at the Colne Valley viaduct; · Multiple visits to capture site specific risk information. **Future Actions / Requirements:** None additionally at this time **Consequences if no further action taken:** Emerging Risks Group will monitor developments and identify any new risks.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: The Elizabeth Line	
The Elizabeth Line, formally known as the Cross-rail project, is a 73-mile railway line crossing London from West to East, each end splits into two branches: in the west to Reading and Heathrow Airport and in the east to Abbey wood. The line is owned and operated by the Transport for London (TfL). The line runs through Buckinghamshire at Taplow, Burnham, Iver and parts of Langley on existing rail track infrastructure, with the station end equipment, trains and platforms being upgraded to support the London Underground infrastructure.	

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The Elizabeth line is now open and as such this now represents 'business as usual' for BFRS with standard range of rail related hazards and risks such as derailments, collisions and onboard fires.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. BFRS monitored progress of the construction of this infrastructure project by having a representative on the Elizabeth Line Emergency Services Group (ELESG). A number of exercises were conducted by London Fire Brigade during the construction phase and learning was shared with relevant partners including BFRS. **Future Actions / Requirements:** None additionally at this time

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Western Rail Link into Heathrow There is a proposal for a rail connection from the west of Britain to Heathrow. The Western Rail Link to Heathrow (WRLTH) would leave the main line between Langley and Iver.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
No immediate impact as this project is currently paused.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. **Future Actions / Requirements:** BFRS will monitor developments and carry out engagement and risks assessment activities in the event that the project recommences. **Consequences if no further action taken:** No further action required at this time.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: East West Rail (EWR)	
East West Rail is a major railway project which comprises: · Upgrading an existing section of railway between Oxford and Bicester · Bringing back a section of railway between Bicester and Bletchley · Refurbishing existing railway between Bletchley and Bedford · Building brand new railway infrastructure between Bedford and Cambridge Enabling and construction work is well underway between Bicester and Bletchley. This includes bridge and structure refurbishments / renewals. The current construction plan envisages that the infrastructure will be ready for testing with trains in 2024.	

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Road closures / temporary re-routing · Working at height risks	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. BFRS is a member of the HS2/EWR Thames Valley CCA Partnership. This ensures that the emergency responders, HS2, EWR and the identified contractors work together as effectively as possible, at all levels of command from planning and preparedness to responding to minor, major or complex incidents. **Future Actions / Requirements:** None additionally at this time **Consequences if no further action taken:** Emerging Risks Group will monitor developments and identify any new risks.

Environmental (Natural and Built)

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Climate Change</td></tr>
<tr><td>The Met Office advises that across the UK, climate change is expected to lead to:
Warmer and wetter winters
Hotter and drier summers
More frequent and intense weather extremes
On the 19 July 2022 the UK recorded its highest ever temperature of 40.3°C (104.5°F). The months of July (16 - 19) and August (9 - 15) 2022, brought record high temperatures and dry weather that presented many challenges for Fire and Rescue Services (FRSs) and other emergency responders across the country. Major incidents were declared by fifteen FRSs across the country including two in the BMKFA service area.</td><td>The Met Office produces a Fire Severity Index that provides localised forecast maps, up to five days ahead, of how severe a fire could become if one were to start. It is not an assessment of the risk of wildfires occurring. The FSI shows the current day's fire severity and a forecast of likely fire severity over the coming five days. The index values are from 1 to 5, which represents an increasing degree of fire severity as follows:
FSI level 1 = low fire severity
FSI level 2 = moderate fire severity
FSI level 3 = high fire severity
FSI level 4 = very high fire severity
FSI level 5 = exceptional fire severity</td></tr>
<tr><td>Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service</td><td>Actions Undertaken / Required</td></tr>
<tr><td>These changes can lead to hazards that can have adverse effects on people, infrastructure, buildings, the economy and the environment. These include events such as:
Heat stress, affecting human health, behaviours and habitability;
More frequent and intense fires (including Wildfires);
Droughts leading to water shortages;
Intense / prolonged periods of rainfall leading to flooding;
Storms that cause damage to buildings, infrastructure and disruption transport networks.
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/climate-change-explained</td><td>Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:
BFRS has an Environment and Climate Action Plan that is regularly updated and reviewed with Fire Authority Members. The Plan contains several actions designed to improve the Service’s response to extreme weather events, as well as taking action to reduce its own carbon emissions.
Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks.

Future Actions / Requirements:
The draft 2025-2030 CRMP includes proposals for improving Service capabilities for responding to extreme weather related incidents such as wildfire.

Consequences if no further action taken:
Loss of opportunities to reduce risk to life, property, the economy and environment.</td></tr>
</table>

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Rewilding
Rewilding seeks to restore areas of land to a more natural state by withdrawing active human management and allowing wild flora and fauna to reshape the ecosystem. It is seen as an effective and sustainable way to restore damaged landscapes and improve biodiversity. The UK Government has announced support for elements of rewilding with plans to restore 300,000 hectares of wildlife habitat across England by 2042. Rewilding projects are already underway across the areas served by BMKFA in both rural and urban environments.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Changes to land use can alter the risk profile of landscapes and their associated ecosystems, potentially increasing or decreasing the likelihood and / or severity of, for example, fire or flooding. · Proponents of rewilding argue that more varied vegetation, wetland habitats, reintroduction of key species of wildlife, and healthier water-retaining soils can provide more resilience against the effects of extreme weather events like wildfires and also reduce vulnerability to risks associated with flooding.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Work more closely with Landowners and the community to identify and reduce / mitigate risks of emergency incidents. Investment in suitably equipped multi-terrain vehicles. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Loss of opportunity to reduce risks to life and the environment.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Housing and associated infrastructure development

The current local plan for Milton Keynes envisaged construction of 26,500 new homes between 2016 and 2031 to accommodate the growth of the population to an estimated 335,000 by the early 2030s. This is primarily in the areas shaded red in the accompanying map. Looking further out, Milton Keynes has set out ambitious plans for the further growth of the city in its Strategy for 2050. This includes the potential for 30,000 - 35,000 additional homes over the coming decades to meet the needs of the 410,000 people that are expected to be living in Milton Keynes by 2050. This would be achieved via a combination of intensification and extensification of existing urban areas as illustrated in the map at page 73 of the linked strategy document.

Current housing growth projections for Buckinghamshire are set out in the local plans prepared by the district councils prior to the formation of the new unitary authority that merged the county and district councils: Local development plans | Buckinghamshire Council.

Areas earmarked for significant housing development over the period 2013 - 2033 include:

- 30,000 new homes in the Aylesbury Vale area, primarily via the extension of the existing urban areas to the east, south and south west of Aylesbury (where shaded blue in the accompany map). More detailed information on development proposals is available from the Vale of Aylesbury Local Plan (VALP).
- 10,925 new homes in the former Wycombe District Council area. Most of this development is taking place in Wycombe, Princes Risborough, and Bourne End with about 15% being in the rural areas. Half of the homes to be built in Wycombe District will be on brownfield land. The proposals include a significant expansion of Princes Risborough, with a housing allocation of 2,083 new homes, to 2033, distributed where shown on the map at page 142 of the Wycombe Local Plan. A need for a further 540 beyond 2033 is also identified.



Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
The creation of new homes at scale does not necessarily lead to a proportionate increase in fire risk relative to that pertaining to the existing 'legacy' housing stock. Nonetheless, given the scale of development planned, some increase in the number of emergency incidents in homes can be anticipated. Fire risks can also be present during the construction phase, particularly where timber framed methods are used. Other issues experienced with some new housing developments include restricted access for emergency vehicles and fire hydrants where: · insufficient dedicated car parking has been provided leading to casual parking on narrow sections of road and / or pavements; · certain types of traffic calming measures have been used.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The scale of new housing development and perceived lack of supporting infrastructure across the BMKFA area was among the key concerns raised by members of the public from Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, who participated in a 'Listening and Engagement' consultation undertaken by the Service in June 2023 (see page 16 of linked report). The Service reviews and responds to all local plan consultations. Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. **Future Actions / Requirements:** The draft 2025-30 CRMP will include a review of fire and rescue service provisions in high growth areas, including: · Location of fire and specialist appliances; and, · Duty / crewing systems. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Failure to optimise services in relation to changes to the built environment leading to loss of opportunities to reduce risks to life and property.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: UK Government's Long Term Plan for Housing / Permitted Development
On 24 July 2023, as part of a long-term plan for housing, the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Levelling Up announced a programme for regeneration, inner-city densification and housing delivery across England. As part of the Plan, the Government will consult on new Permitted Development Rights, to provide more certainty over some types of development, and how design codes might apply to certain rights to protect local character and give developers greater confidence. New and amended permitted development rights would make it easier to convert larger department stores, space above shops and office space. The plan also envisages changes to support farm diversification and development, to allow businesses to extend and more outdoor markets to be held. The government will also consult on further measures in the Autumn of 2023 on how to better support existing homeowners to extend their homes. The government will continue to ensure that local removal of permitted development rights through Article 4 Directions will only be agreed where there is evidence of wholly unacceptable impacts.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Increases in numbers of people resident in areas and buildings originally designed for non-domestic purposes such as town centre high streets, offices, shops and department stores. · Repurposing of buildings not originally designed for domestic residential use. · Potential for accessibility issues in repurposed buildings and built environments.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** RBIP identifies property types which require building design consultation and audit. From a protection perspective, we can have a level of confidence that any permitted development which falls under high risk identification will be scrutinised. **Future Actions / Requirements:** **Consequences if no further action taken:** Potential for prevention / response risk for those premises which do not fall under high risk / Regulatory Reform Order

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Reinforced Autoclaved Aerated Concrete (RAAC)

On 31 August 2023, the Education Secretary made an announcement regarding the risks associated with the presence of reinforced autoclaved aerated concrete, more commonly known as RAAC, in educational settings, together with new guidance in relation to this. RAAC is a lightweight form of pre-cast concrete used primarily in, but not limited to, roof construction in the UK from the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s. RAAC panels have been linked with a risk of sudden full, or partial collapse.

A list of 156 schools nationally has been published (52 with mitigations already in place, 104 pending implementation). Of these three are located in Buckinghamshire and one in Milton Keynes.

RAAC is also present in other buildings, dating from the 1960s – 1980s, with flat roofs as indicated in a SCOSS Alert published in May 2019. More technical information is available here: Information on Reinforced Autoclaved Aerated Concrete (RAAC) | Local Government Association.

Figure 2
A lump sample of AAC [3]

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
A National Operational Learning Action Note was published in February 2022 which summarised the risks associated with RAAC: *"There may be a risk of sudden full or partial structural collapse due to instability of the material. Fire and rescue services may be called to these types of incidents and should be aware of the risk of further collapse when attending. Although there has been little research into how this material would behave involved in fire, it is thought that thermal radiation may cause it to collapse. Likewise, if water was applied this may trigger a structural collapse."* Central Government has confirmed locations of all schools with RAAC present in buildings and the means by which remedial works will be funded.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The National Operational Learning User Group recommended that fire and rescue services should: · Identify the risk of this material in the building stock of their area; · Provide Site-Specific Risk Information for personnel on identified risk sites; · Provide training and awareness to personnel on the hazards presented by RAAC and what control measures to implement to prevent a structural collapse. Emerging Risk Group assembled to identify potential impacts of all major infrastructure projects and emerging environmental and technological risks. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Ongoing monitoring. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Risk of structural collapse, pending implementation of remedial works.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Defective External Wall Systems (Cladding)
There are many types of cladding, ranging from traditional brickwork or rendered systems to more modern metallic rainscreen systems or curtain walls made from glass. Cladding systems can be complicated constructions with voids, breather membranes, cavity barriers etc. but the two main cladding materials are the thermal insulation and the front façade panel. Thermal insulation is generally made from either a mineral (stone) wool or a foam, such as phenolic foam or PIR foam. Façade panels can be made from a wide variety of materials including wood, metal, brick or vinyl, and are often made from composite materials. Two types of composites have been associated with increased fire risk: · ACM (aluminium composite material) façade panels are made up of two aluminium skins bonded to a non-aluminium core which can be highly combustible. This is the type of façade panel that was responsible for the rapid vertical fire spread during the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017. · HPL (high pressure laminate) façade panels are a type of timber cladding made by pressurising layers of wood or paper fibres into a resin and then bonding them together using heat. This is the type of façade panel that was used on the University of Bolton student accommodation block that caught fire in 2019. **Source:** What is cladding? | Fire Protection Association (thefpa.co.uk)

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Heightened concerns over fire risks amongst occupants in buildings with unsafe forms of cladding. · Costs of remedial works. · Uncertainty over responsibility for cost of remedial works. · Cost of interim safety measures, such as fire wardens, pending removal of unsafe cladding. · Reduced saleability and value of affected properties. · Cost / opportunity cost of fire and rescue safety interventions in affected buildings.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Details of prevention, protection and response interventions to mitigate risks associated with affected buildings are set out in recent report to BMKFA (see pages 5 - 7). These form part of a comprehensive programme to implement all relevant recommendations from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI). **Future Actions / Requirements:** Phase 1 of the GTI focused on the cause of the fire, its subsequent development and the course of events during the night. Phase 2 of the inquiry focuses on how and why the decisions were made that led to the fitting of a highly combustible cladding system and also explore other areas that emerged from the information gathered during Phase 1. It is anticipated that there will be additional recommendations for fire and rescue services to review and action once the phase 2 report is published. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Potential failure to implement further measures to reduce risks to life and property.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Presence of asbestos at emergency incidents and other interventions in buildings, industrial plant etc.

"*Although it is now illegal to use asbestos in the construction or refurbishment of any premises, many thousands of tonnes of it were used in the past in such things as: lagging on plant and pipework; insulation products such as fireproof panels; asbestos cement roofing material; sprayed coatings on structural steel work to insulate against fire and noise. Much of this material is still in place. However, buildings constructed after 2000 are unlikely to contain asbestos materials.*" Source: Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The HSE advises as follows in relation to this risk: *"Asbestos is the single greatest cause of work-related deaths in the UK.* *As long as asbestos is in good condition and is not disturbed or damaged there is negligible risk. However, if it is disturbed or damaged, it can become a danger to health, because asbestos fibres are released into the air and people may breathe them in."*	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The Service has established operational procedures for dealing with incidents involving asbestos: "OIN-TV-602 (v4) Incidents Involving Asbestos Containing Materials". Qualified Hazardous Materials Advisors in place. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Maintain HMA cadre to ensure a minimum of one is available on all occasions within the Thames Valley area. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Increased risks to personnel responding incidents in contaminated sites.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Unoccupied and Derelict Buildings

Unoccupied and derelict buildings awaiting demolition are an extremely hazardous environments. They are likely to be secured against trespassing using such measures as boarding; metal security screens; or brick or block work. Nevertheless, these sites can attract rough sleepers, vandals, children and people looking to conduct illegal activities such as the cultivation and production of drugs or the manufacture of illicit alcohol. Also, a management company or the property owner may have "property guardians" living in the building to provide security and general property maintenance. It is also possible that utilities will not have been isolated.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Such sites can attract rough sleepers, vandals, children and people looking to conduct illegal activities such as the cultivation and production of drugs or the manufacture of illicit alcohol. Resulting hazards could include: Discarded drug paraphernalia; Tampered with utilities and meters; Malicious trap; Illegal storage of hazardous materials, including gas cylinders; Fly-tipped waste which could increase fire loading; Animals, animal waste and carcasses; Damaged or removed structural elements causing structural weakness; Damaged pipework or electrical cables.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Operational Information Note: "Fires in Buildings under Construction or Demolition" (OIN-TV-652). **Future Actions / Requirements:** Work with partner agencies to identify high risk sites. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Sub-optimal response leading to increased risk to life.

Legislative and Regulatory Change

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: The Fire Safety Act 2021

The Fire Safety Act 2021 amends the existing Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (The Fire Safety Order).

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	Actions Undertaken / Required
The Act specifies additional areas which the responsible person / duty-holder for multi-occupied residential buildings must consider when managing and reducing risk of fire within their premises. These are: · The structure and external walls of the building including anything attached to it (e.g. cladding, balconies, windows etc) · Entrance doors from the common areas of the building into individual flats	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** BFRS has made changes to its Fire Safety audit methodology to take account of these changes. All high rise residential feature in the Risk Based Inspection Programme (RBIP). In particular, the following have been informed / will be informed: · Duty Officers / Group Commanders / Principal Officers so they understand the legislative changes and therefore offer suitable advice when required; · Prevention team staff who visit multi-occupied residential buildings so they can offer appropriate advice; · Members of the Fire Authority so that they are aware of legislative Fire Safety changes. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Support Building Safety Regulator with inspection. · Enforcement as required for non-compliance. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Loss of opportunities to reduce risks to life, property and the economy.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: The Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022

These regulations were introduced in response to the recommendations of the Phase 1 Grenfell Tower Inquiry. They came into full force on 23 January 2023.

The regulations impose additional requirements on the responsible person of multi-occupied residential buildings These depend upon the height of the buildings as illustrated in the accompanying diagram.



Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The new regulations require that for all multi-occupied residential buildings, the following is provided: · Fire Safety instructions; · Fire Door Information. For all residential buildings above 11 metres in height: · The above, plus · Fire Doors For high-rise residential buildings above 18 metres or 7 storeys · All of the above, plus · Building Plans · External Wall Systems · Lifts and other key Fire-fighting Equipment · Secure Information Boxes · Wayfinding Signage	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** BFRS has taken steps to assist Responsible Persons (RPs) with complying with the new regulations, including: · The provision on the BFRS website of electronic forms for RPs to complete and send to the Protection Teams (including floor plans, defective fire-fighting equipment and external wall systems information); · Prevention staff informed to ensure that they offer the correct advice and information to residents they visit; · Duty Officer/Group commander/Principal officer instructed on correct advice and actions to undertake with information coming from RPs. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Ensure Responsible Person compliance through RBIP. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Loss of opportunities to reduce risks to life, property and the economy.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: The Building Safety Act 2022
The Act provides for a new regulator (the Building Safety Regulator [BSR]) to be established under the Health and Safety Executive. The aim of the regulator is to: secure the safety of people in and around buildings with respect to the risk arising from them; improve the standards of buildings; assure the safety of higher-risk buildings; improve the competence of those involved; provide clearer standards and guidance

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The Act applies to new and existing buildings above 18m with at least two residents (including care homes and hospitals above this height). It creates: · a universal change in responsibility and culture within the building industry; · puts residents at the heart of safety in buildings; · Clarifies who is responsible for Fire and Building Safety throughout the life cycle of such buildings. There will also be an additional approvals process for higher-risk buildings. Changes to liability in relation to construction of new buildings such that there will be a general and direct right of action brought into force.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Thames Valley Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) / resource allocated to support BSR. · RBIP already includes HRRB's. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · BFRS dedicated resource may be required to support BSR. · Potential enforcement action where Responsible Persons are not meeting requirements of the Act. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Loss of opportunities to reduce risks to life, property and the economy.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: The Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023

The Act received Royal Assent on 20 July and is designed to require unionised workforces in England, Scotland and Wales to provide a minimum level of service during a strikes in certain sectors deemed essential on public safety or other grounds. Ambulance and fire and rescue services are included within its scope.

It amends the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 to:

- Protect the public's access to essential services by imposing conditions on the protection of trade unions from legal action in respect of strikes relating to services where provision has been made for minimum service levels (MSL). The services will be prescribed by regulations, following consultation;
- impose obligations on trade unions and individuals to comply with minimum service levels and enabling employers within specified services to issue work notices to roster the workforce required to secure the minimum service level on a strike day.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Although the Act has received Royal Assent, Minimum Service Levels (MSL) will not take effect until the regulations that detail the sector specific MSL come into force. Once implemented, MSL may be applied in relation to any strike in the specified services. The Government conducted a public consultation on the most appropriate approach for delivering minimum service levels for fire and rescue services between 9 February and 11 May 2023. Details of the consultation can be viewed here: Minimum service levels for fire and rescue services (accessible) - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) The outcomes of the consultation and Government's response to the feedback have yet to be published but will appear here when released: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/minimum-service-levels-for-fire-and-rescue-services	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The Service responded to the Government consultation on the fire and rescue MSL. **Future Actions / Requirements:** An impact analysis and options / plans for complying with the requirements of the fire and rescue MSL regulations will be prepared as soon as they are available. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Failure to comply with statutory requirements. Sub-optimal response to incidents leading to increased risks to life, property, the economy and / or the environment.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity Serious Violence Duty (SVD): Serious Violence Duty Statutory Guidance	
The Duty came into effect on 31st January 2023, when Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs) as specified partners were required to collaborate and plan together with local authorities, the police, specified criminal justice agencies and health authorities, to reduce and prevent serious violence in their local area. The Duty is aligned to the statutory duties set out in existing legislation, notably the Fire and Rescue Services Act (2004) and the Policing and Crime Act (2017) and has the overarching aim of enhancing collaboration, data sharing and training to empower Fire and Rescue Services in the course of their Prevention, Protection and Response functions to tackle serious violence.	

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Specific requirements of Fire and Rescue Services are specified at paragraphs 304-308 of the Statutory Guidance. · Analysis of serious violence trends and the demographic characteristics of victims and perpetrators for Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes are set out at pages 3 – 4 of the Service's 2024-27 Serious Violence Duty Strategy *[add hyperlink to Fire Authority paper].*	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · BFRS has begun implementation of its 2024-27 Serious Violence Duty Strategy that was approved by the Fire Authority on 6 December 2023 [*hyperlink to Fire Authority Paper*). **Future Actions / Requirements:** · A mid-term review of the SVD Strategy will be completed when the Prevention Strategy is reviewed in 2025 and when required by any change in legislation, the statutory guidance, or the Serious Violence Strategies of Buckinghamshire Council or Milton Keynes City Council. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Failure to comply with legislative requirements pertaining to the Service / Authority. · Failure to deliver reductions to the incidence of serious violence across the areas served by BFRS / BMKFA.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Procurement Act 2023
The Procurement Bill received Royal Assent on 26 October 2023. The Act is intended to bring a range of benefits, including: · creating a simpler and more flexible commercial system that better meets the country's needs while remaining compliant with international obligations; · opening up public procurement to new entrants such as small businesses and social enterprises so that they can compete for and win more public contracts; · tougher action on underperforming suppliers and excluding suppliers who pose unacceptable risks; · embedding transparency throughout the commercial lifecycle so that the spending of taxpayers' money can be properly scrutinised. The new regime is planned to take effect from October 2024, following a notice period of at least 6 months.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Opportunity for BFRS to support economic development and growth across the area it serves by making more use of smaller local suppliers; · Potential for reduction in procurement costs and contract risks.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Training of procurement staff of the changes required to embed the changes to current procurement processes and procedures following the introduction of the new Procurement Act is due to commence Nov 2023 to Oct 2024. · Ongoing guidance and collaboration with NFCC Procurement Hub and Fire Services procurement network to introduce outcomes of the new Procurement Act. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · BMKFA internal processes and procedures to be updated to reflect the new Procurement Act, where applicable. · BFRS Procurement and Contract Management Training packages to be updated to reflect changes. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Failure to comply with new legislative requirements.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Failure to comply with equal pay legislative requirements.

Failing to adhere to equal pay legislation could mean being at risk of expensive employment tribunal litigation, low employee morale, reputational damage, loss of productivity and key employees.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Reputational damage of not paying employees fairly, could mean our communities would not be attracted to join us; this in turn could impact our diversity . · Our employees could leave the service for another fire and rescue service or alternative work – this would impact us as we would have the recruit more and we could lose our highly skilled workforce, putting our communities at risk. · Employment tribunal costs for equal pay claims could be high and this could mean we would not be able to finance important work . · Employee morale could be affected by not treating employees fairly; this could impact employee engagement and productivity	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Robust job evaluation scheme (KornFerry Hay) in place; procedure consulted upon and published; all evaluators trained. · Support Services Pay scales transparency; Grey book pay scales agreed nationally. · Pay Policy reviewed annually and approved by February Fire authority. · Recruitment and Selection procedure consulted on and published; processes reviewed regularly to ensure no bias. · Recruiting Managers trained and supported by Human Resources. · Operational Promotions Procedure consulted upon and published. · Interim selection process to enable employees to have the opportunity to be substantive in roles .sooner, and therefore contributing to an enhanced pension. · Gender Pay gap report published yearly. · Equal Pay audit undertaken in 2020. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Ethnicity Pay gap report undertaken and published yearly. · Pay and Allowance review and Support Service Pay scales review undertaken – January 2024. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Processes and procedures under constant review and scrutiny to ensure equality.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Potential amendments to Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Business Regulations 2003

The Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses (Amendment) Regulations 2022 is a statutory instrument of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The regulations removed Regulation 7 of the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations 2003, which prevented employment agencies from supplying agency workers to employers to replace workers taking part in official industrial action. The regulations were struck down in a High Court case in July 2023, and quashed from 10 August 2023.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
If employees take strike action, the Service can employ agency employees or contractors to cover. This will ensure the community are protected if industrial action takes place.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · The Service has contributed to the Minimum Service Levels consultation. · Resourcing requirements are reviewed and planned for the future. · The Service communicates with the community and employees to ensure they are aware of the industrial action and implications. · The Service continues working with the recognised Trade Unions. · The Service works closely with other Fire and Rescue Services and partners to minimise disruption. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Officers will continue to monitor developments and take action as required. **Consequences if no further action taken:** The community could be impacted by less resources and may not be able to respond accordingly, as per our statutory requirements under legislation.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Firefighters Pensions (Remediable Service) Regulations 2023
The Firefighters' Pension Scheme (England) Regulations 2014 are the scheme regulations establishing the successor firefighters' pension scheme to the schemes established by the Firemen's Pension Scheme Order 1992 and the Firefighters' Pension Scheme (England) Order 2006. The 2014 Regulations provided for transitional protection for certain cohorts of legacy scheme members. Transitional protection of this sort was subsequently found to unlawfully discriminate between legacy scheme members on the basis of age. These Regulations are scheme regulations in relation to a member's remediable service in a firefighters' pension scheme.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
A number of employees who transferred from their legacy schemes into the new scheme are now entitled to be treated as if they had remained in their legacy scheme. There is no direct impact to the community, but a large administrative burden will be placed on the Service, who must review all historic information and ensure all pension entitlements are recalculated correctly.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The Service had already identified a number of potential cases and sought to remedy those before the individuals retired. However, there are still a number of historic cases that need to be recalculated, and those that were processed before the Regulations were introduced will need to be revisited. **Future Actions / Requirements:** The Service needs to continue to process cases, with the Regulations providing a period of 18 months for this to be done. One-off funding has been confirmed for 2024-25 to allow the Service to engage staff on a temporary basis to support this additional administrative burden. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Retirees would not receive the correct pension they are entitled to, which could result in complaints to the Pensions Regulator and potential legal action against the Service, as well as a detrimental impact on the individuals concerned.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Safeguarding
Fire and rescue services have a statutory due to safeguard their communities, people, and organisation through efficient and effective safeguarding practices. Safeguarding means protecting people's health, wellbeing, and human rights, enabling them to live free from harm and abuse.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Protecting people and safeguarding responsibilities should be a governance priority for all fire and rescue services. It is a fundamental part of operating for the public benefit. Services must take reasonable steps to protect from harm people who come into contact with the organisation. This includes: · people in the community, whether it be from responding to a call for emergency assistance, a scheduled home fire safety visit or other means of contact · staff · other people who come into contact with the Service through its work A wide range of risks and harms exist, including but not limited to: · sexual harassment, abuse and exploitation · an organisation's culture, which may allow poor behaviour and poor accountability · people abusing a position of trust they hold within an organisation · bullying or harassment	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The Service has an approved safeguarding policy statement (https://bucksfire.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/bfrs_policy_statement_safeguarding_v2.pdf) and internal safeguarding procedure. This is aligned with the national safeguarding fire standard. The Service is also represented across a range of safeguarding boards. All staff are required to obtain an enhanced DBS check. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Continue to ensure procedure is updated in line with new legislation and best practice guidance. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Potential harm to vulnerable people could occur or continue unchallenged.

Organisational

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Risk that Service funding over the medium term is insufficient to achieve 2025-30 CRMP objectives.
By law, fire and rescue services must set a balanced budget. The only aspect of its funding that the Service can directly control is the level of council tax that it sets, sometimes also referred to as the precept. For the majority of the last ten years, increases to this amount have been restricted to either 2% or 3%. BFRS has one of the lowest band D equivalent council tax charges of any fire and rescue service so was disproportionately affected by these restrictions. For the financial years 2022-23 and 2023-24 BFRS was able to increase the band D charge by £5, firstly allowing the Service to increase its operational establishment, and then to maintain the level in the face of high inflation during 2023-24. However, this flexibility was determined on a year by year basis, and the current core principle is that increases are limited to 3%.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
During its most recent inspection HMICFRS described BFRS as being a very lean service. If the Service is required to make savings to balance the budget it is likely that these will have an adverse impact on the service delivered to the community. In previous periods where funding has been particularly stretched, this has manifested itself in a reduction in the availability of appliances on several occasions. Limited funding also restricts the Service's ability to address some of the concerns and recommendations within the HMICFRS inspection report as quickly as the Service would like to.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Financial Strategy, Reserves Strategy and Medium-term Financial Plan produced to ensure plans are affordable and sustainable. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Operational Resource requirements to be reviewed in-line with revised response strategy. · Efficiencies to be delivered and re-invested into the Service. **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Service delivery could be compromised to balance the budget.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: BFRS resilience issues e.g. staff availability, recruitment, retention, loss of key staff.
There are a range of risks and issues that can affect the resilience, effectiveness and availability of the Service including: staff inability or reduced ability to work due to disruption caused by factors such as pandemics, fuel supply issues, industrial action etc.; impact of employment market conditions on attraction of new staff, retention of existing staff, and overall workforce stability (specifically the ratio of experienced / competent staff to inexperienced staff / staff in development.)

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Potential detrimental effects on service delivery to the community resulting in increased risks to life, property, the economy, other public services and the environment. Increased pressure on remaining staff with health, safety and welfare implications.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The Service has used the opportunity of Precept flexibility offered by Central Government, in relation to Council Tax over the last two financial years, to increase the size of its operational firefighting workforce, providing additional capacity and resilience. **Future Actions / Requirements:** An associated risk has been included in the Service's Corporate Risk Register (CRR). The CRR, which includes progress reporting relating to the mitigation of included risks, is scrutinised in public at every meeting of the Fire Authority's Overview and Audit Committee: Report. Further measures to improve the resilience of the Service are included in the draft 2025-30 CRMP. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Failure to discharge statutory duties. Loss of critical knowledge / skills / capacity / competency levels. Disruption to integrity and continuity of the incident command structure and / or Service strategic leadership structure. Potential for reputational damage / loss of public confidence in the Service

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Ageing workforce: health and wellbeing.	
An ageing workforce could have implications for the Service – for example: · Positive – skills and expertise are retained and shared with other employees, positive attitude to work. · Negative - a loss of skills and expertise, absence costs, health concerns, technology concerns, productivity, younger people not joining the Service as no vacancies, employees may not be able to afford to retire or reduce hours, due to cost of living.	The largest proportion of staff at BFRS fall within the 35-49 age bracket. This is also the highest age group of the working population of Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes. 

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Older workers are highly skilled and can work with younger less experienced employees, to ensure their skills, experience and knowledge are shared. Older works may have a more positive work ethic. This should positively impact our communities. As employees get older; they may find the more physical aspects of the role harder, there may be opportunities in the service for them to apply for alternative roles. Some struggle with technology and the pace of change; this could impact the service to our communities. If older workers do not leave the Service, it may impact the diversity of the service, as the community will not be able to join, this could impact how we reflect the diversity of our community.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** · Occupational Health Provision, Employee Assistance Programme, Welfare Officer, Mental Wellbeing Champions, reasonable adjustments, retirement courses, Support Services can work from home or alternative location. · Procedures in place to support throughout career – i.e. Menopause, Absence Management, Flexible and Hybrid Working, Flexible Retirement, supporting employees with mental and physical disabilities. · Regular meetings with Line Manager · Absence Statistics and trends reviewed at the Health, Safety and Wellbeing Committee · Healthy Workplace Standard – Absence, silver award achieved. **Future Actions / Requirements:** · Wellbeing procedure to be reviewed. · Dying to Work Charter. · Continually review procedures to help support the ageing workforce. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Each employee needs to be treated fairly, to support them at work - procedures and support are in place to do so.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: FRS workplace culture: risk of misconduct / behaviours at odds with Service Values on the part of individuals or groups in the employ of, or associated with, the Service and / or the Fire Authority.
There have been a number of recent high profile cases of unacceptable behaviours by employees of Fire and Rescue Services that have attracted national media attention e.g. South Wales FRS and Dorset and Wiltshire FRS. Alongside these are the findings of recent FRS Culture reviews identifying cases of bullying, harassment and discrimination including: London Fire Brigade and, more widely, in a national report produced by the HMICFRS.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
This issue was discussed with a representative sample of the public from the areas served by BFRS. Awareness of the issue was low although a range of concerns were raised once it was explained to them. See pages 19 – 21 of the linked report: 2025-30 CRMP Listening and Engagement Consultation Outcomes. However, there is potential for more widespread local concern, were serious issues to emerge within BFRS, potentially leading to public and / or staff loss of confidence in the Service and consequential reputational damage.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Steps being taken by Service management to address the recommendations made by the HMICFRS in their national 'Values and culture in fire and rescue services' were considered at an exceptional meeting of the Fire Authority on 28 April 2023: bucksfire.gov.uk/documents/2023/04/bmkfa-extraordinary-meeting-28-april-2023-item-8-values-and-culture-in-fire-and-rescue-services.pdf/ **Future Actions / Requirements:** An associated risk has been included in the Service's Corporate Risk Register (CRR). The CRR, which includes progress reporting relating to the mitigation of included risks, is scrutinised in public at every meeting of the Fire Authority's Overview and Audit Committee: Report **Consequences if no further action taken:** Harm to members of the public and / or Service personnel. Potential exposure to litigation and financial loss. Reputational damage resulting in negative publicity locally / nationally leading to public loss of confidence in the Authority / Service. Staff / Fire Authority Member loss of confidence in Authority and / or Service leadership / management.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: TVFCS mobilising issues.

BFRS entered into a inter authority fifteen-year agreement with our Thames valley FRS partners and Thames Valley Fire Control Service (TFCS) to ensure a suitable provision was provided for effective emergency control room function. This term is from 2015 to the end of 2030.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Under the Fire and Rescue National Framework for England: Section 2.15 - Fire and rescue authorities must collaborate with other fire and rescue authorities to deliver intraoperability (between fire and rescue authorities); Section 2.16 - Intraoperability includes, but is not limited to: o compatible communications systems, control rooms and equipment; o common command and compatible control and co-ordination arrangements. Section: 2.17 Interoperability includes, but is not limited to: o compatible communications systems, control rooms and equipment, as appropriate; o compatible command, control and co-ordination arrangements; o effective inter-agency working and liaison and, where appropriate, information, intelligence and data sharing.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Currently BFRS are in a fifteen year inter authority agreement for the full TVFCS provision which is due for renewal at the end of 2030. **Future Actions / Requirements:** This agreement will require a timely review to ensure a command and control provision is tendered for, consulted on and agreement made on a suitable provider prior to the end of the agreement period. **Consequences if no further action taken:** BFRS will not a have a control/mobilising provision.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Strategic Partnership Opportunities/Collaboration
The Policing and Crime Act 2017 states: "… a new statutory duty on police, fire and rescue and emergency ambulance services to keep under consideration opportunities to collaborate with one another, and further, where it would be in the interests of efficiency or effectiveness of at least two of the services, for those services to give effect to such collaboration. This new duty will ensure that all opportunities for collaboration to improve efficiency or effectiveness are fully explored." **The Fire and Rescue National Framework for England outlines the importance of collaboration in delivering the functions of the fire service. It identifies collaboration as one of the key priorities for the fire service and highlights the need for collaboration in identifying and assessing risks, preventing and protecting against risks, and responding to incidents.**

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
HMICFRS state: "We were pleased to see the service meets its statutory duty to collaborate. It continues to consider opportunities to collaborate with other emergency responders."	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** **BFRS is part of the Thames Valley Collaboration group made up of:** - Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service - Oxfordshire Fire & Rescue Service - Royal Berkshire Fire Service - South Central Ambulance Service - Thames Valley Police Ongoing monitoring of neighbouring Fire and Rescue Service CRMPs including responding to consultations relating to draft plans. Review of other Thames Valley blue light service strategic plans to identify future collaboration opportunities and any implications for BFRS: - South Central Ambulance Service plan - Thames Valley Police **Future Actions / Requirements:** Improve evaluation of outcomes / value of collaborative working and initiatives. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Loss of opportunities to improve efficiency and effectiveness leading to poorer value and service outcomes for the public.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Contaminants management / liabilities.
A growing body of evidence suggests that firefighters have an increased risk of developing cancer and other diseases compared to the general population. This increased risk may be linked to firefighters' occupational exposure to toxic fire effluents (LeMasters et al., 2006). The university of Central Lancashire released a report entitled Minimising firefighters' exposure to toxic fire effluents *Interim Best Practice Report* Minimising firefighters' exposure to toxic fire effluents | Fire Brigades Union (fbu.org.uk)

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
· Potential for adverse health consequences leading to reduced quality and length of life amongst at risk staff. · Additional demands on already stretched health and social services due to emergence of treatment and care needs.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Contaminants management project launched, reporting into the Service's Business Transformation Board and Health Safety and Wellbeing committee. Gap Analysis undertaken against Interim Best Practice Report Minimising Firefighters' Exposure to Toxic Fire Effluents from University of Central Lancashire. 158 actions identified, 101 compliant or complete 57 outstanding. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Development and implementation of an action plan to address areas of concern identified in the gap analysis. National sector guidance/best practice will be forthcoming from NFCC within life of CRMP any further identified gaps will be incorporated into action plan. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Failure to reduce / mitigate risks to health and life of firefighters / staff potentially exposed to carcinogenic toxins during the course of their work. Potential pursuit of legal claims by staff adversely affected by exposure to toxins encountered during the course of their work.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Impact of public inquiries e.g. Grenfell, Manchester Arena, Covid Pandemic.
The Grenfell Tower fire took place on 14 June 2017 and led to the loss of 72 lives and more than 70 injured making it the worst residential building fire since World War 2. It was preceded by the terrorist attack at the Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017 in which 22 people were killed and 1,017 injured as a result of the bombing. Both of these events have led to changes to legislation designed to improve public safety as well as recommendations for the emergency services, including fire and rescue.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Building safety related legislation and regulations have been comprehensively updated in light of the findings from the Grenfell inquiry. In particular, the roles of persons responsible for tall and multi-occupancy buildings have been clarified and extended as detailed at page 54 of this document. In addition, draft legislation known as 'Martyn's Law' in currently being enacted by Parliament. This seeks to improve safety and security at publicly accessible venues with a capacity of 100 or more people. Phase 1 of the Grenfell Inquiry made 46 recommendations directed at London Fire Brigade, other fire and rescue services, the emergency services, Government and owners and managers of residential buildings. The Manchester Arena Inquiry (MAI) led to 50 recommendations directly applicable to fire and rescue services and a further 24 to multiple agencies including fire and rescue.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Of the 46 Grenfell recommendations, BFRS adopted 46 related actions of which 37 have been completed. The nature of the (MAI) recommendations has required multi-agency planning at national and regional levels. Monthly Thames Valley (TV) MAI working group meetings have commenced with representation for the three TV fire and rescue services and TV Fire Control Service. A single action plan has been created to ensure an aligned response to the recommendations. BFRS action plan progress will be reported internally by the MAI project team to the Overview and Audit Committee via the Performance Monitoring Board and Operational Assurance Group. A more detailed report on BFRS' response to both Inquiries is available **here**. **Future Actions / Requirements:** BFRS has well established, dedicated resources, planning processes and decision making structures to ensure that learning from all types of incidents, including those of national significance, in the form of its Operational Assurance Team, Operational Assurance Improvement Plan and Operational Assurance Group **Consequences if no further action taken:** · Potential failure to comply with legislative and regulatory requirements. · Increased risks to life and property.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Demand for SCAS or TVP services exceeds available capacity to respond. This can be a result of seasonal factors such as flu and / or staff shortages.

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Injured / vulnerable persons left in the care of BFRS personnel when attending incidents requiring multi-agency response. Potential for BFRS appliances committed to incidents being unavailable for other incidents due to safeguarding responsibilities until relieved. Adverse outcomes for members of the public injured at incidents due to lack of availability of required care / interventions.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** TVOB2023-019 agreed and in place for casualty discharge at scene. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Continually working with blue light partners to understand impacts. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Potential for: · Increased pressure on remaining BFRS capacity. · Slower response times.

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Results from Audits / Inspections	
The Service is subject to a comprehensive regime of audit and inspections undertaken by various bodies including: · internal audits procured from Buckinghamshire Council; · external audits of the Authority's financial management processes and reporting (currently undertaken by Ernst and Young); · Inspection of operational, financial and people related performance by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS).	HMICFRS Making communities safer

Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
The outcomes of audits and inspections, particularly those undertaken by the HMICFRS, can have a significant impact on the Service's: · Strategic and service improvement priorities; · Reputation, public image and key stakeholder perceptions / expectations; · Staff morale · Public confidence. The Service received the following judgements from the HMICFRS' most recent inspection undertaken in 2023:	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** The outcomes of all audits and any Service Management action plans to address the findings are reported to the Authority's Overview and Audit Committee on a regular basis: Overview and Audit Committee - 8 November 2023 - Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service (bucksfire.gov.uk) The Service has an established process for action planning and reporting in relation to recommendations for improvement made by the HMICFRS. The most recent Action Plan, addressing the issues identified in the 2023 inspection report were presented to the Fire Authority on 6 December 2023: bucksfire.gov.uk/documents/2023/11/fire-authority-meeting-6-december-2023-item-15-hmicfrs-action-plan.pdf/ **Future Actions / Requirements:** The Service continues to have ongoing dialogue with HMICFRS at both a strategic and tactical level to ensure that progress is in line with their expectations. The HMICFRS enhanced monitoring process provides additional scrutiny and support from the Inspectorate to help the Service address key causes of concern and improvement recommendations. **Consequences if no further action taken:**

The detailed findings from the inspection can be viewed here: bucksfire.gov.uk/documents/2023/10/extraordinary-fire-authority-meeting-24-october-2023-item-9-hmicfrs-inspection-report.pdf/

The inspection findings resulted in the HMICFRS placing the Service under 'enhanced monitoring': Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service moved into enhanced monitoring - His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (justiceinspectorates.gov.uk)

- Failure to address key issues and recommended improvements identified by auditors or the HMICFRS with consequential implications for public safety and / or value.
- Potential loss of confidence in Service leadership by key stakeholders (HMICFRS, Home Office, other local government and public / emergency services within the Service's operating area, Service staff and the general public).
- Poorer service outcomes for the public.
- Damage to staff morale and motivation.
- Adverse impact on staff retention and recruitment.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Fire and Rescue Service Pension Scheme Changes</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Court of Appeal ruling on the McCloud / Sargeant cases: potential impact on staff retirement profile, resourcing to implement required changes and financial impacts thereof.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service</td><td>Actions Undertaken / Required</td></tr>
<tr><td>· Failure to discharge statutory duties.
· Failure to comply with legal requirements.
· Exposure to potential claims / litigation.
· Unknown / unquantified budgetary impacts.</td><td>Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:
· Potential impacts on costs are factored into future Medium-Term Financial Planning process.
· Recruitment of dedicated specialist resource to evaluate requirements arising from the Court of Appeal ruling and implement necessary administrative changes.
· The Service has now recruited a dedicated Pensions Officer to manage the additional administrative burden.

Future Actions / Requirements:
· Continue to monitor costs of the scheme and factor into the medium-term financial plan.

Consequences if no further action taken:
· Potential breach of legislation and consequential claims</td></tr>
</table>

Risk / Issue / Opportunity: Maintaining cadres of specialist skills: NILO, HMA, DIM, WIM, Tac-Ads.	
Impact on Community and / or Fire and Rescue Service	**Actions Undertaken / Required**
Currently the FRSs are mobilised or called upon to provide a response carry out activities which stretch us beyond the traditional core functions. These do, on many occasions require specialist advice and/or a specialist response capability. This can be provided through internal investment by building cadres of specialists and/or can be requested through National Resilience funding. Having a specialist provision and capability will assist in the more timely and safer resolution of incidents, which benefit, not only the FRS, but all other responding agencies.	**Actions Undertaken / Current Mitigations:** Currently have healthy agreed headcounts within each Cadre - Haz mat advisors x 8 - DIM advisors x 4(x 12 optimum in Thames valley) - NILOs x 5 - Water Incident Managers x 8 - Communication Tac-ads - CBRNe tactical Commanders (Strategic x1, Tactical x 1) All of the above receive appropriate training, development, refreshers, requalification/assessment and CPD as required per role. **Future Actions / Requirements:** Maintain the current levels of specialist cadres, and where possible, increase these numbers where appropriate. Skills maintenance must remain and succession planning to ensure these agreed numbers do not fall below agreed levels. This will need to be managed by the cadre leads through the TNA process. **Consequences if no further action taken:** The possibility of not providing specialist advice or response could lead to incidents having a prolonged attendance, increase necessity to require OTB or NR attendance requests. Further consequences could lead to Incident Commanders not having the appropriate immediate advice available to make critical early appropriately assessed incident interventions.

Section 3 - National Security Risk Assessment

Risk: NRR Definitions	Risk Score	Impact / Effects if risk crystalises From NRR 2023	Current preparedness and future capability requirements
Terrorism			
Terrorist attacks Explosive devices Marauding Terror Attack Cyber Hostages **Affecting:** Transport (Road, Rail and Air) Infrastructure (Gas, Electricity, Water) Fuel supplies Telecommunications Banking	Medium	Potential for multiple fatalities and casualties, damage to property, infrastructure, and transport links with increased demands on all emergency services, disruption to essential services and economic damage. Likelihood of power outages occurring within affected areas. Loss of heating and cooking facilities. Limited access to fuel supplies in affected areas leading to panic buying. Limited or no access to the internet, mobile networks, or landlines. Limited or no access to banking facilities including ATM's. Potential for long lasting psychological injuries to attending personnel and the public.	**Current Preparations / Capabilities:** Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) for collapsed buildings and search and rescue. National Interagency Liaison Officers (NILO) cadre in daily liaison with Police. Operational Procedures. Multi Agency Plans in place via Thames Valley Local Resilience Forum (TVLRF). Collaborating with Thames Valley Fire and Rescue Services and fire and rescue services nationally, to implement the recommendations from the Manchester Arena Enquiry. Access to Cross border and National Assets for assistance. Strategically placed generators across the Service to maintain operational response. **Future Requirements:** Maintain a technical search and rescue capability. Exercises on new Infrastructure (HS2, East/West Rail) **Consequences if no further action taken:** Sub-optimal response increasing risk to life and property.

Risk: NRR Definitions	Risk Score	Impact / Effects if risk crystalises From NRR 2023	Current preparedness and future capability requirements
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks			
CBRN is the term used to describe the terrorist use of, or threatened use of, Chemical Biological Radiological or Nuclear material as a weapon with the intention to cause harm. Malicious attack on chemicals infrastructure	Low	Potential for contamination of air, land, waterways, water supplies, buildings, food - resulting in fatalities and casualties in proportion to the scale and nature of the attack. Irrespective of the scale of attack the impact will remain high. Unlike Gas and Electricity, the water network cannot be redistributed from other areas.	**Current Preparations / Capabilities:** CBRN Strategic, Tactical Commanders and Tactical-Advisors in service. Trained Hazmat (Hazardous Materials) and Detection Identification and Monitoring (DIM) Officers in Service. National Interagency Liaison Officers (NILO) cadre in daily liaison with Police. Operational Procedures. Multi Agency Plans in place via Thames Valley Local Resilience Forum (TVLRF). Risk information available to Crews for known high risk sites. **Future Requirements:** Identify additional CBRN Commanders to increase the cadre. Continue to exercise with Thames Valley Partners. **Consequences if no further action taken:** The possibility of not providing specialist advice or response could lead to incidents having a prolonged attendance, Further consequences could lead to Incident Commanders not having the appropriate immediate advice available to make critical early appropriately assessed incident interventions.

Risk: NRR Definitions	Risk Score	Impact / Effects if risk crystalises From NRR 2023	Current preparedness and future capability requirements
Accidents and System Failures			
To include. Insolvency of supplier(s) of critical services to the public sector Insolvency affecting fuel supply. Transport accident (Road, Rail or Air) including transport of dangerous goods. Simultaneous loss of all fixed and mobile forms of communication. Failure of the regional/ National Electricity Transmission System (NETS). Failure of gas supply infrastructure. Water infrastructure failure or loss of drinking water.	Low	The reasonable worst-case scenario is multiple casualties or fatalities, and significant environmental or economic damage. Potential for failure of infrastructure which supports operational systems or back-office processes impacting on critical service delivery. Potential for widespread disruption to fuel supplies for both commercial and domestic purposes due to limited production. Panic buying by members of the public. Significant disruption to the road/ rail network with the closure of affected routes whilst investigations and repairs take place. Potential contamination and damage to the environment. Public unable to contact friends/ family or to summon help in the event of an emergency. Loss of electricity for up to seven days would result in widespread disruption to all forms of transport networks, communication methods, utilities, businesses, and domestic services. Loss of gas supplies may result in power outages for commercial and domestic premises as many UK power stations are gas fired. The impacts of a loss of water supply would have significant impacts on the community with the closure of schools, and workplaces. The inability to flush toilets, shower, or bathe. There would be limited supplies for firefighting. Alternative water supplies may be available until the supply is restored.	**Current Preparations / Capabilities:** National Interagency Liaison Officers (NILO) cadre in daily liaison with Police. Operational Procedures. Multi Agency Plans in place via Thames Valley Local Resilience Forum (TVLRF). National Fuel Plan Strategically placed generators across the Service to maintain operational response. **Future Requirements:** Investigate alternative water sources for firefighting e.g., using treated wastewater. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Sub-optimal response increasing risk to life and property.

Risk: NRR Definitions	Risk Score	Impact / Effects if risk crystalises From NRR 2023	Current preparedness and future capability requirements
Natural and Environmental Hazards			
To include. Major Fire Wildfire High Temperatures and Heatwaves including drought. Low Temperatures and snow Storms Flooding (River, Groundwater, Surface)	High	The reasonable worst-case scenario is multiple casualties or fatalities, significant environmental and/ or economic damage. A major fire within a commercial or domestic setting has the potential for large scale evacuations to occur, could significantly disrupt the road/ rail network within the affected area with the closure of affected routes whilst firefighting operations and investigations take place, and result in contamination and damage to the environment. Wildfires require protracted emergency service attendance resulting in significant impacts on responder resilience. The resulting consequences of a wildfire could see lasting damage to the environment and may take several years to recover. High temperatures, heatwaves and drought can cause significant health impacts to the general population. Disruptions to transport networks, supply chains, power supplies and water supplies would. Other hazards are likely to occur concurrently with, or immediately after, the heatwave, including flooding from severe	**Current Preparations / Capabilities:** Wildfire Tactical Specialists Flood Response Tactical Advisor Water Rescue capability Access to National Resilience Tactical Advisors and Assets. Operational Procedures. Multi Agency Plans in place via Thames Valley Local Resilience Forum (TVLRF). Access to the Met Office and Environment Agency advisors and alerting systems. **Future Requirements:** Work more closely with Landowners and the community to reduce the risks of wildfires. Investment in suitably equipped multi-terrain vehicles. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Sub-optimal response increasing risk to life and property.

Risk: NRR Definitions	Risk Score	Impact / Effects if risk crystalises From NRR 2023	Current preparedness and future capability requirements
		thunderstorms, poor air quality, drought, and wildfires. Low temperatures and snow also have the potential to cause significant impacts on health, disruption to transport and power supplies. Significant storms are usually issued as a wind warning and are named. They can cause significant damage to property, infrastructure, and the environment and can have major impacts on the local and wider economy. All types of flooding also cause significant damage and disruption to the community, environment, and infrastructure along with substantial impacts to the economy.	

Risk: NRR Definitions	Risk Score	Impact / Effects if risk crystalises From NRR 2023	Current preparedness and future capability requirements
Human, Animal and Plant Health			
To include. **Human:** Outbreak of an emerging infectious disease including a pandemic. **Animal:** Major outbreak of Foot and mouth disease major outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza	High	The reasonable worst-case scenario is multiple fatalities, significant environmental and/ or economic damage. As seen during the Covid 19 pandemic the biggest risk to humans is the constant mutations of a virus that infects via contact, blood, and droplets. Foot and mouth disease is a highly infectious notifiable disease that affects cloven hoofed animals (Pigs, Cattle, Deer, Sheep and Goats). Although transmissible to humans it is extremely rare and is not generally considered a risk to the public. Highly pathogenic avian influenza is also a highly infectious notifiable disease that affects domestic as well as wild birds. Although transmissible to humans it is extremely rare, and is not generally a risk to the public. Any outbreaks would have a significant economic impact as animals will have to be culled to control the disease. For foot and mouth disease biosecurity measures would be implemented with rights of way and rights of access for the public being closed in affected areas.	**Current Preparations / Capabilities:** Operational Procedures. Multi agency plans in place via Thames Valley Local Resilience Forum (TVLRF). Links into UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA). Links into Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). **Future Requirements:** Service's Emerging Risks Group will monitor and evaluate new / emerging risks and consider potential mitigations. **Consequences if no further action taken:** Increased risk to Service personnel attending incidents in affected areas. Sub-optimal response increasing risk to life and property.

Appendix 1. Response to Cabinet Office Integrated Review Call for Evidence

Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service
Response to Cabinet Office Integrated Review Call for Evidence

1. What are the key opportunities, challenges, threats and vulnerabilities facing the UK now?

Opportunities	**Challenges**
· Potential for greater numbers of working age people to be present in rural villages and small towns during the working day as employers and employees leverage remote working technologies rather than locating in / commuting to large urban centres[1]. This could increase the pool of people willing to act as community first responders either on a voluntary[2] or part-time / flexible basis e.g. first aiders, on-call firefighters, Special Constables etc. · Greater use of social media to warn and inform the public and orchestrate coordinated mobilisation of community based / volunteer first responders[3].	· Ability to adequately fund capabilities across the range of functions included within the scope of the Integrated Review in the wake of economic damage arising from measures taken to tackle the Covid-19 outbreak. · Accelerated retirement of senior leadership cadre / experienced personnel within Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) due to impact of recent rulings in relation to firefighter pension schemes (the McCloud / Sargeant age discrimination cases). · FRS National Resilience / USAR assets approaching end of life / obsolescence relative to current / future risk profile – renewal of these at a time of extreme pressure on government funds. · Sustainability of FRS water rescue assets given funding pressures[4]. · Potential 're-shoring' of industrial, manufacturing, laboratory and other facilities deemed critical to national security could have implications for FRS capacity and specialist capabilities in areas such as Protection, fire engineering, DIM and HAZMAT.
Threats	**Vulnerabilities**
· More frequent and unpredictable extreme weather events arising from climate change leading to damage to infrastructure, built environment, industry and agriculture. · Potential for existing diseases historically confined to particular climate zones, e.g. tropical, to enter UK due to medium to long term effects of climate change[5]. · Potential for hostile actors (state / non-state) to modify / 'weaponise' and deploy naturally occurring viral agents[6]. · Use of social media by hostile actors to orchestrate and co-ordinate civil unrest[7]. · Potential for hostile actors, especially terrorist groups, to acquire capabilities from across the CBNRE and Cyber (malware, viruses etc.) spectrums and deploy against soft / vulnerable UK targets[8]. · Use of fire setting by hostile actors e.g. terrorist groups[9].	· NHS resilience and capacity to absorb further civil contingency related shocks as it seeks to address the backlog of non-emergency / elective treatments that were postponed during the Covid-19 peak. · Sustainability and resilience of water supplies, particularly in SE England as a result of increased demand due to population growth coupled with impact of climate change[10]. · Cyber-security across critical public services - particularly smaller less well-resourced services[11]. · Increasing dependency on internet and / or satellite platforms for communication and information rather than 'hard-wired' communications infrastructure. · Potential for strategic vulnerabilities, arising in the wake of withdrawal from the EU, from the UK: no longer using or having access to Galileo for defence and critical national infrastructure; the

	encrypted Public Regulated Service; or, playing any future part in its future development. These require evaluation to determine potential implications and risks including any that may affect the delivery and resilience of emergency services as well as wider national security and resilience[12]. · Failure to achieve an "adequacy decision" (post 31December 2020) with the EU which would deem the UK's data protection laws sufficiently robust to satisfy GDPR standards. This could impact the UK's ability to access personal data for reasons of national security. On a local level we will need to have standard contractual clauses if we choose to do business, involving personal data transfers, with EU/EEA countries. · Presence in UK of more higher risk industrial, manufacturing, laboratory and other sites / facilities deemed critical to national security as a result of 'reshoring'.

2. What are the key global and domestic trends affecting UK international policy and national security out to 2030, and how should the government prioritise its efforts in response to these?

- Pressures on community cohesion – could be accelerated by economic and social impact of Covid-19[13] and also future migration trends[14].
- Short, medium and long-term changes to local community risk profiles as a result of the economic and social effects of Covid-19.
- Changes in community risk and vulnerability post-Covid-19. NHS capacity was created by, inter alia, moving complex medical needs cases from hospital to domestic settings (as demonstrated through the Shielding programme) with resulting delays to planned treatments. This will change the risk and vulnerability profile in communities, with the potential for adverse effects on quality and length of lives, to which Government, and local agencies, will need to respond by reshaping and sufficiently resourcing their services.

3. What are the key steps the UK should take to maximise its resilience to natural hazards and malicious threats? How can we build a whole of society approach to tackle these challenges?

- Reduce reliance on 'just in time' supply chains by stockpiling supplies / consumables critical to national security and resilience. Also ensure sustainability and effective life-cycle management of stockpiles[15].
- Avoid building on flood plains unless accompanied by robust flood management and defence measures[16]

- Adopt a more holistic approach to the management of water in the built and natural environment to reduce risk of flooding and water shortages[17]. This should include consideration of the adequacy of water storage capacity and the integrity of transmission mechanisms (pipelines etc).
- Explore opportunities to improve public awareness, engagement and communication at local level with political, civic and resilience leadership structures (the 'Community Board' concept has potential as a model for this[18]).
- Explore feasibility and potential of establishing a more structured / coordinated approach to equipping, training and mobilising civilian volunteers to undertake prevention, protection and first response activities at local community level across a range of risks. The Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) model, developed and introduced by the Los Angeles City Fire Department, and now operated nationally across the USA, offers a potential model for this: https://www.ready.gov/cert

4. **What are the most effective ways for the UK to build alliances and soft power?**
   - Consider feasibility / potential for UK Fire and Rescue Services to make a greater contribution to emergency disaster relief overseas e.g. by working with the military to facilitate deployment of specialist capabilities such as USAR and heavy rescue assets.
   - Refresh the EU Civil Protection Mechanism as a means to provide, at short notice, UK subject matter specialists to overseas partners and to assess the provision of capability and support.

5. **What changes are needed to Defence so that it can underpin the UK's security and respond to the challenges and opportunities we face? (Submissions focusing on the engagement of an increasing range of stakeholders while maintaining clear responsibility, accountability, and speed of action are particularly welcome.)** N/A – a matter for respondents with military / defence expertise.

6. **How should the UK change its governance of international policy and national security in order to seize future opportunities and meet future challenges? (Submissions focusing on the engagement of an increasing range of stakeholders while maintaining clear responsibility, accountability, and speed of action are particularly welcome.)**
   - Review of CCA to ensure fitness for purpose relative to anticipatable future risks as proposed by former MP Ruth Smeeth: https://rusi.org/commentary/britain-beyond-pandemic-resilient-legal-framework

   - A coordination framework exists for fire and rescue service activity during emergencies to link in with the national government concept of operations. This national 'Con-Ops' is significantly out of date and does not reflect current practice, particularity around the COBR / Cabinet Office / Local Resilience Forum interface. A refresh of this national to local interface, and subsidiary frameworks, would facilitate better the deployment of UK capability domestically and in supporting a refreshed posture overseas.

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7. What lessons can we learn from the UK's international delivery over the past 5 years? Which are the key successes we should look to develop and build on, and where could we learn from things that didn't go well?

- Through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, and through direct request, UK has provided specialist support during major international emergencies (e.g. Pakistan earthquakes 2015 and 2019). A refresh of this mechanism would enable the deployment of UK specialists in response to overseas disasters.
- The UK decided not to accept offers of support from overseas partners (particularly during the 2015 wide area flooding). UK capability was stretched during this period, so a refresh of the National Resilience Capabilities programme (perhaps with refreshed membership and terms of reference) would enable a better and more coherent understanding of current capability gaps and where capability investment is best directed.

8. How should UK systems and capabilities be reformed to improve the development and delivery of national strategy?

- Consider feasibility and potential benefits of improving interoperability, efficiency and effectiveness of UK emergency services through greater integration and re-structuring as, for example, proposed by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Homeland Security in their report of June 2013: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Blue-light-Report_LR.pdf

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[1] The impact of Covid-19 may act as an accelerant for an emerging trend identified by Bain & Co in 2016: https://www.bain.com/insights/spatial-economics-the-declining-cost-of-distance/

[2] The scale of the public response to the NHS call for volunteers to assist with the response to Covd-19 indicates the presence of a substantial number of people, within the population, potentially willing to undertake tasks that could enhance resilience at community level: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/apr/13/a-million-volunteer-to-help-nhs-and-others-during-covid-19-lockdown

[3] For example, some 750,000 respondents to the NHS call for volunteers signed up using a mobile phone app: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/apr/13/a-million-volunteer-to-help-nhs-and-others-during-covid-19-lockdown

[4] The DEFRA Flood rescue concept of operations depends heavily on the voluntary provision of assets and capabilities from a range of organisations including the Fire and Rescue Service. The Flood Rescue National Asset Register, held by DEFRA, lists the teams or assets that voluntarily join the register and maintain availability for national deployment. Under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, whilst Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs) have a power to respond to floods, they do not have a statutory duty to do so, therefore the ability to maintain a water rescue capability in its current format, may prove to be unsustainable at a time when significant flooding events are becoming more frequent and the outlook for funding is uncertain.

[5] https://www.who.int/globalchange/climate/en/chapter6.pdf

[6] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/alarm-as-dutch-lab-creates-highly-contagious-killer-flu-6279474.html

[7] https://www.ft.com/content/a4eabbea-459e-11e9-a965-23d669740bfb

A key lesson from Sweden's 2020 Total Defence Exercise was "that it is extremely difficult to communicate clear messages to the population of a free society against the background noise of sustained disinformation campaigns":
https://rusi.org/commentary/northern-composure-initial-observations-swedens-total-defence-2020-exercise

[8] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/09/iran-linked-terrorists-caught-stockpiling-explosives-north-west/

[9] https://nfpa.org/-/media/Files/Membership/member-sections/Metro-Chiefs/Urban-Fire-Forum/2014/DHSTerroristInterestedInUsingFireAsAWeapon.ashx

https://ctc.usma.edu/fire-as-a-weapon-in-terrorist-attacks/

[10] "The state of the environment: water resources", Environment Agency, May 2018:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/709924/State_of_the_environment_water_resources_report.pdf

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/feb/27/redcar-and-cleveland-council-hit-by-cyber-attack

[12] https://www.gov.uk/guidance/satellites-and-space-programmes-from-1-january-2021

[13] https://demos.co.uk/project/what-next-priorities-for-britain/

[14] https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf

[15] https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/france-pays-a-high-price-for-ignoring-those-who-predicted-a-pandemic-1.4249817

[16] Also, Fire and Rescue Services are not included as statutory consultees for large new housing developments many of which are constructed on land vulnerable to flooding.

[17] We note the Government's adoption of 12 recommendations from the Surface Water Drainage Review published in May 2020:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/911812/surface-water-drainage-review.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/water-companies-challenged-to-improve-environmental-performance

[18] https://shadow.buckinghamshire.gov.uk/about-the-shadow-authority/new-buckinghamshire-council/communityboards/community-boards-in-action/

Appendix 2. National Resilience Strategy Call for Evidence - 23 September 2021

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Questions on Vision and Principles (pages 13 – 14)

Question	Answer
1. Do you agree with the proposed vision of the Resilience Strategy? Is there anything you would add, amend, or remove?	We are in broad agreement with the vision as an aspiration. However, there are trade-offs to be made between resilience and efficiency that need to be recognised and an appropriate balance between the two struck. See for example: Resilience vs. Efficiency: Calibrating the Tradeoff | by BCG Henderson Institute | BCG Henderson Institute. Also, how will we measure / evaluate progress, at a societal level, towards realisation of the vision? Who will we compare ourselves with (e.g., 'peer' nations, all nations)? This is a potentially complex task given structural differences and differing states of development between nations.
2. Do you agree with the principles laid out for the strategy? Is there anything you would add, amend, or remove?	These seem comprehensive and appropriate. However, they might benefit from more emphasis on contingency planning and considering opportunities to engineer out / reduce risk through prevention and protection measures as the emphasis currently seems more weighted towards response and recovery. Also, regulatory regimes need to anticipate or at least keep pace with the rate and nature of change across relevant domains such as information, communication and transportation technologies, the built environment and energy sectors (e.g., alternative fuels). Although not specifically related to the principles, we note that there is no reference to the UK's counter terrorism strategy 'CONTEST' (published in June 2018) or the 2018 UK Biological Security Strategy in the Call for Evidence. We would recommend that consideration of these be included within the scope of the National Resilience Strategy development.

Questions on Risk and Resilience (pages 16 – 18):

Question	Answer
1. Is there more that the Government can do to assess risk at the national and local levels? If so, what?	The existing approach is too static and 'top down' driven. The present two-yearly cycle for updating of the National Risk Register is not frequent enough. The scale, pace and, at times, unpredictable nature of change in the global environment with potential 'feedback' effects on the UK would favour a more dynamic, real-time approach to risk identification and evaluation. Also, better integration, visibility and engagement between national and local levels & across government departments & agencies generally.

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Question	Answer
2. Is there more that the Government can do to communicate about risk and risk appetite with organisations and individuals? If so, what?	Communication strategies should be informed by a better understanding of relevant stakeholder and, where appropriate, the general public's understanding of and tolerance for risks. This activity could be undertaken both at central and local government / agency levels. For example, we explore public perceptions of risk as part of our integrated risk management planning process (see pages 129 – 153, and in particular, 141- 145 of the linked document: (Public Pack)Agenda Document for Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority, 13/02/2019 11:00 (bucksfire.gov.uk) The legislative environment, and concerns and perceptions about limitations under GDPR, has also led to the development of risk averse information cultures in some organisations and sectors. This has made information sharing more challenging, even between what in other respects are trusted partners, in planning for and responding to civil emergencies. It should also be made clear that managing risk effectively does not mean the adoption of a risk averse posture, but rather that it is about being aware of, and evaluating the risks associated with any decisions and willingness to understand and accept the consequences in the event of risks crystalising, despite best efforts to prevent or mitigate.
3. How could the Government make risk assessment and data more accessible by frontline personnel in an emergency?	Improve access to shared risk critical information at point of need - particularly the timeliness. For example, delays to receiving worst-case scenario analyses during Brexit and Covid – these were frequently out of date and therefore of limited utility by the time they were received. Review impact of relevant legislation on ability to plan for and manage emergencies, there is currently confusion and / or conflict as to what can be shared under GDPR and CCA. Create a clear location and pathway for the provision of information from Government to frontline personnel that is regularly used and of which all staff are aware. This would mean that there is a familiar site to visit and could be populated with the relevant risk assessments and data with the relevant hyperlinks which could be pointed to as required. This could be a recognisable page on Resilience Direct or a regularly updated page on the Service / Agency intranets of which everyone is aware of. Also, ensure that access to risk information is not unduly restricted and, where it needs to be, that access to the relevant vetting process is visible and accessible on a 'need to know' basis for essential users / stakeholders.

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Question	Answer
4. How does your organisation assess risks around unlikely or extreme events, when there is limited or no data?	Although we have seldom, if ever, encountered risks that we are unable to assess for want of data, the Cynefin framework provides a useful analytical tool for understanding the fundamental nature of risks and a basis for the formulation of appropriate approaches to managing them: *https://hbr.org/2007/11/a-leaders-framework-for-decision-making* In addition, we would also recommend use of "What if?" type scenario planning in assessing extreme and / or improbable risks and contingencies: https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3673.pdf
5. How could the current local risk assessment process, managed through Local Resilience Forums, be strengthened to help local partners?	The current process makes it difficult for local partners as the NSRA is restricted access so difficult to draw from to inform local risk assessments. To allow it to be more open, where possible, would strengthen the involvement of other partners and / or ensure that access to the relevant vetting process is visible and accessible on a 'need to know' basis for essential users / stakeholders. Also, consider: · Improving the visibility of EPOs and Local Authority emergency planning functions, better defining and standardising their roles and approaches to emergency planning; and, · ways of better accessing and leveraging information held a local level (for example, by Parish and Town Councils) and identifying where gaps in this may exist (e.g., in 'unparished' areas).

Questions on Responsibilities and Accountability (pages 19 – 21):

Question	Answer
1. Do you think that the current division of resilience responsibilities between Central Government, the Devolved Administrations, local government, and local responders is correct? If not, why?	From our perspective we are of the opinion that bringing these functions under the authority of one Government department will both safeguard and further enhance this capability.

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Question	Answer
2. How can the UK Central Government, DAs, local and regional forms of government and local responders better collaborate on resilience?	Align the coterminous boundaries between the Home Office, Department of Health, MHCLG and the Department of the Environment, to improve the ability to consistently engage with key stakeholders in terms of emergency planning and response. Draw on Covid experiences to identify barriers to effective national and local preparation and joint working during civil emergencies.
3. What role, if any, should the UK Central government have in assuring that local areas are effectively carrying out their resilience responsibilities, whilst also respecting local responsibilities?	The Civil Contingencies Secretariate and the Cabinet Office should take a more active role in the Local Resilience Forum structure and assurance process. Consider the potential benefits and feasibility of consolidating central government responsibility for local resilience within the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.
4. What do you consider the advantages and disadvantages of the current legislative basis for resilience?	The CCA does not include any reference to recovery within its current scope (emergency response and recovery requirements are currently addressed as 'guidance' rather than having statutory force – this guidance should also be reviewed and refreshed if needed).

Questions on Partnerships - Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) owners and operators (22 – 25):

Question	Answer
1. Do you think that the resilience of CNI can be further improved? If so, how?	Yes, greater shared awareness of CNI would improve resilience and our ability to plan and respond. Currently not all CNI is shared with Fire and Rescue Services, so we are unaware of nature and locations to inform risk management.
2. Do you think the introduction of appropriate statutory resilience standards would improve the security and resilience of CNI operators? Why?	Potentially – however, fundamentally diverse types of CNI, multiplicity of different agencies, legislation, regulations, and assurance arrangements would make standardisation challenging.
2. a. How would such standards define the necessary levels of service provision?	Achieve consistent and defined minimum standards for all CNI.

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Question	Answer
2. b. Are there any risks associated with implementing such standards?	Pre-existing standards have different regulatory and assurance regimes that may not easily be consolidated into a single framework.
3. What do you think is the most effective way to test and assure the resilience of CNI?	Subject to knowing the type and location, LRF training and exercising. Joint organisational learning.
3. a. To what extent do you think regulators should play a role in testing the resilience of CNI systems and operators?	The regulator should assure the process. The responsible person should test the resilience. There could be an independent assurance team to report compliance, but the regulator should not.
4. During an emergency, what do you think should be the role of the operators of CNI in ensuring continued provision of essential services (e.g. water, electricity, public transport)?	Develop, enable, and activate business continuity arrangements to limit disruption. Representation within the emergency response arrangements / JESIP principles / decision making model.
4.a How can the Government support CNI owners or operators during an emergency?	Access to and representation from the Resilience Emergency Division Government Liaison Officer at all incidents where requested. Planned and funded use of mutual support from a broad range of national resilience capabilities.

Wider critical sectors:

5. What role, if any, does your business or sector play in national resilience?	Fire and rescue service national resilience capabilities, such as Urban Search and Rescue, Detection identification and monitoring of hazardous materials, flood rescue etc. Planning, training, exercising through the LRF. Engaging with the implementation of ESMCP (replacement of Airwave Radio).

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Question	Answer
6. What are the risks that your business is most concerned about?	The areas of risk that concern us most are those that could affect our ability to sustain an acceptable range and quality of services to the public. In particular, over the medium term, Service funding and general resourcing (especially attracting and retaining sufficient numbers of suitably qualified and experienced staff). Information security and, in particular, the risk of malicious cyber-attacks is identified as a clear and present danger: https://bucksfire.gov.uk/documents/2021/07/oa-item-13-210721.pdf/ In terms of community risk: scale of change / growth of built environment; infrastructure (e.g. HS2); risks arising from roll-out of new information and transportation technologies e.g. Smart motorways, electric and autonomous vehicles Post Consultation (bucksfire.gov.uk); also of concern are emerging risks associated with the use of unregulated alternative fuels and battery energy storage systems in both domestic and commercial premises.
7. What information, tools or guidance could the Government provide to help your business better assess or prepare for these types of risk?	Enhanced use of Resilience Direct / multi-agency tools to improve access to sector data to use as mapping layers. For example, flood, societal, hazmat, environmental, socio-economic data layers. Improve awareness of existing tools such as MAST (Market Analysis and Segmentation Tool road safety data) and, also consider opportunities for joint or national procurement rather than Services / agencies procuring individually.
8. What is your business' approach to building resilience in any key supply chains that your business is part of?	As the regulator for the Fire Safety Order, we provide a range of advice and guidance to commercial businesses, that contributes to their continuity and protection. In terms of goods received, resilience is achieved through nationally coordinated procurement and distribution hubs.
9. How useful have vehicles such as Local Enterprise Partnerships, Growth Hubs and other local business support services been strengthening your organisations' resilience? Why?	This question is best responded to by the business sector.

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Question	Answer
10. What can the Government do to make collaboration between academic and research organisations more effective?	This question is best responded to by the academic / research sector and relevant Government departments.
11. Are there areas where the role of research in building national resilience can be expanded?	The research into modern building construction and how it reacts when subjected to fire and collapse (also need to ensure that planning and building control regimes are informed / updated in light of the findings of such research). Environmental research and modelling.

Questions on Community and local resilience (pages 26 – 28):

Question	Answer
1. Do you agree that everyone has a part to play in improving the UK's resilience? If not, why not?	Yes
2. Do you understand the types of emergencies that might impact you and other members of your community?	Our Public Safety Plan defines the risks and our strategic approach to managing these within our areas of statutory responsibility.
2. a. What would help you better understand the risks that could affect your community?	Better quality and broader range of appropriate shared data (accurate and timely).
2. b. Do you know where to access information about emergencies that could affect you?	Yes - for the range of emergencies within our statutory responsibilities.

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Question	Answer
3. Have you considered the actions you might take to prepare for or during an emergency?	Yes
3. a. What has motivated you to plan or make preparations?	Statutory duties - CCA, Fire and Rescue Services Act etc. Public need / expectation.
3. b. What has stopped you from planning or making preparations?	Funding constraints have limited our capacity to do this.
3. c. What would help you to be able to make a plan or prepare?	Better funding and access to resources e.g. data
4. Have recent emergencies (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic, flooding, terrorist attacks) made you think differently about risks or changed the way you prepare for emergencies?	Yes – greater engagement with, and support for, partners by leveraging transferable skills to alleviate resourcing issues at pressure points such as Fire and Rescue Service blue light drivers driving ambulances, planning and assisting with set up of vaccination centers, and contingency planning.
5. Are there any barriers in accessing local volunteering schemes or finding community groups that discuss local emergency planning? If so, what are the barriers?	Information sharing, notably with respect to the management of personal / sensitive information. Volunteer groups may not work to the required standards, have the same values as the lead organisation or meet vetting requirements for access to sensitive information. Potential legal liabilities for lead agencies. Also, the lack of statutory responsibilities to do so makes it challenging for categorised responders to support this type of activity.

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Questions on Investment (pages 29 – 30):

Question	Answer
1. How does your organisation invest in your approach to the risks outlined in this document? Is your investment focused on particular stages of the risk lifecycle (for example, on prevention)?	Due to the funding constraints, our Medium-Term Financial plan plays a key role in ensuring that budgets that have been approved are aligned with the key priorities and mitigate risks highlighted in our Public Safety Plan. With limited funding and constraints on precept flexibility, in the past we have adopted a zero-based budgeting (ZBB) approach which has enabled us to realign budgets against our key priorities. An example of this is the increase in establishment for the Prevention / Protection teams via reallocating existing funds and investing where they were most needed.
2. Has the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the way your organisation is investing, or will invest, in preparing for these risks? If so, how?	Additional costs associated with COVID-19 have been fully funded via external grants to date and therefore have had a limited impact on the way the organisation is investing. However, going forward, we may need to realign existing funds to cover additional costs associated with COVID-19 if no further funding is made available. The existing COVID-19 grant is forecast to be spent by September 2021.
3. Are there models of successful resilience investment? If so, to what extent could they be adopted in the UK?	Our resourcing model for deploying fire and rescue emergency response capacity / capability. This strikes a balance between efficiency and resilience by only crewing at immediate readiness the number of appliances required to meet anticipated day-to-day demand. The remaining appliances are held at tiered availability and crewed by on-call and / or recall of off-duty Wholetime personnel to meet infrequent / exceptional contingencies (as illustrated at page 21 of the linked document): https://bucksfire.gov.uk/documents/2020/03/public_safety_plan_2020_to_2025.pdf/
4. Are there examples of where investment (whether by the Government, by businesses or by individuals) has driven improvements in resilience?	Our Zero-Based Budget approach for 2020/21 has allowed us to realign our budgets to build resilience within our workforce. A few examples are as follows: 1. Increase Wholetime establishment by 20 FTE. 2. Increase Protection establishment by 4 FTE. 3. Increase Prevention establishment by 4FTE. Without further additional funding, it will be difficult for the Authority to invest in additional resilience. We would still like to do more to achieve the additional resilience needed, however the funding constraints limit what we can invest in.

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Questions on Resilience in an Inter-connected World (page 31 -33):

Question	Answer
1. Where do you see the UK's resilience strengths?	A capable and flexible military that, amongst other things, has a demonstrated ability to provide timely and effective support to civil authorities when required (albeit that the process for mobilising under MACA is very bureaucratic and a high threshold must be reached before they can be). Local Resilience Forum structures and emergency services have proved effective through the Covid pandemic, although due to differing boundaries for different types of authorities and responders, this does present some complexities and challenges. System for deploying fire and rescue national resilience assets in response to civil emergencies. However, there are also areas of potential weakness and vulnerability that will be challenging to address, particularly in the context of the UK's current economic and fiscal position arising from the impact of measures taken to combat the Covid pandemic. For example, whilst the military and fire and rescue services have historically been resourced with regard to contingent risks, other key agency resourcing models, such as those pertaining to the police and ambulance services, are demand led with little or no latent capacity. Also, significant reductions to frontline military and fire and rescue personnel numbers over recent years has reduced their capacity to respond to major and / or multiple simultaneous incidents. Given this, more focus on identifying means of managing demand and public expectations, in the event of major or simultaneous emergencies that require diversion of resources away from routine activities, is required alongside capacity building measures and strategies. Also, in their national report which evaluated the fire and rescue services' response to the Covid 19 pandemic, the HMICFRS highlighted the impact of issues associated with the working arrangements between fire and rescue service National Employers and the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) which prevented some firefighters from maximising the support they could provide to the public indicating a need for a review of these arrangements: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/news/news-feed/firefighters-prevented-from-fully-supporting-public-during-covid-19-pandemic/

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Question	Answer
2. Are there any approaches taken by other countries to resilience that you think the UK could learn from?	Yes – a number of countries have adopted or are exploring / developing 'whole of society' approaches to mobilising for both military and civil contingencies. For example: Sweden: summary-of-government-bill-total-defence-2021-2025-final.pdf; NATO Review - Resilience: Planning for Sweden's "Total Defence"; https://www.regeringen.se/4afeb9/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/forsvarsberedningen/resilience--report-summary---20171220ny.pdf Denmark: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/disaster-management/denmark_en Switzerland: https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RR-Reports-2020-TrendsBev%C3%B6lkerungsschutz.pdf USA: the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Also, the Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) model, developed and introduced by the Los Angeles City Fire Department, and now operated nationally across the USA, offers a potential model for improved local resilience: https://www.ready.gov/cert

Question	Answer
3. Which of the UK's international relationships and programmes do you think are most important to the UK's resilience?	International Search and Rescue provisions. NATO (mutual aid).
4. What international risks have the greatest impact on UK resilience?	High dependencies on extra-territorial sources of, and therefore potential for disruption to, energy (gas, oil, electricity), imported raw materials, manufactured goods, services, food. Mass-migration (due to state failure / war / climate change etc.). Climate change. Terrorism. New or existing exotic diseases. Cyber-attacks.
5. How can the UK encourage international partners to build resilience to global risks?	Share knowledge. Targeted aid and support to address specific risk areas.

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Questions

Part 1 of the CCA:

This section covers Part 1 of the CCA, which provides the statutory framework for civil protection at a local level. We particularly invite responses from Category 1 responders, Category 2 responders, and those involved in emergency planning, response and recovery at the national, regional and local levels.

Definition:

The CCA (section 1) defines an emergency as:

(a) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom,

(b) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom, or

(c) war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.

Questions on the Civil Contingencies Act (pages 36 – 40):

Question	Answer
1. Does the above definition reflect your understanding of an emergency, and if not, how does the definition need to be expanded within the CCA?	The definition is already sufficiently widely drafted particularly as, by virtue of section 1(5), the 'event or situation' includes an event or situation occurring outside of the UK. Consideration to be given toward clarifying and / or defining a 'Major Incident' and what constitutes an emergency under the CCA e.g., 'threshold' / scale / magnitude to constitute an emergency. Need to ensure consistent typology across relevant legislation. However, any clarification on major incidents should remain in the subsidiary guidance. Also, a common lexicon is needed across related guidance. For example the JESIP doctrine uses terms such as 'civil emergency' which isn't even referenced in the approved lexicon https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon

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Question	Answer
2. Is the current designation of Category 1 and 2 responders appropriate? If not, what would be the merits of changing the identities and / or status of responders within the CCA?	Yes
3. Are there gaps in critical representation of responder organisations?	Yes - the voluntary sector should be involved if we are to develop a 'whole of society' approach to resilience. If it is foreseeable that they contribute to the response phase, then they should be involved in collective planning and preparation.
4. Should elected local figures (e.g., Council Leaders, MPs, Metro Mayors, Police and Crime Commissioners) have greater involvement in emergency planning and preparative exercising, response, and recovery and in what way?	Yes - in leadership roles for warning, informing and advising the public under section 2(1)(g) of the CCA and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations and in the recovery phases. Improving the engagement and visibility of elected political leaders in this respect could be beneficial from a public recognition and understanding perspective. However, strict protocols for political engagement would need to be established and adhered to, given the complex political geographies present in some parts of the country. For example, the Thames Valley LRF area has 9 upper tier local authorities, across 3 counties, and a focus on political engagement at 'Place' level. Training, above and beyond the existing briefing mechanisms for local politicians, would also be required for those selected to play a greater role than at present.
5. Are the current duties on Category 1 and 2 responders, as described in the CCA, appropriate?	Yes
6. If not, please list the duties which should be added, adjusted, or removed?	N/A
7. Does the framework set out in the CCA provide sufficient clarity of the different roles and responsibilities of Category 1 and 2 responders?	Yes
8. If the answer to the above question is no, how could this be made clearer within the CCA?	N/A

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Question	Answer
9. Are existing mechanisms for oversight and assurance of organisations involved in resilience adequate?	No
10. If the answer to the above question is no, please explain why this is the case, providing evidence to support where possible	There is no competency standard across the sectors for operating within the multi-agency Emergency Response Arrangements.
11. Should the CCA mandate review of local contingency plans covering a range of risk scenarios?	Yes, there should be a requirement to test and review – and to provide evidence that the plans are assured e.g., via feedback from local exercises undertaken to test multi-agency capabilities and effectiveness in relation to risk scenarios.
12. If you answered yes to the question above (Please rate the options below based on how appropriate they are 1 = not appropriate, 10 = highly appropriate): - Peer review (e.g. LRF to LRF) - Independent review - Lead Government Department review - Other - please specify	Peer review (e.g., LRF to LRF) = 3 Independent review = 9 Lead Government Department review = 6
13. Do the arrangements as set out in the CCA provide the LRF Chair and Secretariat with sufficient means by which they can effectively coordinate contingency planning of Category 1 and 2 responders in their area?	Yes, but limited by current funding arrangements.
14. A Minister of the Crown may use High Court or Court of Session proceedings to enforce duties under Part 1 of the CCA upon a Category 1 or 2 responder. Is this the right way to enforce obligations under the CCA if duties are not met?	Yes, there are reciprocal powers for Cat 1 and Cat 2 responders vis-à-vis the Minister although currently there are no specific duties on a Minister under the CCA – see Q/A 19.

National Resilience Strategy: Call for Evidence
Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service Response
23 September 2021

Question	Answer
15. Does the CCA sufficiently consider recovery arrangements? If not, how could this be improved?	The CCA does not specify the recovery arrangements (although they are addressed in the non-statutory guidance). Therefore, there is disparity between the status of statutory guidance (to which responders must have regard under sections (3)(1) and (3) of the CAA e.g. Cabinet Office, Emergency Preparedness (Revised 2012); and non-statutory guidance: Cabinet Office, Emergency Response and Recovery (2013) which has no statutory basis as recovery arrangement obligations are out of scope of the CCA.
16. Are the responsibilities related to information sharing and cooperation sufficient for ensuring an effective multi-agency response?	No. They are sufficient during an emergency but not for planning and post-event management / recovery. For example, information on vulnerable persons can be shared during an emergency incident to protect life e.g., during flooding. However, this cannot be shared in the planning or recovery stages due to GDPR. Also, the legislative environment in general, and, in particular, concerns and perceptions about limitations under GDPR, have at times made information sharing challenging.
17. How could we improve the effectiveness of LRFs (non-legislatively)?	More hypothecated funding and resourcing (currently dependent on Category 1 responders for funding).
18. Are LRFs/Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) fulfilling a sufficient role in terms of planning, response, and recovery? If not, what are the barriers to this?	Yes – broadly. However, alignment of the coterminous boundaries between relevant government and other agencies would improve the ability to consistently engage with key stakeholders in terms of emergency planning and response. For example, Milton Keynes, which is part of the Thames Valley LRF, is in different areas for Health Trusts and Environment Agency.
19. Should specific duties be placed upon central government in Part 1 of the CCA, and if so, what would these be?	Yes - Government is central to providing timely, accurate guidance, updates and leadership, including consistent messaging across all Government departments.

National Resilience Strategy: Call for Evidence
Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service Response
23 September 2021

Question	Answer
20. Would you like to note anything in regard to Part 1 of the CCA that is not captured by the questions above.	There have been significant changes across the resilience 'landscape' since 2004. These include the introduction of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP). Also, the most recent CCA guidance was published 2011-2013. The CCA and accompanying guidance therefore needs to be reviewed and updated with regard to the learning that has occurred since.

Civil Contingencies Act 2004

CHAPTER 36

Part 2 of the CCA:

This section focuses on Part 2 of the CCA, which provides for the making of special temporary legislation ('emergency regulations') to deal with the most serious of emergencies, and the conditions under which they may be made (known as the 'triple lock'):

- An emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur;
- It is necessary to make provision for the purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency;
- The need for provision referred to in point 2 is urgent.

The emergency regulations must also be an appropriate and proportionate response to the emergency.

In the event that emergency regulations are made, Part 2 also requires a senior Minister of the Crown to appoint a Regional Nominated (or Emergency) Coordinator who is not a servant or agent of the Crown, to oversee the coordination of response efforts in each area where the emergency regulations are made, at the regional level and in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

National Resilience Strategy: Call for Evidence
Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service Response
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Question	Answer
24. The CCA sets out strict conditions which must be met for emergency regulation to be made - this is known as the 'triple lock. Are these conditions still appropriate and, if not, how could the 'triple-lock' be improved?	Yes
25. Should the regional coordinator role be retained? If yes, why is this the case, and who should be eligible to fill the position?	Yes. During Covid, the Government Liaison Officer was heavily utilised as the single point of advice and guidance to the LRF. Without this role in place communication between Local Resilience Forums and Government would be less effective. There remains an issue of inconsistency of regions across agency domains.
26. Would you like to note anything in regards to Part 2 of the CCA that is not captured by the questions above?	No.
27. Are there institutions and positions that have come into existence after this CCA was developed which should be included in the statutory guidance? For example, Police and Crime Commissioners and Combined Authority Mayors ('Metro Mayor').	The statutory duties for Cat 1 responders apply - i.e., to the chief constable, a council, and a fire and rescue authority. As there are no duties for a Metro Mayor, nor a Police and Crime Commissioner, it would render any statutory guidance including such post-holders of nil effect
28. Would you like to note anything in regard to the statutory guidance of the CCA?	No.

Appendix 3. Fire Reform Consultation Paper - 13 July 2022

Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority. Responses to the Home Office White Paper Consultation 'Reforming Our Fire and Rescue Service'. 13 July 2022

Q1: To what extent do you agree/disagree that fire and rescue services should have the flexibility to deploy resources to help address current and future threats faced by the public beyond core fire and rescue duties?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments:

In addition to their core duties, Section 11 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 confers a wide power on fire and rescue authorities to take any action that they consider appropriate in response to an event or situation that causes, or is likely to cause, one or more individuals to die, to be injured or become ill, or to cause or be likely to cause harm to the environment, including the life and health of plants and animals.

However, unless the Grey Book contractually obliges firefighters to undertake duties beyond core fire and rescue activities they cannot be required to do so [as was held in Bull v Nottinghamshire and City of Nottingham Fire and Rescue Authority/ Lincolnshire CC v Fire Brigades Union [2007] EWCA Civ 240. Firefighters were not contractually obliged to carry out co-responding duties (attending medical emergencies where able to do so in advance of ambulance attendance) as that was not expressly provided for in the national scheme of conditions of service].

Q2: To what extent do you agree/disagree that fire and rescue services should play an active role in supporting the wider health and public safety agenda?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments:

The Authority endorses all of the activities in the wider health and public safety agenda, undertaken by local agreement with its employees and representative

bodies, as reported by Matt Parr CB, Her Majesty's Inspector of Fire & Rescue Services, 22 January 2021.

It agrees that further expansion into other roles should continue via local agreement with employees and representative bodies. In addition, it is mindful that its 'trusted brand' gives its employees access by consent to a wide variety of households enabling it to fulfil its 'fire prevention' duties and would be concerned if alignment under a PFCC could negatively impact its image in that regard and also in the eyes of potential recruits.

COVID-19 inspection: Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service – Letter - HMICFRS (justiceinspectorates.gov.uk)

'To protect communities, fire and rescue staff including firefighters were encouraged to carry out extra roles beyond their core duties. This was to support other local blue light services and other public service providers that were experiencing high levels of demand, and to offer other support to its communities.

The service carried out the following new activities: driving ambulances, assisting vulnerable people, delivering PPE, packing/repacking food parcels for vulnerable people, and delivering training to care home staff.'

'The service consulted locally to implement the tripartite agreement with the FBU and the Fire Officers Association. Other unions were engaged, including UNISON, if their members were asked to do extra work, including those activities covered under the tripartite agreement. All of the new work done by the service under the tripartite agreement was agreed on time for it to start promptly and in line with the request from the partner agency.

There were extra requests for work by partner agencies that fell outside the tripartite agreement, including the distribution of PPE across the Thames Valley. Throughout the pandemic, service staff helped the Thames Valley LRF's logistics cell to co-ordinate and manage the distribution of emergency supplies to key services, including care homes and primary care services. On-call staff helped facilitate a COVID-19 testing site at the request of Buckinghamshire Council. This work was agreed and undertaken on time and in line with the request from the partner agency.

All new work, including that done under the tripartite agreement, was risk-assessed and complied with the health and safety requirements. All activities to support other

organisations during this period were monitored and reviewed. The service has identified which to continue, for example, helping medical staff to gain entry to private properties. The relationship between Buckinghamshire FRS and South Central Ambulance Service has been strengthened as a result of FRS staff driving ambulances. Staff will continue to maintain their ambulance driving competencies and there will be joint training in future.'

'Buckinghamshire FRS is an active member of the Thames Valley collaboration group, strengthening its relationships with its partners, local authorities and South Central Ambulance Service. This has enabled the emergency services to support the LRF more effectively, which in turn has provided better service to communities across the Thames Valley. Buckinghamshire FRS is looking at ways its workforce can support these organisations more consistently especially during periods of high demand.'

'Good practice and what worked was shared with other services in the Thames Valley collaboration group. The service moved into the new Blue Light Hub in Milton Keynes on 30 June 2020, despite the pandemic. Thames Valley Police, South Central Ambulance Service and NHS Blood and Transplant will join them in the new building later this year*.

The hub's design promotes engagement between the three services. It includes flexible working spaces for all services, and informal breakout spaces to promote collaboration.'

* All now in place.

There have already been many benefits realised since all three blue light partners moved into the hub. For example, during the pandemic, working so closely with health partners, ensured the safest possible environment in respect of controls and procedures to ensure safe working environments for all personnel. These procedures and measures were then replicated across all three services. Thus, ensuring, as far as possible, both the safety of all staff and the best possible service provision for the public.

Other benefits include having instant access to partners regarding operational matters and safeguarding issues, along with the ability to train together and share data and intelligence at both strategic and operational levels. This has improved the service to the public in that locality and more widely across the Service's operating area. Additionally building improved relationships and understanding at all levels of

the organisations has undoubtedly been an added benefit for all partners and the direction of travel is to build upon these successes.

Q3: To what extent do you agree/disagree that the business continuity requirements set out in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provide sufficient oversight to keep the public safe in the event of strike action?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments:

Section 7 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 places duties on a fire and rescue authority to plan and provide arrangements for fighting fires and protecting life and property from fires within its area. A fire and rescue authority is required to secure the provision of sufficient personnel, services and equipment to deal with all normal circumstances, as well as adequate training. A fire and rescue authority must also put in place effective arrangements for receiving and responding to calls for help and for obtaining information which it needs to carry out its functions.

Section 8 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 places a duty on a fire and rescue authority to make provision for rescuing persons from road traffic collisions and for dealing with the aftermath of such accidents; and to put in place effective arrangements for receiving and responding to calls for help and for obtaining information to exercise its functions (for example, knowledge of local road and trunk road network).

The duties are 'target duties' for which no absolute standard need be attained, however case law suggests that grounds for non-provision must be 'compelling and reasonable'. Everything that can reasonably be done, must be done - including taking reasonable steps to provide cover and making reliable contingency plans for industrial action which may include plans to use staff within the fire and rescue authority who do not participate in industrial action.

The statutory guidance issued under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, The Home Office Fire and Rescue National Framework for England, May 2018 states

"2.11 Fire and rescue authorities must have effective business continuity arrangements in place in accordance with their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Within these arrangements, fire and rescue authorities must make every endeavour to meet the full range of service delivery risks and national resilience duties and commitments that they face. Business continuity plans should not be developed on the basis of armed forces assistance being available."

Text in its two previous iterations (published 2008 and 2012 respectively), which states that an emergency includes a period of industrial action, has been deleted from the current National Framework.

'The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 lays down duties for specified "Category 1 responders", including Fire and Rescue Authorities, to assess, plan and advise in relation to emergencies. For a Fire and Rescue Authority, an emergency includes a period of industrial action.' [2008]

'The Civil Contingencies Act requires fire and rescue authorities to put in place business continuity management arrangements for emergencies. For a fire and rescue authority, an emergency includes a period of industrial action.' [2012].

Like the duties under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, the duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 are 'target duties'. Even if breaches of these duties are established by a judicial determination, there is no effective remedy or sanction for non-provision.

Therefore, there is no 'effective oversight' provided by the legislation itself - aside from indirectly via the intervention protocol for the Secretary of State for failure of a fire and rescue authority to comply with the National Framework and the biennial reporting mechanism to Parliament.

The Authority supports the view that there should be a duty on all unions to maintain emergency arrangements for the protection of the community during periods of industrial action.

Q4: To what extent do you agree/disagree that the current pay negotiation arrangements are appropriate?

Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority. Responses to the Home Office White Paper Consultation 'Reforming Our Fire and Rescue Service'. 13 July 2022

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Q5: Please provide the reasons for your response: The current arrangements for the negotiation of pay have been in place since 2004, with pay previously agreed through a pay formula. The issue that faces all Fire Authorities is the ability to pay for any increases, with the precept capped at 2 per cent, this only allows for pay to be increased by the same amount. Any changes to the mechanism, should set out, how any increases in pay would be funded.

The Authority would be against local pay negotiations for Grey and Gold book employees. Support Services employees' pay is currently already agreed at a local level outside of national terms and conditions.

Q6: To what extent do you agree/disagree that consistent entry requirements should be explored for fire and rescue service roles?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Q7: Please provide the reasons for your response:

For operational roles this could enable greater equalities and collaboration through centralised recruitment processes and centralised training facilities. The entry requirements should be evidenced and proportionate to the role.

As the Authority has a range of employment propositions for operational roles, these would need to be fully explored and the equalities issues fully reviewed and considered. The Authority has an Appointments Board, Development Centres/Promotional processes, transferees, flexi firefighters, On Call and Wholetime, whereas other Fire and Rescue Services may not have this whole range.

For support services employees, it would be difficult to have consistent entry requirements due to the nature, diversity and scope of the roles and size of individual Fire and Rescue services.

Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority. Responses to the Home Office White Paper Consultation 'Reforming Our Fire and Rescue Service'. 13 July 2022

Q8: To what extent do you agree/disagree that other roles, in addition to station and area managers, would benefit from a direct entry and talent management scheme?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments: This approach already exists in many areas for specialist and professional support roles, including some of the most senior positions within FRS's and should not be limited to traditional 'operational' or 'grey book' roles.

Regarding the more traditional operational roles, smaller FRS's would find this challenging as has been identified with the work around station and area managers, as in effect the operational element of the role requires an intense and sometimes lengthy process to ensure command and operational competence. Therefore, the operational element of the role would have to be covered in another way which would increase costs.

The equalities aspects of this approach need to be fully considered, the development centres and development pool ensure a consistent process is followed for all.

The transferee request process is in place, for internal employees to broaden their experience and request alternative locations or roles to help with their development and work life balance.

Q9: To what extent do you agree/disagree with the proposed introduction of a 21st century leadership programme?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Q10: Please provide the reasons for your response: The introduction of a leadership programme would enable recognised development for all staff and equip them with the knowledge, competence and confidence to fulfil their roles in the community. All aspects and content of the programme would need to be explored in consultation with Fire and Rescue services and employees. It would enable a consistent approach across all Fire and Rescue services.

Q11: To what extent do you agree/disagree that completion of the proposed 21st century leadership programme should be mandatory before becoming an assistant chief fire officer or above?

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments: As question 9				

Q12: To what extent do you agree/disagree that each of the activities outlined above are high priorities for helping improve the use and quality of fire and rescue service data?

- **A national data analytics capability.**

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments: A national capability would provide consistency in the way data is analysed and reduce duplication of effort across Services. Benchmarking across Services would be more meaningful and lead to better outcomes for the Service nationally and for the communitiesthat they serve.				

- **Data-focused training**

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**

Comments: Data focused training is key to ensure all Services are proficient in the data they collect and what they do with it. GDPR considerations need to be considered.

- **Consistent approaches to structuring data**

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments: Consistency would allow data to be aggregated more easily at a national level.				

- **Clear expectations for data governance**

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments: GDPR and clear data expectations are key to ensure data is collected, utilised and analysed effectively.				

- **Securing data-sharing agreements.**

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments: Sharing data across partners will allow Services to more easily identify those who may be at a greater risk in our communities so that they can target their limited resources more effectively.				

Q13: What other activities, beyond those listed above, would help improve the use and quality of fire and rescue service data? Please give the reasons for your response.
Response: Updates/upgrades to systems allow data to be captured more easily, accurately and in a timelier manner (e.g. use of smart devices, Artificial Intelligence)

Research

A central fire and rescue research capability could undertake the following activities:

- collaborating – providing a permanent set of skilled analysts to collaborate with others, including services, to promote good quality research that will provide benefits to services
- commissioning – commissioning other organisations to conduct research on behalf of the central fire and rescue research function when national-level research is appropriate
- conducting – directly undertaking research, including reviews of existing evidence, using staff permanently housed within the central fire and rescue research function
- collating – identifying emergent issues, opportunities, and ongoing fire-related research undertaken across services, academia, industry and other organisations, ensuring that priorities are being addressed and learning is being shared to avoid duplication of effort

Q14: To what extent do you agree/disagree that each of the activities outlined above are high priorities for improving the use and quality of fire evidence and research?

- **Collaborating**

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**

Comments:

- **Commissioning**

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments:				

- **Conducting**

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments:				

- **Collating**

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments:				

Q15: What other activities, beyond those listed above, would help improve the use and quality of evidence and research on fire and other hazards? Please provide the reasons for your responses.
Response: None identified at this stage.

Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority. Responses to the Home Office White Paper Consultation 'Reforming Our Fire and Rescue Service'. 13 July 2022

Q16: To what extent do you agree/disagree with the creation of a statutory code of ethics for services in England?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments: The Authority is aware that there is a Code of Ethics that was issued by the College of Policing in July 2014 pursuant to the power under section 39A of the Police Act 1996. Its status as a statutory code of practice applies only to chief police officers, however it is an advisory Code of Ethics for all officers and police staff, including 'all those engaged on a permanent, temporary, part-time, casual, consultancy, contracted or voluntary basis' [paragraph 1.3.3]. It is understood that before the Code of Ethics was issued, a consultation was held on a draft including with, i.a. all the main staff associations, unions, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, and the public. As fire and rescue services now fall under the HMICFRS it would seem appropriate for consistency for a similar approach to be adopted and applied to all fire and rescue service staff as well as those engaged on a permanent, temporary, part-time, casual, consultancy, contracted or voluntary basis.

The Authority already has a stated position in letters to the Minister of State (Minister for Building Safety and Fire) and Chairman of the NFCC that higher standards of vetting for fire and rescue staff should be mandated not least because, inter alia, since the duty to collaborate arose under the Policing and Crime Act 2017, there are an increasing number of examples of collaborative working with both the police and ambulances services with only firefighters not subject to enhanced DBS checking, when they may be working side by side and sharing information with their blue light partners at incidents, training events, and shared facilities such as 'Blue Light Hubs'.

Q17: To what extent do you agree/disagree that placing a code of ethics on a statutory basis would better embed ethical principles in services than the present core code of ethics?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments: There may be issues with introducing a statutory code of ethics where fire and rescue staff are employed by, for example, county councils as to those employers' extant disciplinary procedures.

The NFCC code of ethics was published in May 2021, it aligns to the Authority's current vision and values. If Fire and Rescue services do not have a vision and values, they would benefit from adopting a code of ethics.

Q18: To what extent do you agree/disagree that the duty to ensure services act in accordance with the proposed statutory code should be placed on operationally independent chief fire officers?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments: The premise of q18 is that 'Services' should act in accordance with the code, which is disputed on the basis that the Authority believes that the duty to comply with a code of ethics should be on the individuals themselves (i.e. whoever is obliged to comply with its obligations, be they employees under 'contracts of service', or per response to q16, third parties engaged under 'contracts *for* service').

If individuals fail to comply with the code of ethics, non-compliance should be dealt under the relevant procedures of the fire and rescue authority. It should not necessarily follow that non-compliance with the code, by an individual bound by it, should give rise to culpability of the chief fire officer.

Q19: To what extent do you agree/disagree with making enforcement of the proposed statutory code an employment matter for chief fire officers to determine within their services?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Comments: For the reasons stated in response to Q18.				

Q20: To what extent do you agree/disagree with the creation of a fire and rescue service oath for services in England?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Q21: Please give the reasons for your response.

It is understood that, for example, Thames Valley Police has circa eight thousand personnel, of whom circa three thousand are not obliged to swear an oath of office.

(As at 28 June 2022)	Actual
Police officers	4,570
Police staff (exc. OPCC)	3,001
PCSOs	299
TOTAL	7,870

Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 sets out the five potentially fair reasons for an employer to dismiss an employee. (i.e. per section 98(4), depending on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case).

Section 98(2)(d) provides that one potentially fair reason is 'that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment.'

It therefore follows that failure by an employee to swear an Oath specified in legislation would give rise to the sanction of dismissal. The resource implications of following fair procedures which may result in dismissal for failure to swear a statutory Oath are likely to be significant yet are not mentioned in the Home Office Impact Assessment.

Q22: To what extent do you agree/disagree that an Oath would embed the principles of the Code of Ethics amongst fire and rescue authority employees?

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments: A positive act by an employee such as being required to sign or affirm an agreement, procedure or policy will generally increase adherence.				

Q23: To what extent do you agree/disagree with an Oath being mandatory for all employees?

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
Comments: For the reasons stated in responses to Q20 and 21				

Q24: To what extent do you agree/disagree that breach of the fire and rescue service oath should be dealt with as an employment matter?

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**

Comments: It should be a matter between the employer and employee in the same way as other areas of non-compliance with implied or express terms of employment contracts. It should not, in itself, be subject to criminal sanctions.

Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority. Responses to the Home Office White Paper Consultation 'Reforming Our Fire and Rescue Service'. 13 July 2022

Q25: To what extent do you agree/disagree that the five areas listed above are priorities for professionalising fire and rescue services?

- **Leadership**
- **Data**
- **Research**
- **Ethics**
- **Clear Expectations**

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments: It can be argued that the fire and rescue service already conducts its business in a highly professional manner. There is, however, always room for improvement and it is agreed that the areas listed are some of the key areas of focus to continue with those improvements.

Q26: What other activities, beyond the five listed above, could help to professionalise fire and rescue services?
Response: As above, the areas listed are some of the key elements for improvement. Other areas could include investment in people and development along with continual development and implementation of professional standards.

Q27: To what extent do you agree/disagree with the creation of an independent College of Fire and Rescue to lead the professionalisation of fire and rescue services?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Q28: Please give the reasons for your response: A centralised and funded College of Fire and Rescue has the potential to enhance the development of staff, be more inclusive and enhance the leadership of the fire and rescue service.

Q29: To what extent do you agree/disagree that Government should transfer responsibility for fire and rescue services in England to a single elected individual?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments: Whilst there are clearly some merits to the proposal, it is not clear that there is a compelling case for this change at this time. It risks unnecessary distraction and costs for the Fire and Rescue Service.

Any transfer should remain a matter for local determination where a strong local case is made that it is in the best interests of either efficiency, economy and effectiveness or public safety for such a transfer to take place (i.e. applying the statutory criteria that exist in respect of PFCCs under section 4A(5) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 before an order can be made transferring FRA functions to a PCC).

However, given the direction of travel appears set on this approach, it is important that some of the key challenges, considerations to ensure the best of the existing model is retained and implementation risks are well understood- to ensure any changes are successful. These are set out elsewhere in our response.

Q30: What factors should be considered when transferring fire governance to a directly elected individual?

Please provide the reasons for your response:

There are some important factors which need careful consideration should this change be pursued, including:

• Whether a single person would be able to effectively represent an entire fire and rescue authority area.

If the fire and rescue authority area is geographically large (such as the Thames Valley) there may be issues relating to distinct differences in demographics, built environment, and risk profiles among communities which may lose the advocacy of local political representatives.

• The adequacy of checks and balances.

A 4-year term has benefits in terms of continuity of direction for both the chief fire officer and the fire and rescue service and provides more stability than can occur with, typically, annual appointments onto a combined fire and rescue authority. Although a directly elected individual is accountable to the public at the ballot box there may be a lack of accountability if the individual's geographical area is particularly large such that the electorate feels disengaged and thereby disenfranchises itself.

- Whether, if a PFCC model were adopted, sufficient training and induction would need to be provided to panel members to enable effective scrutiny. Current scrutiny arrangements for the PCC are not strong enough to hold the PCCs to account and consideration should be given to legislating to give PCPs 'teeth' particularly if their scrutiny role is to equate to the level that currently exists in well governed fire and rescue authorities.

- Whether, a single Police, Fire and Crime Commissioner could cope with the workload of the additional fire and rescue functions.

In a combined fire and rescue authority good governance arrangements would typically include the appointments of 'Lead Members' as well as a Vice Chairman. This enables a cadre of councillors from within the wider authority to, for example: take a lead role in providing support and constructive challenge to senior officers with the development of strategies and plans and contributing towards the strategic direction of the authority; act as a 'sounding board' for senior officers on issues within the portfolio; and be supportive in dealing with any problems at a strategic level; review, in conjunction with senior officers, the service within the portfolio; keep abreast of related developments and policies at national, regional and local level; take the lead

in reporting on issues within the portfolio; and, be accountable to scrutiny for issues within the portfolio.

- Whether, if a PFCC model were adopted, the 'trusted brand' of the fire and rescue service which gives its employees access by consent to a wide variety of households enabling it to fulfil its 'fire prevention' duties, could be negatively impacted in that regard and also in the eyes of potential recruits.

- Whether an elected individual would have adequate skills and robustness to, on his or her own, hold a chief fire officer to account without the additional inputs and support available from other councillors on an authority.

It is also a concern that in a combined PFCC model, Fire and Rescue Services will get insufficient focus when set alongside with the larger challenges of the Police Service.

Q31: Where Mayoral Combined Authorities already exist, to what extent do you agree/disagree that fire and rescue functions should be transferred directly to these MCAs for exercise by the Mayor?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments: Any transfer should remain a matter for local determination where a strong local case is made that it is in the best interests of either efficiency, economy and effectiveness or public safety for such a transfer to take place (i.e. applying the statutory criteria that exist in respect of PFCCs under section 4A(5) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 before an order can be made transferring FRA functions to a PCC).

Q32: To what extent do you agree/disagree that Government should transfer responsibility for fire and rescue services in England to police and crime commissioners?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments: The Authority acknowledges the direction of travel that is signalled in the White Paper. However any transfer should remain a matter for local determination where a strong local case is made that it is in the best interests of either efficiency, economy and effectiveness or public safety for such a transfer to take place (i.e. applying the statutory criteria that exist in respect of PFCCs under section 4A(5) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 before an order can be made transferring FRA functions to a PCC).

The Authority has set out elsewhere in its response the key risks, challenges and implementation risks associated with effecting this change. It is important these are fully understood and mitigated to ensure any change is successful.

Q33: Apart from combined authority mayors and police and crime commissioners, is there anyone else who we could transfer fire governance that aligns with the principles set out above? Yes / No

Q34: If yes, please explain other options and your reasons for proposing them.
Response: N/A.

Q35: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the legal basis for fire and rescue authorities could be strengthened and clarified?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Q36: Please provide the reasons for your response
The duties and powers of fire and rescue authorities are set out in the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, with the ability of the Secretary of State to add to the types of

emergencies under their responsibility by Statutory Instruments made under section 9 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. The responsibilities for combined fire and rescue authorities in terms of financial matters and precept raising are set out in other local government legislation.

However their responsibilities vis-à-vis oversight of the fire and rescue service and/or Chief Fire Officer is left to local determination.

It would seem appropriate for Parliament to legislate using, as a precedent, the duties under section 79 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 for the Secretary of State to, following due consultation, issue a 'policing protocol' (see response to q42 below).

Q37: To what extent do you agree/disagree that boundary changes should be made so that fire and rescue service areas and police force/combined authorities (where present) areas are coterminous?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments: The Authority acknowledges the direction of travel that is signalled in the White Paper, however any transfer should remain a matter for local determination where a strong local case is made that it is in the best interests of either efficiency, economy and effectiveness or public safety for such a transfer to take place (i.e. applying the statutory criteria that exist in respect of PFCCs under section 4A(5) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 before an order can be made transferring FRA functions to a PCC).

It is axiomatic that a PFCC would require coterminous boundaries. In order to take on responsibility for the governance of fire and rescue, section 4A(2) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act (added by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, January 31, 2017) requires that a PCC's police area must be coterminous with the area of the FRA proposed to be created by the order or, where a PCC takes on more than one FRA within their area, the PCC's police area must be the same as the areas of those FRAs when taken together.

This will present local challenges, which may in themselves render any business case unlikely to achieve the statutory criteria which must be met before an order can be made to transfer FRA functions to a PCC. Within the Authority's area, for example, the City of Milton Keynes although earmarked in the Levelling Up White Paper as being in the same region as Buckinghamshire Council, and while within the Thames Valley PCC's boundary, has synergistic alignments with other administrative bodies such as the South East Midlands Local Enterprise Partnership and the Bedfordshire, Luton and Milton Keynes Clinical Commissioning Group.

Q38: To what extent do you agree/disagree with ring-fencing the operational fire budget within fire and rescue services run by county councils and unitary authorities?

Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Neither agree nor disagree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**

Q39: Please provide the reasons for your response

If legislation is implemented that creates changes to the Executive of a county or unitary council, so that a leader within the Executive has direct responsibility for fire and rescue functions the budget for fire and rescue should be ring-fenced. A model for this would be similar to that introduced by the amendments made to the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, which requires a PFCC establish and maintain a fire fund separate from the policing fund with all receipts and expenditure of the fire and rescue functions being paid into and out of that fire fund.

This would also require full transparency of the total cost of providing the fire and rescue service. It would be important to accurately show the cost of shared activities including, for example, how the share of central support services such as finance, HR and ICT are passed on to the fire and rescue service. This would ensure the cost of fire and rescue in a council can be more accurately compared with the cost of services under other governance models. The same principle of accurately recording the full cost of services must also be applied to ensure sufficient funding is given to council fire and rescue services if and when they become a standalone service or combine with another fire and rescue service.

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Balanced Leadership Model

Task	**Responsible**
Setting priorities	Executive leader
Budget setting	Executive leader
Setting precept	Executive leader
Setting response standards	Executive leader
Opening and closing fire stations	Executive leader*
Appointment and dismissal of chief fire officer	Executive leader
Appointment and dismissal of other fire service staff	Chief fire officer
Allocation of staff to meet strategic priorities	Chief fire officer
Configuration and organisation of resources	Chief fire officer
Deployment of resources to meet operational requirements	Chief fire officer
Balancing of competing operational needs	Chief fire officer
Expenditure up to certain (delegated) levels	Chief fire officer

*Opening and closing of fire stations could be a joint decision; operationally fire chiefs could be responsible for decisions on moving teams, whilst ultimate political and executive responsibility lies with the executive leader.

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Q40. To what extent do you agree with this proposed approach (as outlined in the table above)?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Q41. Do you have any other comments to further support your answer?

It is believed by the Authority that the same outcomes could be achieved under existing governance models by the demarcating of responsibilities via a combination of a 'scheme of delegation' to a Chief Fire Officer and terms of reference for whatever is the political oversight body to which the Chief Fire Officer reports, together with an agreed Member - Officer Protocol to complement a Members' Code of Conduct.

However, it is accepted that this can lead to inconsistencies between fire and rescue services dependent on what constitutional arrangements and safeguards have been put in place.

Q42. Are there any factors we should consider when implementing these proposals?

Section 79 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 required the Secretary of State to, following due consultation, issue a 'policing protocol' to which the following persons must have regard: (a) the Secretary of State in the exercise of policing functions; (b) each elected local policing body; (c) the chief officer of each police force maintained by an elected local policing body; and (d) police and crime panels.

The current policing protocol was brought into force by the Policing Protocol Order 2011 (Statutory Instrument 2011/2744) on 16 January 2012.

Provisions of particular significance are that a police and crime commissioner "must not fetter the operational independence of the police force and the chief constable who leads it" [paragraph 18] and that "the operational independence of the police is a fundamental principle of British policing. It is expected by the Home Secretary that the professional discretion of the police service and oath of office give surety to the public that this shall not be compromised." [paragraph 30]

The Authority believes that the respective responsibilities of a Chief Fire Officer and the political oversight body should be demarcated similarly by a protocol made via a Statutory Instrument and, moreover, there would be merit in setting out the means of enforcement and sanctions for non-compliance within such a protocol which are absent in the Policing Protocol Order.

Q43: What factors should we consider when giving chief fire officers operational independence?

Please provide the reasons for your opinions.

As set out above at Q42

Q44: What factors should we consider should we make chief fire officers corporations sole?

Factors that should be considered are:

- Operational independence is not contingent on making a Chief Fire Officer a corporation sole, it only would be necessary if a change of employer for fire and rescue employees from the governance body were needed. Operational independence is wholly unrelated to creating a separate legal entity for a Chief Fire Officer
- If the Chief Fire Officer became a corporation sole under a PFCC, this would be at odds with, and conflicts with, the existing provisions under the Policing and Crime Act 2017 for a single employer model.

- If the Chief Fire Officer in a county council FRS became the employer as a corporation sole, consideration would need to be given as to which employees transfer from support services from the wider council's service support functions.

The necessity for making a chief constable a 'corporation sole' simultaneously with the abolition of police authorities under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, was the change in employment arrangements for the civilian staff engaged to support a police force. Previously these staff were employed by the police authority, but under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 Act they

became employed by the chief constable. Changing the legal status of the chief constable enabled these staff to be employed, and new staff to be appointed, under contracts of employment with rights and liabilities which pass to the chief constable's successor when he leaves office.

Where Police and Crime Commissioners have become Police Fire and Crime Commissioners they have become, as the fire and rescue authority, the employer of fire and rescue staff. None of have them have used the powers under the Policing and Crime Act 2017 to adopt the 'single employer model' i.e. to delegate fire and rescue functions to a single chief officer for policing and fire in which the chief officer as, a corporation sole, employs both police staff and fire and rescue staff.

Q45: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the responsibility for strategic and operational planning should be better distinguished?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments:

For the reasons set out in response to q41

Q46: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the strategic plan should be the responsibility of the fire and rescue authority?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Comments:

For the reasons set out at Q48 response.

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Q47: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the operational plan should be the responsibility of the chief fire officer?

Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

Q48: Please provide the reasons for your response

This mirrors existing arrangements in which the Authority approves the Public Safety Plan (Integrated Risk Management Plan/ Community Risk Management Plan), Corporate Plan, and the Medium-Term Financial Plan/annual budget - with the Chief Fire Officer responsible for operational implementation of those plans.