

**BUCKINGHAMSHIRE AND MILTON KEYNES FIRE AUTHORITY  
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE**

Director of Legal & Governance, Graham Britten  
Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service  
Brigade HQ, Stocklake, Aylesbury, Bucks HP20 1BD  
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**Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive**  
Louise Harrison

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To: Members of Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes Fire Authority

30 September 2024

**MEMBERS OF THE PRESS  
AND PUBLIC**

Please note the content of  
Page 2 of this Agenda Pack

Dear Councillor

Your attendance is requested at a **MEETING** of the **BUCKINGHAMSHIRE AND MILTON KEYNES FIRE AUTHORITY** to be held in **THE OCULUS, THE GATEWAY OFFICES, GATEHOUSE ROAD, AYLESBURY, BUCKS, HP19 8FF** on **9 OCTOBER 2024** at **11 AM** when the business set out overleaf will be transacted.

Yours faithfully

Graham Britten  
Director of Legal and Governance

**Health and Safety:**

There will be limited facilities for members of the public to observe the meeting in person. A recording of the meeting will be available after the meeting.

Chairman: Councillor Rouse

Councillors: Adoh, Bagge, Bailey, Banks, Carroll, Chapple OBE, Exon, Hall, Hussain OBE, Khan, Lambert, McLean, O'Neill, Stuchbury, Sullivan and Walsh



**MAKING YOU SAFER**



## **To observe the meeting as a member of the Press and Public**

The Authority supports the principles of openness and transparency. To enable members of the press and public to see or hear the meeting this meeting will be recorded. Please visit:

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWmIXPWAscxl3vliv7bh1Q>

The Authority also allows the use of social networking websites and blogging to communicate with people about what is happening, as it happens.

## **Adjournment and Rights to Speak – Public**

The Authority may adjourn a Meeting to hear a member of the public on a particular agenda item. The proposal to adjourn must be moved by a Member, seconded and agreed by a majority of the Members present and voting.

A request to speak on a specified agenda item should be submitted by email to [gbritten@bucksfire.gov.uk](mailto:gbritten@bucksfire.gov.uk) by 4pm on the Monday prior to the meeting. Please state if you would like the Director of Legal and Governance to read out the statement on your behalf, or if you would like to be sent a 'teams' meeting invitation to join the meeting at the specified agenda item.

If the meeting is then adjourned, prior to inviting a member of the public to speak, the Chairman should advise that they:

- (a) speak for no more than four minutes,
- (b) should only speak once unless the Chairman agrees otherwise.

The Chairman should resume the Meeting as soon as possible, with the agreement of the other Members present. Adjournments do not form part of the Meeting.

## **Rights to Speak - Members**

A Member of the constituent Councils who is not a Member of the Authority may attend Meetings of the Authority or its Committees to make a statement on behalf of the Member's constituents in the case of any item under discussion which directly affects the Member's division, with the prior consent of the Chairman of the Meeting which will not be unreasonably withheld. The Member's statement will not last longer than four minutes. Such attendance will be facilitated if requests are made to [enquiries@bucksfire.gov.uk](mailto:enquiries@bucksfire.gov.uk) at least two clear working days before the meeting. Statements can be read out on behalf of the Member by the Director of Legal and Governance, or the Member may request a 'team's meeting invitation to join the meeting at the specified agenda item.

## **Petitions**

Any Member of the constituent Councils, a District Council, or Parish Council, falling within the Fire Authority area may Petition the Fire Authority.

The substance of a petition presented at a Meeting of the Authority shall be summarised, in not more than four minutes, by the Member of the Council who presents it (as above). If the petition does not refer to a matter before the Authority, it shall be referred without debate to the appropriate Committee.

## **Questions**

Members of the Authority, or its constituent councils, District, or Parish Councils may submit written questions prior to the Meeting to allow their full and proper consideration. Such questions shall be received by the Monitoring Officer to the Authority, *in writing*, at least two clear working days before the day of the Meeting of the Authority or the Committee.

## COMBINED FIRE AUTHORITY - TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. To appoint the Authority's Standing Committees and Lead Members.
2. To determine the following issues after considering recommendations from the Executive Committee, or in the case of 2(a) below, only, after considering recommendations from the Overview and Audit Committee:
  - (a) variations to Standing Orders and Financial Regulations;
  - (b) the medium-term financial plans including:
    - (i) the Revenue Budget;
    - (ii) the Capital Programme;
    - (iii) the level of borrowing under the Local Government Act 2003 in accordance with the Prudential Code produced by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy; and
  - (c) a Precept and all decisions legally required to set a balanced budget each financial year;
  - (d) the Prudential Indicators in accordance with the Prudential Code;
  - (e) the Treasury Strategy;
  - (f) the Scheme of Members' Allowances;
  - (g) the Integrated Risk Management Plan and Action Plan;
  - (h) the Annual Report.
  - (i) the Capital Strategy
3. To determine the Code of Conduct for Members on recommendation from the Overview and Audit Committee.
4. To determine all other matters reserved by law or otherwise, whether delegated to a committee or not.
5. To determine the terms of appointment or dismissal of the Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive, and deputy to the Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive, or equivalent.
6. To approve the Authority's statutory pay policy statement.

## **AGENDA**

### **Item No:**

#### **1. Apologies**

#### **2. (a) Minutes**

To approve, and sign as a correct record the Minutes of the meeting of the Fire Authority held on 12 June 2024 (item 2a) **(Pages 7 - 28)**

#### **(b) Minutes**

To approve, and sign as a correct record the Minutes of the Extraordinary meeting of the Fire Authority held on 11 September 2024 (item 2b) **(Pages 29 - 36)**

#### **3. Matters Arising from the Previous Meetings**

The Chairman to invite officers to provide verbal updates on any actions noted in the Minutes from the previous meeting.

#### **4. Disclosure of Interests**

Members to declare any disclosable pecuniary interests they may have in any matter being considered which are not entered onto the Authority's Register, and officers to disclose any interests they may have in any contract to be considered.

#### **5. Chairman's Announcements**

To receive the Chairman's announcements (if any).

#### **6. Petitions**

To receive petitions under Standing Order SOA6.

#### **7. Questions**

To receive questions in accordance with Standing Order SOA7.

#### **8. Recommendations from Committees:**

**Executive Committee – 11 September 2024**

**(c) Performance Management - Q1 2024/25**

‘It is recommended that the Performance Management – Q1 2024/25 be noted.

To consider item 8a **(Pages 37 - 78)**

**9. Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Phase One and Phase Two Recommendations**

To consider item 9 **(Pages 79 - 110)**

**10. Exclusion of Press and Public**

To consider excluding the public and press representatives from the meeting by virtue of Paragraph 1 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972, as the reports and minutes contain information relating to any individual; and Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972, as the reports and minutes contain information relating to the financial or business affairs of a person (including the Authority); and on these grounds it is considered the need to keep information exempt outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

**11. Exempt Minutes**

To approve, and sign as a correct record the Exempt Minutes of the meeting of the Fire Authority held on 12 June 2024 (item 11)

**12. Industrial Action Planning Update**

To receive a briefing.

**13. Interim Senior Management Team (SMT) Arrangements**

To consider item 13

**14. Deputy Chief Fire Officer Appointment**

To follow.

**15. Date of Next Meeting**

To note that the next meeting of the Fire Authority will be held on Wednesday 4 December 2024 at 11 am at The Oculus, The Gateway Offices, Gatehouse Road, Aylesbury, Bucks, HP19 8FF

If you have any enquiries about this agenda please contact: Katie Nellist (Democratic Services Officer) – Tel: (01296) 744633 email: [knellist@bucksfire.gov.uk](mailto:knellist@bucksfire.gov.uk)



## **BUCKINGHAMSHIRE AND MILTON KEYNES FIRE AUTHORITY**

### **ROLE DESCRIPTION**

#### **LEAD MEMBERS**

1. To take a lead role in providing support and constructive challenge to senior officers in the development of strategies and plans and contributing towards the strategic direction of the Authority, within the Authority's overall policy objectives.
2. To act as a 'sounding board' for senior officers on issues within the portfolio, and be supportive in dealing with any problems at a strategic level.
3. To review, in conjunction with senior officers, the service within the portfolio.
4. To keep abreast of related developments and policies at national, regional and local level.
5. To take the lead in reporting to the Authority, one of its committees, or panels on issues within the portfolio.
6. To attend the Overview and Audit Committee, at its request, in connection with any issues associated with the portfolio which is the subject of scrutiny.
7. To act as a spokesperson for the Authority on issues within the portfolio.
8. To represent the Authority on bodies, at events and at conferences related to the portfolio, as appointed by the Executive Committee and to feedback to the Authority any issues of relevance / importance.

(Approved 8 June 2007)



# Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BUCKINGHAMSHIRE AND MILTON KEYNES FIRE AUTHORITY HELD ON WEDNESDAY 12 JUNE 2024 AT 11 AM.

**Present:** Councillors Adoh, Bagge, Bailey, Banks, Carroll, Chapple OBE, Exon, Hall, Hussain OBE, Khan, McLean, O'Neill, Rouse, Stuchbury, Sullivan and Walsh

**Officers:** L Harrison (Chief Fire Officer), M Osborne (Deputy Chief Fire Officer), S Tuffley (Assistant Chief Fire Officer), G Britten (Director of Legal and Governance), M Hemming (Director of Finance and Assets), A Carter (Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO), A Stunell (Head of Human Resources), P Scanes (Head of Prevention and CRMP), O Finch (Station Commander HR Projects), M Joseph-Hussain (Safety Centre Chief Executive) and K Nellist (Democratic Services Officer)

**Online:** A Hussain (Deputy Director of Finance and Assets), F Mansfield (HR Advisory and Development Manager), C Newman (Data Intelligence Team Manager), J Cook (Community Safety and Safeguarding Manager) and A Collett (Organisational Development Manager),

**Apologies:** Councillor Lambert (joined online)

Councillor McLean opened the meeting by welcoming everyone to the Annual Meeting of Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes Fire Authority.

Councillor McLean advised that although members of the public were able to attend and observe in person, following the meeting, a video recording would be uploaded to the Authority's YouTube Channel.

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWmIXPWAscxpL3vIiv7bh1Q>

## **FA01 ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN**

(Councillor McLean in the Chair)

It was proposed and seconded that Councillor Rouse be elected Chairman of the Fire Authority for 2024/25.

RESOLVED –

That Councillor Rouse be elected Chairman of the Authority for 2024/25.

(Councillor Rouse in the Chair)

**FA02 APPOINTMENT OF VICE CHAIRMAN**

It was proposed and seconded that Councillor McLean be appointed Vice-Chairman of the Fire Authority for 2024/25.

RESOLVED –

That Councillor McLean be appointed Vice-Chairman of the Authority for 2024/25.

**FA03 MINUTES**

RESOLVED –

That the Minutes of the meeting of the Fire Authority held on 14 February 2024, be approved, and signed by the Chairman as a correct record.

**FA04 MATTERS ARISING FROM THE PREVIOUS MINUTES**

The Chairman advised that there were the following matters arising from the previous minutes:

FA57 Recommendations from Committees – Executive Committee – 8 February 2024 (c) His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) – Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service (BFRS) 2023 update - The Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO advised that officers did continue to meet with the FBU on a regular basis, and it should be captured in the report, and would ensure it was going forward. In terms of Milton Keynes City Council, various teams did meet with them, and the references to key partners would be presented differently in future. The Chairman asked that perhaps on future updates, it be noted who had been communicated to in terms of the planning and engaged with. These have been actioned.

FA58 Treasury Management Strategy 2024/25 - A Member asked the real term value of the money and if Members could see some bench marking against similar organisations to see how the Authority compares – The Director of Finance and Assets advised that when a report was next brought to the Overview and Audit Committee, it would look at the impact of inflation over the last five years on the value of the Authority’s investments.

**FA05 DISCLOSURES OF INTERESTS**

Councillor Bailey disclosed she was employed by Cranfield University.



Councillor Banks disclosed he was employed by the Open University and Milton Keynes University Hospital.

**FA06 CHAIRMAN'S ANNOUNCEMENTS**

The Chairman welcomed the new Members to the Fire Authority and announced that as some Members may already be aware, the Corporate Planning Manager, Stuart Gowanlock, retired at the end of May, after 18 years with the Service. Stuart was recognised for his outstanding contributions to the Service by his receipt of the Chairman's Award in 2019 from my predecessor Lesley Clarke OBE. Members may like to know that I wrote to Stuart on behalf of the Authority to say thank you for all he had done and for his important contributions during my time as Chairman, for which I will always be grateful.

Members gave a round of applause for Stuart Gowanlock.

The Chairman announced that he, the Chief Fire Officer and Deputy Chief Fire Officer attended the Fire Performance Oversight Group (FPOG) with HMIFRS and representatives from the Home Office, National Fire Chiefs Council and the Local Government Association. It was a very positive session.

The Chief Fire Officer thanked the team and said that HMIFRS acknowledged the incredible amount of work that had gone on to focus and prioritise the work that needed to be done.

**FA07 MEMBERSHIP OF THE AUTHORITY**

The Authority noted that the following Members had been appointed by the Constituent Authorities to serve on the Fire Authority for 2024/25:

Buckinghamshire Council (11)

Councillors Adoh, Bagge, Carroll, Chapple OBE, Hall, Hussain OBE, Lambert, Rouse, Stuchbury, Sullivan and Walsh

Milton Keynes Council (6)

Councillors Bailey, Banks, Exon, Khan, McLean and O'Neill

**FA08 COMMITTEE MATTERS**

- (a) Local Government and Housing Act 1989 and Local Government (Committees and Political Groups) Regulations 1990

The Authority noted that the allocation of seats on the Authority was:

(i) Conservative Group:	9 seats	(52.94%)
(ii) Liberal Democrat Group:	3 seats	(17.65%)
(iii) Labour Group:	4 seats	(23.53%)
(iv) Ungrouped:	1 seat	

(b) Committee Matters – Committee Appointments

RESOLVED –

That the following Committees be appointed, and seats be allocated, as follows:

Executive Committee (8 Members):

- (i) Conservative – 4 seats
- (ii) Liberal Democrats – 2 seats
- (iii) Labour – 2 seat

Overview and Audit Committee (9 Members):

- (i) Conservative – 5 seats
- (ii) Liberal Democrats – 1 seat
- (ii) Labour – 2 seats
- (iv) Ungrouped – 1 seat

RESOLVED –

1. That the following Members be appointed to the Executive Committee:

Councillors Bailey, Banks, Hall, Lambert, McLean, O’Neill, Rouse and Walsh in accordance with the Group Leaders’ wishes.

2. That the following Members be appointed to the Overview and Audit Committee:

Councillors Adoh, Bagge, Carroll, Chapple OBE, Exon, Hussain OBE, Khan, Stuchbury and Sullivan and in accordance with the Group Leaders’ wishes and the ungrouped Member (Sullivan).

**FA09 CALENDAR OF MEETINGS**

The Authority considered proposed dates for its meetings and meetings of its committees during 2024/25.

RESOLVED –

1. That meetings of the Authority be held on Wednesday 9 October 2024, Wednesday 4 December 2024, Wednesday 12 February 2025 and Wednesday 11 June 2025, all at 11 am.
2. That meetings of the Executive Committee be held on Wednesday 10 July 2024, Wednesday 11 September 2024, Wednesday 13 November 2024, Wednesday 5 February 2025 and Wednesday 19 March 2025, all at 10 am.
3. That meetings of the Overview and Audit Committee be held on Wednesday 17 July 2024, Thursday 7 November 2024 and Wednesday 12 March 2025, all at 10am.

**FA10 APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES TO OUTSIDE BODIES**

The Authority considered the appointment of representatives to outside bodies having received nominations which were seconded:

RESOLVED –

1. That Councillors Rouse and McLean be appointed to attend the Local Government Association Annual Conference.
2. That Councillor Rouse be appointed as the Authority’s representative (and Councillor McLean as the Standing Deputy) to the Local Government Association Fire Commission.
3. That Councillors Rouse and McLean be appointed as the Authority’s representatives to the Local Government Association Annual Fire Conference.
4. That Councillors Rouse and Walsh be appointed as the Authority’s representatives on the Thames Valley Fire Control Service Joint Committee.
5. That Councillors Hall and McLean be nominated as substitute members of the Thames Valley Fire Control Service Joint Committee.

**FA11 LEAD MEMBER RESPONSIBILITIES**

Each having been nominated and seconded it was:

RESOLVED -

That Members be appointed as Lead Members for 2024/25 as follows:

Responsibility	Lead Member
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Service Delivery, Protection and Collaboration	Councillor Rouse
People, Equality and Diversity and Assurance	Councillor Hall
Finance and Assets, Information Security, and IT	Councillor Walsh
Health and Safety and Corporate Risk	Councillor McLean

**FA12 2020-2025 CORPORATE PLAN: YEAR 4 PROGRESS REVIEW AND YEAR 5 UPDATE**

The Director of Legal and Governance advised Members this was a review of progress made over the fourth year of the five year Corporate Plan that the Authority approved at its annual meeting in June 2020. It also sets out the programme for the remaining year of the plan, through to the end of March 2025. Progress made during the third year and the year four refresh were approved by the Authority at its last annual meeting on 14 June 2023. In light of the progress made, officers had taken the opportunity to refresh the programme of activities that would be undertaken over the remaining year of the plan in pursuit of the Authority’s Strategic Objectives.

Since Members last received the plan, it had been updated to align with the Medium Term Financial Plan approved by the Authority at its February 2024 meeting. The new Promise and Values Structure refreshed Strategic Objectives and Key Performance Measures had recently been agreed by the Chief Fire Officer and Strategic Management Board. Members would see a summary of projects by status, 10 items had been completed and/or streamed into business as usual activity, and 14 had been carried over into the Year 5 plan. There were no items at red rag status, 8 were green (on track) and six amber (off track but recoverable).

A Member asked if officers were abiding by the Gunning Principles in the Standing Orders.

The Director of Legal and Governance advised that the next report related to the public consultation of the CRMP and the Gunning Principles relate to the Authority making decisions, or changing policy, which required consultation with the public. In terms of the interface with the public regarding meetings which was set out in the Standing Orders, they were compliant.

The Chairman asked for confirmation on the timeline for business continuity and resilience, and when the Service would be in the position to move it forward.

The Director of Legal and Governance advised that for continuity of the role, an interim officer was looking at what was currently in place. When a new person was appointed, they would look at making the process as automated as possible.

RESOLVED –

That the 2020-25 Corporate Plan Year 4 Progress Review and Year 5 Update be approved by the Authority.

**FA13 COMMUNITY RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 2025-2030**

The Director of Finance and Assets advised Members that this report presented the Community Risk Management Plan 2025-30 (CRMP) to be approved to go forward for consultation with the public, staff, and partner organisations. The consultation would run for a 12-week period during July through to September. Due to the upcoming General Election and period of heightened sensitivity, the earliest date to start would be the week commencing 8 July 2024. Previously known as the Public Safety Plan (PSP), this document reflected on the progress made over the past five years and looked ahead to the future.

The CRMP aims to explain how the Service plans to mitigate identified risks and improve community safety by aligning available resources with key objectives and utilising them in the most efficient way. It also reflected the Service's updated promise to the public, core values and core behaviours. As well as considering the full assessment of risks, it also addressed issues raised in the Service's most recent HMICFRS inspection report.

The document detailed three strategic objectives supported by three strategic enablers. Strategies for each were embedded within the document to ensure they were fully

aligned with the CRMP. The CRMP also contained details of the measures relevant to each objective and enabler so that performance could be tracked throughout the lifetime of the plan. Detailed plans for implementing the actions within each strategy would form the basis of the Annual Delivery Plan (previously known as the Corporate Plan) which would be presented to the Authority for approval at its meeting in February 2025.

The document had been produced with the assistance of an external design agency. Through the internal governance process, officers had noticed a number of typographical errors, which would be picked up, along with any feedback from Members today, before the document was published for consultation. While the whole document was subject to consultation, consultees were in particular being asked to provide responses to the proposed response standard and resourcing proposals.

The proposed response standard was that the first pump would, on average, arrive on scene in 10 minutes for all incidents. In terms of the resources available to respond to incidents the proposal set out in the document was to:

- Maintain the same number of wholetime and day-crewed pumps as currently in service.
- Review and optimise on-call pumps and specialist appliances to ensure the Authority could meet its risks and response standard, while looking for opportunities to increase efficiency and effectiveness.

The CRMP also referenced the changes being proposed to the Automatic Fire Alarms (AFA) policy but noting that this was subject to a separate consultation under the current PSP.

The Fire Brigades Union (FBU) would be submitting a fully considered response as part of the formal consultation process, but had already agreed a couple of amendments to this version before it went out to public consultation:

- In the document it states that during the period of the CRMP the Service would plan to maintain the same number of wholetime and day-crewed pumps. Officers had agreed to say “at least” the same number, as depending on funding it may be desirable to have more guaranteed availability.

- To make it clearer that the table on page 29 was badged as risks and opportunities. The FBU manifesto was an opportunity to work together on common aims.

As part of the internal audit plan, a draft of the CRMP was shared with Mazars who had undertaken some assurance work on the extent to which the CRMP met the Fire Standard and addressed HMICFRS comments about the previous PSP.

There were two areas that had not yet been fully evidenced due to timings:

- Continually evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and delivery of the Community Risk Management Plan and the organisational impact of risk management decisions.
- The Service had held limited consultations with its communities and other relevant parties to inform the annual update and priorities of its Public Safety Plan.

For this CRMP, the Service had planned a number of initiatives to broaden its reach and community engagement beyond public and staff consultations, including:

- Engagement sessions centred around the CRMP facilitated by and at each fire station;
- Youth Council engagement sessions;
- Short-form surveys distributed through social media and/or in-person channels.

One other area highlighted would be further developed for the final version of the CRMP. HMICFRS noted that while the Service has done some positive work to reduce risk, it was still unclear how all its core functions of Prevention, Protection and Response would work together effectively to further reduce risk. Therefore, the area for improvement identified in 2021 remained.

Mazars noted that although these functions were known to work collaboratively in the Service, more work was needed to outline how the three functions would be working together in the CRMP.

Mazars also noted several positive aspects including noting that “Whilst the PSP outlined the Service’s (old) vision and strategic objectives, we found that the CRMP provides a much clearer linked-up storyline stretching from the

Service's vision (or promise) through to corresponding strategic objectives. The CRMP further clarifies specific aims, risks and actions related to each strategy which provides the reader with clearer ideas around the Service's direction, compared to the PSP."

A Member asked how the modelling was undertaken.

The Director of Finance and Assets advised that the modelling was primarily done on historic incidents as it was hard to know where incidents may take place in the future. New housing did not necessarily mean more risk as new housing tended to be of better quality from a fire point of view than older housing stock. The Service does engage heavily with Milton Keynes City Council and Buckinghamshire Council around future plans as part of this and would continue to do so for the lifetime of the CRMP. This was an active document and would be kept up to date throughout the life of the plan, to ensure the Service always had the best risk information available.

A Member asked about response times, where the Service was now and where it was nationally,

The Director of Finance and Assets advised that response times were within 10 minutes. The 10 minutes was based on the initial public consultation. More context would be added to the final version.

A Member asked about financial growth.

The Director of Finance and Assets advised that in terms of financing, the growth would go into the Council Tax base. About 70% of revenue came from Council Tax and about 30% from business rates. So in terms of funding, housing growth had a positive impact on the finances of the Authority. More houses do not necessarily mean more risk, it depends on what kind of housing it was.

RESOLVED –

That the Fire Authority approves the Community Risk Management Plan 2025-2030 for consultation with the public, staff and partner organisations.

**FA14 POSITIVE ACTION PROGRAMME REVIEW 2024 AND POLICY STATEMENT**

The Station Commander – HR Projects advised Members that this programme was run to support applicants during the most recent Wholetime recruitment campaign. The



HMICFRS report for the Service was published in October 2023 and identified causes for concern, one of these related to EDI. The report stated that the Service should be more ambitious in its efforts to attract a more diverse workforce that better reflected the community it served.

The success of the positive action work undertaken was demonstrated in the makeup of the successful candidates who were due to start in September 2024. 5 females and 7 males; of which 7 of the 10 who had attended the interview workshops secured a role with the Service.

A Member asked if some of the items raised in the FBU Manifesto would be included in future reports.

The Chairman advised new Members that the FBU representative was invited to the December 2023 meeting to present the FBU Manifesto. It was a very productive meeting and Members agreed with a vast majority of the Manifesto, as there were some very good ideas and recommendations. Officers were engaging with the FBU, but it was important that the progress was noted in reports.

The Chairman also advised that it was important that all Members supported officers in encouraging their local communities to support events, i.e. have a go days, and also support on social media promoting recruitment.

A Member asked what was being done to keep people once they were employed by the Service, as the staff turnover graph was amber, and it would be good to understand why the Service was losing people.

The Head of Human Resources advised that from the HMICFRS Inspection and the EDI Action Plan there were lots of actions being undertaken. The Service had recently had a Culture Survey which was asking employees for their opinions. There was work on stations to ensure the facilities provided were good. There was also a People and Culture Officer starting imminently.

A Member stated it was interesting to see the data on the selection process, was there any learnings to be had, what was the diversity of the interview panel and had they had any unconscious bias training.

The Station Commander – HR Projects advised the interview panel was made up of both operational and support staff and both male and female staff. They had not had unconscious bias training.

RESOLVED –

1. The Positive Action Policy Statement (at Appendix 6) be approved.
2. It be noted that:
  - a. The Physical Training programme to support underrepresented groups will form part of all future recruitment campaigns;
  - b. A programme to keep attendees that are unsuccessful for the current Wholetime campaign engaged for future opportunities is being explored; and
  - c. All essential joining criteria will be reviewed, and recommendations/risks presented to a future Strategic Management Board for approval.

**FA15 TRAINING NEEDS ANALYSIS OVERVIEW & TRANSFORMATION BID**

The Organisational Development Manager advised Members that this report provided an overview on the Authority's Training Needs Analysis (TNA) process, outcomes, and the rationale for requesting Members to approve funding of £190,000 for additional training this year via the Transformation Reserve. The Service's TNA collates staff training requirements annually and was monitored quarterly by the Training Strategy Group (TSG). The TNA was translated into prioritised learning programmes, submitted by department managers, approved by the TSG and scrutinised to ensure alignment with business priorities, business continuity succession plans and approved budgets.

Within the TNA submissions, managers were asked to assess the priority level of the training requests and were reminded that there was one budget that funds all training for all staff across the organisation, and that it was increasingly coming under pressure and therefore must ensure any training requested was role critical only. The base budget for all staff training was £260,000 this had increased this year by £30,000 to compensate for rising inflation over the last two years.

The Organisational Development Manager advised that the Service continued to demonstrate efficiencies through the use of apprenticeships and utilising the government levy

with a levy spend of £96,626 in 2023/24. Due to being effective in fully utilising the levy, the Service was now benefiting from co-funding arrangements with the Department of Education, where they fund 95% of the apprenticeship cost and the Service funds the other 5%.

The Organisational Development department had secured a transfer of levy arrangement with Santander, one of Milton Keynes largest employers, to fund the enrolment of three members of staff on to apprenticeships with Cranfield University. Santander had transferred the full levy cost to fund this.

The Strategic Management Board had approved establishing a People Oversight Board, chaired by the Director of Human Resources and Organisational Development. The People Oversight Board would bring together all people related matters into one place. It would enable improved understanding of people measures, monitoring performance against them and translating them into informed people priorities which would enable the Service to be pro-active with its recruitment and training requirements and plan capacity and cost accordingly.

RESOLVED –

1. The Training Needs Analysis overview and provision approved by the Training Strategy Group for 2024/25 be noted.
2. The funding for the additional training requirements for 2024/25 via the transformation reserve be approved.
3. The work in progress (Appendix A) to align the approval of the Training Needs Analysis and budget setting processes is noted.

**FA16      UPDATED CODE OF CONDUCT (V5.0)**

The HR Advisory and Development Manager advised Members that the Service's Code of Conduct provided employees with an understanding of the standards expected when performing duties as an employee and guides behaviour, placing an obligation on all employees to take responsibility for their own conduct.

The Code of Conduct supports the overarching employment related policy themes and was compliant with the strategic direction of the Service on employment related policy matters and supported delivery of corporate objectives. To ensure the Code of Conduct remained fully aligned with the

Service's key strategic documents, following the launch of the Services' new Promise, Values and Behaviours in April 2024, an in-year review of the Code of Conduct was undertaken, and the document updated.

The purpose of presenting this updated Code of Conduct, was for approval for publication. Section three had been amended to remove reference to the Service's vision and previous values and now detailed the Service's promise to the public and its people, updated core values and behaviours. With regards to the core Code of Ethics, this part of Section three had been slightly amended, with a link added to the core Code of Ethics and the five bullet points and wording underneath removed.

A Member asked if these changes had been made in consultation with the FBU.

The Deputy Chief Fire Officer advised that in the report it advised that the changes had been to the Joint Consultation Forum, which the FBU were represented on, so they had been sighted on the changes.

The Chairman asked if this changed the terms and conditions for employees.

The HR Advisory and Development Manager advised that the main changes were making reference to the new values and behaviours. There were no significant changes in the document and these did not change employees' contractual terms and conditions.

RESOLVED –

That the Code of Conduct, as detailed in Appendix one, is approved for publication.

#### **FA17 SERIOUS VIOLENCE DUTY UPDATE**

The Community Safety and Safeguarding Manager advised Members that the Serious Violence Duty had its origins in the Government's strategic approach to cutting crime, homicide, serious violence and neighbourhood crime, exposing and ending the hidden harms and building capability and capacity to deal with fraud and online crime under the levelling up agenda. This led to the Police Crime Sentencing and Courts Act in 2022 with the National Fire Chiefs Council contributing to the development of the fire services role within the subsequent statutory guidance.

The definition of serious violence was agreed by local partners, it was not a national definition. It was agreed within the Thames Valley Violence Prevention Partnership, and it was that serious violence included specific types of recorded crime, such as homicide, grievous bodily harm, incidents that involve a knife, and areas of criminality where serious violence or its threat was inherent, such as in county lines drug dealing. Whilst domestic abuse related offences account for a large proportion of serious violence offences, these were not dealt with under the serious violence strategies. Both councils in this area had separate domestic abuse strategies and deliver their statutory duties under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.

The Serious Violence Duty places obligations on Community Safety Partnerships to work together to prevent serious violence by or against people under the age of 25. The Service fulfils its work within the obligation through partnerships with Safer Bucks and Safer MK. The Community Safety Partnerships had a specified role and contributed towards developing statutory guidance and delivery pathways. Alongside fire, the police, justice, health and local authorities were lead partners and the prison service and education were brought in as and when required to work together. The activity at local level had reporting lines into the Community Safety Partnerships (Safer MK and Safer Bucks) each of which had priority plans. In the Bucks area there were five priority plans, one of which was serious violence.

The Community Safety and Safeguarding Manager advised Members that the Statutory Guidance had 56 references to the role of fire and rescue services and took Members through the Statutory Guidance and how the Service evidenced the work it was doing.

RESOLVED –

That the Serious Violence Duty Update 2024 be noted.

#### **FA18 SAFETY CENTRE IMPACT REPORT**

The Head of Prevention and CRMP welcomed the Chief Executive of the Safety Centre to the meeting and advised that the purpose of the report was to provide Members with an update of the Authority's three year funding agreement with the Safety Centre, and part of that agreement was a yearly update.

The Chief Executive introduced herself and advised Members that the Safety Centre charity specialised in early intervention and preventative safety education and was celebrating 30 years this year as an organisation. Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service was one of the founding partners. When it was created, it was a collaborative partnership approach, created by Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service, Thames Valley Police, Network Rail, Coca-Cola Enterprises, and a whole host of organisations that recognised the need for early intervention and preventative education. When created, the Safety Centre was the world's first interactive, immersive education centre and over the 30 years the work had evolved. In that time frame, part of the legacy of the Safety Centre, was that it helped to create and inspire the creation of other Safety Centres across the UK. There were now ten Safety Centres across the UK and the National Safety Centre Alliance, came together twice a year to look at best practice.

The Chief Executive advised Members that the Safety Centre had expanded and grown and had been developing more outreach programmes because the Hazard Alley Education Centre was extremely popular and already fully booked for this academic year and into 2025. Education programmes had been designed and would be delivered by the education team. As well as expanding outside of the centre, they were also expanding who utilises the centre as it was a community asset, and a priority was to make sure as much of the community could use it as possible. Although the Education Centre was located in Milton Keynes, between August 2023 and March 2024 the education programmes had benefited 7292 people across Milton Keynes and Buckinghamshire. 2824 of those had been specifically in Hazard Alley. 1645 were from Milton Keynes and 1179 from the rest of Buckinghamshire. Education was also provided outside of Buckinghamshire because people commute, socialise, travel and visit within Milton Keynes and Buckinghamshire.

The Chief Executive also advised that she was in talks with national funders around the different range of programmes. For example, a programme had been designed and developed on violence against women and girls, around early intervention and prevention. Also, a huge amount of work had been done around knife crime.

Funding had been secured from the Department of Culture, Media and Support, administered by the National Lottery, about reducing anti-social behaviour, and the Centre had been funded to deliver some work specific to Milton Keynes. The Safety Centre, was pioneering, evolving, looking at what the emerging safety needs were which was only possible because of the partnership approach it had.

The Chairman asked for a visit to the Safety Centre be arranged for Members.

A Member asked if there had been any assessments on the impact of Hazard Alley on knife crime or crime in general.

The Chief Executive advised that Thames Valley Police had undertaken some analysis and had worked with a number of partners on education programmes, including knife crime and what have been the impact of it. The Chief Executive would try and get some of the data to share with Members. Work was also being undertaken with the Open University as to how the Safety Centre could better measure the short, medium, and longer term impact around all of the education programmes.

A Member asked what work was being undertaken specific to Buckinghamshire.

The Chief Executive advised that the education programmes benefit the whole of the county. Money had been provided by Heart of Bucks Community Foundation and a huge amount of work was done in Buckinghamshire, excluding Milton Keynes, regarding knife crime prevention work in schools across the county.

A Member asked about the knife crime programme in Milton Keynes.

The Chief Executive advised they had been funded by different partners over the past two years to deliver intervention and prevention workshops across schools in Milton Keynes.

A Member asked if the Centre had reached out to give general support to the ageing population.

The Chief Executive advised they had begun conversations with lots of partner organisations including Age UK and community groups, and other charities as they wanted as many people as possible to visit the Centre. In term time it

Democratic Services  
Officer

was fully booked, but it was open and available all year for other groups.

RESOLVED –

That the Milton Keynes Safety Centre (Hazard Alley) Ltd Partnership Impact Report April 2024 be noted.

**FA19 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT – Q4 2023/24**

The Data Intelligence Team Manager advised Member that this report consisted of nearly 70 measures in which officers try to provide a holistic and transparent view of how the Service was performing. This included different types of measures such as inputs, outputs and outcomes. Where possible and appropriate, supporting commentary to certain measures had been provided. While the format of this report had remained the same as previous quarters, some of the commentary does refer to the year's performance as well as that of Q4.

As in previous reports, officers had provided a couple of highlighted measures at the beginning of the report, namely False Alarms in the Home and Bank Shift Costs. False Alarms in the home had been highlighted due to the significant numbers attended, as well as the increase in numbers. As mentioned in the commentary, our prevention team were currently working on a plan to improve those numbers. Bank Shift Costs were highlighted as yet another success story to come from being fully established. This coupled with the great work the Organisational Development team and Training Team had been undertaking to ensure crews had the relevant skills, had resulted in the Service needing to utilise its Bank facility much less.

A Member asked about hydrant availability, was there any update on reporting on this measure.

The Data Intelligence Team Manager advised that there had been long term sickness, but the person was now back. The Service was also procuring a new system that allowed better measurement, so there would be reporting on it shortly.

A Member asked about the decrease in on call availability.

The Data Intelligence Team Manager advised that recruitment had previously focussed mainly on wholetime and raising the establishment but now that area had been achieved and sustained, this year's focus would be on call.



There had been one recruitment process already this year, and those successful were currently undertaking Breathing Apparatus training. On call recruitment would now take place twice a year. As part of the CRMP, a lot of resource modelling was done to understand the benefits each on call appliance would provide and where the Service would prioritise and also understand the challenges in those areas.

A Member asked why over the border mobilisations had gone into the red when whole-time availability was very good with 12 appliances available.

The Data Intelligence Team Manager advised that all mobilisations were based on the quickest. If an over the border appliance would be quickest, that's who would be mobilised, even if all BFRS appliances were available. In the south of the county, there were three over the border stations right on the border which had really quick access into this Service's area. It was monitored closely, and whilst numbers had gone up, it did not correlate to the cost. Within the Thames Valley the Service paid on time usage rather than mobilisations. The costs had significantly reduced based on the previous year.

The Chairman asked that if an appliance could respond five seconds later if it was a non-serious incident, had this been looked at.

The Assistant Chief Fire Officer advised that this work had not yet been addressed but tolerance levels would be looked at and brought back to a future meeting.

A Member asked about false alarms in the home and whether there was a breakdown of people more likely to have a false alarm in the home and what was the partnership working around it.

The Data Intelligence Team Manager advised there was a breakdown in the report of what the false alarms were. Work was ongoing with the service delivery, marketing and communications teams as to how these numbers could be reduced.

A Member asked what had happened with the mandatory eLearning in August and September as it had gone from green to red.

The Data Intelligence Team Manager advised that he did not know why it had dropped in August and September, but a change had been made, similar to appraisals and how

Assistant Chief Fire  
Officer

managers were encouraged to complete appraisals, the same system was being adopted for mandatory eLearning.

A Member asked for additional data around average attendance times for all incidents and how many incidents took over ten minutes.

The Data Intelligence Team Manager advised that while that information could be provided, there were a lot of reasons why it could take longer to get to incidents. At the end of each year, a report was run which highlighted those type of things. As part of that report the county was broken down into square miles, with a highlighted colour code which would say on average an attendance time to a specific location whatever the incident.

The Chairman invited new members, if there was anything else they thought should be reported on, to please advise officers.

RESOLVED –

That the Performance Management – Q4 2023/24 be noted

**FA20 HIS MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY AND FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES (HMICFRS) – BUCKINGHAMSHIRE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE (BFRS) 2023-2025 UPDATE**

The Chairman advised Members that this report set out the progress being made with the Corporate Plan and steps for the year ahead.

The Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO advised Members that in October 2023, the Service received its 2023-2025/Round 3 HMICFRS Inspection report. The report detailed three causes of concern, focused on Prevention, Protection and EDI. The report was presented to the Extraordinary Fire Authority meeting on 24 October, with input from HMI Roy Wilsher.

An HMICFRS Action Plan was developed and submitted to HMICFRS on 15 November and presented to this Authority on 6 December. This report showed progress against the Action Plan. Since this report was produced, three more actions had been completed, two in Protection and one in EDI.

To review the progress against the causes of concern HMICFRS completed a revisit to the Service the week commencing 20 May. The revisit included interviews,

desktop reviews and a station visit interacting with a wide range of staff. Initial feedback was positive, and HMI saw the progress the Service had made against the causes of concern. HMICFRS found all staff engaging throughout the process.

HMICFRS have made the decision to not publish any revisit outcome letters until after the General Election, mid July.

In November 2023, HMICFRS informed the Service that it would be entering the Supportive Engage Process. The focus of the engage process was to assist in finding ways to improve and resolve the identified causes of concern and provide a better service for the public. As part of the Engage Process the Service was invited to share an update on progress at the Fire Performance Oversight Group (FPOG).

Last week, the Chief Fire Officer, Chairman and Deputy Chief Fire Officer presented the progress to FPOG. The initial feedback was that the Service was doing well, its plan was focused and had good support from the leadership team and the Authority. HMICFRS were pleased to see officers were ensuring all changes were embedded and reviewing the outcomes or 'so what' for both the staff and the community.

A member asked if the letter could be shared with members once received.

The Chairman advised new members that it was agreed that the HMICFRS Action Plan would go to the Overview and Audit Committee for review.

RESOLVED –

That the HMICFRS 2023-2025 Update be noted.

**FA21 EXCLUSION OF PUBLIC AND PRESS**

That the public and press representatives be excluded from the meeting by virtue of Paragraph 1 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972, as the report contains information relating to any individual; and Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972, as the report and minutes contain information relating to the financial or business affairs of a person (including the Authority); and on these grounds it is considered the need to keep information exempt outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

**FA22 EXEMPT MINUTES**

RESOLVED –

That the Exempt Minutes of the meeting of the Fire Authority held on 14 February 2024, be approved, and signed by the Chairman as a correct record.

**FA23 DIRECTOR OF PEOPLE AND ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

The Authority considered the report and appendices, and approved the recommendations, details of which were noted in the exempt minutes.

RESOLVED -

- 1) That the appointment of Ronnie Davidson, to the role of Director of Human Resources and Organisational Development on a fixed-term two-year contract, on the salary package detailed, be approved.
- 2) It be noted that the start date will be agreed with the candidate following approval of the appointment (with the candidate being required to give three months' notice to his current employer).

The Chairman closed the meeting at 13.11PM



# Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority

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MINUTES OF THE EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE BUCKINGHAMSHIRE AND MILTON KEYNES FIRE AUTHORITY HELD ON WEDNESDAY 11 SEPTEMBER 2024 AT 11 AM.

**Present:** Councillors Adoh, Bagge, Bailey, Banks, Chapple OBE, Exon, Hall, Hussain OBE, Khan, Lambert, McLean (Vice Chairman), Stuchbury and Walsh

**Officers:** S Tuffley (Assistant Chief Fire Officer), G Britten (Director of Legal and Governance), M Hemming (Director of Finance and Assets), A Carter (Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO), A Stunell (Head of Human Resources), A Hussain (Deputy Director of Finance and Assets) D Buchanan (Head of Protection, Assurance and Development) and K Nellist (Democratic Services Officer)

**Apologies:** Councillors Carroll, O'Neill, Rouse (Chairman) and Sullivan  
(Cllr McLean presiding)

Councillor McLean opened the meeting by welcoming everyone to the Extraordinary Meeting of Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes Fire Authority.

Councillor McLean advised that although members of the public were able to attend and observe in person, following the meeting, a video recording would be uploaded to the Authority's YouTube Channel.

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWmIXPWAscxpL3vIiv7bh1Q>

## **FA24 DISCLOSURES OF INTERESTS**

None.

## **FA25 CHAIRMAN'S ANNOUNCEMENTS**

The Vice Chairman announced that he was honoured to attend the Firefighters Memorial Service at the National Arboretum earlier this month along with the Assistant Chief Fire Officer and the Ceremonial Team. He felt it was very emotive and in some way uplifting and virtually all other UK fire services were represented.

At the previous meeting on call firefighters were discussed, and he would encourage any Fire Authority Members to go

along to one of the have a go days, or awareness evenings, not only would they see people that might potentially become firefighters either on call or wholetime, but could also support the current staff there.

**FA26 HIS MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY AND FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES (HMICFRS) – BUCKINGHAMSHIRE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE (BFRS) 2023-2025 UPDATE**

The Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO advised Members that there were three papers being presented today relating to HMICFRS. The reports had been split to ensure they got the focus needed on the important topics covered. The first paper provided an update on the Service’s progress against its Action Plan.

In October 2023, the Service received its 2023-2025 Round 3 HMICFRS Inspection report. The report detailed three causes of concern, focused on Prevention, Protection and Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (ED&I). An HMICFRS Action Plan was developed and submitted to HMICFRS on 15 November 2023 and presented to the Authority on the 6 December 2023. This report showed progress against the Action Plan. All Prevention and Protection actions were now complete, and two more ED&I actions had been completed. To ensure changes were embedded, KPI’s were put in place to monitor completed actions. The plan was reviewed regularly and updated monthly at a strategic management level and at the HMICFRS Tactical and Improvement Boards.

Progress was shared with HMICFRS through regular contact with the HMICFRS Service Liaison lead. HMICFRS also completed a revisit in May 2024 and the progress seen by HMICFRS could be seen in the appendices. A further revisit was planned for September 2024. The Chief Fire Officer and Chairman would also be presenting a further update to the HMICFRS Fire Performance Oversight Group in October 2024.

A Member asked if future updates would be presented to the Overview and Audit Committee.

The Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO advised that they would. The only reason the reports had come to the Authority today was timing, but all future reports

would be presented to the Overview and Audit Committee to be reviewed.

A Member asked how frequent the meetings were, to reassure members that it was still in line with the plan and assurance that every aspect of the plan was reviewed.

The Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO advised that the Tactical and Improvement Board meetings were held monthly and were chaired by the Chief Fire Officer and the Improvement Board was chaired by the Deputy Chief Fire Officer. At present, the governance structure was being reviewed, but if there were areas of concern, and definitely areas for improvement, these would feed into the governance structure so they were monitored and reviewed on a regular basis. Also, KPIs had been embedded and would feed into the performance reports that would be reviewed at the Performance Monitoring Board, and then presented to the Authority.

The Head of Protection, Assurance and Development advised that with regard to Protection, the Service continued to engage with the National Fire Chief Council (NFCC) and attend regular meetings with the NFCC Policy Reform Unit, who constantly look at legislative changes. The NFCC also host a lot of work around the building safety regulations, as that was an emerging regulator the Service needed to interact with. Officers also attend the Southeast Protection Regional meeting and furthermore, the Service had just engaged Avon Fire and Rescue Service to come and undertake a Peer Review in relation to the protection progress.

The Head of Human Resources advised that with regard to ED&I, the Service had received very good support from an ED&I specialist at Buckinghamshire Council and had also been working with the NFCC improvement team looking at Fire Standards and what else the Service needed to do. The Service was also part of the Asian Fire Service Association, attending their conference. The Service had also set up a Culture Board, chaired by the Deputy Chief Fire Officer.

RESOLVED -

That the HMICFRS 2023-2025 update be noted.

**FA27 HIS MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY AND FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES (HMICFRS) – VALUES AND CULTURE UPDATE**

The Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO advised Members that the second paper provided an update on the recommendations made by the HMICFRS Values and Culture report. In March 2023 HMICFRS published a report on Values and Culture in English Fire Services. Following the report being presented in April 2023, the Authority and Service accepted all the recommendations. Since then, the Service had worked hard to ensure they were delivered. The appendices showed the final update on the recommendations. All were now complete and were part of business as usual. This update had also been provided to HMICFRS who would review progress as part of their inspection programme.

A Member asked for reassurance around ED&I as mentioned in the letter from HMICFRS as part of the progress.

The Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO advised that the first part of the letter listed the causes of concern which were identified back in May 2023. The Values and Culture Report came out in March 2023, Officers looked at the recommendations that came out of the Values and Culture Report, and the causes of concern that came out, and that was what had been brought forward into the Action Plan, this was to ensure they were all covered.

A Member asked about the recruitment of staff and diversity, what action was taken from the current year's report.

The Head of Human Resources advised Members that a positive action plan was carried out for the last cohort of apprentices, details of which were presented to the last Authority meeting but would be shared again with the Member.

A Member asked why people were dropping out of the recruitment process.

The Head of Human Resources advised Members that individuals were not dropping out, there were just different processes and not everyone passed the different stages. Individuals would apply, the team would look at the application forms and some individuals would move forward to the next stage, and some would not, because they had not met the criteria. Reports were run to look at the protected characteristics to say why were some people not getting further, were there any trends, was there

Head of  
Human  
Resources



anything the Service needed to do, and that's why the Positive Action Plan was put in place.

RESOLVED –

That the HMICFRS Values & Culture update be noted.

**FA28 HIS MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY AND FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES (HMICFRS) – STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOUR**

The Head of Technology, Transformation and PMO advised that the final HMCIFRS paper related to the most recent HMICFRS report on the Standards of Behaviour and the handling of misconduct in fire and rescue services.

HMICFRS inspected 10 services, and the report provided details on their findings and 15 recommendations. Of the 15 recommendations, all were owned by the Chief Fire Officer and two were jointly owned by the Fire Authority (13 a and b). Both the Service and Authority continued to take the culture of its Service extremely seriously and welcomed the recommendations in this report. The recommendations had been reviewed by the Service and an Action Plan pulled together to show when the recommendations would be delivered and what the measures of success would be. The Action Plan would be reviewed and scrutinised at the HMICFRS Tactical and Improvement Board. Further updates to the Authority would be provided via HMICFRS updates to the Overview and Audit Committee and Fire Authority.

The Vice Chairman asked for clarification as to why the deadline on point 2 was showing 1 February 2025 and the narrative said in quarter three or four and quarter four would be after the 1 February 2025.

The Director of Finance and Assets advised that it was referring to the financial year not the calendar year but agreed it should be quarter three as quarter four would fall after 1 February 2025.

The Vice Chairman asked about number 9, introduction into case management where it said a case management spreadsheet was in place. A spreadsheet was not a system, it was part of a process, does it need more review.

The Head of Human Resources advised that with regard to the case management system, the Service had introduced this year Safe Call the whistleblowing and speak up service and as part of that, there was a portal where the case

management information was added, but access to this was limited and so there was a comprehensive case management spreadsheet to ensure everything was tracked.

The Vice Chairman asked about number 12, as the deadline was now, was this the date it was written or today.

The Head of Human Resources advised it was in regard to the Service's welfare support and everything was in place, there was a Welfare Officer, Occupational Health Services, an employee relations team, and mental health wellbeing support officers. The Inspectorate had complimented the Service on its welfare support.

The Vice Chairman asked about number 13b, and what type of training would be available to Members.

The Head of Human Resources advised that she did not have any details at present, but it would be forthcoming.

The Vice Chairman advised that on number 15a it should be 1 February 2025 and not 1 February 2024.

RESOLVED –

1. That the Fire Authority should accept the recommendations allocated to the Chief Fire Officer in full.
2. That the Fire Authority should accept the recommendations allocated to the Fire and Rescue Authority in full.
3. That the Service will fully engage and support the delivery of the remaining Recommendations.

**FA29 SAFETY OF LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES IN E-BIKES AND E-SCOOTERS CAMPAIGN**

The Assistant Chief Fire Officer advised Members that this paper was seeking the Authority's support and endorsement for the Lithium-Ion Battery Safety Bill, which had its first and second reading in the House of Lords. Electrical Safety First, a UK Charity dedicated to reducing the deaths and injuries caused by electricity was promoting 'The Safety of Electric-Powered Micromobility Vehicles and Lithium Batteries Bill.'

Many national organisations were already supporting the bill, including the National Fire Chiefs Council, many fire and rescue services, the Association of Ambulance Chief

Head of  
Human  
Resources

Executives, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents, and the Royal Society for Public Health.

The bill covered a number of clauses, Clause 1: Safety Assurance - this clause mandated a third-party safety assessment, conducted by a government-approved body, for all e-bikes, e-scooters, and their lithium-ion batteries before they enter the UK market. This process mirrors safety measures in place for other high-risk products like fireworks and heavy machinery.

Clause 2: Responsible Disposal - this clause required the Government to make regulations ensuring the safe disposal of lithium batteries once their lifecycle ends.

Clause 3: Comprehensive Fire Safety - this clause assigns the Government the responsibility of comprehensively addressing fire-related concerns. This involved enhancing safe usage, charging, and storage practices for these devices. It included setting standards for conversion kits and charging systems and considering a temporary ban on the sale of universal chargers that heighten fire risks.

The Assistant Chief Fire Officer advised Members that in addition to what was in the cover report, the Bill now had an additional provision: Before approving a planning application for stand-alone Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) that consist partly or wholly of lithium-ion batteries, a planning authority must consult— (a) the Environment Agency, (b) the Health and Safety Executive, and (c) the local fire and rescue service for the relevant area.'

A Member advised that education was really important, informing people of the dangers so that it can be proactively prevented, were officers able to do that.

The Assistant Chief Fire Officer advised Members that it was a matter of concern for the Service and already formed part of its Prevention Strategy. It was also interwoven as a risk in the draft Community Risk Management Plan and would feature as part of the prevention offering to the public going forward.

RESOLVED –

1. That the Safety of Electric-Powered Micromobility Vehicles and Lithium Batteries Bill proposed by Electrical Safety First intended to ensure greater safety in the use and disposal lithium-ion batteries, which would hopefully have the effect of ensuring

greater safety for both members of the public and Firefighters when attending such incidents, be supported.

2. That the position that any measures which have the potential to increase awareness, the safety of all along with protecting the environment is something Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority actively supports, be endorsed.
3. That the position that the Authority would like to see regulation and legislation to go further in respect of influencing building regulations for example and appreciates that the National Fire Chiefs Council is engaging with government departments to this end on behalf of UK fire and rescue services, be endorsed.

**FA30 DATE OF NEXT MEETING**

To note that the next meeting of the Fire Authority will be held on Wednesday 9 October 2024 at 11 am at The Oculus, The Gateway Offices, Gatehouse Road, Aylesbury, Bucks, HP19 8FF

The Vice Chairman closed the meeting at 12.02pm



# Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority

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**Meeting and date:** Executive Committee, 11 September 2024

**Report title:** Performance Management – Q1 2024/25

**Lead Member:** Councillor Simon Rouse

**Report sponsor:** Mick Osborne, Deputy Chief Fire Officer/Chief Operating Officer

**Author and contact:** Craig Newman, Data Intelligence Team Manager,  
[cnewman@bucksfire.gov.uk](mailto:cnewman@bucksfire.gov.uk)

**Action:** Noting

**Recommendation:** That the report and recommendation below be approved for submission to the Fire Authority:

1. It is recommended that the Performance Management – Q1 2024/25 be noted.
- 

## **Executive summary:**

This report details the suite of 45 performance measures split across 4 quadrants:

- 1) Public Impact
- 2) Response
- 3) Great Place to Work
- 4) Public Value

This report comprises of the Service performance against these measures for Q1 2024/25, see Appendix 1, containing the following:

- 1) Performance Measures Overview – each quadrant on one page
- 2) Performance Measures Details – shows actual performance alongside relevant trend information and where needed commentary.

At the end of Q1, 44 measures reported with a Blue, Green, Amber or Red status, one is awaiting information.

BRAG	Total	%
B	9	20%
G	18	40%
A	10	22%
R	7	16%
-	1	2%

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**Financial implications:** A detailed understanding of the Service’s performance allows informed decision making in relation to future resource allocation. The balance of measures also allows an understanding of the Service’s financial performance and enables a view to be formed of its overall value for money compared with others.

**Risk management:** Performance and risk information is designed and presented to assist the Authority in the strategic decision-making through understanding the communities we serve and associated risk profiles. Performance management information is a major contributor to service improvement and to the effective prioritisation of resources.

**Legal implications:** There are no legal implications arising directly from this report.

**Privacy and security implications:** There are no Privacy and Security implications arising from this paper.

**Duty to collaborate:** There are no opportunities to collaborate directly from this report.

**Health and safety implications:** There are no specific Health, Safety and Wellbeing implications arising from this paper. Performance reports on Health, Safety and Wellbeing is subject to separate scrutiny and performance reporting.

**Environmental implications:** There are no environmental implications arising directly from this report. Performance measures will be developed during the year to provide reassurance that the Service is making progress against its recently approved Environment and Climate action plan.

**Equality, diversity, and inclusion implications:** There are no specific Equality, diversity and inclusion implications arising from this paper. Performance reports on Equality, diversity and inclusion are subject to separate performance reporting.

**Consultation and communication:** We aim to provide performance information incorporating stakeholder contributions. The report will be circulated throughout the

organisation for information and awareness.

Board	Date	Outcome
Performance Monitoring Board	2 August 2024	Approved to go to SMB
Strategic Management Board	20 August 2024	Approved to go to Executive Committee
Executive Committee	11 September	

**Next steps -**

- The performance measures will be reported quarterly
- Indicators and targets will be reviewed annually

**Background papers:**

Fire Authority, 12 June 2024: Performance Management – Q4 2023/24

[\(Public Pack\)Agenda Document for Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority, 12/06/2024 11:00 \(bucksfire.gov.uk\)](#)

Overview and Audit Committee, 8 November 2023: 2022-23 Annual Performance Monitoring Report

[bucksfire.gov.uk/documents/2023/10/overview-and-audit-committee-8-november-2023-item-16-performance-monitoring-report.pdf/](https://bucksfire.gov.uk/documents/2023/10/overview-and-audit-committee-8-november-2023-item-16-performance-monitoring-report.pdf/)

Appendix	Title	Protective Marking
1	BFRS Key Performance Measures – Q1 – 24/25	N/A

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## KEY PERFORMANCE MEASURES - 2024-2025

### QUARTER 1 (APR - JUN)

#### Introduction

This Key Performance Measures report has been designed as a rounded and balanced picture of how the Service is performing at a local level.

Due to the regular frequency of this report being produced, most indicators used within each measures represent change within the Service and does not always represent good or bad performance. For example, Accidental Dwelling Fires could increase, yet still have the fewest number within the country (relative). This level of detail will be covered in annual reports and ad-hoc reports when requested, as most national data is published annually.

It's worth noting, the report contains many types of targets and methods of comparison. Some targets are aspirational, some are there to ensure minimum standards are met and others are there to identify exceptions within trends, allowing us to identify possible needs for change/reaction.

	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)
Better than expected	B	B
As expected (within trend/target)	G	G
Worse than expected	A	A
Considerably worse than expected	R	R

# HIGHLIGHTED MEASURES - 1 of 3

## R.2.02 - Availability On-Call

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	2023/2024	9.7%	7.1%	7.6%	9.0%	6.8%	7.6%	6.0%	8.7%	5.4%	16.9%	14.3%	11.7%	<b>B</b> >55%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>10.6%</b>	<b>9.6%</b>	<b>7.3%</b>										<b>G</b> >29%
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> > 16%
Cumulative	2023/2024	9.7%	8.4%	8.1%	8.3%	8.0%	8.0%	7.7%	7.8%	7.5%	8.5%	9.0%	9.2%	<b>R</b> < 17%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>10.6%</b>	<b>10.8%</b>	<b>9.15%</b>										
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										

What is good  
Higher is better

Ref	R.2.02
Owner	Response
Comparison	Target
Source	TVFC Vision

The availability of BFRS pumps to respond to incidents. This measure reflects when pumps are “on the run”. With this in mind, should an appliance be at an incident, it would still be recorded as being available.  
Reasons for an appliance being “off the run” include, crew deficient, vehicle defects and decontamination.

BFRS have previously concentrated on wholetime recruitment and increasing wholetime numbers. Now that our Wholetime establishment is up to 300+, the focus is now on supporting On-Call resilience. This includes On-Call recruitment, retention, training and development.

Over the past 12 months we have recruited 13 On-Call firefighters. Nine of these will complete their training in October 2024. Eleven further new On-Call firefighters are due to start on the 7th August 2024, one of which will be fast tracked into an available position on a Breathing Apparatus course in September.

Over the past 12 months four On-Call firefighters have been promoted to Crew Commander, which improves appliance availability. A new firefighter safe to command process has enabled two On-Call firefighters to be in-charge of fire appliances, increasing the availability of appliances. One wholetime crew commander has taken up an On-Call Watch Commander position.

An On-Call campaign was open at the time of reporting with the aim of recruiting another 12 On-Call firefighters ready for February 2025.

Transformation funding approved by Members has enabled the Service to secure additional training courses for new On-Call firefighters.

# HIGHLIGHTED MEASURES - 2 of 3

## GP.1.06 - Appraisal & Objectives Completion

		Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Appraisals	Target	25%	50%	75%	80%	85%	90%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	<b>B</b> >10% of target or 95%	
	<b>2023/2024</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>63%</b>	<b>71%</b>										<b>G</b> => 0% of Target	
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>A</b>										<b>A</b> < 0% of target	
															<b>R</b> < 10% of target
Objectives	Target	25%	50%	75%	80%	85%	90%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	What is good	
	<b>2024/2025</b>	-	<b>30%</b>	<b>54%</b>										Higher is better	
	Status	-	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>											

Ref	GP.1.08	The percentage of all staff that have received their 2023/2024 end of year review and their 2024/2025 objectives.
Owner	Learning & Development	
Comparison	Target	
Source	iTrent	

The Service has now established a regular process for monthly reporting which provides managers with timely data on their appraisal returns.

For 2024/2025 the Service introduced a new and improved appraisal form focusing on talent management and EDI, and giving people an opportunity to openly discuss their future career plans. These new areas also provide a chance for managers to identify gaps in their team’s EDI knowledge to support education in this area and create tangible, personal goals.

To support the reporting and the launch of the new form, numerous training sessions have been facilitated in the lead up to the End Of Year (EOY) and Objective Setting due dates. These were held throughout February and March to assist with EOY and again in April to showcase the new form, and further training was provided in July as part of the Supervisory Managers Acquisition Programme. Whilst numbers are still not at the desired returns, appraisal returns have improved considerably over the period when compared with previous years. We do note a considerable increase in returns after each monthly management report, again, highlighting the importance of regular reporting to managers.

# HIGHLIGHTED MEASURES - 3 of 3

## PV.1.02 - Bank Shift Cost (£)

		Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	<b>B</b>	
Monthly	Prev 3 year	103K	100K	98K	105K	110K	107K	120K	105K	96K	52K	81K	81K	<b>G</b>	< 0%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>68K</b>	<b>47K</b>	<b>87K</b>										<b>A</b>	> 0%
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										<b>R</b>	> 10%
Cumulative	Prev 3 year	103K	203K	301K	406K	517K	624K	744K	849K	945K	997K	1078K	1160K	What is good	
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>68K</b>	<b>115K</b>	<b>202K</b>										Less is better	
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>											

Ref	PV.1.02	The total cost of Bank shifts. Bank shifts are paid to cover shortfall in operational staff or skills at wholetime and day crewed stations.
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Previous three year average	
Source	BFRS Accounts	

The number of bank shifts required to maintain our resourcing requirements of wholetime appliances during Q1 2024/2025 reduced by 43.5% when compared to the average of the previous three years.

Despite wage increases over the previous three years, we are seeing a downward trend in bank shift costs owing to the improved operational establishment and improved skills of our firefighters.

This trend is being closely monitored to establish if any underspends could be reallocated to further invest in the Service.

# PUBLIC IMPACT

## IN THE HOME

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
PI.1.01	Number of Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADFs)	A	B	11
PI.1.02	Number of serious ADFs	G	B	11
PI.1.03	ADFs - Fire related fatalities	G	G	12
PI.1.04	ADFs—Fire related serious injuries	G	G	12
PI.1.05	Dwelling fires - Deliberate	B	G	13
PI.1.06	Home Fire Safety Visits	A	G	13

## IN THE WORKPLACE

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
PI.2.01	Non-domestic property fires - Accidental	R	B	14
PI.2.02	Non-domestic property fires - Deliberate	G	A	14
PI.2.03	Non-domestic property fires - Serious	R	G	15
PI.2.04	Non-domestic property fires - False Alarms	G	A	15
PI.2.05	Fire Safety Audits	R	R	16
PI.2.06	Prison Fires	B	B	16

## DELIBERATE FIRES

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
PI.3.01	Deliberate Secondary Fires (to other's property)	B	B	17
PI.3.02	Deliberate Primary Fires (to other's property)	B	A	17

# RESPONSE

## INCIDENTS

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
R.1.01	Total incidents (exc co-responders)	B	B	19
R.1.02	Average attendance time to all incidents (exc co-responder)	B	G	19
R.1.03	Average attendance time to accidental dwelling fires	B	A	20

## RESPONSE MODEL

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
R.2.01	Availability - Wholetime Appliances	A	A	21
R.2.02	Availability - On-call Appliances	R	R	21
R.2.03	Response Model - Wholetime Appliances	A	G	22
R.2.04	Response Model - On-call Appliances	R	R	22
R.2.05	Over The Border Mobilisations into BFRS	R	G	23
R.2.06	Over The Border Mobilisations our of BFRS	B	B	23

## OPS RESILIENCE

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
R.3.01	Maintenance of Competencies	A	A	24
R.3.02	High Risk Site Information	R	G	24

# A GREAT PLACE TO WORK

## PEOPLE

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
GP.1.01	Actual vs Establishment - Wholetime	B	B	27
GP.1.02	Actual vs Establishment - On-Call	R	R	27
GP.1.03	Actual vs Establishment - Support	A	G	28
GP.1.04	Staff Turnover	G	G	28
GP.1.05	Absence	R	B	29
GP.1.06	Appraisal & Objectives Completion	A	R	29

## HEALTH & SAFETY

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
GP.2.01	Injury Rate	G		30
GP.2.02	Workplace Injuries	G	G	30
GP.2.03	Near Miss Events Recorded	G	G	31
GP.2.04	RIDDOR Reportable Injuries	A	A	31

# PUBLIC VALUE

## FINANCE

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
PV.1.01	Forecast - Outturn	A	-	33
PV.1.02	Bank Cost	G	G	33

## COMPLIANCE

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
PV.2.01	Data Breaches	-	G	34

## ENGAGEMENT

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
PV.3.01	Compliments & Complaints	-	G	34
PV.3.02	Social Media Engagements	R	R	35
PV.3.03	Website Engagements	R	R	35

## PROJECTS

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
PV.4.01	Internal Audits	-	A	36
PV.4.02	Projects	-		36

## ENVIRONMENT

Ref	Description	Monthly (in most cases)	Cumulative (in most cases)	Page
PV.5.01	Carbon Emissions	-	-	37
PV.5.02	Printing	B	A	37







**FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE**

**PUBLIC IMPACT**

**PI.1.01 - Number of Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADF)**

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	23.2	25	23.4	16.6	19.8	22.6	21.6	23.6	26.2	25.6	23.2	18.8	<b>B</b> <10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>27</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>A</b>										<b>A</b> >10%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	23.2	48.2	71.6	88.2	108	130.6	152.2	175.8	202	227.6	250.8	269.8	<b>R</b> >20%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>64</b>										What is good
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										Less is better

Ref	PI.1.01
Owner	Prevention
Comparison	Previous five year average
Source	BFRS IRS

Number of dwelling fires where the cause of the fire was recorded as accidental. Dwelling fires are fires in properties that are a place of residence i.e. places occupied by households such as houses and flats, excluding hotels/ hostels and residential institutions.

This is the lowest number of recorded ADFs since 2010 (when incident recording changed).  
Our prevention strategy continues to focus on reducing these numbers and protecting those most at risk.

**PI.1.02 - Number of Serious ADFs**

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	8.2	5.6	7.6	5.8	5.2	7.6	6.2	7.6	7.2	7.6	6.4	8.4	<b>B</b> <20%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>										<b>G</b> Within 20%
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>G</b>										<b>A</b> >20%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	8.2	13.8	21.4	27.2	32.4	40	46.2	53.8	61	68.6	75	83.4	<b>R</b> >30%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>16</b>										What is good
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										Less is better

Ref	PI.1.02
Owner	Prevention
Comparison	Previous five year average
Source	BFRS IRS

Number of accidental dwelling fires where the fire spread from the item that had first ignited. Fire spread is in relation to heat or flame damage. This does not include smoke damage.

In line with the number of ADFs, the number of serious ADFs was the lowest on record (since 2010).

PI.1.03 - ADF Fire-Related Fatalities

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	0	0	0.4	0	0.2	0.0	0.4	0	0	0	0.2	0.4	<b>B</b>
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>										<b>G</b> 0
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										<b>A</b> > 0 a year
														<b>R</b> > 3 a year
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	0	0	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	1	1	1	1	1.2	1.6	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										

Ref	PI.1.03	Number of fire related fatalities recorded at accidental dwelling fires. In general, 'fire-related deaths' are those that would not have otherwise occurred had there not been a fire.
Owner	Prevention	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

PI.1.04 - ADF Fire Related Serious Injuries

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	0.2	0	0	0.2	0.6	0	0	0	0.6	0.8	0	0.4	<b>B</b>
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>										<b>G</b> < 3 a year
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										<b>A</b> > 2 a year
														<b>R</b> > 4 a year
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	1	1	1	1	1.6	2.4	2.4	2.8	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										

Ref	PI.1.04	Number of fire related serious injuries recorded at accidental dwelling fires. In general, 'serious injury' can be defined as: at least an overnight stay in hospital as an in-patient.
Owner	Prevention	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

Both injuries were recorded at incidents that happened in the early hours of the morning. Both were attributed to smoking/disposal of cigarettes, and both injuries were recorded as being due to smoke inhalation. One of those injured was suspected to be under the influence of alcohol and had no detectors within the property. The second was an elderly lady that was asleep above the where the fire started. However, this property did have a detector which raised the alarm. Both incidents were attended in less than 10 minutes. This information helps shape our prevention targeting and activities.

PI.1.05 - Deliberate Dwelling Fires

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	1.2	2.2	1.8	2.4	3	0.6	3	1.6	0.8	0.8	1.8	0.4	<b>B</b> < 2 per month
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>										<b>G</b> 2 per month
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>										<b>A</b> > 2 per month
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	1.2	3.4	5.2	7.6	10.6	11.2	14.2	15.8	16.6	17.4	19.2	19.6	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>G</b>										

Ref	PI.1.06	Number of dwelling fires where the fire was started deliberately by someone other than the owner/occupant. This includes derelict properties - derelict are buildings which are unfit for further use.
Owner	Prevention	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

All incidents were attended in less than 10 minutes (the average attendance time was 06:43)  
 One of the six properties involved was a derelict property.  
 Three only suffered minor damage, while the other three were more significant.  
 No injuries were recorded at these incidents.  
 We work closely with TVP on all incidents that are suspected of being arson related.

PI.1.06 - Home Fire Safety Visits

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Target	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	<b>B</b> > 10%	
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>342</b>	<b>363</b>	<b>392</b>									<b>G</b> Within 10%	
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>									<b>A</b> < 10%	
Cumulative	Target	400	800	1200	1600	2000	2400	2800	3200	3600	4000	4400	4800	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>342</b>	<b>705</b>	<b>1097</b>										More is better
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>G</b>										

Ref	PI.1.08	Number of Home Fire Safety Visits (HFSVs) completed monthly by operational crews and the Community Safety delivery team. This includes targeted addresses, referrals, post incidents and hot-strikes.
Owner	Prevention	
Comparison	Against Target	
Source	BFRS PRMS	

Q1 2024 visits were marginally under target. This has been attributed to bedding in new systems and processes across the Service, which went live at the beginning of May. We envisage a significant increase in these numbers during Q2. which will bring us back in line with the annual target of 4800 visits.

**PI.2.01 - Non-domestic Property Fires - Accidental**

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	10.6	11.2	9.4	12	9.8	8.4	12	9.6	9.2	10	8.4	9.4	<b>B</b> < 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> > 10%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	10.6	21.8	31.2	43.2	53	61.4	73.4	83	92.2	102.2	110.6	120	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>28</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										

Ref	PI.2.01
Owner	Protection
Comparison	Previous five year average
Source	BFRS IRS

Number of fires in non-domestic properties where the cause was recorded as accidental.  
 This excludes derelict properties (unless four or more pumps were needed) and Prisons.

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**PI.2.02 - Non-domestic Property Fires - Deliberate**

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	2.2	1.4	1.8	2.4	2.8	1.8	1.4	0.2	1.8	1.6	1.2	2.2	<b>B</b> < 1 per month
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>										<b>G</b> < 3 per month
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>G</b>										<b>A</b> > 2 per month
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	2.2	3.6	5.4	7.8	10.6	12.4	13.8	14	15.8	17.4	18.6	20.8	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>										

Ref	PI.2.02
Owner	Protection
Comparison	Previous five year average
Source	BFRS IRS

Number of fires in non-domestic properties where the cause was recorded as deliberate (where the fire was started deliberately by someone other than the owner/occupant).  
 This excludes derelict properties (unless four or more pumps were needed) and Prisons.

Seven of the nine incidents were attended in less than 10 minutes (the average attendance time was 08:15)  
 Two of the nine properties involved were derelict properties.  
 Six of the fires were confined to the room of origin, while the other three were more significant.  
 No injuries were recorded at these incidents.  
 We work closely with TVP on all incidents that are suspected of being arson related.  
 None of the incidents required more than three pumps.

PI.2.03 - Non-domestic Property Fires - Serious

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	8.6	6.2	6.8	10.4	6.6	6	5.2	5.4	6	5.4	5	5.8	<b>B</b> < 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> > 10%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	8.6	14.8	21.6	32	38.6	44.6	49.8	55.2	61.2	66.6	71.6	77.4	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>23</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										

Ref	PI.2.04	Number of fires in non-domestic properties where the fire spread from the item that first ignited. This excludes derelict properties (unless four or more pumps were needed) and Prisons. Fire spread is in relation to heat or flame damage. This does not include smoke damage.
Owner	Protection	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

The incidents included: four garden sheds, three private garages, three barns, two laundrettes and two food and drink establishments.

Most incidents required only two or three pumps, with a couple of exceptions including: one incident that required eight pumps, and one that required four.

PI.2.04 - Non-domestic Property False Alarms

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	110.4	114.6	120.8	139.8	141.6	154.8	163.8	150	150.2	136.4	116.6	118.8	<b>B</b> < 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>121</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>G</b>										<b>A</b> > 10%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	110.4	225	345.8	485.6	627.2	782	945.8	1096	1246	1382	1499	1618	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>401</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>A</b>										

Ref	PI.2.07	Number of incidents attended in non-domestic properties that were recorded as a False Alarm. These could have been fire related or a special service i.e. flooding. However, this does not include where we attended as a co-responder. These numbers do not include incidents in Prisons.
Owner	Protection	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

BFRS continue to monitor and manage non-domestic property false alarms in line with our unwanted fire signal policy. It is acknowledged that the policy has its limitations in terms of impact, as a significant number of the false alarms are infrequent offenders.

BFRS will start a six month Automatic Fire Alarm call challenging pilot on the 8th July 2024. This will reduce the number of incidents we attend in non-domestic properties that would have been recorded as a false alarm, had we attended.

PI.2.05 - Fire Safety Audits

		Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	
Monthly	Target	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	<b>B</b> > 100 Per month
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>43</b>										<b>G</b> > 82 Per month
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> > 60 Per month
Cumulative	Target	83	166	249	332	415	498	581	664	747	830	913	996	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>148</b>										More is better
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										

Ref	PI.2.08	<p>Number of Fire Safety Audits Completed.</p> <p>A fire safety audit is an examination of the premises and relevant documents to ascertain how the premises are being managed with regards to fire safety. Occupants will need to demonstrate to our officers that they have met the duties required by the Fire Safety Order.</p>
Owner	Protection	
Comparison	Target	
Source	PRMS	

In October 2023, the Service introduced what was anticipated to be a stretching target for protection audit numbers. Whilst there is still some opportunity to make efficiencies to ways of working, it is likely that the target will require review. However, it should be acknowledged that since the introduction of the target, the Service have more than doubled audit numbers against the previous year and we anticipate completing the very high and high Risk Based Inspection Program (RBIP) planned audits within timeframe. Additionally, it is reassuring that the audit outcomes across the period indicate we are targeting the right premises for our RBIP.

PI.2.06 - Prison Fires

		Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	
Monthly	2023/2024	3	6	10	14	18	23	15	18	2	11	4	5	<b>B</b> < 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>										<b>A</b> > 10%
Cumulative	2023/2024	3	9	19	33	51	74	89	107	109	120	124	129	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>15</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										

Ref	PI.2.09	<p>Number of fires attended in prisons.</p> <p>All causes i.e. accidental/deliberate were included within these figures.</p> <p>All damage levels are included within these figures.</p>
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Previous year	
Source	BFRS IRS	

While we have seen an improvement in the number of incidents attended at prisons, we continue to work closely with these establishments to bring these numbers down further.



**PI.3.01 - Deliberate Secondary Fires (to other’s property)**

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	39.8	39.2	41.8	43.2	51.8	33.8	20.4	16.6	11.8	10.8	17.4	20.6	<b>B</b> < 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>27</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										<b>A</b> > 10%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	39.8	79	120.8	164	215.8	249.6	270	286.6	298.4	309.2	326.6	347.2	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>64</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										

Ref	PI.3.05
Owner	Prevention
Comparison	Previous five year average
Source	BFRS IRS

Number of secondary fires that were deliberately started by somebody that wasn’t the owner. Secondary fires are generally small outdoor fires, not involving people or property. These include refuse fires, grassland fires and fires in derelict buildings or vehicles, unless these fires involved casualties or rescues, or five or more pumping appliances attended.

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**PI.3.02 - Deliberate Primary Fires (to other’s property)**

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	13.4	14.2	15.6	19.4	19	14.4	10.6	8.4	9.2	9.8	7.8	11	<b>B</b> < 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>										<b>A</b> > 10%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	13.4	27.6	43.2	62.6	81.6	96	106.6	115	124.2	134	141.8	152.8	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>48</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>A</b>										

Ref	PI.3.06
Owner	Prevention
Comparison	Previous five year average
Source	BFRS IRS

Number of Primary fires that were deliberately started by somebody that wasn’t the owner. Primary fires are potentially more serious fires that harm people or cause damage to non-derelict property such as buildings, vehicle or (some) outdoor structures.  
Prison Fires have been excluded from these numbers.

Of the 48 incidents, 24 were related to road vehicles, 15 were related to buildings and nine were related to outdoors i.e. crops or and machinery.  
Of the 24 road vehicles, motorcycles saw an unusually high number of seven.  
The average attendance time to these incidents was 09:28.  
BFRS works closely with TVP for all incidents such as these, where arson is suspected.



# RESPONSE

R.1.01 - Total Incidents (exc co-responders)

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	569	583	608	677	690	637	617	573	574	549	496	504	<b>B</b> < 2.51%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>575</b>	<b>560</b>	<b>580</b>										<b>G</b> Within 2.5%
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										<b>A</b> > 2.51%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	569	1152	1760	2437	3127	3764	4381	4954	5528	6076	6572	7076	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>575</b>	<b>1135</b>	<b>1715</b>										Monitor
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>B</b>										

Ref	R.1.01	Total number of incidents attended within Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes (excluding co-responder incidents).
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

While incident numbers remain relatively similar, the type of incidents we are attending is changing.

	Previous five years	2024/2025
Fire	33.3%	24.8%
RTCs	6.8%	7.1%
Other Special Service	19.5%	19.0%
False Alarm	40.4%	49.1%

R.1.02 - Average Attendance Time to all Incidents (exc Co-Res)

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	08:28	08:23	09:20	08:48	08:55	08:53	08:43	08:47	08:44	08:38	08:28	08:28	<b>B</b> < 10 Sec
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>08:43</b>	<b>08:46</b>	<b>08:55</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10 sec
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>										<b>A</b> > 10 Sec
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	08:28	08:25	08:44	08:45	08:47	08:48	08:47	08:47	08:47	08:46	08:45	08:44	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>08:43</b>	<b>08:44</b>	<b>08:48</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>G</b>										

Ref	R.1.04	The average attendance time to all incidents (excluding co-responding incidents). The average time is the minutes and seconds elapsed from the time the first appliance was assigned to the incident, to the arrival of the first appliance at the incident.
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

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R.1.03 - Average Attendance Time to ADFs

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
Monthly Prev 5 year	08:03	07:42	07:56	08:15	08:02	08:16	08:41	08:38	07:24	08:43	08:06	07:53
Monthly <b>2024/2025</b>	<b>09:24</b>	<b>08:56</b>	<b>06:55</b>									
Monthly Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>B</b>									
Cumulative Prev 5 year	08:03	07:52	07:54	07:58	07:59	08:02	08:07	08:11	08:05	08:09	08:09	08:08
Cumulative <b>2024/2025</b>	<b>09:24</b>	<b>09:14</b>	<b>08:15</b>									
Cumulative Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>A</b>									

<b>B</b>	< 10 Sec
<b>G</b>	Within 10 sec
<b>A</b>	> 10 Sec
<b>R</b>	> 30 seconds

What is good
Less is better

Ref	R.1.05
Owner	Response
Comparison	Previous five year average
Source	BFRS IRS

The average attendance time to Accidental Dwelling Fires.  
 The average time is the minutes and seconds elapsed from the time the first appliance was assigned to the incident, to the arrival of the first appliance at the incident.

### R.2.01 - Availability - Wholetime

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	2023/2024	92%	90.9%	88.2%	94.3%	95.1%	97.4%	94.9%	96.9%	94.5%	99%	98.8%	98.7%	<b>B</b> 99% - 99.9%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>97.9</b>	<b>99.1</b>	<b>96.7</b>										<b>G</b> 98% - 98.9%
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>A</b>										<b>A</b> 96% - 97.9%
Cumulative	2023/2024	92%	91.5%	90.4%	91.4%	92.1%	93.0%	93.3%	93.7%	93.8%	94.3%	94.7%	95.1%	<b>R</b> <96%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>97.9%</b>	<b>98.5%</b>	<b>97.9%</b>										What is good
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>A</b>										Higher is better

Ref	R.2.01	The availability of BFRS pumps to respond to incidents. This measure reflects when pumps are “on the run”. With this in mind, should an appliance be at an incident, it would still be recorded as being available. Reasons for an appliance being “off the run” include, crew/skill deficient, vehicle defects and decontamination.
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Target	
Source	TVFC Vision	

### R.2.02 - Availability On-Call

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	2023/2024	9.7%	7.1%	7.6%	9.0%	6.8%	7.6%	6.0%	8.7%	5.4%	16.9%	14.3%	11.7%	<b>B</b> >55%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>10.6%</b>	<b>9.6%</b>	<b>7.3%</b>										<b>G</b> >29%
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> > 16%
Cumulative	2023/2024	9.7%	8.4%	8.1%	8.3%	8.0%	8.0%	7.7%	7.8%	7.5%	8.5%	9.0%	9.2%	<b>R</b> < 17%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>10.6%</b>	<b>10.8%</b>	<b>9.15%</b>										What is good
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										Higher is better

Ref	R.2.02	The availability of BFRS pumps to respond to incidents. This measure reflects when pumps are “on the run”. With this in mind, should an appliance be at an incident, it would still be recorded as being available. Reasons for an appliance being “off the run” include, crew deficient, vehicle defects and decontamination.
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Target	
Source	TVFC Vision	

BFRS have previously concentrated on wholetime recruitment and increasing wholetime numbers. Now that our Wholetime establishment is up to 300+, the focus is now on supporting On-Call resilience. This includes On-Call recruitment, retention, training and development.

Over the past 12 months we have recruited 13 On-Call firefighters. Nine of these will complete their training in October 2024. Eleven further new On-Call firefighters are due to start on the 7th August 2024, one of which will be fast tracked into an available position on a Breathing Apparatus course in September.

Over the past 12 months four On-Call firefighters have been promoted to Crew Commander, which improves appliance availability. A new firefighter safe to command process has enabled two On-Call firefighters to be in-charge of fire appliances, increasing the availability of appliances. One wholetime crew commander has taken up an On-Call Watch Commander position. An On-Call campaign was open at the time of reporting with the aim of recruiting another 12 On-Call firefighters ready for February 2025.

Transformation funding approved by Members has enabled the Service to secure additional training courses for new On-Call firefighters.

### R.2.03 - Wholetime - Response Model

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Day	2023/2024	10.8	10.7	10.5	11.2	11.0	11.3	11.3	11.6	11.4	12	12	12	<b>B</b> >11.99
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11.6</b>										<b>G</b> > 11.79
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>A</b>										<b>A</b> > 11.49
Night	2023/2024	11.4	11.3	10.9	11.7	11.5	11.7	11.7	11.9	11.6	12	12	12	<b>R</b> < 11.50
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11.9</b>										What is good
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>G</b>										Higher is better

Ref	R.2.03	The average number of Wholetime pumps available at the beginning of each shift, broken down my day shift and night shift.
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Target	
Source	BFRS Fire Service Rota	

Skill deficiencies are impacting appliance availability. A comprehensive operational resourcing work plan is being reviewed and implemented by the resourcing team to address these skill deficiencies and enhance appliance availability.

The Service will see it's number of Crew Commanders increase by a couple over the next two months. We will also see seven firefighters move to a new rank of 'Safe to Command'. This will help improve availability of our wholetime availability and resilience.

### R.2.04 - On-Call - Response Model

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Day	2023/2024	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.3	1.2	0.6	2.7	2.0	1.3	<b>B</b> > 5
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.8</b>										<b>G</b> 2.99
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> < 3
Night	2023/2024	1.1	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.0	0.6	2.3	2.2	1.8	<b>R</b> < 2
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0.9</b>										What is good
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										Higher is better

Ref	R.2.04	The average number of On-Call pumps available at the beginning of each shift, broken down my day shift and night shift.
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

R.2.05 - OTB Mobilisations into BFRS Grounds

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	129	132	144	197	193	151	140	129	138	117	104	107	<b>B</b> < 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>188</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> > 10%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	129	261	405	602	795	945	1086	1215	1353	1470	1574	1681	<b>R</b> > 20%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>445</b>										What is good
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										Less is better

Ref	R.2.05	Number of mobilisations of appliance from Over The Border (OTB) into BFRS grounds
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

Mobilisation into BFRS is subject to TVFCS mobilising the quickest appliance, if the incident is close to our border and a neighbouring TVFRS has a station closer, TVFCS will mobilise from that station.

For incidents close to the borders with non-TVFRS areas, TVFCS will contact those neighbouring Services

R.2.06 - OTB Mobilisations out of BFRS Grounds

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 5 year	39	50	44	56	56	43	50	35	49	38	33	33	<b>B</b> < 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>35</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										<b>A</b> > 10%
Cumulative	Prev 5 year	39	88	133	189	245	288	338	373	422	460	492	525	<b>R</b> > 20%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>108</b>										What is good
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										less is better

Ref	R.2.05	Number of mobilisations of appliance from BFRS into Over The Border (OTB) grounds.
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Previous five year average	
Source	BFRS IRS	

### R.3.01 - Maintenance of Operational Skills

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Target	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	5%	-	-	<b>B</b> > 10
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>6.5%</b>	<b>6.5%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>										<b>G</b> => 0 difference
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>										<b>A</b> < 0
Cumulative	Target	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	95%	95%	95%	<b>R</b> < 10
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>6.5%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>20.8%</b>										What is good
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>										Higher is better

Ref	R3.01	Progress against maintenance of operational skills by wholetime firefighters and supervisory managers.
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Target	
Source	BFRS IRS	

Quarterly reports are generated by the Operational Training Team, and Service Delivery Area

Benchmarking reports track and monitor progress. This will be closely monitored over the next quarter, with a sustained increase expected.

### R.3.02 - High Risk Site Information

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	
Level 4	Target	90%	90%	90%	90%	90%	90%	90%	90%	90%	90%	90%	<b>B</b> > 5%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>82%</b>	<b>82%</b>	<b>79%</b>									<b>G</b> Within 5%
	Status	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>R</b>									<b>A</b> < 5%
Level 3	Prev 5 year	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%	75%	<b>R</b> < 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>73%</b>									What is good
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>									Higher is better

Ref	R.3.03	Site Specific Risk Information (SSRI) for high-risk sites is updated in accordance with the current risk review process. The level of detail obtained is relevant to the level of risk at each site. Site visits to maintain records and training is dependent on both crew and business cooperation and availability.
Owner	Response	
Comparison	Target	
Source	BFRS SSRI	

Level 3 and Level 4 sites should be reviewed annually, with progress tracked through reports generated by the Data Intelligence Team and captured in the Service Delivery Area benchmarking reports. Efforts are underway to introduce a new scoring methodology, question set, and system for recording information, which should provide better clarity and accuracy. In the meantime, work will focus on improving completion rates in line with our current procedural expectations.







**A GREAT PLACE  
TO WORK**

GP.1.01 - Actual vs Establishment - Wholetime

		Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	
Monthly	Target	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	<b>B</b> >100%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>306</b>										<b>G</b> > 94.9%
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										<b>A</b> < 95%
														<b>R</b> < 90%
Average YTD	Target	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>102%</b>	<b>102%</b>	<b>102%</b>										Higher is better
	Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>										

Ref	GP.1.01
Owner	HR
Comparison	Target
Source	iTrent

Total number of people in Wholetime roles v's budgeted establishment

The Service has recruited a further 12 apprentice firefighters to commence employment in September/October 2024. Their initial training is scheduled for completion by mid January 2025.

GP.1.02 - Actual vs Establishment - On-Call

		Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	
Monthly	Target	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	<b>B</b> > 95%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>54.9</b>	<b>54.8</b>	<b>55.7</b>										<b>G</b> > 89.9%
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> < 90%
														<b>R</b> < 85%
Average YTD	Target	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>58%</b>										Higher is better
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										

Ref	GP.1.02
Owner	HR
Comparison	Target
Source	iTrent

Total number of people in On-Call roles v's budgeted establishment (FTE).

Please see highlighted measure for details in relation to BFRS' On-Call plan.

GP.1.03 - Actual vs Establishment - Support

		Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	
Monthly	Target	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	133	<b>B</b> >100%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>126</b>										<b>G</b> > 94.9%
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>										<b>A</b> < 95%
														<b>R</b> < 90%
Average	Target	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>95.5%</b>	<b>95.1%</b>	<b>95.0%</b>										Higher is better
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										

Ref	GP.1.03
Owner	HR
Comparison	Target
Source	iTrent

Total number of people in Support roles v's budgeted establishment.

GP.1.04 - Staff Turnover

		Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	
Monthly	Target	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	< 1%	<b>B</b>
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>0.6%</b>	<b>0.4%</b>										<b>G</b> < 1%
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										<b>A</b> < 2%
														<b>R</b> > 1.9%
Average	Target	< 1%	< 2%	< 3%	< 4%	< 5%	< 6%	< 7%	< 8%	< 9%	< 10%	< 11%	< 12%	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>0.6%</b>	<b>1.0%</b>										Less is better
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>										

Ref	GP.1.04
Owner	HR
Comparison	Target
Source	iTrent

Percentage of employees who leave the Service, expressed as a percentage of the total workforce.

GP.1.05 - Absence

Wholetime

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
Target	226	226	226	226	226	226	226	226	226	226	226	226
<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>317</b>									
Status	<b>R</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>R</b>									

<b>B</b>	< 20%
<b>G</b>	< 0%
<b>A</b>	> 0%
<b>R</b>	> 10%

Support

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
Target	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103	103
<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>79</b>									
Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>B</b>									

What is good
Less is better

Ref	GP.1.05
Owner	HR
Comparison	Target
Source	iTrent

The number of working days (shifts) lost per month due to sickness. This covers short and long term sickness.  
 The target within the measure is based on the sector average in 2019/2020, as detailed within the National Fire and Rescue Service Sickness Absence Report. The 2019/2020 report was used as not to reflect the impact of Covid 19.

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GP.1.06 - Appraisal & Objectives Completion

Appraisals

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
Target	25%	50%	75%	80%	85%	90%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%
<b>2023/2024</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>63%</b>	<b>71%</b>									
Status	<b>B</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>A</b>									

<b>B</b>	>10% of target or 95%
<b>G</b>	=> 0% of Target
<b>A</b>	< 0% of target
<b>R</b>	< 10% of target

Objectives

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
Target	25%	50%	75%	80%	85%	90%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%
<b>2024/2025</b>	-	<b>30%</b>	<b>54%</b>									
Status	-	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>									

What is good
Higher is better

Ref	GP.1.08
Owner	Learning & Development
Comparison	Target
Source	iTrent

The percentage of all staff that have received their 2023/2024 end of year review and their 2024/2025 objectives.

The Service has now established a regular process for monthly reporting which provides managers with timely data on their appraisal returns.  
 For 2024/2025 the Service introduced a new and improved appraisal form focusing on talent management and EDI, and giving people an opportunity to openly discuss their future career plans. These new areas also provide a chance for managers to identify gaps in their team’s EDI knowledge to support education in this area and create tangible, personal goals.  
 To support the reporting and the launch of the new form, numerous training sessions have been facilitated in the lead up to the End Of Year (EOY) and Objective Setting due dates. These were held throughout February and March to assist with EOY and again in April to showcase the new form, and further training was provided in July as part of the Supervisory Managers Acquisition Programme. Whilst numbers are still not at the desired returns, appraisal returns have improved considerably over the period when compared with previous years. We do note a considerable increase in returns after each monthly management report, again, highlighting the importance of regular reporting to managers.

GP.2.01 - Injury Rate

Quarterly

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Prev 3 year	16.3	12.0	19.7	25.2
<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>18.6</b>			
Status	<b>G</b>			

<b>B</b>	< 15
<b>G</b>	< 23
<b>A</b>	> 22
<b>R</b>	> 30

What is good
Less is better

Ref	GP.2.01
Owner	Health & Safety
Comparison	Previous three year average
Source	H&S Reporting System

The injury rate give the number of people injured over a quarter based on a group of 1,000 employees or workers.

Injury rates are consistently monitored by the H&S dept and investigations conducted as appropriate, with a view to learning and reducing future occurrences.

GP.2.02 - Workplace injuries

Quarterly

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Prev 3 year	7.7	5.7	9.3	12.3
<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>9</b>			
Status	<b>G</b>			

<b>B</b>	< 5 per qtr
<b>G</b>	< 11 per qtr
<b>A</b>	> 10 per qtr
<b>R</b>	> 15 per qtr

Cumulative

Prev 3 year	7.7	13.3	22.7	35.0
<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>9</b>			
Status	<b>G</b>			

What is good
Less is better

Ref	GP.2.02
Owner	Health & Safety
Comparison	Previous three year average
Source	H&S Reporting System

The number of workplace injuries reported across the Service. This includes operational staff, support staff, agency and visitors.

Of the nine recorded workplace injuries, five were recoded as moderate, and four as minor.

Details of the five moderate injuries:

- Overheating during a BA assessment
- A superficial burn on an arm while firefighting at an incident where persons were reported.
- A very minor injury to a visitor. Recorded as moderate due to process not injury
- Moderate due to RIDDOR reportable injury due to time off work—minor injury to finger
- Moderate due to RIDDOR reportable injury due to time off work—minor injury to ear

GP.2.03 - Near Miss Events Recorded

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Quarterly Prev 3 year	13	9.7	7.0	8.3
Quarterly <b>2024/2025</b>	<b>7</b>			
Quarterly Status	<b>G</b>			
Cumulative				
Cumulative Prev 3 year	13	22.7	29.7	38.0
Cumulative <b>2024/2025</b>	<b>7</b>			
Cumulative Status	<b>G</b>			

<b>B</b>	< 5 per qtr
<b>G</b>	< 11 per qtr
<b>A</b>	> 10 per qtr
<b>R</b>	> 15 per qtr

What is good
Monitor

Ref	GP.2.03
Owner	Health & Safety
Comparison	Previous three year average
Source	H&S Reporting System

Number of near miss events recorded across the Service.  
 A near miss is where a safety event (an accident or incident) occurs, but no personal injury, damage or financial loss results.

Of the seven near miss events recorded, five were recorded as moderate, and two recorded as minor.  
 Details of the five moderate near miss events:  
 - A known risk address to other agencies was not passed to BFRS. A lone worker was then sent to this address.  
 - Water pump on appliance failed at an incident involving a car fire.  
 - Incorrect usage of a BA set during a drill.  
 - Incorrect BA process followed at an incident involving a TTL.  
 - A failure of appliance steps to activate with crews onboard.

GP.2.04 - RIDDOR reportable Injuries

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Quarterly Prev 3 year	3.0	0.7	0.3	4.0
Quarterly <b>2024/2025</b>	<b>2</b>			
Quarterly Status	<b>A</b>			
Cumulative				
Cumulative Prev 3 year	3.0	3.7	4.0	8.0
Cumulative <b>2024/2025</b>	<b>2</b>			
Cumulative Status	<b>A</b>			

<b>B</b>	
<b>G</b>	< 1 per qtr
<b>A</b>	=> 1 per qtr
<b>R</b>	=> 3 per qtr

What is good
Less is better

Ref	GP.2.05
Owner	Health & Safety
Comparison	Previous three year average
Source	H&S Reporting System

Number of staff who suffered RIDDOR reportable injuries at work.  
 RIDDOR (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations) reportable injuries are generally considered to be serious injuries to staff and visitors. The definition of RIDDOR injuries can be found on HSE's website.

The two RIDDOR reportable injuries were:  
 - RIDDOR reportable injury due to time off work—minor injury to finger  
 - RIDDOR reportable injury due to time off work—minor injury to ear  
 (both were included within workplace injuries figures and commentary)



**PUBLIC VALUE**



PV.1.01 - Forecast - Outturn (£000's)

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
Target	39,470	39,470	39,470									
Forecast	-	-	38,791									
% Difference	-	-	1.7%									
Status	-	-	A									

<b>B</b>	Within 0.5%
<b>G</b>	Within 1.0%
<b>A</b>	Within 2.0%
<b>R</b>	> 2% difference

What is good
Closer to Target

Ref	PV.1.01
Owner	Finance
Comparison	Target
Source	BFRS IRS

The financial measure compares the approved revenue budget (target) against the forecast revenue outturn position (forecast). Negative % difference indicates an underspend whereas positive % difference indicating an overspend.

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PV.1.02 - Bank Shift Cost (£)

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
Monthly Prev 3 year	103K	100K	98K	105K	110K	107K	120K	105K	96K	52K	81K	81K
2024/2025	68K	47K	87K									
Status	G	G	G									
Cumulative Prev 3 year	103K	203K	301K	406K	517K	624K	744K	849K	945K	997K	1078K	1160K
2024/2025	68K	115K	202K									
Status	G	G	G									

<b>B</b>	
<b>G</b>	< 0%
<b>A</b>	> 0%
<b>R</b>	> 10%

What is good
Less is better

Ref	PV.1.02
Owner	Response
Comparison	Previous three year average
Source	BFRS Accounts

The total cost of Bank shifts. Bank shifts are paid to cover shortfall in operational staff or skills at wholetime and day crewed stations.

The number of bank shifts required to maintain our resourcing requirements of wholetime appliances during Q1 2024/2025 reduced by 43.5% when compared to the average of the previous three years.

Despite wage increases over the previous three years, we are seeing a downward trend in bank shift costs owing to the improved operational establishment and improved skills of our firefighters.

This trend is being closely monitored to establish if any underspends could be reallocated to further invest in the Service.

PV.2.01 - Reportable Data Breaches

Annual		17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21	21/22	22/23	23/24	24/25	<b>B</b>	
	Target	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>G</b>	0
	<b>Breaches</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>A</b>	
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>R</b>	> 0

What is good
Less is better

Ref	PV.1.03	A data breach means a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data. A reportable data breach is one that triggers a requirement for notification to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) where a breach is likely to result in a significant risk to an individual to whom the data relates.
Owner	Legal & Governance	
Comparison	Target	
Source		

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PUBLIC VALUE - ENGAGEMENT

PV.3.01 - Compliments and Complaints

Compliments		Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	<b>B</b>	0
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<b>G</b>	1
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>										<b>A</b>	> 1
	Status	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<b>R</b>

Complaints		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	What is good	
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>										Monitor	
	Status	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>G</b>											

Ref	PV.3.01	Number of compliments and complaints received each month. This does not identify if the complaints were upheld.
Owner	Legal & Governance	
Comparison	Monitor	
Source		

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PV.3.02 - Social Media - Engagement (000's)

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	Prev 2 year	18.8	8.4	11.8	27.6	15.6	10.7	11.8	10.6	14.9	12.0	18.1	23.0	<b>B</b> > 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>18.3</b>	<b>9.2</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> < 10%
														<b>R</b> < 20%
Cumulative	Prev 2 year	18.8	27.1	38.9	66.5	82.0	92.8	104.6	115.2	130.0	142.1	160.2	183.2	What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>25.1</b>	<b>34.2</b>										Higher is better
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>R</b>										

Ref	PV.3.02	Total number of unique engagements with our social media content across Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and LinkedIn.
Owner	MarComms	
Comparison	Previous year	
Source	Social Media Platforms	

Due to a recent technical issue with our X (Twitter) account, we were unable to access our previous account and had to set up a new one. This transition has led to a loss of followers, which will naturally affect our engagement metrics in the short term. However, the new account is now aligned with our updated branding and operates under a business account, providing us with enhanced insights and functionality. We are committed to rebuilding our follower base and leveraging these new capabilities to improve our engagement and reporting moving forward. Engagement figures from this platform will be included within Q2 figures.

PV.3.03 - Website Visits (000's)

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar		
Monthly	2023/2024	12.7	14.7	17.2	13.9	15.0	13.0	16.7	15.3	10.3	15.3	12.1	9.3	<b>B</b> > 10%
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>7.7</b>										<b>G</b> Within 10%
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										<b>A</b> < 10%
														<b>R</b> < 20%
Cumulative	2023/2024	12.7	27.4	44.6										What is good
	<b>2024/2025</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>18.4</b>	<b>26.1</b>										Monitor
	Status	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>										

Ref	PV.3.03	Our website is our biggest public communication and engagement channel. Website traffic is monitored for user analyse. Currently, we monitor this superficially due to capacity and conflicting priorities. However it enables us to react, when required, yielding valuable insights to help identify audience, improve the customer experience and website performance.
Owner	MarComms	
Comparison	Monitor	
Source	Google Analytics	

PV.4.01 - Internal Audits

	Feb-21	Jun-21	Oct-21	Feb-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Feb-23	Jun-23	Oct-23	Feb-24	Jun-24		
Number	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<b>B</b> < 5%
Overdue Audits	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>		<b>G</b> 5% - 9.9%
Status	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<b>A</b> 10% - 20%
													<b>R</b> > 20%
Percentage	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%		What is good
Overdue Audits	<b>14%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>14%</b>		Less is better
Status	<b>A</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>A</b>		

Ref	PV.5.01	Number of overdue audits actions following internal audits. This is then compared with the total number of actions.
Owner	PMO	
Comparison	Target	
Source	Audit Providers - (BC)	

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PV.4.02 - Projects

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	
In Progress	-	-	-	-	<b>B</b>
2024/2025	<b>24</b>				<b>G</b> < 3 off track
	-	-	-	-	<b>A</b> 3 off track
					<b>R</b> > 3 off track
Risk to progress	<3	<3	<3	<3	What is good
2024/2025	<b>0</b>				Less is better
Status	<b>G</b>				

Ref	PV.5.02	The number of projects the service has in progress, and the number of those deemed to be at 'risk to progress'. This excludes projects in relation to property.
Owner	PMO	
Comparison	Target	
Source	PMO	

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PV.5.01 - Carbon Emissions—Tonnes of CO2

	2022/2023	2023/2024	2024/2025	2025/2026
Target	-	-	-	-
Tonnes	978			
Status	?			

B	
G	
A	
R	

What is good
Less is better

Ref	PV.6.01
Owner	Finance & Property
Comparison	Target
Source	

Scope 1 and 2 carbon emissions (comprising gas, electricity and diesel). This will be an annual measure due to the seasonal nature of consumption, and even then a particularly mild or cold winter or high or low number of incidents could have a large impact on the figures.

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PV.5.02 - Printing

Monthly

	Apr	May	June	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
Target	<20K	<20K	<20K	<20K	<20K	<20K	<20K	<20K	<20K	<20K	<20K	<20K
2024/2025	28.9k	38.7k	5.7k									
Status	R	R	B									

B	< 10k per month
G	< 20k per month
A	< 25k per month
R	> 25k per month

Cumulative

Target	<20K	<40K	<60K	<80K	<100K	<120K	<140K	<160K	<180K	<200K	<220K	<240K
2024/2025	28.9k	67.6k	73.3k									
Status	R	R	A									

What is good
Less is better

Ref	PV.6.02
Owner	Finance
Comparison	Previous year
Source	ICT & 3rd Party Printers

The number of sheets of paper used for printing, per month, both internally and by 3rd party suppliers. Historical information for this measure is not available.

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# Buckinghamshire & Milton Keynes Fire Authority

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**Meeting and date:** Fire Authority, 9 October 2024

**Report title:** Grenfell Tower Inquiry – Phase One and Two Recommendations

**Lead Member:** Councillor Simon Rouse

**Report sponsor:** Deputy Chief Fire Officer Mick Osborne

**Author and contact:** Area Commander D Buchanan - [dbuchanan@bucksfire.gov.uk](mailto:dbuchanan@bucksfire.gov.uk)

**Action:** Noting

**Recommendations:** That the report be noted.

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## **Executive summary:**

On 6 December 2023, Fire Authority Members were provided information on the Services' progress against the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI) phase one recommendations as part of a wider report on Operational Learning and Assurance. With the recent publication of the GTI phase two report and its recommendations (04 September 2024), it is appropriate for Officers to provide a further update by way of assurance in relation to operational improvements made since the tragedy, but also to provide a high-level understanding of the implications of the phase two report and its recommendations.

Whilst Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service (BFRS) have responded effectively to GTI recommendations and also our protection regulatory role, it must be stressed that the landscape still remains challenging in respect of the built environment and more specifically high-risk residential buildings (HRRB's). The attached report provides some insight, but as a Service we continue to focus on operational preparedness and competence as well as continuing to work with our regulatory partners to reduce risk across the HRRB building stock in Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes.

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## **Financial implications:**

Grenfell has impacted the fire sector significantly, both in respect of delivering improvements across operational response, but perhaps more significantly in realigning resource to manage our regulatory requirements across a complex built environment.

Since the tragedy, the Service has received three funding streams as detailed in the attached report.

**Risk management:**

Risks associated with Grenfell improvement work are captured and monitored through the Service Corporate Risk Management Procedure.

**Legal implications:**

Since Grenfell, the legislative picture has become more complex with the introduction of the Building Safety Act (2022) and amendments to the Regulatory Reform Order (2005). Any legal implications have been / will be considered as the respective strands of the inquiry recommendations are addressed.

**Privacy and security implications:**

There are no identified privacy issues or security implications.

**Duty to collaborate:**

BFRS worked very closely with Thames Valley FRS partners in addressing the phase one recommendations. It is likely that the same approach will be adopted for phase two for operational requirements. From a protection perspective, it is clear that we will need to continue to work co-operatively with other regulatory partners, specifically in relation to high rise residential buildings, but also a larger stock of medium rise residential buildings.

**Health and safety implications:**

None identified.

**Environmental implications:**

None identified.

**Equality, diversity, and inclusion implications:**

Equality, Diversity, and Inclusion matters are considered routinely as part of Operational Learning and Assurance processes. Equality impact assessments are undertaken in line with the Services' procedure.

**Consultation and communication:**

Strategic Management Board

**Background papers:**

Operational Learning and Assurance Progress against Grenfell Tower and Manchester Arena Inquiry Recommendations (December 2023)

[Grenfell Infrastructure Update \(September 2022\)](#)

[Phase 1 report | Grenfell Tower Inquiry](#)

[Phase 2 report | Grenfell Tower Inquiry](#)



Appendix	Protective Marking	
1	Report: Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase One and Two Recommendations (September 2024)	None
2	GTI Phase Two Report – NFCC Summary (September 2024)	None
3	GTI phase one NFCC tracker (September 2024)	None

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# Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase One and Two Recommendations

(September 2024)



## **Executive Summary**

With the recent publication of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI) phase Two report, this briefing document is intended to provide an update on Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Services (BFRS) activity and service improvement since the tragedy occurred on 14 June 2017. The report also identifies our progress against the phase one monitored recommendations (appendix two). The latter section of the document will provide an early assessment of the phase two inquiry recommendations and their likely impacts to the sector and service.

BFRS have made significant improvement since Grenfell, both in respect of our regulatory role in keeping residents safe in high rise buildings, and also our operational capabilities, which has included policy and procedural changes, training and assurance in dealing with high rise incidents and the purchase of new operational equipment to deploy tactics effectively.

In April 2020 an announcement was made by Lord Greenhalgh, the Minister of State for Building Safety, Fire and Communities, offering a grant to assist with the implementation of the Phase 1 findings. Since that commitment, the sector has received three funding streams to support operational improvement and protection activity. The funding breakdown for BFRS to date has been as follows:

Building risk review programme	- £60,000
Grenfell	- £46,000
Protection uplift grant	- £578,000

Whilst there is some tangible spend directly attributed to GTI phase 1 recommendations, it is difficult to accurately put a figure on the cost of Grenfell to the Authority, in so far as the work has extended to a more holistic service delivery approach to improvement across operational preparedness and competence, but also the delivery of our regulatory requirements.

## **BFRS Response to Phase One Recommendations**

Phase one of the inquiry focussed on the factual events on the night of the 14 June 2017. The report was published on 30 October 2019 and it produced 46 recommendations, with 14 of these being aimed solely at London Fire Brigade and a further 15 directed to Fire and Rescue Services more broadly. Whilst the other 17 recommendations were not directly

aimed at FRS, the Service took an approach that it was appropriate to consider how we could support other stakeholders in improving safety across the built environment for the benefit of residents.

In the years that have passed since the tragic fire, BFRS has undertaken a significant amount of work to enhance how it manages the risks associated with large, complex buildings across the Service Delivery functions of prevention, protection and response.

## **Overview of Prevention Activity**

The Service recognised early on after Grenfell the impact this would have to many people living in high rise premises. We took a proactive approach in engaging residents and community groups with the offer to provide support and fire safety advice. Some of the things the Service have in place include:

- A regular programme of interventions at high-rise residential buildings is in place to provide residents with preventative advice
- Prevention staff have been provided training to recognise fire safety issues to signpost to our protection staff
- The home fire safety visit risk stratification takes account of living in high rise as a risk factor, thus escalating the likelihood of a visit in the event other vulnerabilities are present
- The Services website has information and signposting for residents living in high rise buildings and also buildings with a stay put policy
- Where a building has been identified for remediation and / or is under enforcement by BFRS, Prevention staff have attended meetings held for residents in order to provide clarity on steps they can undertake to improve their fire safety behaviours within their flats
- The system for recording Home Fire Safety Visits was updated to include prompts on specific advice to be given when completing visits in high-rise buildings

## **Overview of Protection Activity**

Across Buckinghamshire and Milton Keynes, there were a total of 46 high rise buildings which fell into scope of the building risk review programme co-ordinated by the NFCC. The Service have undertaken audit of all of these, and they now feature in our risk-based inspection programme. In support of the work to regulate these premises, the Service created the

role of Station Commander High Risk Residential Buildings, with the post holder undertaking a degree in fire engineering.

There are a number of buildings which have undertaken required works to remediate unsafe cladding and there are still some which are in the process of remediation works. Our protection team remain regularly engaged as these works progress.

In addition to maintaining our regulatory requirements in respect of audit, the Service has put in place the following:

- Fire Safety training delivered to Operational Staff to support operational response and tactical decision making in the event of fire, but also to provide education in respect of signposting non-compliance to qualified protection staff
- BFRS website providing information to both responsible persons and residents in respect of high-rise fire safety.
- Site specific risk information (SSRI) has up to date information on cladding and evacuation strategy to support operational response and tactical decision making in the event of fire

## **Overview of Response Activity**

Following the phase one report and recommendations, the NFCC established a reporting tool, which services were required to update on a 6 monthly basis. The reporting was broken down into 10 themes and contained a total of 34 actions as identified below: Appendix three in this pack provides the Services assessment that all our requirements are now complete, but with recognition that elements of operational preparedness and competence require regular testing and assurance.

- 1) Operational response fire standards (3 actions)
- 2) Materials in high rise residential buildings (7 actions)
- 3) Section 7 (2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (4 actions)
- 4) Plans (1 action)
- 5) Control and incident command communications (1 action)
- 6) Emergency calls (2 actions)
- 7) Command and control (5 actions)
- 8) Equipment (4 actions)
- 9) Evacuation (4 actions)
- 10) Co-operation between emergency services (3 actions)

The bullet points below provide a high-level indication of the operational improvements the Service has undertaken to satisfy the actions contained within the ten themes above:

- All high-rise buildings identified, updated and placed on yearly SSRI review schedule. Any new high-rise buildings to be placed as a minimum 'high' risk and current evacuation policy available to crews
- Service policies reviewed to meet requirements of GTI recommendations – several Thames Valley aligned Operational Information Notes (OINs) produced
- Creation or update to a suite of training packages for operational staff. These include packages for external wall systems (EWS), evacuation alerting systems and fires in tall buildings
- Thames Valley aligned guidance for operational roles such as Evacuation Commander
- Purchase of equipment such as loud hailers, smoke hoods, additional thermal imaging cameras (TICs) and gas monitors to support operations / tactical plan
- Promotion of premises information boxes (PIBs) / building information boxes (BIBs) and awareness for operational crews in how these can be used to support response
- A programme of operational training and assurance on high-rise procedures and knowledge covering all operational staff in the service
- Procedures to deal with Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) in place between Thames Valley Fire Control Service (TVFCS) and incident ground
- Training, assurance and exercising carried out with Thames Valley Fire Control staff in line with new national guidance
- National testing and assurance with Fire and other blue light partner control rooms
- All high-rise building risk information within 10km of neighbouring Services shared on a reciprocal basis
- Technology upgrade and refresh on Incident Command Unit (ICU)

## **Phase Two Recommendations – Understanding the impacts and requirements for BFRS**

Whereas phase one of the Grenfell inquiry focussed predominantly on the events of the night of 14 June 2017 and the operational response, phase two was intended to understand and report on the root cause issues of how Grenfell Tower came to be in a condition which allowed the fire to spread in the way it did, in a building designed to support a stay put evacuation.

As such, the key findings consider failings by multiple stakeholders including central government, the Royal Borough of Kensington and

Chelsea Council, the Building Research Establishment, Product Manufacturers and Regulatory Authorities, which includes the London Fire Brigade. The entirety of the 58 phase two recommendations can be found in appendix 2, with varying requirements for the stakeholders identified above.

Below are some of the recommendations specific to FRS and any early considerations from a BFRS perspective as to our current position and potential improvement work. It should be noted that the service has not yet undertaken an in depth assessment of the implications of the recommendations:

- 1) Fire engineers: **We also recommend** that the government, working in collaboration with industry and professional bodies, encourage the development of courses in the principles of fire engineering for construction professionals and members of the fire and rescue services as part of their continuing professional development.

***BFRS: In recognition of the likely requirements to enhance capability in this area, BFRS invested in one of our protection Station Commanders to undertake a Fire Engineering Degree, which began in 2022 and is expected to be complete in 2026.***

- 2) The Control Room: **We recommend** that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (“the Inspectorate”) inspect the LFB as soon as reasonably possible to assess and report on:
  - the extent to which the control room is now integrated into the organisation.
  - the effectiveness of the arrangements for identifying the training needs of control room staff, delivering effective training and recording its outcomes.
  - the effectiveness of the control room generally.
  - the ability of the control room to handle a large number of concurrent requests for advice and assistance from people directly affected by fires or other emergencies; and
  - the quality and effectiveness of the arrangements for communication between the control room and the incident commander.

***BFRS: These were all part of the phase one recommendations for FRS, and as such BFRS can be satisfied are adequately addressed. However, noting the integral role the control room have to play in an incident of this complexity, we***



***continue to work with TVFRS partners and TVFCS to test and assure our preparedness***

- 3) Incident Commanders: **We recommend** that as soon as reasonably possible the Inspectorate inspect the LFB to examine and report on the arrangements it has in place for assessing the training of incident commanders at all levels and their continuing competence, whether by a process of revalidation or otherwise.

***BFRS: Our incident commanders are all trained and assessed in line with national operational guidance and standards. Furthermore, all assessments are subject to skills for justice accreditation.***

- 4) Operational Planning: **We recommend** that as soon as reasonably practicable the Inspectorate inspect the LFB to examine and report on its arrangements for collecting, storing and distributing information in accordance with section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, and in particular its arrangements for identifying high-risk residential buildings and collecting, storing and distributing information relating to them.

***BFRS: These were all requirements of the phase one recommendations for FRS, and as such BFRS can be satisfied are adequately addressed. All high-rise residential buildings are regularly assessed as part of our operational risk information programme.***

- 5) Implementing Change: **We recommend** that the LFB establish effective standing arrangements for collecting, considering and effectively implementing lessons learned from previous incidents, inquests and investigations. Those arrangements should be as simple as possible, flexible and of a kind that will ensure that any appropriate changes in practice or procedure are implemented speedily.

***BFRS: whilst the Service have a reasonable level of confidence in our operational learning and assurance processes, it should be acknowledged that the HMICFRS inspection of 2023 identified an area of improvement in terms of how quickly the Service addressed lessons learned. This has been a work in progress and will be supported by the new operational learning framework.***

- 6) Communications: **We recommend** that fire and rescue services that continue to use low power intrinsically safe radios as part of

breathing apparatus consider reserving them only for situations in which there is a real risk of igniting flammable gases and generally using radios of higher power, particularly in high-rise buildings. There is strong evidence that in general digital radios are more effective than analogue radios. **We therefore recommend** that all fire and rescue services give consideration to providing all firefighters with digital radios.

**We recommend** that firefighters be trained to respond appropriately to the loss of communications and to understand how to restore them.

***BFRS: The Service have just purchased new fireground radios which will meet the requirements of tis recommendation in so far as they can operate both as analogue or digital. It is anticipated that these will be on the frontline before the end of the calendar year.***

- 7) Water: On the night of the Grenfell Tower fire firefighters were unable to distinguish between different types of hydrants. That is a clear indication of a need for better training, and **we therefore recommend** that basic training on the structure and operation of the water supply system, including the different types of hydrants in use and their functions, be given to all firefighters. Training should also be given on effective measures to increase water flow and pressure when necessary.

**We recommend** that all fire and rescue services establish and periodically review an agreed protocol with the statutory water undertakers in their areas to enable effective communication between them in relation to the supply of water for firefighting purposes.

**BFRS: The service will review our existing position in relation to the above two recommendations and assess whether we have further requirements.**

- 8) Deployment of Firefighters: **We recommend** that National Fire Chiefs Council consider whether, and if so in what circumstances, firefighters should be discouraged from departing from their instructions on their own initiative and provide appropriate training in how to respond to a situation of that kind.

**BFRS: deviating from a brief would usually be expected to be under unusual or extreme circumstances. BFRS will engage as appropriate with NFCC to identify whether we need to**

**review existing policy or training in relation to this recommendation.**

A College of Fire and Rescue: We welcome the government’s ambition to create an independent College of Fire and Rescue expressed in the white paper *Reforming our Fire and Rescue Service* and **we therefore recommend** that the government establish such a college immediately with sufficient resources to provide the following services nationally:

- practical training at all levels supplementary to that provided by individual fire and rescue services;
- education in the form of lectures and seminars on different aspects of the work of the fire and rescue services in order to share experience and promote good practice;
- research into matters that may affect the work of the fire and rescue services, including major fires;
- the development of equipment, policies and procedures suitable for ensuring the effectiveness of fire and rescue services nationally and the safety of firefighters and the public;
- setting and maintaining national standards of managerial competence for senior managers, including control room managers, and providing management training for, and regular assessment of, senior ranks by reference to such standards.

Although it is for the government to decide how the college should be constituted, **we recommend** that it should have a permanent staff of sufficient size to manage its operations and develop its functions in response to the demands of fire and rescue services nationally and the requirements of the board. The college will need access to permanent facilities, including facilities for practical training and education.

***BFRS: The Service can see there would be potential benefits from a college of fire and rescue. However, recognising that this is likely years in the making, we will expect to continue making suitable provision for the training of our staff.***

## **Protection impacts from phase two recommendations**

Whilst there are limited direct recommendations pertaining to FRS protection activity, BFRS must further consider the implications on other partners and regulators, and what role the service should play in support

of reducing risk within a complex built environment. What the Grenfell tragedy uncovered and as is clearly articulated in the phase two findings, several years of de-regulation has allowed a situation whereby the built environment contains many buildings which have not been built to adequate specification and in some cases will not behave in the case of a fire as they were expected to. Whilst Grenfell highlighted this risk dramatically in respect of tall buildings, there are many other buildings such as medium rise residential blocks of flats, care homes, supported living, etc where stay put evacuation strategies will not be suitable in keeping people safe. Both through our risk-based inspection programme and with intelligence led data from partners, we need to continue to review our legislative and community focussed requirements.

### **Governance Arrangements**

It is expected that there will be some level of national co-ordination from the NFCC in relation to the inquiry findings and recommendations, in which BFRS will of course be a willing partner. However, we will not wait to start furthering our understanding and planning of any required improvements and will establish internal governance to support required change. and be accountable. As with phase one recommendations, the fire Authority will continue to hold officers to account from a governance perspective.



# Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report Summary

## 1. Purpose

- 1.1 The purpose of this briefing is to provide a summary of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase Two report, published on 4 September 2024. This paper is a non-exhaustive summary of areas of note and recommendations for our members. The summaries below are not intended to substitute for reading the recommendations in full themselves; NFCC will be developing further work in due course in relation to the formal recommendations and to support members.

## 2. Background

- 2.1 The Inquiry was established to examine the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the fire at Grenfell Tower on the night of 14 June 2017. [Phase 1](#) focused on the factual narrative of the events on the night of 14 June 2017. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry's final hearings took place in November 2022.
- 2.2 [Phase 2](#) examines the causes of the fire, including how Grenfell Tower came to be in a condition which allowed the fire to spread in the way identified by Phase 1.

## 3. Foreword by NFCC Chair Mark Hardingham

- 3.1 The 72 people who lost their lives in the Grenfell Tower fire are at the forefront of our minds as we read the report. We thank Sir Martin Moore-Bick and his team for the diligence and persistence of the report and recommendations, which paint a clear picture of the circumstances leading to the fire. We also pay tribute to all the firefighters and emergency service workers who responded on the night.
- 3.2 This summary briefing provides an overview of the Inquiry's key findings and recommendations. We will, however, need to take time to consider and understand the report in full, and each of the recommendations, to give them our thorough consideration, and to work with Government and partners across and beyond the sector as we continue to pursue significant reform.
- 3.3 We have already seen many changes in fire and rescue services (FRSs) from the first report – issued in 2019 – and its 46 recommendations. As is made clear in the final report, we must maintain our focus on the Phase 1 recommendations as we turn to those in this final report. This includes those recommendations yet to be completed, but also to assure ourselves that those that have been completed are looked at again, with a fresh pair of eyes, and in the context of this final report. Our mission is to keep communities and firefighters safe. We are committed to delivering reform on behalf of the communities of Grenfell and across the country.

## 4. Key Findings

### Government

- 4.1 The report finds that Government had missed multiple opportunities to identify and take action to address the risks of combustible cladding and insulation. As late as 2016, Government was aware of the risks but failed to address them.
- 4.2 In 2001, a large-scale test of a system incorporating aluminium composite material (ACM) panels was undertaken. Government failed to publish the results or warn the construction industry of the risks posed by these materials.
- 4.3 The statutory guidance for the Building Regulations 2010 concerning fire safety, Approved Document B (ADB), is described as “vague and ill-considered”, perpetuated “erroneous assumption[s]”, and the official responsible for the regulations was not given “adequate oversight.” Many in the industry misunderstood the content and purpose of ADB, and the inquiry found that it was not uncommon for construction professionals to conflate compliance with ADB with compliance with the Building Regulations.
- 4.4 The report found that the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG, now MHCLG) did not treat the coroner's recommendations following Lakanal House “with a sense of urgency” and that civil servants “did not explain clearly to the Secretary of State (SoS) what steps were required to comply with them”. The report found that “the department displayed a complacent and at times defensive attitude to matters affecting fire safety” and “disregarded” fire safety in favour of a deregulatory agenda.
- 4.5 It was also during this post-Lakanal deregulatory period that “Government determinedly resisted calls from across the fire sector to regulate fire risk assessors and to amend the Fire Safety Order (FSO) to make it clear that it applied to the exterior walls of buildings containing more than one set of domestic premises”.
- 4.6 Government officials unacceptably influenced the outcome of Sir Ken Knight’s report on issues arising from the Lakanal House fire in 2009 regarding changes to the FSO and competence. This was due to the presumption that Government’s deregulation agenda meant such changes would not be approved, and resources were insufficient to support more legislation. As a result, no proposals for reform were put forward to Ministers.
- 4.7 At a 2009 Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA, now NFCC) enforcement working group meeting, it was noted that “although the department recognised that many would welcome a nationally recognised accreditation scheme for fire risk assessors, it was not something that Government intended to develop”.
- 4.8 In response to a consultation on the Fire Safety in Purpose-Built Blocks of Flats guide, CFOA stated “that not to include advice on the evacuation of disabled people was a fundamental error”. Despite this view, the drafting group did not commission research or examine ways of helping those unable to escape unaided. The CFOA response was “either considered and rejected or simply ignored”.

## **Building Research Establishment (BRE)**

- 4.9 The report found that the privatisation of BRE limited the scope of advice on fire safety matters. On occasions, it deliberately curtailed investigations before any proper conclusion had been reached.
- 4.10 BRE recognised as early as 1991 following the Knowsley Heights fire “that small-scale testing”, which provided the basis for the national standard, “did not enable a proper assessment” for how an external wall system would react to fire. However, BRE did not draw this fact to Government’s attention. The report also found that BRE failed to draw attention to the way ACM panels with unmodified polyethylene cores “behaved and the dangers [they] presented” following its large-scale test in 2001.
- 4.11 The Inquiry found BRE’s reports into three major fires (Knowsley Heights [1991], Garnock Court [1999] and the Edge [2005]), were “far from comprehensive” and that every report “failed to identify or assess important contributory factors”. This resulted in giving DCLG the false impression that “the regulations and guidance were working effectively”.
- 4.12 Weakness in the way BRE carried out tests and in its record keeping allowed it to be manipulated by “unscrupulous product manufacturers”. It found that senior BRE staff gave advice to customers, such as Kingspan and Celotex, on “the best way to satisfy the criteria for a system to be considered safe”. The accommodation (in some cases) of existing customers was at the “expense of maintaining the rigour of its processes and considerations of public safety”.

## **Product Manufacturers**

- 4.13 The report is clear that safety in the built environment depends on knowing how products and materials will react to fire. A significant reason for Grenfell Tower being clad in combustible materials was due to “systematic dishonesty” by those who made and sold rain-screen cladding and insulation products with “deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent test data and mislead the market”.
- 4.14 These strategies were successful because certification bodies “failed to ensure that the statements in their product certificates were accurate and based on test evidence”. The body with oversight of the certification bodies also failed to “apply proper standards of monitoring and supervision”.

### Arconic:

- 4.15 From 2005 until after the Grenfell Tower fire, “Arconic deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger” of its Reynobond 55 PE rainscreen product in cassette form “particularly on high-rise buildings”. This was “not an oversight” but a “deliberate strategy” to continue selling the product in the UK “based on a statement about its fire performance that it knew to be false”.
- 4.16 From early 2005, Arconic had been in possession of test data showing the cassette product “reacted to fire in a very dangerous way” and could not be classified in accordance with European Standards.
- 4.17 Despite knowledge of the danger of the product in cassette form and concerns in the construction industry around ACM, Arconic “was determined to exploit what it saw as

weak regulatory regimes” to sell the product. After cladding fires in Dubai in 2012 and 2013, they did not withdraw the product in favour of a new fire-resistant version.

#### Celotex:

- 4.18 In an attempt to break into the market of insulation suitable for high-rise buildings, Celotex embarked on a “dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market.” Celotex deliberately tested its RS5000 insulation product in 2014 “with the complicity of the BRE” in a manner to ensure it passed. It then obtained a BRE test result that omitted the use of magnesium oxide boards in the testing, rendering the report “materially incomplete and misleading”.
- 4.19 Celotex marketed the product, referring to the successful test, as acceptable for use in buildings above 18 metres. They also put (in small print) that the system test used does not test or classify individual products. From 2011, it was sold and marketed as having Class 0 fire performance though this was “false and misleading”.

#### Kingspan:

- 4.20 From 2005 until after the inquiry began, Kingspan “knowingly created a false market in insulation for use on buildings over 18 metres”. Kingspan knew its K15 product could not be sold as suitable for use in external walls of buildings over 18 metres in height.
- 4.21 Kingspan relied upon results of a single 2005 test on a system whose components were not representative of a typical external wall. It continued to rely on the test despite changing the composition of the product in 2006. Kingspan held its own concerns on the new composition’s fire performance, which tested disastrously, but did not withdraw the product.
- 4.22 Kingspan concealed from the British Board of Agrément (BBA) that the product they were selling differed from the 2005 test product. The BBA certificate contained three fire performance statements which were untrue and used a form of words suggested by Kingspan and drawn from the company's marketing literature. The re-issued 2013 certificate contained a false implication that the product was of limited combustibility.
- 4.23 Kingspan also obtained a Local Authority Building Control (LABC) certificate in 2009 containing false statements. It used the LABC certificate to “mask or distract from” the absence of supporting test evidence.
- 4.24 When Kingspan returned to testing on systems containing K15, they did not use the product which was currently on the market, yet used those results to support the sale for use on buildings over 18 metres until October 2020.

### **Regulatory Bodies and Compliance**

- 4.25 The report is clear that all of the “certification bodies that provided assurance to the market of the quality and characteristics of the products [used on and in Grenfell Tower] failed to ensure that the statements in the certificates they issued were accurate and based on appropriate and relevant test evidence.” A recurring theme throughout the report is the fundamental incompatibility and inability of Government to reconcile rigorous independent examination in the best interests of the public with the delivery of a commercial service.



### British Board of Agrément

- 4.26 The BBA, responsible for product compliance with legislation, awarded certificates of compliance to insulation products used in Grenfell Tower, and the report finds that it was neither “independent nor rigorous”. This is attributed to an “ingrained willingness to accommodate customers instead of insisting on high standards”, along with “inadequate levels of competence” among its staff.
- 4.27 The BBA’s certificates of compliance were found to contain false information and were allowed to be dictated by the manufacturers themselves. In some cases, the BBA did not even assess or test products before issuing certificates.

### Local Authority Building Control

- 4.28 LABC is responsible for verifying the compliance of construction products with the Building Regulations. The Inquiry found that it failed “to take basic steps” to ensure its compliance certificates were accurate, that it failed to properly scrutinise products, that its staff were not competent to undertake their roles, and that it was “vulnerable to manipulation”.

### National House Building Council (NHBC)

- 4.29 NHBC provided building control services to a large proportion of the construction industry. Evidence found that NHBC was “nervous” about the use of Celotex insulation in high-rise buildings, and even consulted FRSS on the issue. The report describes NHBC as “unwilling to upset its own customers”, however, and that building control bodies “preferred to co-operate with applicants...rather than enforce the Building Regulations rigorously.”

### United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS)

- 4.30 UKAS is appointed by the Government to assess and accredit organisations that provide services including certification, testing, and inspection. UKAS “relied too much on the candour and co-operation of the organisations being assessed and too much was left to trust.”

### **The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) Council and the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO)**

- 4.31 The Inquiry found that RBKC and the TMO, jointly responsible for Grenfell Tower’s fire safety management, showed “persistent indifference” to safety requirements. Residents of the tower repeatedly raised dissatisfaction with their treatment by the TMO, argued the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower (which fitted the building with combustible cladding) was mismanaged by the TMO, and that by the time of the fire relationships between the organisation and Grenfell Tower’s residents “had deteriorated to the point at which they could be described as hostile.”
- 4.32 The TMO’s Chief Executive “consistently failed” to draw attention to the London Fire Brigade’s (LFB) concerns about the tower’s failure to comply with the FSO, either to the TMO board or RBKC.
- 4.33 Despite a 2009 recommendation from an independent fire safety consultant, no fire strategy had been approved by the TMO or RBKC at the time of the fire. The TMO’s only fire assessor was not subject to “any formal selection or recruitment process.” The report

notes that LFB raised concerns about the assessor's competence, which were subsequently ignored.

- 4.34 Fire risks identified in the tower were not remedied suitably or efficiently. The "TMO had developed a huge backlog of remedial work", information about vulnerable occupants was not collected, and senior management even reduced the importance attached to certain fire safety works. The TMO did not value fire safety and the demands of managing it were seen "as an inconvenience".
- 4.35 Grenfell Tower's fire protection systems did not work effectively and were in some instances not present at all. The TMO "failed to specify the correct fire safety standard" when ordering fire protection measures despite a 2015 Enforcement Notice from LFB on the same failure in another property in the TMO's portfolio.
- 4.36 In 2010, a fire had broken out in the lobby of Grenfell Tower, but was quickly extinguished by LFB. The TMO's post-fire report, provided to the TMO board on 17 June 2010, is described by the Inquiry to have "grossly understated the extent to which smoke had spread within the tower and was seriously misleading." The spread of smoke in this fire led LFB to issue a 2014 deficiency notice to the TMO for its failure to maintain the smoke ventilation system. The system was only replaced in 2016.
- 4.37 RBKC did not have an effective emergency plan for the displacement of a large number of people, of which fire is only one hazard which might necessitate the evacuation. This is "a serious criticism of a local authority responsible for resilience".

### **London Fire Brigade**

- 4.38 The report is critical of LFB's senior leadership, noting that the "Lakanal House fire in July 2009 should have alerted the LFB to the shortcomings in its ability to fight fires in high-rise buildings... Those shortcomings could have been made good if LFB had been more effectively managed and led."
- 4.39 The Inquiry pointed to complacency and overconfidence in bodies set up to review and report on necessary changes, but monitoring did not occur to ensure changes had been fully implemented. This resulted in growing knowledge about the dangers presented by the increasing use of combustible materials not being reflected in operational policies and procedures.
- 4.40 It finds that LFB did not provide sufficient guidance or training for control room operators dealing with many concurrent calls, fire survival guidance refresher training, nor training for firefighters in dealing with uncontrolled external wall fires.
- 4.41 LFB's policies for firefighting in high-rise buildings were found not to reflect national guidance at the time, and a "well known problem" with communication equipment, which did not adequately function inside the tower, was not addressed.
- 4.42 The report also notes several instances of LFB advice that went ignored by the TMO, which "failed to give sufficient weight to the advice of the LFB". One example shows that, in 2014, LFB requested for a premises information box to be installed, which was denied by the TMO's fire assessor, and another relates to the deficiency notice given by LFB in 2016 as relating to the lack of self-closing doors.

## 5. Conclusions

- 5.1 The Inquiry found that multiple opportunities were missed by Government to highlight the risks of combustible cladding to the wider industry. Testing information was not shared and recommendations from the Lakanal House coroner were not implemented. Government's deregulation agenda combined with the culture within DCLG made addressing concerns and achieving positive change extremely difficult. To remedy this, the Inquiry has called on Government to combine and streamline its various workstreams to have one department reporting to one SoS responsible for fire safety.
- 5.2 Understanding of ADB and how to meet the Building Regulations is poor across the industry, and revisions are required to make it fit for purpose and to clarify that complying with ADB does not necessarily guarantee compliance with the Building Regulations.
- 5.3 LFB comes under criticism for not responding effectively to learning from the Lakanal House fire and other incidents and for the inadequacy of training for control rooms and incident commanders. The Inquiry recommends that HMICFRS inspect LFB to assess whether the improvements made since the Phase 1 report was published have been implemented satisfactorily.
- 5.4 Recommendations for improvement for FRSs mainly revolve around communications and the use of radios, however, the Inquiry also calls on Government to expedite the establishment of a College of Fire and Rescue. The Inquiry's envisaged role for the College goes beyond that outlined in the White Paper, recommending access to physical premises with a role for providing training as well as monitoring standards and research.
- 5.5 Much greater importance has been placed on the importance of fire engineering as a discipline. Several recommendations call for new steps of the building safety regime to be carried out by fire engineers, and call on Government and the wider industry to formalise and increase the number of people entering the profession and improve knowledge across the sector, particularly for senior FRS staff, through new CPD courses.
- 5.6 Almost all of those involved in the design, build and sign-off of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment come under heavy criticism for immoral business practices and the "merry-go-round of buck-passing" famously stated by Richard Millett KC during the Inquiry. To address this, the Inquiry calls on Government to establish a new Construction Regulator and Chief Construction Adviser to oversee the industry, new licensing and accreditation schemes for professionals in the design and build process, and a fundamental review of the Building Control model including the role of commercial incentives. It does, however, note that a single regulator may not "solve the problem because the system will still depend on the effectiveness of the conformity assessment bodies and the limited oversight of UKAS."
- 5.7 The Inquiry criticises the support provided to Grenfell Tower survivors and other local community members affected by the fire, and calls on the Government to reform the Civil Contingencies Act and on local authorities and other Category 1 responders to improve preparedness, response and recovery activities, including improvements to training, guidance and procedures.

## 6. Recommendations

This section lists the 58 Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 recommendations as they appear in the final report.

### Regulation

**We recommend** that the government draw together under a single regulator all the functions relating to the construction industry to which we have referred.

**We recommend** that the definition of a higher-risk building for the purposes of the Building Safety Act be reviewed urgently.

### Government

**We recommend** that the government bring responsibility for the functions relating to fire safety currently exercised by MHCLG, the Home Office and the Department for Business and Trade into one department under a single Secretary of State.

### Chief Construction Adviser

**We recommend** that the Secretary of State appoint a Chief Construction Adviser with a sufficient budget and staff to provide advice on all matters affecting the construction industry, including:

- monitoring all aspects of the department's work relating to the Building Regulations and statutory guidance;
- providing advice to the Secretary of State on request; and
- bringing to the attention of the Secretary of State any matters affecting the Building Regulations and statutory guidance or matters affecting the construction industry more generally of which the government should be aware

### Legislation and Guidance

Approved Document B must then be kept under continuous review, together with the other Approved Documents, and amended annually or promptly whenever developments in materials or building methods make that desirable. It should be drafted conservatively to ensure, as far as possible, that compliance with it will provide a high degree of confidence that on completion of the work the building will comply with the Building Regulations. **We therefore recommend** that the statutory guidance generally, and Approved Document B in particular, be reviewed accordingly and a revised version published as soon as possible.

It is understandable that those who turn to the guidance for advice about how to comply with the Building Regulations should be tempted to treat it as if it were definitive, but that is a danger that the Secretary of State needs to recognise and guard against. **We therefore recommend** that a revised version of the guidance contain a clear warning in each section that the legal requirements are contained in the Building Regulations and that compliance with the guidance will not necessarily result in compliance with them.

ADB proceeds on the assumption that effective compartmentation renders a stay put strategy an appropriate response to a fire in a flat in a high-rise residential building. New materials and methods of construction and the practice of overcladding existing buildings make the existence

of effective compartmentation a questionable assumption and **we recommend** that it be reconsidered when Approved Document B is revised.

A stay put strategy in response to a compartment fire will be acceptable only if there is negligible risk of fire escaping into and spreading through the external wall. Calculating the likely rate of fire spread and the time required for evacuation, including the evacuation of those with physical or mental impairments, are matters for a qualified fire engineer. We do not think that it would be helpful to attempt to include in Approved Document B an indication of what would be acceptable because each building is different, but **we recommend** that the guidance draw attention to the need to make a calculation of that kind.

**We recommend** that, as far as possible, membership of bodies advising on changes to the statutory guidance should include representatives of the academic community as well as those with practical experience of the industry (including fire engineers) chosen for their experience and skill and should extend beyond those who have served on similar bodies in the past.

### **Fire Safety Strategy**

**We recommend** that it be made a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer (see below) to be submitted with building control applications (at Gateway 2) for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion (Gateway 3). Such a strategy must take into account the needs of vulnerable people, including the additional time they may require to leave the building or reach a place of safety within it and any additional facilities necessary to ensure their safety.

### **Fire Performance Tests**

As is apparent from the experiments conducted by Professor Bisby and Professor Torero for Phase 2 of our investigations, the factors that affect the way in which fire spreads over ventilated rainscreen external wall systems are complex and understanding them is an evolving science. Intuitive judgements are often wrong because a small change in the system can have a significant effect on the outcome. It follows that assessing whether an external wall system can support a particular evacuation strategy is difficult because the necessary information is not always available. **We therefore recommend** that steps be taken in conjunction with the professional and academic community to develop new test methods that will provide the information needed for such assessments to be carried out reliably.

In the light of Professor Torero's evidence we think that BS 9414 will encourage people who are not trained fire engineers to think that they can safely assess the performance of a proposed external wall system by extrapolation from information obtained from tests on one or more different systems. For the reasons given by Professor Torero we think that BS 9414 should be approached with caution and **we recommend** that the government make it clear that it should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer.

### **Certification of Products and Certification of Test Data**

**We recommend** that the construction regulator should be responsible for assessing the conformity of construction products with the requirements of legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards and issuing certificates as appropriate.

In our view clarity is required to avoid those who rely on certificates of conformity being misled.

**We therefore recommend:**

- that copies of all test results supporting any certificate issued by the construction regulator be included in the certificate;
- that manufacturers be required to provide the construction regulator with the full testing history of the product or material to which the certificate relates and inform the regulator of any material circumstances that may affect its performance; and
- manufacturers be required by law to provide on request copies of all test results that support claims about fire performance made for their products.

**Fire Engineers**

**We recommend** that the profession of fire engineer be recognised and protected by law and that an independent body be established to regulate the profession, define the standards required for membership, maintain a register of members and regulate their conduct.

In order to speed up the creation of a body of professional fire engineers **we also recommend** that the government take urgent steps to increase the number of places on high-quality masters level courses in fire engineering accredited by the professional regulator.

**We recommend** that the government convene a group of practitioner and academic fire engineers and such other professionals as it thinks fit to produce an authoritative statement of the knowledge and skills to be expected of a competent fire engineer.

**We also recommend** that the government, working in collaboration with industry and professional bodies, encourage the development of courses in the principles of fire engineering for construction professionals and members of the fire and rescue services as part of their continuing professional development.

**Architects**

We recognise that both the Architects Registration Board and the Royal Institute of British Architects have taken steps since the Grenfell Tower fire to improve the education and training of architects. **We recommend** that they should review the changes already made to ensure they are sufficient in the light of our findings.

**We also recommend** that it be made a statutory requirement that an application for building control approval in relation to the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer under the Building Safety Act 2022 that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be as safe as is required by the Building Regulations.

**Contractors**

**We recommend** that a licensing scheme operated by the construction regulator be introduced for principal contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings and that it be a legal requirement that any application for building control approval for the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor to take all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is as safe as is required by the Building Regulations.

## **Building Control**

**We recommend** that the government appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process.

**We recommend** that the same panel consider whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority.

## **A Construction Library**

Those who design buildings, particularly higher-risk and complex buildings, would benefit from having access to a body of information, such as data from tests on products and materials, reports on serious fires and academic papers. In Chapter 112 we have referred to the Cladding Materials Library set up by the University of Queensland, which could form the basis of a valuable source of information for designers of buildings in general. **We recommend** that the construction regulator sponsor the development of a similar library, perhaps as part of a joint project with the University of Queensland, to provide a continuing resource for designers.

## **Response to Recommendations**

**We recommend** that it be made a legal requirement for the government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners and public inquiries together with a description of the steps taken in response. If the government decides not to accept a recommendation, it should record its reasons for doing so. Scrutiny of its actions should be a matter for Parliament, to which it should be required to report annually.

## **Fire Risk Assessors**

**We recommend** that the government establish a system of mandatory accreditation to certify the competence of fire risk assessors by setting standards for qualification and continuing professional development and such other measures as may be considered necessary or desirable. We think it necessary for an accreditation system to be mandatory in order to ensure the competence of all those who offer their services as fire risk assessors.

## **Fire Control Switches in Lifts**

We are not in a position to determine whether greater standardisation of fire control switches and keys is required. **We therefore recommend** that the government seeks urgent advice from the Building Safety Regulator and the National Fire Chiefs Council on the nature and scale of the problem and the appropriate response to it.

## **Pipeline Isolation Valves**

Pipeline isolation valves are a critical part of the gas distribution network because they are intended to enable the supply of gas to be shut off quickly in an emergency. At the time of the fire at Grenfell Tower the valves could not be operated because they had been covered over in the course of hard landscaping. There was evidence that it was a common problem in the industry for pipeline isolation valves to be lost in that way. In our view that poses an unacceptable risk to health and safety and could have significant consequences. **We therefore recommend** that every gas transporter be required by law to check the accessibility of each such valve on its system at least once every three years and to report the results of that inspection to the Health and Safety Executive as part of its gas safety case review

## **A College of Fire and Rescue**

We welcome the government's ambition to create an independent College of Fire and Rescue expressed in the white paper *Reforming our Fire and Rescue Service* and **we therefore recommend** that the government establish such a college immediately with sufficient resources to provide the following services nationally:

- practical training at all levels supplementary to that provided by individual fire and rescue services;
- education in the form of lectures and seminars on different aspects of the work of the fire and rescue services in order to share experience and promote good practice;
- research into matters that may affect the work of the fire and rescue services, including major fires;
- the development of equipment, policies and procedures suitable for ensuring the effectiveness of fire and rescue services nationally and the safety of firefighters and the public;
- setting and maintaining national standards of managerial competence for senior managers, including control room managers, and providing management training for, and regular assessment of, senior ranks by reference to such standards.

Although it is for the government to decide how the college should be constituted, **we recommend** that it should have a permanent staff of sufficient size to manage its operations and develop its functions in response to the demands of fire and rescue services nationally and the requirements of the board. The college will need access to permanent facilities, including facilities for practical training and education.

## **The Control Room**

**We recommend** that His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services ("the Inspectorate") inspect the LFB as soon as reasonably possible to assess and report on:

- the extent to which the control room is now integrated into the organisation;
- the effectiveness of the arrangements for identifying the training needs of control room staff, delivering effective training and recording its outcomes;
- the effectiveness of the control room generally;
- the ability of the control room to handle a large number of concurrent requests for advice and assistance from people directly affected by fires or other emergencies; and
- the quality and effectiveness of the arrangements for communication between the control room and the incident commander.

## **Incident Commanders**

**We recommend** that as soon as reasonably possible the Inspectorate inspect the LFB to examine and report on the arrangements it has in place for assessing the training of incident commanders at all levels and their continuing competence, whether by a process of revalidation or otherwise.

## **Operational Planning**

**We recommend** that as soon as reasonably practicable the Inspectorate inspect the LFB to examine and report on its arrangements for collecting, storing and distributing information in



accordance with section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, and in particular its arrangements for identifying high-risk residential buildings and collecting, storing and distributing information relating to them.

### **Implementing Change**

**We recommend** that the LFB establish effective standing arrangements for collecting, considering and effectively implementing lessons learned from previous incidents, inquests and investigations. Those arrangements should be as simple as possible, flexible and of a kind that will ensure that any appropriate changes in practice or procedure are implemented speedily.

### **Communications**

**We recommend** that fire and rescue services that continue to use low power intrinsically safe radios as part of breathing apparatus consider reserving them only for situations in which there is a real risk of igniting flammable gases and generally using radios of higher power, particularly in high-rise buildings.

There is strong evidence that in general digital radios are more effective than analogue radios.

**We therefore recommend** that all fire and rescue services give consideration to providing all firefighters with digital radios.

**We recommend** that firefighters be trained to respond appropriately to the loss of communications and to understand how to restore them.

### **Water**

On the night of the Grenfell Tower fire firefighters were unable to distinguish between different types of hydrant. That is a clear indication of a need for better training and **we therefore recommend** that basic training on the structure and operation of the water supply system, including the different types of hydrants in use and their functions, be given to all firefighters. Training should also be given on effective measures to increase water flow and pressure when necessary.

**We recommend** that all fire and rescue services establish and periodically review an agreed protocol with the statutory water undertakers in their areas to enable effective communication between them in relation to the supply of water for firefighting purposes.

**We recommend** that the British Standards Institution amend BS 750 to include a description of the circumstances under which the flow coefficient to which it refers in paragraph 10.2 is to be measured.

### **Deployment of Firefighters**

**We recommend** that National Fire Chiefs Council consider whether, and if so in what circumstances, firefighters should be discouraged from departing from their instructions on their own initiative and provide appropriate training in how to respond to a situation of that kind.

### **The Civil Contingencies Act 2004**

The government's powers in sections 5 and 7 of the Act to intervene in response to an emergency are far-reaching but they do not enable it to intervene promptly or decisively when a Category 1 responder is failing to rise to the challenge. **We therefore recommend** that the Act

be reviewed and consideration be given to granting a designated Secretary of State the power to carry out the functions of a Category 1 responder in its place for a limited period of time.

The response of local voluntary organisations to the disaster demonstrated their capacity to act as valuable partners in responding to an emergency. Regulation 23 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 requires a Category 1 responder to have regard when making its plans to the activities of relevant voluntary organisations. **We therefore recommend** that the regulation be amended to require Category 1 responders to establish and maintain partnerships with the voluntary, community and faith organisations in the areas in which they are responsible for preparing for and responding to emergencies.

### **Guidance**

The current guidance on preparing for emergencies is contained in several documents, all of which are unduly long and in some respects out of date. **We recommend** that the guidance be revised, reduced in length and consolidated in one document which lays greater emphasis on the need for those leading the response to consider the requirements for recovery, the need to identify vulnerable people, the importance of identifying and ensuring co-operation with voluntary, community and faith groups and is consistent with the Equality Act 2010.

**We also recommend** that regard for humanitarian considerations be expressly recognised by making it the ninth principle of effective response and recovery.

### **London Local Authority Gold Arrangements**

Events demonstrated that there is a need for a clearer understanding of the nature of the London Gold arrangements, in particular in situations in which a single borough is affected. **We therefore recommend** that the guidance on the operation of those arrangements be revised and that existing and newly appointed chief executives be given regular training to ensure they are familiar with its principles.

### **Local Resilience Forums**

**We recommend** that local resilience forums adopt national standards to ensure effective training, preparation and planning for emergencies and adopt independent auditing schemes to identify deficiencies and secure compliance.

**We also recommend** that a mechanism be introduced for independently verifying the frequency and quality of training provided by local authorities and other Category 1 responders.

### **Local Authorities**

**We recommend** that local authorities train all their employees, including chief executives, to regard resilience as an integral part of their responsibilities.

RBKC had no effective means of collecting and recording information about those who had been displaced from the tower and surrounding buildings, including those who were missing. Compiling reliable information of that kind is difficult and the challenges likely to be faced by local authority Category 1 responders will vary according to the nature of the emergency. **We recommend** that all local authorities devise methods of obtaining and recording information of that kind, if possible in electronic form, and practise putting them into operation under a variety of different circumstances.

Any local authority is likely to have difficulty finding temporary accommodation for a very large number of displaced persons but the need to do so should be recognised and contingency plans drawn up. **We recommend** that all local authorities make such arrangements as are reasonably practicable for enabling them to place people in temporary accommodation at short notice and in ways that meet their personal, religious and cultural requirements. Such arrangements should, as far as possible, involve local providers of social housing.

**We recommend** that all local authorities include in their contingency plans arrangements for providing immediate financial assistance to people affected by an emergency.

**We also recommend** that as part of their planning for emergencies local authorities give detailed consideration to the availability of key workers and the role they are expected to play so that suitable contingency arrangements can be made to ensure, as far as possible, continuity of support.

**We recommend** that as part of their emergency planning local authorities make effective arrangements for continuing communication with those who need assistance using the most suitable technology and a range of languages appropriate to the area.

**We recommend** that all local authorities include in their plans for responding to emergencies arrangements for providing information to the public by whatever combination of modern methods of communication are likely to be most effective for the areas for which they are responsible.

In future, to avoid confusion, wasted effort and frustration **we also recommend** that what in the past has been called by the police a “casualty bureau” be described in a way that makes it clear that it does not provide information to the public about people affected by the emergency.

### **Vulnerable People**

**We recommend** that further consideration be given to the recommendations made in the Phase 1 report in the light of our findings in this report.

**We also recommend** that the advice contained in paragraph 79.11 of the LGA (*Fire Safety in Purpose-Built Blocks of Flats*) Guide be reconsidered

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## Appendix 3 – NFCC GTI Phase One Tracker (September 2024)




**NFCC**  
National Fire  
Chiefs Council

### Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations progress tracker

Data provided by:	
Fire and Rescue Service	Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service

Theme	Number of actions				Chart
	Complete	In progress	Unknown (likely post April 2023)	Not started	
Operational Response Fire Standards	3	0	0	0	
Materials in high rise residential buildings	7	0	0	0	
Section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004	4	0	0	0	
Plans	1	0	0	0	
Control and incident command communications	1	0	0	0	
Emergency calls	2	0	0	0	
Command and control	5	0	0	0	
Equipment	4	0	0	0	
Evacuation	4	0	0	0	
Co-operation between emergency services	3	0	0	0	
Total	34	0	0	0	



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